How transparency is constrained by privacy and secrecy

There is a fashion for transparency and yet transparency is not an unalloyed good. On the one hand, limits are placed on it by privacy and secrecy and on the other transparency can be employed to mislead. This paper is concerned with the distinctions and similarities between the concepts of transparency, secrecy and privacy, with the intention or hope that a closer understanding of the circumstances under which privacy and secrecy should be a proper limit to transparency might restrain those who otherwise might unwittingly legislate or regulate for transparency without understanding the potential dangers. It considers the development of the scope of each concept over time, and their potentially perverse manifestations. We argue that despite the many purposes for which privacy, transparency and secrecy are employed, these uses can be placed into two categories, those based on instrumental or utilitarian claims, and those based on respect for persons or virtue. This classification can be, we believe, a useful aid when considering the extent to which transparency should be constrained by privacy or secrecy.