Increasing environmental outcomes with conservation tenders_ The participation challenge.pdf (1 MB)
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Increasing environmental outcomes with conservation tenders: The participation challenge

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journal contribution
posted on 22.06.2022, 02:19 authored by John RolfeJohn Rolfe, Steven Schilizzi, Md Sayed Iftekhar
Incentive payments to landholders have become increasingly popular as mechanisms to achieve conservation goals. Within these mechanisms economists commonly recommend competitive tenders over fixed rate payment schemes because (a) specialist knowledge of landholders about their own enterprises and costs can be utilized, (b) auction prices are more likely to reflect the marginal value of the resources being used to produce the environmental outcome, and (c) the scope for rent seeking is reduced by competition between landholders. Yet there is very little uptake of conservation tenders as agrienvironmental schemes, potentially because of the difficulties in generating sufficient levels of landholder participation to make tenders effective. In this paper we summarize the efficiency benefits of using competitive tenders, analyze reasons why participation rates may be so low, and suggest potential mechanisms to address this.

History

Start Page

1

End Page

9

Number of Pages

9

eISSN

1755-263X

ISSN

1755-263X

Publisher

Wiley Open Access

Additional Rights

CC BY 4.0

Language

en

Peer Reviewed

Yes

Open Access

Yes

Acceptance Date

26/11/2021

External Author Affiliations

University of Western Australia; Griffith University

Era Eligible

Yes

Journal

Conservation Letters

Article Number

e12856

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