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Concurrent legal interpretation versus moderate intentionalism

journal contribution
posted on 06.12.2017, 00:00 authored by Christopher WalshawChristopher Walshaw
In a previous article I introduced the case for concurrent interpretation of legal texts that is that meaning is found in application and not in advance of application. As a counterpoint I examined and challenged the intentionalist thesis propounded by Stanley Fish and some others of the originalist position. That article was incomplete in two essential matters and the purpose of this article is to (i) examine and challenge the case for moderate intentionalism as opposed to the case for the strong intentionalism propounded by Fish and (ii) further explain the practical work of concurrent interpretation. It will be seen that these two tasks overlap and inform each other. The recent and much discussed case of Yemshaw provides a leitmotif and so the article seeks to contribute to the extensive discussion of that case and so-called interpetative ‘updating’ as well.

History

Volume

35

Issue

3

Start Page

244

End Page

260

Number of Pages

17

eISSN

1464-3863

ISSN

0144-3593

Location

Oxford

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Language

en-aus

Peer Reviewed

Yes

Open Access

No

External Author Affiliations

School of Business and Law (2013- ); TBA Research Institute;

Era Eligible

Yes

Journal

Statute law review.