The use of prior conduct and convictions in criminal proceedings
has been a controversial issue for over a hundred years. Rarely
does a year go by without another call from lawmakers or
prominent citizens for prior convictions and ‘history’ to be made
available to tribunals to resolve issues of guilt. Yet the debate
seems to have reached an impasse, with the proponents of either
side facing off at 20 paces, armed only with the familiar
arguments that have failed to prevail in the past. The lack of
resolution in the debate suggests that it needs to be reframed.
The present article proposes a perspective based on broader
scientific methodology, analysing factual decisions in a criminal
trial as a form of probabilistic argument. The psychology of
probabilistic reasoning is examined with a focus on the effect of
attributional information on judgments of probability. The logical
structures of factual reasoning about disposition, tendency, similar
facts and coincidence are then put under the microscope to
expose some new arguments, some weaknesses in old arguments,
and some quantitative relations that affect probability judgments
in this area.