Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach for non-human species: A preliminary critique

Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach for non-human species has been cited as a promising alternative approach to law and public policy dealing with animals. The capabilities approach is a set of political principles, expressed as ten core entitlements. Although initially developed to allow the voices of women to be heard in the global development agenda, more recently, Nussbaum has adapted the capabilities approach as a framework for human obligations towards other species. To this end, the capabilities approach for non-human species seeks to encompass non-human species as primary subjects of justice. In Nussbaum's approach, the notion of justice for non-human species is based on dignity and Aristotelian notions of flourishing and 'the good life'. This paper critically analyses Nussbaum's claim for justice for animals. As background, relevant aspects of utilitarian and social contract theory are discussed. The capabilities approach for non-human species is described and examined against Nussbaum's claim of justice for animals. The question whether the capabilities approach goes beyond animal rights or utilitarian approaches to the well-being of animals is considered. Two of the ten capabilities approach entitlements, 'life' and 'bodily health', provide a starting point for discussion. The paper concludes by presenting a set of principles, drawn from Nussbaum's and other work, which might underpin an Australian law and policy dealing with animal protection and well-being.