DEVELOPMENTALISM AND THE POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT PROJECT:
A FOUCAULTIAN APPROACH TO SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE OPERATION OF POWER THROUGH DEVELOPMENT

by Morgan James Brigg

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Central Queensland University
School of Psychology and Sociology
Faculty of Arts, Health and Sciences
Rockhampton
Australia

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This thesis undertakes two principal tasks in relation to postwar efforts to develop the Third World. The first of these is to explore "developmentalism" as a historically and culturally contingent conceptualisation of social change in order to map the location of development efforts. By drawing primarily on the work of Michel Foucault, I argue that developmentalism emerges in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century through intertwined relations of knowledge, power, governing and the constitution of the Western subject. This cultural-historical approach demonstrates that considerations of development efforts should not accord developmentalism, nor the economic relations and concepts which are central to it, their widely-held a priori status.

Following from this requirement, the second major task taken up in this thesis involves extending current critical approaches by elaborating a Foucaultian framework for analysis of the emergence and operation of the postwar development project. This methodological approach, based on Foucault's notion of dispositif and his analytic of power, foregrounds relations of power without eliding complexity, resorting to an aggregated view of power, or reducing relations of power to economic relations.

Through a macro-level application of Foucault's notion of normalisation, I show that, in the early decades of the development project, the Third World is "normalised" to the standard of economic growth and development embodied by the United States. In considering the current neoliberal conjuncture and the reconfiguration of development efforts in approximately the past two decades, the analytical framework of the dispositif enables analysis of the rise of notions of autonomy and empowerment, the emergence of the microcredit movement and the shift to sustainable development without pre-judging the power effects of these changes. My analysis of participation, empowerment and self-regulation, and the accompanying reconfiguration of development, reveals a shifting operation of power in which subjectification and developmentalist conceptualisations are central. This thesis advances an alternative interpretive framework for the study of development efforts and identifies key contemporary political sites for consideration by development practitioners and scholars.
DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis does not incorporate any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made in the text.

Signature ....................................

Date .......................................
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ACRONYMS

Acronyms used in this thesis are introduced throughout, but I also include the full list here as a single point of reference for the reader.

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSD</td>
<td>Commission for Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDs</td>
<td>Executive Directors (of the World Bank)</td>
</tr>
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<td>EDI</td>
<td>Economic Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPZ</td>
<td>Export Processing Zone</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IISD</td>
<td>International Institute for Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>The World Conservation Union (orig. International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCS</td>
<td>Microcredit Summit Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICs</td>
<td>Newly-Industrialising Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRT</td>
<td>State Railways of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Trans-National Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCED</td>
<td>World Commission on Environment and Development</td>
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<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wide Fund for Nature</td>
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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

My use of the terms "Third World", "First World", and "the West" throughout this thesis requires explanation. I am acutely aware of the shortcomings of these terms, including their unwarranted homogenisation and aggregation of difference, the accompanying reification of conceptually flawed categories and their role in a popular understanding that the people who live in the "Third World" and outside "the West" or "First World" are somehow lesser. There are two reasons for my decision to continue to make use of them in this thesis. First, I am concerned that while the substitution of more politically appropriate terms, such as "Majority World" and "Minority World" instead of "Third World" and "First World", may reverse the aforementioned hierarchal implications, this move away from convention would soon become tedious for the reader without enhancing clarity. Second, the exploratory nature of this thesis requires that I make use of such aggregations. The problems associated with these terms are mitigated by my mindfulness of their inadequacies and my intention that the approach adopted here be a basis for my pursuit of less aggregated research in the future.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks are due to Dr Aminul Faraizi, Dr Jim McAllister and Dr Bert Wigman for supervisory assistance with this project. Aminul has given support and intellectual guidance throughout and has remained committed to the project through various changes; Jim provided assistance and support in the earlier stages; and Bert has contributed in the later part of my candidature. I want to particularly thank Bert for agreeing to enter the project part way through, and for the thoroughness of his supervision. His considered approach has been a valuable antidote to my sometimes wayward enthusiasm, and he has been both demanding and encouraging as the situation required. Numerous other people have also contributed over the course of this project by providing various levels and types of support. In some cases these contributions might be regarded as minor; they may have been as simple as a few words of encouragement. Nevertheless, these and longer-term forms of support were always bound with some form of companionship without which this project could not have been completed. I therefore want to thank Clyde Allen, Abul Bhuiyan, Pat Goon, Mark Hancock, Vaughan Higgins, Liz Hills, Simon Kitto, Kristen Lyons, Brendan Murphy, Tony Schirato, Jen Webb, Catherine Mills and Paula Turnbull. I particularly want to thank Catherine and Paula for their longstanding friendship, intellectual and emotional support and unfaltering faith in my capacity to complete this project.
Chapter One: Introduction: Approaching the Postwar Development Project

In Mexico, you must be either numb or very rich if you fail to notice that 'development' stinks (Esteva 1987:135).

[How do you see change ... if you link it with the themes of meaning, project, origin and return, constituent subject, in short with the entire thematic that ensures for history the universal presence of the Logos? [Why do] ... you analyse it in accordance with dynamic, biological, evolutionist metaphors...? ... What is that fear which makes you seek ... the great historicotranscendental destiny of the Occident? (Foucault 1972:209-210).

These provocative enunciations belong to different yet overlapping registers. On the count of difference, Gustavo Esteva is referring to the ensemble of institutions, resource flows, projects and practices which have emerged since World War Two and are geared toward "developing" the nation-states of the Third World, while Michel Foucault is challenging the tradition of the human sciences in the West by sparring with an imaginary interlocutor about Western conceptualisations of change. Esteva's statement presents most obviously as that of an activist by pointing to what are, for him, the inequalities and injustices perpetrated in the name of development. Foucault's questions are less overtly political: themes such as the status of meaning, the human subject and the nature of history speak more to the preoccupations of the contemporary social sciences and humanities than to protest against development.

Equally though, by challenging either development or developmentalist conceptualisations, both enunciations derive their provocative effect from a common source: they both challenge a "sacred cow" of the socio-cultural identity of the West. Foucault's challenge to Western biological and evolutionist conceptualisations of change and the "great historicotranscendental destiny of the Occident" indicates that for him developmentalist conceptualisations of change carry a powerful politics; he is clearly suggesting that the way the West conceptualises change is important to its relation with itself and other cultures. Whether manifest as the ensemble of institutions, projects and practices which constitute the effort to "develop" the Third World or as a conceptualisation of change, development(ali)sm is political.
The following thesis fuses the critical intent of these enunciations by locating postwar development efforts on a cultural-historical "grid of intelligibility" (Foucault 1981:93), and elaborating an interpretive framework for the analysis of relations of power and governance through development. While such an effort is necessarily theoretical and historical, it does not seek to establish a "theory of development" nor to locate the current conjuncture as the inevitable outcome of a unilinear historical process. Instead the aim is to deploy theory and analysis to contribute to the destabilisation of development by demonstrating its historically specific and contingent nature. This provides a basis for further research and serves as part of an effort to open ourselves, as development scholars and practitioners, to different professional modalities and futures.

Overview of Thesis

The thesis is organised as follows:

Chapter One: Introduction: Approaching the Postwar Development Project

In order to introduce the thesis and elaborate its major dimensions, the current chapter provides a brief overview of development studies before positioning the thesis in relation to contemporary theoretical groupings. In particular, I orient this thesis in relation to two sets of critics: those who centre economic relations more or less explicitly as part of their work; and those who contribute to the anti- or post-development critique which has emerged over approximately the past decade. Through this discussion I cover various theoretical and methodological points which are important to my efforts in the rest of the thesis. Finally, this chapter also serves to outline the major arguments of the thesis.

Chapter Two: Locating Contemporary Developmentalism and the Postwar Development Project

This chapter locates the transformation and expansion of developmentalist discourse at the beginning of the modern era on a grid of intelligibility of relations of knowledge, power and subjectivity partly informed by the colonial situation. Beginning with relations of knowledge, I argue that the directional, cumulative and teleological conceptualisation of change, and
the accompanying centrality of labour, production and economic relations, do not emerge out of the discovery of an autonomous or natural domain, but rather through the relationship Europeans negotiate with their world through new forms of knowledge. I then concretise this argument by explicating the simultaneous emergence of contemporary relations of power and governance which maintain a mutually conditioning relation with forms of knowledge. This involves a discussion of the rise of a productive modality of power in Europe, contrasting with the sovereign modality of colonial power. In the latter section of this chapter I establish a methodological framework for considering the deployment of developmentalism and the operation of power through the postwar development project by drawing upon and elaborating Foucault's notions of systems of dispersion and the dispositif, and his analytic of power.

Chapter Three: From Colonial Power-Knowledge to the Development Dispositif and the Normalisation of the Third World

In this chapter I begin by briefly discussing the differential deployment of developmentalism in the colonial context, before turning to the formation of the postwar development dispositif and the normalisation of the Third World. I argue that an international development dispositif emerges with the proliferation of nation-states out of the former colonies, the rise of international institutions, and the emergence of developmentalist discourse in relation to the ex-colonies. These phenomena result in the emergence of an international developmentalist whole, and therefore a basis for an operation of normalisation. Through the proliferation of developmentalist social science and accompanying development programs and projects, Third World nation-states and subjects are distributed and regulated against the norm of development signified by the West and embodied by the United States. Central to this process, particularly in the early decades of the development project, are the nation-state and a dominant economism. In the last section of the chapter I consider the World Bank as a leading international development institution. While the operation of power in the development dispositif is not undifferentiated, the power exercised by organisations such as the Bank rests upon a multiplicity of power relations dispersed throughout the dispositif. Throughout this chapter I illustrate the value of the dispositif as a framework which allows
the study of particular loci in development efforts without eliding the complexity and interrelatedness of the development project.

**Chapter Four: The Changing Development Dispositif**

The central topic of this chapter is the major reconfiguration of the development *dispositif*, and the accompanying relations of power and governance, from the late 1970s. The Foucaultian interpretive grid elaborated to this point allows the drawing out of the continuities and discontinuities with the earlier *dispositif* in a way which does not preconfigure the power effects of the recent rise of NGOs, notions of empowerment and autonomy, the microcredit movement and sustainable development. While I argue that such shifts have some potential to disrupt dominant developmentalism, they also reconfigure the operation of power and governing in ways which are both similar to and different from earlier operations. In the overall reconfiguration of power and governing in a neoliberal climate, processes of subjectification and self-regulation through notions of autonomy, empowerment and participation emerge as the most salient differences with the earlier development *dispositif*. Together with the ongoing renegotiation of development through the notion of sustainability, they are also critical sites for contemporary development studies and practice.

**Chapter Five: Conclusion and Further Implications**

In this final chapter of the thesis, I draw together a number of themes and sets of implications. A recapitulation of my arguments regarding the cultural specificity of developmentalism serves to both highlight the inadequacy of critical approaches which centre economic relations in the consideration of social change, and to identify an alternative critical strategy which does not appropriate more power than necessary to carry out the critical function. Such a strategy involves the identification of a modest and located place for theory and the critic, an engagement with our developmentalist cultural tradition, and recognition that contemporary developmentalism and power are synthetically bound. As a valuable interpretive and analytical framework, the notion of *dispositif* not only provides a critical understanding of relations of power through development but also allows the identification of important political sites of
contestation in the reinvention of development. In summarising earlier discussion, I argue that in the current neoliberal conjuncture, the terrain of subjectification, initiatives such as microcredit and NGO practices surrounding empowerment and participation deserve to be considered as important political sites by scholars and practitioners of development.

**Early Development Studies**

The development project emerged in the complex international political and social milieu of the early post-World War Two period. At least two currents are identifiable in this conjuncture: first, the standard of living of the West, which had been denied to colonial subjects under colonialism, emerged as a powerful basis of Third World nationalisms as colonial empires declined; second, in a climate of superpower rivalry, assistance to strategically positioned countries was overtly pursued. In this context a wide range of international, governmental and private agencies - from the United Nations to rice research institutes, educational and research institutions, national planning ministries, agencies for the administration of foreign aid and philanthropic foundations - pursued policies, programs and projects directed toward increasing economic growth and social change in the "underdeveloped areas" of the world.

In this early conjuncture, the vast bulk of social science was either descriptive or technical: it was taken for granted that development was a good thing and that the role of the social scientist was to theorise it, map its progress, and "make it work". Frequently termed modernisation theory, the dominant effort of the 1950s-60s typologised societies as either "pre-modern" or "modern" (with the former *en route* to the latter). It focused on the national developmental state and the factors internal to it rather than international relations, and was heavily economistic. Through

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1 In his role of speaking about American interests in relation to the economic development of the 'underdeveloped countries', Jacob Viner (1952:175) opened a contribution to a series of lectures at the University of Chicago in 1951 by intimating that:

the first interest ... and the one ... which is going to be given major weight ... will be the security interests of the United States. We are seeking willing and strong allies. We are seeking the maintenance and development of overseas sources of strategically important raw materials.

modernisation theory, economics took and has subsequently retained the dominant disciplinary position in development studies. (See Meier and Seers [1984] for a series of reflections by prominent early development economists).

Following its early dominance, modernisation theory was challenged by Marxist-influenced dependency theory, which emerged initially in the Latin American countries in the 1950s and 1960s. (Compare Hulme and Turner [1990], David Harrison [1988], and Andrew Webster [1990] for a more detailed but introductory discussion of modernisation and dependency theories). Coming to prominence in the 1970s, dependency theory took issue with the modernisation theorists' assumption of the independent nature of nation-states, arguing that the status of dominant (First World) and dependent (Third World) countries was an effect of the capitalist system. In their view, the underdevelopment of the Third World results from the plundering of its economic surplus in a contradictory international capitalist system, rather than being an original state of affairs. Under the broad influence of dependency theory, the related modes of production and world systems theories emerged in the 1970s. (For an overview of these theories, see Frans Schuurman [1993:6-9]).

While these theories offered both a critique of the assumptions of unilinear social change along the lines of the West and provided a counterpoint to the capitalist approach to development, neither they nor modernisation theory fundamentally questioned the category of development or its historically and culturally specific origins. Instead the focus of both modernisation theory and its challengers was predominantly on how to bring about development, whether this be by increasing savings, capital and industry as in modernisation theory, or by overcoming the exploitative relationships and contradictions inherent in the international capitalist system.

Modernisation and dependency remained dominant in development studies until the 1980s, when criticism of both these approaches, and the somewhat limited success of the first three decades of the development project, led to what has been termed the "impasse" in development studies and to a vacuum in development theory (Schuurman 1993:9-11). During the 1980s, development studies fractured and gave rise to various issue-specific dimensions, including sustainable development, women in development,
and various neo-populisms such as participation, community development and empowerment. Following disenchantment with broad theories of development, these approaches are not so much theories as operational bases for development practice. However, in addition to this operational focus and complexity, there are three broad groups of theoretical approaches to development in the post-impasse era.


The currently most influential and popularly known of these approaches can be termed a new or ultra-economism. Emerging out of the neoliberal counter-revolution in development economics spearheaded by the "purist" economics of Peter Bauer (1981; 1984) and others, ultra-economism insists that the market (and increasingly the world market) is the most efficient means of allocating resources. These theorists advocate the end of intervention by governments, as this is seen to only distort markets and further deteriorate the welfare situation of human beings. They argue that the best way to promote economic growth is by leaving it to the invisible hand of the market. Ultra-economism thus promotes a neo-classical orthodoxy, an appeal to the market as a transcendental force. The most well-known manifestations of this approach in development efforts are the structural adjustment programs and loans of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Through its rejection of government intervention, ultra-economism is in part a shift away from earlier modernisation approaches, yet in its unreserved focus on economics and faith in the market, it is at the same time a form of hyper-modernisation. Occupying a central position in development studies and practice, ultra-economism is invariably one of the main targets of critical approaches.

The first of two sets of critics I want to identify is not a single approach, but rather a range of approaches which share a common critical base. With Marx's critical irruption into classical political economy as their legacy, and mirroring the centrality of economic considerations in the study of development, this group includes contemporary variants on the dependency theme, world systems theory, regulation theory and various other political economy approaches. The shared characteristic of these somewhat different approaches is some level of centring of economic
relations, whether explicit or implicit. Dependency theory and its variants focus on the exploitative and uneven relations set up in the world capitalist economy (Hout 1993; Sklair 1994); the historical-analytic approach of Immanuel Wallerstein's (1980; 1994a; 1994b) world systems theory defines the boundaries of a historical system on the basis of the division of labour (1994b:285); the regulation school focuses on "regimes of accumulation" of economic products and accompanying "modes of regulation" (Lipietz 1984; Lipietz 1992:6-8); and various other political economy of development approaches analyse commodity chains and consider the differential positions which human subjects occupy in global production and consumption networks (Gereffo 1994; McMichael 1996; Hoogvelt 1997).

It follows that these approaches have much to offer in explicating the inequalities perpetrated through the world capitalist system: they are, after all, a well-developed and wide-ranging set of analytical tools for studying relations of production and their associated effects. However, despite the influence Marxist-derived approaches have exerted, it is untenable to assume that drawing on economic relations allows us to adequately deal with all relations of domination through development or with development as a whole. As several critical scholars (Polanyi 1957 [1944]; Baudrillard 1975; Dumont 1977) have argued, the economic is not a transhistorical given but rather a cultural element which is specific, in the first instance, to eighteenth and nineteenth century Western Europe. It has only subsequently been universalised, in part through Marxism and related critical approaches based in economic relations (Baudrillard 1975:84-91).

This does not delegitimate the critical stance based in economic relations which limits its claims: the approaches referred to above challenge ultra-economism just as Marx challenged the imagined universality of classical political economy. However, as Jean Baudrillard (1975:47) argues, this advantage is lost when the concepts of critical political economy are transhistoricised and utilised as something more than an interpretive hypothesis; when they are taken as a principle of explication. In this move they redouble the concepts and forms they aim to challenge. By reinscribing "Nature and Progress, Man and Reason, formal Logic, Work, Exchange, etc.", critical political economy manifests a "critical imperialism" which mirrors that which it is attempting to critique (1975:47). Baudrillard (1975:47-48) argues that to be true to the critical impulse introduced by
Marx, critical categories must be turned back upon themselves: history must be historicised and the concept of production must be regarded as produced.

In his critique of the concept of historical materialism, Mark Poster challenges Marxism, and thereby related approaches based in economic relations, by arguing that it "cannot be taken for granted that human societies are structured by the subject-object relation of labour, nor that change in society can best be understood by referring back to a subject who makes something" (1984:51). While nothing may seem more material than economic relations, the model of the subject acting upon the object installs a preconstituted human subject in the eminent position. What is thereby revealed is not the concrete activity of the body or the relationship with the materials that it comes into contact with, but the power of the mind over both body and materials. As Poster (1984:51) points out, this is more a creationist than materialist approach. This centring of the subject slips into critical intellectual activity and engenders a domination of its own beyond that manifest through relations of production. The mind and reason are not only deployed in the act of production, but become the basis of order and freedom in the world through critical intellectual activity. Thus while the critique based in economic relations serves to reveal certain aspects of domination, it also installs reason over activity, theory over practice, intellectual over non-intellectual and therefore its own form of domination (Poster 1984:59).

Poster (1984) argues that a more tenable framework for explicating domination is one which, following Foucault, studies "technologies of power": assemblages of discursive and non-discursive practices which act on and constitute subjects in a wide range of settings and which cannot be reduced to the economic. Such an approach does not require the construction of elaborate chains of reasoning to deduce the operation of power and domination as bound with, or at the service of, economic relations (Poster 1984:55-58). By remaining at the analytical level and not making any claims to universality, it does not indulge in the "religion of meaning" (Baudrillard 1975:48). This approach does not deny that power operates through economic relations, but it confronts this domination more directly by mapping its technologies and mechanisms at the concrete level of its operation in a wide variety of settings and sets of relations, including
the economic. Such an approach further allows that development may be thought of as more than an essentially economic phenomenon.

Hence, critical approaches based in economic relations which claim to reveal domination beyond that which emerges through concrete relations of production rely on the reification of a culturally specific emergence, which leads to the analyst-theorist asserting his/her dominance over the social field. This suggests, at the very least, that critical approaches based in economic relations should assume a more modest analytical role. Moving beyond these problems requires that we do not reduce power relations to economic relations (or vice versa), that we locate human subjects and the analyst in historical and cultural practices and networks, and that we recognise that discourse or theory is itself part of the equation of domination. Following Baudrillard's (1975:47-48) suggestion that critical concepts be turned upon themselves, the fact that economic considerations are central to development efforts suggests that it is necessary to explore the extent to which economic conceptualisations are bound with development and the operation of power which proceeds through it. In sum, the analysis of domination and power through development, and, as a corollary, the critical interrogation of development in general, needs to both include a critique of, and be extended beyond, those approaches which centre economic relations. This is one of the aims of this thesis, which I pursue through a genealogy of the centrality of economic concepts in our considerations of social change and a Foucaultian interpretation of the operation of power through development.

In undertaking this task, this thesis is related to a second critique of mainstream development which has emerged in approximately the past decade. This approach, which has been termed anti- or post-development (Watts 1995; Escobar 1992; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997), takes a radical stance by questioning the very category and project of development itself3. Drawing to some extent on the discursive turn in the social sciences as well as local, indigenous, and marginalised knowledges, these writers challenge

many of the received orthodoxies of other approaches. Post-development has critiqued development not only as a form of economic exploitation which is environmentally maladaptive, but also as a discourse, a way of imagining the world, and a violence against local and indigenous cultures. Their critique also extends to dependency theory which has been labelled "colonising anti-colonialism" by Esteva (1992:11-12). In many of its manifestations, post-development is strongly oppositional and therefore does not propose an alternative development/s but rather, as Michael Watts (1995:45) points out, alternatives to development.

While post-development is broadly positioned alongside the discursive turn in the social sciences, thereby effecting a move away from the centring of economic relations toward a wider critique of development, engagement with the substantive works of key theorists such as Foucault, Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida or with post-colonial or cultural studies in general has been very limited at this stage. While post-development sometimes alludes to the above theorists (for example, The Development Dictionary [Sachs 1992] alludes to Foucault's work in its subtitle: A guide to knowledge as power) there is a rarely a significant engagement with their work or discussion of how it may be of value for coming to terms with development. The Development Dictionary, for instance, is characterised more by a decrying of the Eurocentrism and injustice of development than an engagement with Foucault. (Compare Stuart Corbridge [1998] for a critical review of post-development). Thus one of the contributions this thesis seeks to make to post-development is a closer engagement with the work of Foucault and an elaboration of its usefulness for coming to terms with developmentalism and the postwar development project.

Not all of post-development can be characterised in the above way. Recent edited collections by Jonathan Crush (1995a) and Cooper and Packard (1997b) are more scholarly engagements with the operation of development, and with how development knowledge is produced, contested and circulated in the social sciences. Similarly, while the work of Arturo Escobar, one of the most prolific of post-development scholars, has been subjected to valid criticisms that it unduly aggregates development (Magagna 1995; Crow 1996) and is a limited use of Foucault (Lehman 1997), it also offers a more sophisticated and nuanced critique of development than many of its counterparts (Magagna 1995), and begins the engagement
with Foucault and other bodies of work. It is on this basis that I use Escobar's main publication, *Encountering Development: The making and unmaking of the Third World*, as a reference and departure point for this thesis in addition to the previously discussed critical approaches which centre economic relations.

**Extending Current Critical Approaches: A Grid of Intelligibility for Locating Developmentalism and an Interpretive Framework for Analysing the Postwar Development Project**

In order to come to terms with development as a historically and culturally specific phenomenon, I begin Chapter Two by taking up Escobar's (1995:11) suggestion, which is not pursued in his work, that we investigate the extent to which the form of the contemporary human sciences has given rise to development discourse. This leads me initially to a consideration of the shift in developmentalist discourse at the beginning of the modern era by drawing upon Robert Nisbet's (1969) *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western theory of development* and Foucault's (1970) *The Order of Things*. Following Foucault (1972), I am interested only in a quite specific and rare category of discourse which is constituted by what he terms "statements". By statement, Foucault is not referring to everyday or common speech acts, but instead to those elements of discourse which are validated through some form of institutional test which provides them with the stamp of "truth" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:48). To avoid confusion, I adopt the terminology of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982:48) by identifying such statements as *serious speech acts*. Developmentalist discourse or "developmentalism" is thus the "discursive formation" (Foucault 1972) of speech acts about social change that is seen as valid and able to be taken seriously at a given point in time. Nisbet's (1969) history of the concept of developmentalism, the only full-length publication dealing with the subject, serves to pre-select and condense Western serious speech acts relating to social change and therefore forms the basis of my discussion of shifts in developmentalism in Chapter Two.

However, from this early stage it is necessary to extend the grid of intelligibility for locating contemporary developmentalism. While Escobar

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4 While Rist's (1997) recent book covers this subject and is useful to complement Nisbet, his Chapter Two (pp 25-46) takes its lead from and draws heavily on Nisbet (1969).
(1995) emphasises the European origins of development, it is necessary to mitigate the European focus of Nisbet and Foucault's work, because any suggestion that developmentalism or the development project is influenced only from the West is rendered problematic by recent colonial studies scholarship which has highlighted the problems associated with distinguishing the histories of metropole and colony. While compartmentalised and bracketed histories of the West were commonplace in decades past, they can no longer be sustained, given that, as Ann Laura Stoler (1995:5) notes,

A collective impulse of the last decade of post-colonial scholarship has been precisely to disassemble the neat divisions that could imagine a European history and its unified collectivities apart from the externalized Others on whom it was founded and which it produced.

In this sense Europe is not a unified fact which exists beyond the colonial relationships which in part constitute it (Cooper and Stoler 1997a). Thus while the postwar development project has been critiqued as Eurocentric by post-development scholars (Addo 1985; Sachs 1992a), this elides the more complex and ultimately more tenable proposition that both developmentalism and development are not purely framed through either a European or a colonial past but through a metropole-colony nexus. Hence throughout this thesis I incorporate discussion of the key ways in which the colonial situation is important to the emergence of developmentalism in Europe and the postwar development project.

It is also necessary to extend the grid of intelligibility beyond the dimension of discourse, because while Foucault focused predominantly on discursive relations in *The Order of Things*, his later work effects a change in direction following a recognition that it is not possible to isolate the rules governing discourse without reference to wider social forces. I pursue a broadly synthetic reading of Foucault which allows me to draw upon all three phases of his work (knowledge, power and subjectivity) to map the emergence of contemporary developmentalism. While this approach may lead me to overly unify Foucault's oeuvre, I have allowed my appropriation of his work to be guided by the practical consideration of what is useful for

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5 My focus, however, is mainly on the dimensions of knowledge and power.
the project at hand, rather than engage in a lengthy exegesis to justify my approach as an "authentic" use of Foucault.

Drawing on the interrelated dimensions of Foucault's work and the colonial situation allows me to map the transformation in developmentalism and its expanded application at the beginning of the modern era. This explication reveals developmentalism as a historically and culturally located phenomenon, and shows that while the concepts of labour, production and the economic approach in general are central to the emergence of contemporary developmentalism, they should not be considered the a priori of our considerations of social change, but rather the effect of a particular historical conjuncture. This conjuncture, which systematically relates the forms of knowledge of the social sciences and the operation of power, gives rise to developmentalist conceptualisations and practice. Since human subjects do not exist beyond these social networks of knowledge and power, but are constituted by them, there can be no possibility of the development theorist or critic operating beyond this grid of intelligibility. This does not signal that a critical approach is impossible, because we are nevertheless able to objectify developmentalism by considering the sets of historically contingent relations that give rise to it. It does signal, however, that the analyst needs to take a modest and grounded role, and that neither reason nor the critic occupy a privileged position with respect to social practice.

Having located developmentalism in this way, it is necessary to consider how it influences the postwar development project. To this end I draw on Foucault's notion of "systems of dispersion". This allows me to show that while the discursive formation of developmentalism exhibits a certain durability and persistence through time, this is contingent upon its continual reinscription and renegotiation in a range of contexts, and its mobilisation in relations of power. Using this conceptualisation means that we do not reify developmentalism as possessing an internal consistency as a "Eurocentric" or hegemonic discourse, but instead highlights the way it can be differentially deployed. Hence in the lead up to the emergence of the postwar development project, I briefly consider the polyvalent ways in which developmentalism is deployed in the colonial context. In order to move from my discussion of developmentalism as discourse to consideration of the concrete ensemble of the postwar development project,
I elaborate an interpretive and analytical framework signalled by Escobar (1995) and James Ferguson (1990) through their use of the term "apparatus" (Ferguson 1990:xv, 9, 17, 18, 25, 276; Escobar 1995:10, 155).

"Apparatus" is drawn from Foucault's term dispositif, which he employs to refer to a "thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble" of discursive and material elements (Foucault 1980c:194). A dispositif may consist of "discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions" and so on (1980c:194). The dispositif is not simply the collection of elements per se but also the "system of relations ... established between these elements" (1980c:194). The relationships between the various elements can be conceptualised in terms of relations of knowledge (discourse), power and subjectivity (Deleuze 1992).

This conceptualisation is appropriate for considering the postwar development project because development emerges as a complex ensemble of institutions, discourses, resource flows, programs, projects and practices. Furthermore, because a heterogeneous collection of elements which acts on and emerges through the actions of a multitude of subjects clearly cannot operate entirely in concert, this conceptualisation avoids the tendency, indulged in by some post-development writers, to view development and its effects as monolithic and uniform (see Esteva and Prakesh [1998] and the critique of post-development by Corbridge [1998]). The heterogenous nature of the apparatus, and the idea that effects are not necessarily predictable, means that a wide range of both positive and negative outcomes can be generated through development without attributing these to a meta-subject or force, or requiring that we see imposition or interdiction at play (for example, Esteva 1992:6).

At the same time, though, such ensembles operate to achieve overall effects, thereby serving a dominant strategic function (Foucault 1980c:195). For example, Foucault states that in the case of the dispositif of madness in the nineteenth century, such a function was "the assimilation of a floating

6 The range of effects generated through the dispositif should not be confused with - and thereby reduced to - the more specific and widely known Foucaultian insight advanced in Discipline and Punish and drawn upon by both Ferguson (1990:254-256) and Escobar (1995) that while failing on their own terms, apparatuses can have effects which serve other purposes.
population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy" (1980c:195). Hence while the various elements of the development dispositif clearly do not always operate in concert, they do have a relation to one another, they form an identifiable project, and they have an overall strategic effect, as Escobar (1995) points out, of governing the Third World.

While both Ferguson (1990) and Escobar (1995) make some use of the term "apparatus", neither offers the above explication, and their use of the concept is at times questionable. For instance, while there is much to recommend Ferguson's grounded ethnographic approach to the development apparatus, he regularly refers to it as a "conceptual apparatus", even indicating that this specification derives from Foucault (Ferguson 1990:xv, 25, 276). However, Foucault (1980c:194) clearly states that the dispositif is an ensemble of material and discursive elements, and Gilles Deleuze (1992:159) states that it is a concrete social apparatus. The development dispositif may organise the way development scholars and practitioners conceptualise development, but this is something quite different from a conceptual apparatus. This indicates the need for a higher level of precision in the deployment of Foucault's notion of dispositif. Moreover, the idea that any single dimension of knowledge, power or subjectivity (or any other set of relations such as the economic) should not be prioritised or given an overdetermining role is central to the analytic framework of the dispositif and efforts to avoid reductionist analyses of social relations.

Although Escobar uses the term apparatus much less regularly, a similar problem is evident in the place he accords the apparatus in relation to developmentalism, or the discursive formation of development. He states that:

The ensemble of forms found along these axes [of knowledge power and subjectivity] constitute development as a discursive formation, giving rise to an efficient apparatus that systematically relates forms of knowledge and techniques of power (Escobar 1995:10).

While it is somewhat unclear what is giving rise to the "efficient apparatus" in this statement, Escobar appears to be suggesting that the discursive
formation gives rise to the *dispositif*, or that it at least has a prominent organising role. Such a reading is supported by the role he claims for discourse in an earlier article, where he states that the "discourse of development ... was able to form systematically the objects of which it spoke, to group them and arrange them in certain ways, to give them a unity of their own" (Escobar 1984:386). However, while in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault (1972:72) argued that discursive formations order the relationship of a range of material and discursive elements, he also struggled to justify this prioritising of discourse before adjusting his methodology with works including *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality* (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:105, 63-67). This later approach views relations of discourse and relations of power (both conceptualised as "practice") as mutually conditioning. In short, it is not possible to prioritise the discursive dimension of development over the more concrete development apparatus. Thus while Escobar and Ferguson have introduced Foucault and the notion of the *dispositif* to post-development, there are clear indications that both their use of Foucault and post-development can be complemented and extended in a number of ways.

As part of a more rigorous elaboration and application of the framework of the *dispositif* and Foucault's conceptualisation of power, one such extension involves effecting a shift away from a negative or repressive view of the operation of power through development. This tendency emerges most forcefully in the work of writers such as Esteva (1992:6) and Wolfgang Sachs (1992:2-5) through their claims that development is a Western imposition. However it also surfaces in Escobar's suggestion that the World Bank "should be seen as an agent of economic and cultural imperialism at the service of a global elite" (1995:167). In contrast, what is striking about the operation of development is not its "repressive" nature but rather the extent to which it accords with the productive modality of power explicated by Foucault. This also represents a move beyond Ferguson's (1990:255-256) argument that while development projects may fail in terms of their stated aims, they are accompanied by a growth in the operation of power. Instead of associating power with the failure of development, I want to suggest that in its very aims, development is synthetically bound with the contemporary modality of power which operates by bringing forth and promoting the forces and energies of subjects.
To highlight the emergence of developmentalist power, I draw a contrast between the colonial and the development era. In the former, the productive modality of power explicated by Foucault was unable to emerge in a comprehensive sense because of the essentially sovereign modality of colonial power. This power extracted the products and energies of colonial subjects and operated through force or show of force. It is only between the first and second world wars that a change in the strategic situation begins to emerge such that, after World War Two, the possibility emerges for the operation of a different modality of power. This new modality operates not by suppressing the energies of subjects but by enhancing and drawing out their energies through development.

By the end of World War Two, a wide variety of traffic in social and cultural technologies and practices between metropole and colony, and the shift in strategic possibilities associated with resistance to and overthrow of colonial regimes, meant that many of the political, academic and technical elements necessary for the formation of an international development dispositif operating with a non-sovereign modality of power were in circulation. In Chapter Three I argue that the formation of the postwar development dispositif at an international level occurred through three developments in the early post-war period: the proliferation of the nation-state as an important form of socio-political organisation in the post-colonial period; the formation of international developmentalist institutions; and the emergence of developmentalist discourse in relation to the ex-colonies. These events see the emergence of a global project to develop the nations of the Third World.

My analysis of the early postwar conjuncture extends the currently limited reference to the operation of "normalisation" through development in the post-development literature (DuBois 1991; Johnston 1991; Escobar 1995:53, 143-144). I argue that within the space of the dispositif, the people and nation-states of the ex-colonies are both incorporated into a world developmentalist whole and regulated against the norm of development embodied by the United States. This process, articulated through economic discourse and the nation-state, results in Third World countries and subjects internalising a developmentalist ethos through the operation of power circulating in the development dispositif. International institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) play a key role in this process.
role as lead institutions in the dispositif. These organisations do not strictly "hold" power over Third World nations. Rather the lines of force of the development dispositif attain a high level of density as they "channel through" organisations such as the IMF and World Bank. In considering the decades of the development project from the 1950s to 1970s, the dispositif emerges as a valuable analytical framework for analysing relations of power and governance.

Although the regulation and governing of Third World nation-states and subjects through their integration into an international developmentalist whole dominates my interpretation of the early decades of the development project, an essential caveat is that the incorporation of Europe's Others is ambiguous in terms of relations of power. Most obviously, "resistance" is integral to development interventions, and, as anthropological studies are beginning to show, appropriation and transformation of Western practices and cultural forms by local people are central to development practice (compare Dahl and Rabo 1992; Pigg 1992). These areas of inquiry hold potential for future study by critical development scholars. Somewhat less obviously, I briefly trace the way the postwar development project signals a shift in relations between Europe and its Others. As a result of the move away from the colonial view of Europe's Others as incapable of development, the "Other" which had previously served as Europe's counterpoint enters the space of the European subject and identity. The extent to which this creates anxieties for bourgeois Western identity and/or opens up possibilities for different futures could be another area for future study.

While I argue that a broadly consistent pattern of normalisation operated in relation to the Third World from the 1950s to the 1970s, a dispositif cannot be considered static. While a dispositif exhibits a certain level of coherence and density, the multiplicity of relations which make up the development ensemble are continually renegotiated and open to contestation, reaffirmation, or consolidation. In this sense, the dispositif can be viewed as a more or less durable shifting coagulation of heterogenous elements. Over the decades from the 1950s to the 1970s, the development dispositif both attains a level of density and exhibits a multiplicity of "internal" shifts and minor reconfigurations. These include shifts to "basic needs", discourses about participation, rural versus urban development, community
development and so on. However, the period from the late 1970s and into the 1980s saw a major reconfiguration of the development dispositif. This reconfiguration, which is the focus of my discussions in Chapter Four, includes a shift to export-orientation in the pursuit of economic growth; the rise of neoliberalism, Non-Government Organisations, notions of autonomy and empowerment in development; and sustainable development.

The interpretive framework which I develop in earlier stages of the thesis is a valuable basis to come to terms with this "reinvention of development" (Crush 1995b:16). The consideration of the notions of autonomy and empowerment, the microcredit movement and sustainable development within the framework of contemporary developmentalism, and in terms of earlier sets of relations of the dispositif, allows an analysis of these shifts which does not preconfigure their power effects. This represents an advance on approaches which consider changes in terms of their relation to ultra-economism, or on any other a priori basis. My discussion of these phenomena highlights the shifting nature of the operation of power through development as it is continually renegotiated within contemporary developmentalism and the sets of relations of the dispositif. In this context a reflexive understanding of the cultural specificity of development and its mode of operation emerges as a valuable critical strategy. To develop these arguments more fully, I now want to turn to developmentalist discourse and its transformation and expansion at the beginning of the modern era.
Chapter Two: Locating Contemporary Developmentalism and the Postwar Development Project

The Transformation and Expansion of Developmentalism

In his history of Western developmentalism, Nisbet (1969; 1986: Chapter One) traces the notion of development from the time of the Greeks, showing that it has its roots in notions of growth, and a process of unfolding and bringing forth the energies held within a particular entity in a directional and cumulative way. While this change may require instigation or nourishment from external agencies in a similar way that a plant or organism requires support, the energies and forces are drawn from within (1969:7). This definition accords with that given by The Oxford English Dictionary, which defines development as (1) "A gradual unfolding, a bringing into fuller view ...", (2) "Evolution or bringing out from a latent or elementary condition ...", (3) "The growth and unfolding of what is in the germ...", (4) "Gradual advancement through progressive stages, growth from within" and so on (The Oxford English Dictionary 1989:563-564).

The extension of this conceptualisation to the social and cultural sphere involves the linking of events and sets of relations with one another in a cumulative and directional way. Although this application seems in many ways self-evident, Nisbet (1969:3-4) points out that it is metaphoric rather than literal:

Nobody has] ever seen - actually, empirically seen, as we see these things in the world of plants and animals - growth and development in civilizations and societies and cultures.... All that we see are the mingled facts of persistence and change. We see migrations and wars, dynasties toppled, governments overthrown, economic systems made affluent or poor.... We see childrearing, working, worshipping, playing, educating, writing, philosophizing, governing.... But we do not see... 'growth,' 'unfolding,' or 'development.'... [Applied to social and cultural phenomena these words [growth and development] are not literal. They are metaphoric.

Through his mapping of the widespread application of the developmental conceptualisation, Nisbet argues that development is a "master metaphor" in Western philosophy and social science, and thus identifies the linking of
events and sets of relations with one another in a cumulative and directional way as central to the serious speech acts about social change in the Western tradition. (For further discussion of the developmentalist approach to change see Nisbet [1969:7, 170-188; 1986:42-53] or, more briefly, Rist [1997:27]).

Although Nisbet (1969) stresses the continuity of the elements of developmentalism from the Greek, through the Augustinian-Christian, to the contemporary secular perspective, a significant mutation in the meaning and application of development occurs over the course of the eighteenth century. In the Greek perspective, social development followed the cycle of plants and animals, meaning that decay and degeneration would follow processes of development. The Augustinian-Christian perspective also included a process of decay, albeit on different terms. In this perspective, human society would evolve as part of God’s plan, but there was only to be one cycle, beginning with Adam, that would terminate some time in the not-too-distant future (1969:70). However, in the late seventeenth century the element of necessary decay begins to be eliminated from notions of development. As Fontenelle wrote of knowledge in 1688 "men will never degenerate, and there will be no end to the growth and development of human wisdom" (quoted in Nisbet 1969:104).

This change, which gathers pace over the course of the eighteenth century, signals two important shifts in serious speech acts about social change. The first of these is the introduction of a teleological orientation: of growth and development proceeding infinitely into the future. Whereas previously development was always followed by decay, either following the analogy of plants and animals or the Augustinian-Christian perspective, the possibility gradually emerges that cumulative and directional social change need not decline. In short, while developmental processes previously had an end point, this point is now displaced infinitely into the future.

The second shift in conceptualisations of social change is the replacement of God with humans as the first cause of development (1969:64). While various secular determinisms - for example, nature, spirit, civilisation, the dialectic - have taken the place of God since this change, what emerges over the eighteenth century is the involvement of human beings in development; from this time development included an agentic dimension, an active
contribution by human subjects. Accompanying this shift in meaning is a change in application of developmentalist notions. Nisbet (1969:114) notes that in the seventeenth century, the ideas of progress and development had been confined to the accumulation of human knowledge. In other words, they had not included a "social" dimension. However, by the end of the eighteenth and proceeding into the nineteenth century, these notions expand their purview to include "governments, economies [and] social institutions of all types" (1969:115). This introduction of a teleological orientation into developmentalist conceptualisations, the entwinement of humans in developmentalist discourse, and the proliferation of developmentalism to include governments, economies and social institutions represents a major transformation in the meaning and application of development.

Nisbet's history of ideas approach, including his reliance on the importance of metaphor as "one of the oldest, most deeply embedded, even indispensable ways of knowing in the history of human consciousness" (1969:3-4), emerges as problematic at this point. Nisbet accounts for the expansion of developmentalism, and particularly the elimination of the element of decay, at the discursive level by asserting that it is an outcome of what is known as the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns (1969:107-111). The argument was resolved in favour of the Moderns following their argument that since they came after the Greeks and knew them and their work, surely they were building on their knowledge. This refuted the idea of a "Golden Age" and asserted that knowledge - and society - was ever-progressing.

However, this phenomenon cannot be accorded explanatory power without positing a deterministic and reductionist relation between the discursive and non-discursive; without arguing that ideas somehow determine social action. Hence while it is possible to argue (as Nisbet does) that the essential semantics of the notion of development remain the same from the time of the Greeks to the present, there is a significant change in the meaning and application of development around the eighteenth century which signals the emergence of a social practice proceeding through notions of development rather than simply speculation within the order of knowledge. In other words, the changes in the notion of development identified by Nisbet represent a simultaneously discursive and non-
discursive development which problematise his reliance on a discursive or history of ideas approach. A first step toward a more satisfactory location of the transformation and wider application of developmentalism can be made by locating it as part of a wider shift in relations of knowledge.

Michel de Certeau (1984:65) shows that from the sixteenth century the "traditional binomial set" "theory" and "practice" becomes increasingly redundant for considering social phenomena. In place of this distinction, de Certeau holds that through the progressive application of the idea of method, the relation between knowing and doing slowly changed as discursive "actions" came to organise "the way of thinking as a way of operating, as a rational management of production and as a regulated operation on appropriate fields" (1984:65). "Theory", in short, no longer operated as a "speculation" "aimed at deciphering the book of the cosmos" (1984:65).

Foucault's assessment of changes in the order of knowledge is similar to that of de Certeau. He argues that following a shift in relations of knowledge that occurred from the end of the eighteenth and into the early nineteenth century, we are faced with a situation in which

Thought ... is no longer theoretical. As soon as it functions it offends or reconciles, attracts or repels, breaks, dissociates, unites or re-unites; it cannot help but liberate and enslave. Even before prescribing, suggesting a future, saying what must be done, even before exhorting or merely sounding an alarm, thought, at the level of its existence, in its very dawning, is in itself an action - a perilous act (Foucault 1970:328).

In short, he argues that the modality of thought which emerged forcefully in the nineteenth century and is still with us today is a "certain mode of action" (1970:328). Instead of a process of speculation which operates at a substantial remove from the meta- or non-discursive, the human sciences are aimed toward the appropriation and ordering of social practices. In the modern era, thought and discourse become practice in the sense that they act on human subjects.

Lest we follow Foucault's European focus too closely and fall into the trap, highlighted by recent colonial studies, of a faulty retrospective unification of "Europe", it is necessary to note that this shift also occurred between
metropolitan and colonial contexts in the construction of the entity we have come to call Europe. Hence this new way of knowing was also taking shape through the colonial encounters Western people had with non-Westerners. Nicholas Thomas (1994:71) points out that in premodern European discourses, non-Western peoples were not characterised in anthropologically specific terms. In contrast, he shows that from the mid- to late eighteenth century there is a "shift from an absence of "the Other" ... to a worldview which imagines [and studies] a plurality of different races or peoples" (1994:71). In the imagining of Europe, the ethnographical illustrations of anthropology serve as both indexical and contrapuntal referents for European cultural projects and the emergence of a "European" sense of self and identity (Thomas 1994:71; Stoler 1995:7, 16). During the same period, social science and humanities disciplines with a metropolitan focus begin to put human subjects into discourse through division, categorisation and differentiation both within themselves and in relation to others (Foucault 1982:208; 1973; 1979; 1981; 1988b). Beyond their differing geographic foci, the new disciplines allow that particular populations - the primitive, the insane, the sick, the poverty-stricken - become visible as objects of government.

It is in the context of this shift in European knowledge and the associated political operations, both of which are in part informed by the colonial situation, that I locate the transformation and expansion of developmentalism in the rest of this chapter, primarily by drawing on the work of Foucault. While I pursue the connection between political operations and knowledge in a following section, at this point I want to temporarily separate relations of knowledge and relations of power by drawing primarily on The Order of Things (1970) and The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), which are Foucault's works that focus on discursive relations. This approach allows me to locate contemporary developmentalism in terms of one set of relations before adding a second layer of complexity. Beyond their methodological difficulties\footnote{In The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault attempts to establish the rules governing discourse as separate from non-discursive practices. Despite the fact that he does not claim that discursive formations are ahistorical, Foucault ultimately recognises the untenable nature of this methodological approach. This is signalled in the shift from his 'archaeological' to 'genealogical' method even though elements of the earlier method are retained (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:105-106).}, Order and Archaeology serve as a significant and iconoclastic insight into, and
description of, relations of knowledge in our culture. It is on this basis rather than on account of their methodology that I draw upon these works at this stage.

Developmentalism and Relations of Knowledge

In *The Order of Things*, Foucault (1970) undertakes an "archaeology of the human sciences" in which he identifies their *episteme* (or historical *a priori*) and a profound change in the positioning and account of the Western subject. He shows that in the classical age (approximately the latter half of the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century) the task of knowledge, to simplify his argument somewhat, was to assemble things in tables according to a pre-ordained order. In the space of the table, knowledge distributed the identities and differences that united and separated things according to the order of the cosmos (Foucault 1970:71-76, passim). The classical episteme thus proceeded through a certain transparency in the act of representation; a sort of unproblematic correspondence between seeing, saying and knowing (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:27). Things were classified and tabulated in their place. Gilles Deleuze (1988:125-126) shows that what is at stake in this process is the way in which the forces within human beings enter into relation with forces from the outside. As an activity which engages the forces of humans, knowledge refers or unfolds to the cosmos or the infinite. The classical episteme thus presented no particular difficulty nor accorded any particular place for human beings as

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8 The episteme requires careful definition and application. Foucault states that the "episteme is not a form of knowledge ... or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities" (1972:191). It must also be stressed that the *a priori* is not a transcendental or ahistorical one. Rather, it is the "epistemological space specific to a particular period" (Foucault 1970:xi). Following the previous footnote and my synthetic reading of Foucault, the episteme is intertwined with, and therefore contingent upon, the relations of power-knowledge which Foucault explicates beginning primarily with *Discipline and Punish* (1979). I discuss these relations in the next section.

9 The metaphor of the fold, or folding, of force relations is central to Gilles Deleuze's (1988) reading of Foucault. In this conceptualisation the usual fixity of the terms 'outside' and 'inside' are bracketed in their implications for the study of human beings as the "outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside ...[which is not] something other than the outside, but precisely the inside of the outside" (1988:96-97). I make use of this metaphor at several points throughout the forthcoming discussion.
knowledgeable: humankind simply brought to light or unfolded the order of the world through infinite representation.

However, with the move to the human sciences of our contemporary period, Foucault identifies a profound change. In his analysis of the study of life, labour and language - which will give rise to biology, political economy and linguistics - Foucault shows that in each of these spheres, "man" enters into a new relation with the forces of the outside through a process which reveals that which is exterior to and older than "man" (Foucault 1970:313). The ways in which scientists begin to study life, labour and language from around 1800 lead to "discoveries" which anticipate "man", which

overhang him with all their solidity, and traverse him as though he were merely an object of nature .... Man's finitude is heralded - and imperiously so - in the positivity of knowledge; we know that man is finite, as we know the anatomy of the brain, the mechanics of production costs or the system of Indo-European conjugation... (1970:313-314).

By entering into a certain relation with these external forces through the positivity of knowledge, humans are now referred to their essentially finite nature and hence to themselves. In becoming both the object and subject of knowledge, "man" emerges as the one whom knowledge is produced about and the producer of that same knowledge (1970:312). Although I am focusing on relations of knowledge at this point, this development is fundamentally bound with shifts in relations of power which I will turn to in the next section.

While Foucault focuses on the European context, Johannes Fabian (1983), in his work on how time and space inform anthropological thought and the encounters of Europeans with non-Europeans, shows that a similar experience was being generated through the colonial situation. Fabian

10 In using the term 'Man', Foucault is not presenting a generic term for human beings but rather is referring to that particular account of human beings which was dominant in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Foucault 1970; Dillon 1995:324). This account continues to frame our understanding today, albeit in a transformed way following feminist challenges. Hence 'Man' deserves to be read as the 'figure of man' (Foucault 1970) or, in Deleuze's (1988) terms, as 'Man-form'. I make use of 'man' in inverted commas where appropriate to indicate this sense, and where it is necessary to maintain consistency with Foucault's discourse.
argues that one expression of the shift to secular anthropological discourse "is the very transformation of one man's all-significant passage on earth into the *topos of travel*" (1983:6). While travel previously took the form of pilgrimages, crusades and missions, from the eighteenth century it became, at least potentially, "every man's source of 'philosophical,' secular knowledge" (1983:6). In this sense travel emerged as man's "intimate vocation" (Moravia quoted in Fabian 1983:7): whereas religious travel "had been to the centers of religion, or to the souls to be saved ... secular travel was from the centers of learning and power to places where man was to find nothing but himself" (1983:6).

Although the constraints revealed through the "discovery" of "man" precede and as such limit him, this situation comes to be viewed not as a limit, but, through a striking twist, as the *possibility* of all knowledge: "the limitation is expressed not as a determination imposed upon man from outside (because he has a nature or history), but as a fundamental finitude which rests on nothing but its own existence as fact" (Foucault 1970:315). The implications of this are startling:

Thus, in the very heart of empiricity, there is indicated the obligation to work backwards - or downwards - to an analytic of finitude, in which man's being will be able to provide a foundation in their own positivity for all those forms that indicate to him that he is not infinite (1970:315).

The *analytic of finitude* defines the direction of modern thought in contrast with the classical episteme. "Instead of an *analysis* of representations one now finds an *analytic* ...[which is] ... an attempt to show on what grounds representation and the analysis of representations are possible and to what extent they are legitimate" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:28).

One of the results of the paradoxical and interminable analytic of finitude, and particularly the effort to "work downwards" in search of a foundation for humanity's existence, is that around the turn of the nineteenth century, "European culture is inventing for itself a depth in which what matters is no longer identities [as in the age of representation] ... but great hidden forces developed on the basis of their primitive and inaccessible nucleus, origin, causality, and history" (Foucault 1970:251). This is a depth linked, as I will show, with the idea that humans would "never degenerate"; a depth which
generates both the introduction of a teleological orientation into
developmentalism and its proliferation. Here I primarily limit myself to
explicating this depth through Foucault's analysis of the study of economic
processes, due both to time limitations and because this aspect is most
important to developmentalist conceptualisations of change and the
postwar development project.

To elucidate the shift in analysis of economic processes which emerged at
the end of the classical age and the "depth" that this change generated for
European culture, it is first necessary to draw a distinction between the
seventeenth and eighteenth century domain of wealth, and the
fundamentally different terrain of political economy of the nineteenth century
which is based on labour and production. In the analysis of wealth in the
mercantile era, money is the measure of wealth, and the means by which a
favourable balance of trade can be attained, industry can be increased, more
merchandise can be procured and so on (1970:174-180). Wealth is thus the
means by which desires and needs can be satisfied through processes of
exchange, and it was on this basis that wealth, in the form of money, was
accumulated. However, the ultimate source of value for the satisfaction of
needs and desires rests with land, which has the property of "being able to
account for far more needs than those of the men cultivating it" (1970:256).
Thus in the mercantile era, and despite rapid expansion through overseas
colonial ventures, the sum total of wealth is regarded as constant (Dumont
1977:35; Hutton 1979:73). Value, embodied in the measure of money which
facilitates the exchange of goods, is a sign which articulates a total system of
equivalences (Foucault 1970:254).

In the shift to modern political economy, value ceases to be a sign and
becomes a concrete product - and that product is labour. This process
begins with the work of Adam Smith in which labour first achieves a
privileged position as a constant measure for the exchange of things
(1970:221-226, 253; Dumont 1977:82-89). This is extended in the work of
David Ricardo, for whom labour is not only a unit common to all other
merchandise but the source of all value (Foucault 1970:254). This is because:

If things are worth as much as the labour devoted to them, or if
their value is at least proportionate to that labour, it is not that
labour is a fixed and constant value exchangeable as such in all
places and all times, it is because any value, whatever it may be,
has its origin in labour. And the best proof of this is that the value of things increases with the quantity of labour that must be devoted to them if we wish to produce them; but it does not change with the increase or decrease of the wages for which labour, like all other commodities, is exchanged (1970:254).

Henceforth labour becomes more radical and basic to human existence, and, in direct contrast to mercantilism, the question of production precedes that of circulation and exchange in political economy (1970:254). From this time on, the question of economics and the problem of increasing wealth were not referred to the "cyclical time of alternating impoverishment and wealth ... nor the linear increase achieved by astute policies" but rather were beholden to production, which "grows in accordance with its own necessity and develops in accordance with autochthonous laws" (1970:226).

In this shift, human beings are repositioned and the "figure of man" emerges. In the folding of finitude, we witness a "shift in primacy, ... from the relations between men to the relations between men and nature or rather between man (in the singular) and things" (Dumont 1977:104-105). Hence "the rise of economics ... and the full accession of the modern Individual ... are solidary aspects of one and the same phenomenon" (1977:106). The full force of this shift to the form of the contemporary Western subject through relations of production is captured by Baudrillard:

"Everywhere man has learned to reflect on himself, to assume himself, to posit himself according to ...[the] scheme of production [introduced by classical political economy and reaching its apotheosis in Marx], which is assigned to him as the ultimate dimension of value and meaning. ... [T]hrough this scheme of production, this mirror of production, the human species comes to consciousness ... in the imaginary" (1975:19).

As Foucault argues, "Homo oeconomicus is not the human being who represents his own needs to himself, and the objects capable of satisfying them..." (1970:257). Rather, "man" is that being confronted with, and produced through, a finitude mediated via relations of production.

Foucault shows that this new conceptualisation has a number of consequences. The first of these is the establishment of a "causal series which is radically new in its form" (1970:255). The costs of the manufacture, harvesting, or transporting of a product will depend on a range of factors.
such as the division of labour, the type of tools used, the quantity of capital invested by the entrepreneur, and so forth. However, the fact that each of these costs is in each instance determined by labour as the fundamental source of all value leads to "the emergence of a great linear, homogenous series, which is that of production" (1970:255). As Foucault states, "All labour gives a result which, in one form or another, is applied to a further labour whose cost it defines; and this new labour participates in turn in the creation of a value, etc." (1970:255).

By organising wealth in a temporal sequence on the basis of successive productions rather than in the space of the table, this new analysis allows for "the possibility of a continuous historical time...[and]... the articulation of economics upon history" (1970:255). One effect of this shift is that political economy both takes up and expands the notion of development while installing labour and production as central to the question of social change: whereas developmentalist conceptions were previously limited by the prospect of a process of decay, or, at the very least, limited to the field of knowledge, this causal series introduces the possibility of the ongoing expansion of wealth through production. This fundamental change in the analysis of wealth also allows the possibility of developmentalist projects, one of which is a developmentalist History for Western society.

The second consequence of the change in the analysis of wealth relates to the question of scarcity. Foucault shows that in the classical age the problem of scarcity is related, on the one hand, to people's needs such that different items are scarce for different individuals or groups, and, on the other hand, to land which was seen to be able to provide for more than the needs of those directly cultivating it (1970:256). In contrast, in the contemporary episteme and political economy, scarcity is not contingent upon circumstance but instead becomes fundamental to human existence. Land no longer provides wealth in itself; rather, it is human labour that is seen as fundamental to economic activity. According to Ricardo, labour or production only became necessary in European history when subsistence was no longer possible; when the land could no longer provide sufficient spontaneous nourishment (1970:256). Moreover, in efforts to extract more wealth from the land as populations increase, what becomes obvious is not the wealth of the land but the increasing difficulty in obtaining wealth from it, and hence a condition of perpetual scarcity. This condition is expressed
as a fundamental principle in contemporary economics as the law of diminishing returns (see Bannock, Baxter and Davis 1992:114-115, 429-430).

Thus humankind enters into relation with the forces of finitude through nineteenth century political economy and the contemporary discipline of economics, as it is located in relation to this fundamental problem of scarcity. The new analysis of wealth which locates humans as labouring and productive beings at the centre of its focus not only provides the possibility for the expansion of the purview of the notion of "development", but also makes "development", in the sense of the bringing forth of capacities and wealth in a directional and cumulative way, necessary as the forces humans enter into relation with through the processes of production are folded upon them. In short, the new a priori of economic knowledge generates an economic developmentalism in which humankind is fundamentally implicated.

This new conceptualisation, which is intimately connected with (and necessary for) the growth of capitalism, did not slip smoothly into nineteenth century life but generated anxieties which were in part resolved through an emerging non-European referent. Christopher Herbert (1991) shows that nineteenth century political economy can be interpreted as an effort to reconcile the desire for accumulation with desire as the origin of vice and misery. This contradiction was defused and thereby in part resolved by developing a theory of culture. This included drawing on knowledge of other cultures, in particular "primitive economies," that revealed the desire for accumulation to be different across cultures (1991:74-149). Thus the emergence of developmentalism deserves to be located not solely in Europe but also in a metropole-colony nexus. This indicates a broader point that from the time of the emergence of political economy in Europe, contemporary developmentalism has involved the recognition/designation of Europe's Others as "non-" or "underdeveloped".

The effort within political economy to pursue the possibility of humanity's material progress through production and labour signals a profound historicity which is equally compelling in the study of life and language. In each case the forces of finitude introduce "contents and forms older than ... ['man'] which he cannot master" (Foucault 1970:331). The effort to find a

basis for the existence of humanity leads to the pushing back of origins and lines of antecedents further and further in an effort to establish its origin. As Foucault states, the task which the analytic of finitude sets for thought is:

that of contesting the origin of things, but contesting it in order to give a foundation, by rediscovering the mode upon which the possibility of time is constituted - that origin without origin or beginning, on the basis of which everything is able to come into being (1970:332).

When the possibility of seeking humanity's origin in the past is exhausted, the focus turns to the future (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:38-41). In Foucault's terms, "the origin is that which is returning, the repetition towards which thought is moving, ... the origin is visible through time; but this time it is the recession into the future" (1970:332). In either the retreat or the return of the origin, the negotiation of the search for humanity's origin within the analytic of finitude leads to "reconstituting traditions, to following evolutive curves, to projecting teleologies, and to having constant recourse to the metaphors of life" (Foucault 1972:12). The result throughout the human sciences is the generation and proliferation of teleological developmentalist serious speech acts and conceptualisations in which human subjects are deeply entwined.

The most appropriate manifestation of this phenomenon to cite at this point is that which emerges through the transformation of "man's all-significant passage on earth into the topos of travel" (Fabian 1983:6) to which I referred above. In the practice of travel of the nineteenth century, the effort to seek humanity's historicity through empirical discoveries manifests firstly (to begin with the pushing back or retreat of the origin) as an exploration of the past. This idea is expressed in a formulaic way by J. M. Degérando, a thinker on "travel as science", who proclaimed in 1800 that "The philosophical traveller, sailing to the ends of the earth, is in fact travelling in time; he is exploring the past; every step he makes is the passage of an age" (quoted in Fabian 1983:7). Through their descriptions of other cultures, the aim of modern travellers and navigators is to complete the history of "man" (1983:8). (To again refer to the genesis of political economy, part of this history of "man" involves the mapping of desire as differential across cultural contexts [Herbert 1991]). This gives rise to the emergence of a
"radically immanent vision of [European] humanity at home in the entire world and at all times" (1983:7). From Europe, "global space appeared transformed into a time sequence with Europeans as the only contemporaries, the sole inhabitants of modernity" (Pieterse 1991:7-8).

Over approximately the past half-century the search for "man's" origin in the past has been increasingly undermined. Adam Kuper argues that while anthropologists previously shared a common view of "primitive society" which allowed them to look back in order to understand the present, the contemporary orthodox view is that no such thing as primitive society exists (1988:7, passim). As he states, "human societies cannot be traced back to a single point of origin..." (1988:7). As efforts to seek the origin in the past have been played out, the origin once again retreats, but this time into the future. As Kuper states, "Nowadays images of the ancient past are less potent than images of the future, and even seem to be less real. Instead of constructing new models of primitive society, intellectuals project images of the global village... [and] the post-industrial society" (1988:240). The most potent (although somewhat hyperbolic) contemporary imagining of the future comes in the form of the impulse for space exploration and settlement. Here an enticing possibility beckons: both knowledge of our physical origins and an "extraterrestrial development".

The deep imbrication of the knowing subject with developmentalist conceptualisations can be seen as a process of invagination, or the constant folding of the outside which gives rise to the inside or subject (Deleuze 1988:97)12. In this folding process a relation is established between developmentalism and the knowing subject: developmentalist conceptions sustain the Western subject in the human sciences by promising that one day humankind will find the kernel of its being, that it will find the return of the origin in the future (Foucault 1970:332)13. As Foucault argues:

If the history of thought could remain the locus of uninterrupted continuities, it could endlessly forge connexions that no analysis

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12 The critique of interiority is a constant theme in Foucault's work which I discuss further in the next section. In brief, the subject is not viewed as a preconstituted entity but rather the result of culturally specific practices of knowledge and power. Drawing on Deleuze's (1988:97-98) metaphor of the fold, "interiority is not something other than the folds and the folding of the 'peristaltic' movements of the outside" (Dean 1996:222).

13 Compare Foucault on the link between the "sovereignty of a pure subject" and "dynamic, biological, evolutionist metaphors" (1991b:64-65).
This mutually supportive relationship between developmentalist conceptualisations of change and the knowing subject of the human sciences poses challenging questions for contemporary development scholars and practitioners who are typically steeped in the social sciences. Connecting historically contingent developmentalism with the knowledge practice of the development expert not only brings into question conceptualisations of social change, but also poses more challenging questions by asking what is at stake in the linking of other cultures into the mode of our own through contemporary development practice. To repeat one of the opening questions I quoted from Foucault: "What is that fear which makes you seek ... the great historico-transcendental destiny of the Occident" (Foucault 1972:210). This fear is no doubt understandable once we accept that the world-developmentalist project is one which sustains the Western secular knowing subject14.

To recapitulate my argument so far, the transformation of developmentalism at the beginning of the modern era can be located in terms of the shift to contemporary knowledge as practice rather than on the purely discursive basis put forward by Nisbet (1969; 1986: Chapter One). The negotiation of a new relation between European humans and their world through the analytic of finitude leads to the emergence of the "figure of man", and the generation and proliferation of directional, cumulative and

14 The link between developmentalism and the Western knowing subject may also be of assistance in understanding why developmentalism has come to play such a major role in Western consciousness and culture; why, as Nisbet says, it is a "master principle of Western philosophy" (1986:41). However, any broad claim along these lines is inherently problematic and needs to be avoided, because subjectivities cannot be 'read off' from the contemporary episteme. Such an approach suffers from the same problem Nikolas Rose (1996c:130) notes with various accounts which see subjectivity as an outcome of broader social transformations or developments. As Rose (1996c:130) argues, subjectification has its own history which cannot be reduced to these broader currents. Therefore while it is possible to suggest that the contemporary episteme produces developmentalist dispositions - which are borne out in the history of the West - this does not establish the production of developmentalist subjectivities as a fait accompli since subjectivity is the result of more practical, local and contingent processes.
teleological conceptualisations of social change in which human subjects are fundamentally bound. Through shifts in economic analysis, the concepts of labour and production emerge as the new relation between humans and things is formulated. This introduces both the possibility and necessity of increasing wealth in a directional and cumulative way, and the articulation of this conceptualisation on history. The moral difficulties associated with this conceptualisation, and the notion of European humanity as the pinnacle of development, are negotiated through the emergence of knowledge of non-European cultures and their recognition/designation as "undeveloped". The shift in developmentalism and the associated concepts of labour and production are not, therefore, the result of a rationality which finally recognises a natural or autonomous set of relations. Rather, these notions are the product of a particular historical conjuncture in which the knowing subject is constituted. In a field which is not given to reflexivity, this imbrication of the subject with developmentalism both highlights the contingency of "development" and links development practitioners and scholars with the tradition in which they operate.

To continue locating contemporary developmentalism, I now want to turn to relations of power and governing, which, in Foucault's retrospective judgement, necessarily operate in a mutually conditioning relationship with relations of knowledge. While I have so far drawn on Foucault's mapping of relations of knowledge, these discursive relations cannot be considered in isolation for the reasons I identified earlier. In the next section I follow Foucault's change of direction after The Archaeology of Knowledge by considering the relations of power which give rise to and are extended by the relations of knowledge outlined above. Because Foucault moves away from the untenable separation of the discursive and non-discursive in this later work, it should be assumed in the following discussion that "power" is always both discursive and non-discursive. The following section also serves a related function of introducing and establishing the relevance of Foucault's conceptualisation of power, which I will draw upon in later chapters to consider the postwar development project.

**Biopower, Colonial Power and Developmentalism**

In *Discipline and Punish* Foucault (1979) explicates a selection of developments in everyday practice in order to elucidate the techniques,
technologies and mechanisms which signal the emergence of a new modality of relations of power and governance in Europe from the seventeenth to nineteenth century. To characterise the new modality of power, Foucault (1981) draws a distinction between sovereign power and biopower in Volume One of *The History of Sexuality*. Sovereign power, which is associated with the reign of the King or monarch (and in our time with the judiciary and the rule of law), operates by "deduction", by taking away and appropriation, by "seizure: of things, time, bodies and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it" (1981:136). In this context we can understand the destruction of bodies in the name of the sovereign, an example of which is provided in the recounting of the gruesome torture in 1757 of the regicide Damiens in the opening of *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault 1979:3-6).

In contrast, biopower, which infiltrates and operates alongside the former modality as it becomes more dominant, sets itself a very different task. Through a multitude of procedures and mechanisms, it fosters, organises, incites and optimises life; by drawing upon mutually supporting procedures of power and knowledge, it simultaneously redefines and administers life in order to manage it in a calculated way. It does not operate in accordance with the symbol of the sword and the right to "take life or let live" (Foucault 1981:136), but instead is a "a way of acting upon an acting subject or subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action" (Foucault 1982:220, my emphasis). Biopower is a "power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them" (Foucault 1981:136, my emphasis). The developmentalist modality of this new European form of power is immediately apparent; biopower operates to bring out forces and to make them grow in an ordered way. At this point then, I want to consider the emergence of this shift and its relation to the

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15 Foucault's shifting use of terms in his analysis of relations of power can be confusing. For this reason I adopt a typology which is in part drawn from Nikolas Rose (1996a:26). I use *technique* to refer to a specific practice, ritual or device; *technology* to refer to "any assembly structured by a practical rationality with a more or less conscious goal" (1996a:26) which incorporates a range of techniques; and *mechanism* to refer to a rationality or minor modality through which power operates. In addition I use *modality* to refer to the overall characteristics of an operation of power. Each of these terms describes part or all of the functioning of power and hence they can all be used to analyse power as it operates through a given *dispositif* or apparatus. I consider the *dispositif* further later in this chapter.
The shift to a predominantly productive modality of power relations occurs through two complementary developments, which can be conceptualised as two poles linked together by a cluster of intermediary relations (Foucault 1981:139). The first of these to emerge focuses on the body as machine, and is described by Foucault as an "anatomo-politics of the human body". The techniques and technologies of the new form of power are directed toward the body's "disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, [and] its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls" (1981:139). While earlier (sovereign) operations of power also focused on the body, "disciplinary power", which is initially associated with practices and technologies for surveillance and the regulation of time and movement of subjects in institutions such as prisons, factories, the military and schools, is distinct in its modes of operation and its effects. Disciplinary power "makes" a "docile body" that may be "subjected, used, transformed and improved" (Foucault 1979:136). In signalling the beginning of the shift from the regime of representation to the contemporary episteme, the object of control is "no longer the signifying elements of behaviour or the language of the body, but the economy, the efficiency of movements, their internal organisation; constraint bears upon the forces rather than upon the signs" (1979:137). To effect discipline of the body's forces, it is not taken as a whole but instead in its specificities: bodies are trained and increased in efficiency by breaking them down and focusing on the movements of the arms, legs, eyes and so on (1979:137-138).

These new disciplinary mechanisms did not spring up ready-formed at a single point in time, but were worked out in a range of contexts through a "multiplicity of often minor processes ... which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another" (1979:138). Although Foucault's work focuses on the European setting, the colonial context should again not be disregarded given his rare but explicit comments about its importance for European political practice. Foucault states that:

It should not be forgotten that colonization with its techniques and juridical and political weapons transported European models to other continents, but that this same colonization had a
return effect on the mechanisms of power in the Occident, on the institutional apparatuses and techniques of power. There had been a whole series of colonial models that had been brought back to the Occident and that made it so that the Occident could traffic in something like a colonization, an internal colonialism (Foucault quoted in Stoler 1995:75).

These comments prefigure recent colonial studies scholarship which has identified a traffic in techniques of power between colony and metropole. Stoler (1995:15-16) cites a number of scholars whose work on colonial contexts shows that political technologies in operation in the colonies at times antedate and act as models for the later emergence of biopower in Europe. While this blurring of the boundaries between colonial and metropolitan operations of power introduces a level of complexity which is beyond the scope of this thesis, a distinction important to the post-colonial emergence and operation of power through the development project can be drawn between the overall modality of colonial power and that of the emerging biopower in Europe.

Colonial rule is characterised by a sense of ownership, sovereignty, or "rule over" which stems directly from the colonial progression of conquest, possession, and rule. Colonial technologies of rule include forced labour, the imposition of cash crops, the extraction of taxes and profits, and a range of abuses associated with the position of power and cultural superiority European colonialists felt they held. (On the importance of a sense of cultural superiority or strength to colonial rule, see Said [1995:31-40] especially his quoting of Lord Balfour on p. 34). In short, the subjugation of indigenous people to work under Europeans, and the extraction and exploitation of the resources of the colonies for the benefit of Empire, constitute the overriding modality of colonial power: colonial rule was exercised over subjects even if it was inherently fragile and routinely subverted by colonial subjects.

16 The identification of an overall modality of colonial power requires the caveat that European colonialisms cannot be reduced to a uniform presence. Rather, as Ania Loomba (1998:4) points out, they involved a wide variety of techniques of control and government, penetrating deeply into some societies while having relatively superficial contact with others. There is thus a related need to be circumspect in use of the term 'colonial' in order to guard against the inherent suggestion that the lives of people who live in the ex-colonies can be characterised singly in relation to 'colonialism' or 'post-coloniality' (Cooper and Stoler 1997b:33).

17 On the subversion and fragility of colonial rule see Nicholas Thomas (1994), Homi Bhabha (1994), and Stoler (1995). Local encounters between European and colonial subjects.
In this sense, the type of power exercised in the colonies contrasts with biopower. Colonial power is closer to a relation of domination and is akin to sovereign power: it was a power exercised primarily through deduction, through the right to extract a portion of wealth, labour, goods and services, and it culminated in the privilege - always held even if not exercised - "to seize hold of life in order to suppress it" (Foucault 1981:136). This modality is illustrated in John Rex's quoting of an East African settler's comments on colonial rule and the colonial subject: "We have stolen his land. Now we must steal his limbs .... Compulsory labour is the corollary of our occupation of the country" (Rex quoted in Loomba 1998:125).

Somewhat ironically, the predominantly sovereign nature of colonial power has resulted in some critiques of Foucault's conceptualisation of power in colonial studies. For instance, Jenny Sharpe, in her analysis of the 1857 uprisings against the British in India, shows that in contrast to the modality of power explicated by Foucault, punishment of Indian rebels attempted to "strike terror' in the rebellious native" in a manner reminiscent of "Europe's own 'barbaric' past" (Sharpe quoted in Loomba 1998:53). Similarly, through her analysis of bio-medicine in colonial Africa, Megan Vaughan (quoted in Loomba 1998:52) argues that in the relations between colonisers and colonised, the margin for liberty was very limited. These criticisms are misplaced because Foucault does not suggest that his work on biopower should be generalised beyond the European contexts he considers. However, they nonetheless reinforce my point about the modality of colonial power because what is indicated here is that colonial power is predominantly underpinned by an exercise of force.

Therefore, while there was no doubt a great diversity of techniques of power deployed through European colonialism and a "traffic" in the techniques and technologies of power between colony and metropole, the were a point of particular weakness for the exercise of colonial power and a source of anxiety for colonial administrators. Subjects enacting the colonial regime did not always entirely share the convictions of its administrators - for instance, they may have belonged to a different class (Cooper and Stoler 1997b:24) - and their 'European' distinctiveness was continually threatened through the playing out of sexual desires (Young 1995) and other relationships with colonial subjects. This generated a nervousness around what constituted 'Europeanness' for metropolitan elites (Stoler 1995) which required the continual definition and maintenance of difference (Cooper and Stoler 1997b:7) through, for instance, the repetition afforded by stereotypes which fix racial difference (Bhabha 1994:66).
comprehensive emergence of biopower cannot be realised in the colonies due to the fundamentally sovereign political arrangement under which they operate. Rather, as will become apparent in Chapter Three, it is in the post-colonial era after the demise of formal colonialism, and with the emergence of the "Third World" and the development project, that Foucault's insights can be applied more completely. Thus while emerging European techniques of power may have their colonial precursors or counterparts, the full-scale emergence of biopower and a new modality of government which moved beyond the institution of sovereignty could only initially emerge fully in the European context.

To return to this emergence, Foucault's (1979) analyses of disciplinary power in particular institutional contexts should not be interpreted as a suggestion that certain institutions - such as prisons, for example - are absolute or bounded centres of discipline. (Compare Deleuze [1988:42] for a discussion of confinement as secondary in Foucault's work). Rather, Foucault states that discipline cannot be "identified with an institution nor with a particular apparatus [dispositif]; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures ... [and] levels of application" (1979:15). The mechanisms of disciplinary power tend to be adaptable and transferable across a wide range of contexts, and at the point at which they gain sufficient density to become a general method, they "swarm" throughout the social body (1979:211). The extension and development of the productive modality of discipline accompanies this proliferation: disciplines were first drawn upon to "neutralize dangers, to fix useless or disturbed populations, to avoid the inconveniences of over-large assemblies" before their capacity to increase utility (for example, "aptitudes, speeds, output and therefore profits" in factories) was recognised, developed, and applied more widely (1979:210).

Regardless of the scale of the operation of disciplinary power, a fundamental effect of its operation is the constitution of the individual subject. The operation of disciplinary techniques, technologies and mechanisms involves the assimilation of injunctions and advice, regimes of training, the regimentation of time, body movements and so on by subjects. This effect of disciplinary power is a further dimension of Foucault's critique of interiority (compare footnote 12), and is again usefully explicated by drawing on Deleuze's (1988) metaphor of the fold.
Disciplinary power proceeds through an "enfolding of authority" which promotes or requires (in varying degrees) the development of practices by which a subject acts upon her- or himself (Dean 1996:222). The folding of authority creates an individual subjectivity by sculpting a "domain that can act on and of itself but which, at the same time, is simply the inside marked out by that folding" (1996:222). As Foucault states:

The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects (1980d:98).

The operation of disciplinary power and this production of the subject cannot be achieved without the mobilisation of knowledge. Disciplinary power requires the detailed study and documentation of the actions and lives of individual subjects in order that they may be acted upon and act upon themselves. Foucault notes that prior to the emergence of disciplinary power, "ordinary individuality - the everyday individuality of everybody - remained below the threshold of description. To be looked at, observed, described in detail, followed from day to day by an uninterrupted writing was a privilege" (Foucault 1979:191). The introduction of a "descending threshold of individuation" through the emergence of disciplinary technologies requires both the development of the social sciences which study human beings, and, in the form and modality of these sciences, the articulation of a subjective interiority for humans in discourse which I discussed in the last section as the "figure of man".

This emergence of "man" in discourse is hence inextricably bound with (and generated through) relations of power. Foucault (1979:29-30) argues that the subjection of the body gives rise to a "surplus" or "non-corporal" element which he terms the "soul" in Discipline and Punish, but which can be interpreted as the "man" of The Order of Things. The "soul" is not
an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished - and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of this soul ... (1979:29).

This "abstract principle" (Racevskis 1983:98) gives rise to concepts and domains such as psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness and humanism (Foucault 1979:29-30). It is consistently invoked in the human sciences, and is the means by which the body can be treated, trained and moulded. In short, the soul is

the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power (1979:29).

Hence the form of the Western subject is at the centre of the power-knowledge nexus.

To turn to the question of the relationship of developmentalism to this complex of power-knowledge relations, the productive modality of disciplinary mechanisms and their swarming throughout the social body provide a basis for disciplining the human material required for the expansion of developmentalist practice in the eighteenth century. Disciplinary power provides the means by which bodies can be trained to ensure good hygiene and health, or be fitted to the requirements of machines and industrial processes in order to increase productivity. Hence it provides a way in which subjects can be enrolled into and disciplined in developmentalist projects such as nineteenth century capitalism or the postwar development effort. One might further advance that the folding of developmentalist injunctions through the operation of disciplinary power reinforces and gives support to the broad developmentalist conceptualisations which emerge through relations of knowledge, thereby producing developmentalist dispositions and subjects. However, while the former is likely to be the case, the latter is problematic because disciplinary power does not determine subjectivities, as it is not the only dimension of
processes of subjectification (compare Foucault 1988a). More tenable is the proposition that disciplinary power not only meshes with developmentalist conceptualisations at one level, but that it also supports wider shifts in the operation of power and governance which reflect a broader developmentalist project, and are bound with relations of knowledge and developmentalist conceptualisations of social change. In order to pursue this argument, I want to introduce the second pole of biopower and the key mechanism of normalisation before turning to the link between developmentalism and the new modality of government which emerges in the nineteenth century.

The second major pole of development in the productive modality of power relations emerged later than disciplinary power and focused on the "species-body" or population of a given nation-state. Having a different target, it is not a variant of disciplinary power, but, from the mid-eighteenth century, it utilised, modified and integrated disciplinary power into its operation (Foucault in Stoler 1995:82; Foucault 1981:140). This "biopolitics of populations" is directed toward concerns such as the vitality of the population, its health, birth and death rates, and the variations in these and their relationship to modes of existence, living conditions and a range of other factors (Foucault 1981:139). Again the working out of the technologies of power and the development of knowledge are inextricably bound. Through the coming together of the poles of biopower,

Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence [the forces of finitude in Foucault's account of relations of knowledge], probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare [and] forces that could be modified (1981:142)

One of the major consequences of the shared focus of both poles of biopower on the incitement and development of life is the increased importance of the "norm" and its infiltration into, and supplanting of, sovereign or juridical apparatuses of power through the operation of the mechanism of "normalisation" (1981:144).

[Normalisation] brings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation and the principle of a rule
to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another, in
terms of the following overall rule: that the rule be made to
function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected or
as an optimum towards which one must move. It measures in
quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the
abilities, the level, the 'nature' of individuals. It introduces,
through this value-giving measure, the constraint of a
conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that
will define difference in relation to all other differences, the
external frontier of the abnormal... (Foucault 1979:182-183).

While sovereign power identifies the permitted and the forbidden
consistent with its power to "let live or take life", normalisation takes a
comprehensive hold of life and the social field by regulating the full range
of subjects' behaviours. Similarly to sovereign power, normalisation
identifies the rule which must be observed and this is how it is able to
operate alongside and within juridical apparatuses. However, rather than
identifying the positive and negative, the "good" and the "bad", and thereby
only a limited range of punishable offences, normalisation distributes all
behaviour between the good and the bad; any behaviour which deviates
from the rule or "norm... becomes the target of discipline (Foucault
1979:180). This means that the number of transgressions is multiplied

Normalisation functions within a system of formal equality by establishing
a unified social field that is a space for comparison and differentiation
(1979:1824). Thus while "the power of normalization imposes
homogeneity", it simultaneously "individualises by making it possible to
measure gaps" and by introducing "all the shadings of individual
difference" (1979:184). The aim of this system is not to punish or discipline
in the sense of expiation or repression, but rather to draw out the forces of
subjects in certain directions through the establishment of an optimum
towards which they must direct their efforts and move (1979:182-183).
Punishment is thus only one element in a double system of gratification-
punishment (1979:180), in which the injunctions, advice and rituals that
subjects enfold benefit them and their progress within the constraints of
certain norms.

The coalescence of the two poles of biopower around the question of sex in
the nineteenth century - which is the focus of Foucault's (1981) The History of
Sexuality - is significant to the extent that sexuality was placed at the heart of an economic and political problem which featured in questions of government of the day (1981:25, 140). This problem, which spoke to the development of the new forms of power and governance, was the increase of the wealth, security, and standard of living of the human subjects such that the population may thrive and be content (Foucault and Pasquino quoted in Gordon 1991:10). Sexuality was thus a "police" (policy) matter not in the sense of the "repression of disorder, but [in the sense of] an ordered maximization of collective and individual forces" (Foucault 1981:24). The emergence of the notion of population and the second pole of biopower signal the expansion and proliferation of the developmentalist modality of biopower and the birth of a new rationality of government which Foucault terms "governmentality"18.

The New Modality of Government and the Proliferation of Developmentalism

In his genealogy of the rationality of the governing of the modern state, Foucault shows that until the middle of the sixteenth century treatises on government predominantly took the form of "advice to the prince", taking in questions of "his proper conduct, the exercise of [sovereign] power, the means of acceptance and respect of his subjects" and so on (Foucault 1991a:87). However, from this time a significant number of treatises emerge which engage in quite diverse discussions of the "arts of government". Framed against Machiavelli's The Prince which saw the sovereign as operating in a relationship of externality and transcendence to his principality, Foucault argues that this literature sought to establish a continuity in both upward and downward directions between the state and its subjects (1991a:87-92). The model for this conceptualisation of governing was that of the family, and, specifically, the managing of individuals, goods and wealth within the family in order that the family fortunes would prosper and that individuals would behave as they should (1991a:92).

18 Foucault takes up the question of government after his work on biopower in a way that demonstrates what Stoler (1995) has identified as the recursive nature of his work. It appears that Foucault first researched widespread changes in the operation of power under the broad heading of biopower before identifying governmentality as a form of government which took up the techniques, technologies and mechanisms of biopower and was at the same time more specifically linked with liberal theorisations of government.
Despite the volume of literature on the arts of government, the modality of government remained trapped throughout the seventeenth century, on the one hand, by the institution of sovereignty itself. Taking mercantilism as an example, Foucault argues that although prosperity was pursued as a strategy of government, the wealth of the country and all of its inhabitants was not so much the aim as the wealth of the ruler. The result was that the prospering of subjects and hence any new modality of government were stifled as they were constrained by the institutional structure of sovereignty (1991a:98). On the other hand, a new modality of government was also not able to be developed because the model of the family, directed to the management of the household, was "too thin, too weak and too insubstantial" to be readily generalised to the territory of the nation-state (1991a:98).

This problem is overcome through a deployment of the notion of population as an object of political attention in the nineteenth century. The transfer of the familial modality of governance to the territory of the nation-state is able to proceed via the theme of population. When this occurs in the nineteenth century, governmentality draws upon the technologies of biopower, exercising, just as in the family, an attentive form of surveillance over individuals and goods in order to make their fortunes prosper (1991a:92). In this shift, the family ceases to be the model of government and instead becomes its instrument. Hence one of Foucault's definitions of governmentality is "the way in which the behaviour of a set of individuals became involved, more and more markedly, in the exercise of sovereign power" (Foucault 1997a:68). The new modality of governing, which is still with us today and is analysed by governmentality scholars (for example, see Miller and Rose 1990; Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; Gordon 1991; Rose 1991; Dean 1994; Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996; Rose 1996b), operates through a combination of technologies of individualisation and the integration of these with wider mechanisms which refer subjects to the nation-state. Governmentality is, as Foucault (1982:213) argues, both an individualising and totalising form of power.

Beyond the emergence of the notion of population, the enabling of this new modality of government which integrates the welfare of individual subjects with the economic health of the nation requires certain developments in the order of knowledge. The emergence of population and the availability of
the mechanisms of disciplinary power were not in themselves sufficient to support the new form of governance which incites, promotes and develops life and the economic wealth of the population. What also emerged and was required in the development of the new modality of government was the generalised developmentalist framework for thinking about social change outlined in the first section of this chapter. In particular, a way of thinking about wealth and organising the terrain of the economic emerged which did not consider scarcity in relation to people's differing circumstances and desires, but which placed a fundamental problem of scarcity and the increase of the wealth of "all and each" at its centre. This way of thinking is political economy, which makes increase in wealth necessary on its own terms. Hence in addition to Foucault's argument that the emergence of population science, the new rationality of government, and political economy constitute "a solid series" (1991a:102), we can add that a fundamental developmentalist orientation is generated through and is essential to this power-knowledge complex. In other words, developmentalism and power are synthetically bound.

Beginning with the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century emergence of a new modality of government, developmentalism expands as the technologies of the two poles of biopower are mobilised and proliferate throughout the social body. This is obviously directly connected with the development of capitalism. As Foucault states, capitalism "would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of phenomena of population to economic processes" (1981:141). Moreover, this required the wider growth of human populations (1981:141). Hence, as Giovanna Procacci notes, the same social inventiveness which gave us the realm of the economy "was an omnipresent force, applying itself to every hotbed of variant social existence, through the converging action of a zealous multiplicity of novel or renovated techniques" (1991:152).

Procacci (1991) elucidates the importance of the construction of the problem of economic wealth in nineteenth century European society by showing that poverty constitutes the ground for the emergence of the "social problem" and the operation of government. Within this system, the wretched peasant embodies the danger of subversion - since s/he challenges the injunction to wealth - and at the same time is a privileged object in so far as s/he is "the
ideal model for the expansion of needs" (1991:155). The problem presented by poverty, though, is not taken up as a strictly economic one. While it is addressed within the framework of political economy in the sense that people are adjusted to the system of wealth, it is in fact taken up very widely as a question of enhancing both people's capacities and happiness by a diverse range of philanthropists, doctors, administrators and economists among others (1991:156). Poverty is addressed as a moral problem in the sense that morality refers to "a discursive mediation which allows a whole range of technologies to be brought to bear on the social as behaviour" (1991:158).

The emergence of this new modality of governance, which links poverty, increases in wealth, political economy, and social behaviour as a whole in a power-knowledge complex, generates the dispersion of an approach to life and social change which embodies the need for incitement and growth of the social body. In short, it leads to the promotion and dispersion of developmentalist practices and conceptualisations of social change. The technologies of biopower reinforce developmentalism as they become important in the life of the nation. This occurs through a symbiotic relation with the modality of governing of the modern state: when the processes of government are unlocked through the emergence of population science and political economy, the technologies of biopower act as a reserve of practices for the new form of governance and are at the same time proliferated as they play a key role in a range of programs and interventions to increase the wealth of the state. As Foucault states, "discipline was never more important or more valorized than at the moment when it became important to manage a population ... [at] the level of its aggregate effects ... [and] in its depths and its details" (1991a:102). Through the emergence of governmentality, biopower is brought to play on both the self and the population: on the one hand subjects are enjoined to self-mastery, self-control and self-regulation, and, on the other, they are integrated with statistical inquiries and programs for reducing illness and maximising the health and productivity of the population (Rose 1993:289-291). In the context of this power-knowledge complex, social science disciplines such as economics, psychology, social work and sociology achieve their status as they simultaneously take up the role of inciting and promoting life, and integrating developmentalism into the discourse, theory and subjectivity of their practitioners.
Hence the emergence of intertwined sets of power-knowledge relations in the new modalities of power and governance give rise to developmentalist practices which range from the micro level of disciplinary techniques and the interstices of the Western subject, to efforts to increase the wealth and welfare of the populations of a nation-state, to the various accompanying and sometimes grand-historical developmentalist conceptualisations of social change in the social sciences. Developmentalism, the contemporary discipline of economics, and concepts such as production and labour which are typically considered the \textit{a priori} of considerations of development and social change, thus deserve to be viewed as historically contingent phenomena belonging to a particular cultural assemblage established in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century in a metropole-colony nexus. The social sciences and their practitioners do not operate in a position of exteriority in relation to this assemblage or to developmentalism. Rather, they are both constitutive of and imbricated within the cultural assemblage, its operation of power and the developmentalist conceptualisation of social change.

This (re)locating of serious speech acts about social change has a number of methodological implications which are important to my consideration of the postwar development project. In my discussion of these in the next section, I briefly draw upon Foucault's idea of "systems of dispersion" in order to introduce his notion of \textit{dispositif} and conceptualisation of power. Foucault's \textit{dispositif} and analytic of power are the main methodological tools I draw upon in the next chapter to consider both the emergence of the postwar development project, and the relations of power and governing which operate through it.

\textbf{From Developmentalism to the Development \textit{Dispositif}: A Methodological Framework}

In the foregoing discussion, relations of power-knowledge which are bound with the formation of subjects serve as a grid of intelligibility for locating contemporary developmentalism. A fundamental implication of this is that analysts cannot adopt a position external to the cultural practices they are studying since they are in fact formed by them. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982:122-125) show that the most pragmatic option available in this
situation, and that which is adopted by Foucault beginning with *Discipline and Punish*, is a form of interpretation. In this approach analysts make their involvement in cultural practices a basis of interpretive understanding, but at the same time distance themselves from these practices, thereby rendering them strange and the object of analysis. The resulting interpretation is not arbitrary or "subjective", because the understanding analysts are developing is a result of their own formation by those very practices (1982:122-123). Thus far I have opened the possibility of such an interpretation of the postwar development project by drawing on Foucault to objectify developmentalism and thereby obtain a distance from our conceptualisations of social change.

In turning to the interpretation and analysis of the postwar development project, it is necessary to consider what role this rendering of developmentalism is able to play. Foucault is quite clear that relations of power are only able to serve as a grid of intelligibility with the caveat that power is a "moving substrate of force relations" which is continually renegotiated (1981:93). His work thus denies attempts at totalisation and limits the power the theorist can appropriate in her/his practice. Hence a second major implication of the approach pursued so far is that there is no possibility of advancing a theory or history of development which allows us to "read off" or preconfigure the postwar development project. In other terms, because developmentalism has been negotiated in a metropole-colony nexus and is continually renegotiated and open to contestation, it is not possible to derive any conclusions for its manifestation in relation to the Third World. This applies regardless, for instance, of how "Western" or imperialistic development may seem from a critical perspective (compare Addo 1985; Esteva 1992:6; Sachs 1992b). As Crush warns in his introduction to a number of recent histories of development, there is a need to avoid filtering our interpretations "through a functionalist master-narrative in which development is a mere instrument of Western domination, drained of ambiguity, complexity and contestation" (1995b:11).

At the same time, though, developmentalism exhibits a certain durability and longevity. From the time it emerged in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe, the conceptualisation of social change as cumulative, directional and teleological, and the assumption that it could be produced in this way by the intervention of human subjects, has remained
remarkably persistent. It is also central to the postwar effort to develop the
Third World: as Crush notes, development has "rarely broken free from
linearity, from organic notions of growth and teleological views of history"
(1995b:11). In developing an interpretive approach to the development
project, there is thus a need to account for the durability and resilience of
developmentalism, including the hold it appears to have on our
conceptualisations of change, while at the same time allowing for the
contingency of social action and the ongoing negotiation of a multiplicity of
force relations in the postwar development project. To introduce such an
approach, I want to draw upon Foucault's idea of "systems of dispersion".

Foucault (1972:31-38) develops the notion of systems of dispersion in The
Archaeology of Knowledge to deal with the question of the relationship
between statements, or, in the terminology I have adopted here, serious
speech acts. He argues that the most immediately obvious ways of
accounting for groups of serious speech acts unduly impute unity and
coherence. By in turn considering the possibility that a group of serious
speech acts may refer to the same object, approach a subject matter in the
same way, share a common and permanent group of concepts, or refer to a
shared theme, Foucault shows that objects under study, concepts, themes,
and the group of statements itself are revealed as more fragmented,
contradictory and contingent than any of these approaches allow. In
response, Foucault argues that a common group of serious speech acts
should be analysed as a system of dispersion which does not reduce
discourse to a coherent unity. This methodological approach, which
Foucault employed in The Order of Things to identify epistemes,
simultaneously identifies regularity and respects difference: it does not
impute coherence or unity but instead recognises speech acts which share
the same characteristics as forming a "discursive formation" (1972:38)
regardless of the context in which they appear. Developmentalism is what
might be termed a "wide" discursive formation with serious speech acts
recurring across a range of contexts from biological evolutionism to
economics.

Discursive formations exhibit a "form of dispersion in time, a mode of
succession, of stability, and of reactivation" (1972:127), governed by, in
Foucault's (1980a:112) later judgement, the operation of power which
circulates through and between them. To the extent that serious speech acts
of a discursive formation are mobilised in operations of power, they are reactivated, thereby establishing a certain historicity, continuity and truth value which can be difficult to challenge. The serious speech acts of developmentalism have a special status in this regard in that they are not only mobilised in particular operations of power, but are also continually reactivated through the contemporary rationality of governance which, as I argued in the last section, operates through a developmentalist modality. In this way developmentalism has gained truth value as the \textit{a priori} of considerations of social change across a wide range of disciplines. At the same time, systems of dispersion cannot be viewed as inherently oppressive or entirely constraining, as they also open possibilities "of reanimating already existing themes, of arousing opposed strategies, of giving way to irreconcilable interests, of making it possible, with a set of particular concepts, to play different games" (Foucault 1972:36-37). Indeed, they are integral to the complexity and contingency of social action, as they enable a complex field of strategic possibility (1972:37). Furthermore, because relations of power-knowledge are constantly being renegotiated, the reconstitution of any discursive formation "does not elude historicity...; it is itself a transformable group" (1972:127). These are themes I take up further in Chapter Four through discussion of the emergence of the recent phenomenon of sustainable development.

In moving to consider the concrete ensemble of institutions, resource flows, practices and projects which constitute the postwar development project, there is no doubt that developmentalism, as a resilient and durable body of serious speech acts about social change, has an important role to play. It provides an understanding of the dominant approach to social change in our culture and defines the space from which serious speech acts on social change can emerge. At the same time, it is not possible to prioritise discursive relations by giving them the status of organiser of the relations within and between the various elements of the development ensemble. This approach, adopted by Escobar (1984:386; 1995:10), although not rigorously applied in his work, belongs to the ultimately untenable methodological approach pursued by Foucault in the works which give priority to discourse (compare Foucault 1972:72; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). Foucault's interpretive and analytical framework which does not prioritise discursive relations over others is the \textit{dispositif} or apparatus which I introduced in Chapter One.
To recapitulate, the dispositif is both a "thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble" of discursive and material elements - for example, "discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions" and so on - and the "system of relations ... established between these elements" (Foucault 1980c:194). Although the elements do not have an interdependent relation, and while the dispositif may generate contradictory effects, it also attempts to achieve an overall or dominant strategic function such as "the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy" in eighteenth century Europe (1980c:195). The conceptualisation of a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble of discursive and material elements is appropriate for consideration of the development project, since from the late 1940s a range of institutions, funding and resource flows, philosophical propositions about the possibilities and desirability of social change modelled on the West, the professional development practitioner, scientific efforts (the entire sub-branch of "development economics"), and government and non-government organisations dedicated to development all begin to emerge.

Establishing clarity about Foucault's intended meaning and usage of dispositif is difficult because he did not speak or write about it at length, and because of problems in its translation. Despite the emergence of the term "apparatus" as the most common translation, translators have noted that there is no straightforward corresponding term in English (for example, see note by Armstrong in Deleuze [1992:15]). This perhaps accounts for some mistranslations, most notably in The History of Sexuality (1981) where dispositif has been translated as a "construct" or "deployment" (Halperin 1995:189-190n). In this situation I draw on Deleuze's (1992) explication. This is justified by the rapport that existed between Foucault and Deleuze (compare Foucault and Deleuze 1977) and because Deleuze's is the only significant elaboration of the dispositif that I am aware of. (The discussion by Dreyfus and Rabinow [1982:120-122] is limited to a few paragraphs).

Deleuze conceptualises the dispositif, in the first instance, as a concrete social apparatus and a "tangle, a multilinear ensemble" (1992:159). This formulation conveys the concern, shared by Foucault and Deleuze, that theory should be a tool to aid analysis rather than a reified entity or end in itself (Foucault...
and Deleuze 1977:208; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:120). In more detail, Deleuze's (1992:159) highly metaphoric account renders the multilinear ensemble as:

composed of lines, each having a different nature. And the lines in the apparatus do not outline or surround systems which are each homogeneous in their own right, object, subject, language, and so on, but follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing themselves from one another. ... Visible objects, affirmations which can be formulated, forces exercised and subjects in position are like vectors and tensors.

Thus an element of the dispositif, whether it be an institution, a particular program, or a practice, is integral to the apparatus. An element emerges and becomes recognisable at the same time as it gains a level of density in the dispositif. Following their emergence, elements are always subject to renegotiation, displacement, or consolidation. While the dispositif is flexible and somewhat amorphous, it consists in, and is therefore identifiable when, we find "strategies of relations of forces supporting and supported by, types of knowledge" (Foucault 1980c:196).

Deleuze explicates three dimensions - knowledge, power and subjectivity - of the dispositif which correspond to each of the three major aspects of Foucault's work. However, this is a heuristic rather than substantive differentiation since the dimensions of knowledge, power and subjectivity are recursive and formative of each other; they are "variables which supplant one another" (1992:159)\(^{19}\). In other words, the "dimensions of knowledge, power and subjectivity are irreducible yet constantly imply one another" (Deleuze 1988:114). I have already indicated the form of the first dimension of the dispositif in the above discussion of systems of dispersion. In Deleuze's (1992) terms, dispositifs or apparatuses operate in a way analogous to machines or devices to produce our enunciations or serious speech acts; they enable what we say and what can be said. The discursive dimension of the dispositif can thus be considered a regime "from the point of view of that which can be enunciated, with the drifting, transformations, and mutations which this will imply" (1992:160). As will become apparent in the next chapter, the serious speech acts of the discursive formation of

\(^{19}\) This is not, of course, a list which claims to entirely map the social field because I am advancing a specific analytical tool rather than a general theory or method.
developmentalism attain a new level of density in the development dispositif as they are instated and then continually reactivated and mobilised in postwar development discourse and practice.

The second dimension of the dispositif, and the other major lens through which I consider development, is that of relations of power. Deleuze (1992:160) conceptualises this dimension as made up of lines of force which pass through every area of the dispositif, conditioning and being conditioned by the previous lines and curves of knowledge. Arising out of agonistic social relations, lines of force connect the curves and lines of knowledge, sometimes in ways which strengthen the relationship of the former, and at other times in ways which make them unstable or which put them in tension. These lines arrange and give shape to, or subjectivise, individuals by marking them out as a certain type, training them in certain activities or functions and so on. This signals lines and curves of subjectification, which absorb, re-direct, twist, and thereby balance lines of force. This final dimension of the dispositif involves the self going to work on itself, and includes processes of resisting, selecting from, modifying, reinventing and transforming the various injunctions, directives and forces which are brought to bear upon it. While the detailed requirements for a study of these processes puts consideration of this dimension of the development dispositif beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that the subject is not entirely at the mercy of the lines of force of the operation of power, but rather engages with force relations, absorbing lines of force, twisting them, or sending them in different directions (Deleuze 1992:161).

Hence the dispositif is a concrete ensemble of heterogenous elements comprised of mutually supplanting relations of knowledge, power and subjectivity. It does not prioritise one set of relations over others nor claim that other sets of relations not included in this framework have lesser priority. To further establish the analytical tools I draw upon in the next chapter, I want to expand on the dimension of power. As I argued in my locating of developmentalism in nineteenth century Europe, the congruity between development - including the aims of increasing the wealth, welfare, and capacities of subjects - and Foucault's explication of the modality of power and governing as productive is striking. This signals the
appropriateness of Foucault's analytic of power for consideration of the postwar development project\textsuperscript{20}.

Deleuze's rendering of power as innumerable lines of force in the \textit{dispositif} captures Foucault's fundamental conceptualisation of power as a "multiplicity of force relations" (1981:92) which operate through modes of action upon both the actions of others and one's self (1982:220-221). It is from this baseline that Foucault's critique of sovereign theories of power and his elaboration of the techniques, technologies and mechanisms of power proceeds. While it is not possible to summarise the full gamut of Foucault's work on power, I want to elaborate his insights as they are relevant for my consideration of the postwar development \textit{dispositif} in the next chapter.

Following the conceptualisation of power as a multiplicity of force relations, Foucault (1987:11) has noted that he almost always uses the term power to refer to \textit{relations of power}. It is in this sense that "Power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere", including from below (1981:93, 94). Power relations are always agonistic and shifting as subjects, which are both the conduits and effects of power, are embroiled in, modify, evade and bring about the operation of power. Power is thus not "held" by particular individuals or groups (as is the view in traditional political and social theory) but is a "complex strategic relation in a particular society" (1981:93)\textsuperscript{21}. It represents the mobilising of force relations through the techniques, technologies and mechanisms of power in ways which channel lines of force through particular sites with certain levels of density and effects. This conceptualisation displaces the view that power operates from a central point, or through a meta-subject whether conceived as "the Father, the Monarch, ... the general will" (Foucault 1980b:140), or, in the case of the development project, through any supposedly hegemonic group such as "the West" or "the Americans" (compare Esteva 1992:6).

\textsuperscript{20} Although the following discussion focuses most directly on power, it must be remembered that this is not to the exclusion of relations of knowledge and subjectivity because the latter are inevitably embedded in the former.

\textsuperscript{21} On the contrasts between Foucault's conceptualisation of power and that of conventional political and social theory, see Torben Bech Dyrberg (1997: Chapter Three).
This disaggregated and relational understanding of force relations is useful for moving beyond the overtly oppositional stance of some current post-development studies and their argument that development is a Western imposition or hegemony (compare Sachs 1992b:4-5). Such positions and arguments are problematic because they elide the fact that development has been actively embraced by many Third World governments and subjects. Equally problematic for such aggregated and monolithic views of power is the implication that there is little scope for resistance by subject populations. It could be argued, for instance, that the approach which states that "The mental space in which people dream and act is largely occupied by Western imagery" and "the 'Other' has vanished with development" (Sachs 1992b:2), writes the "Others" out of history in a similar way to discourses that are more commonly targeted as Eurocentric. Viewing power solely as imposition or interdict leaves us, as Foucault states, with "the insubstantiality of the notion of the master, an empty form haunted only by the various phantoms of the master and his slave, the master and his disciple" (1980b:139). In short, once power is designated in this way, resistance either rests with the enlightened intellectual and/or assumes a revolutionary form and there is no room for analysis of the operation of power.

The negative conceptualisation of power is seen by Foucault (1980a:121) as a legacy of the institution of sovereignty and an anachronism in the current dominantly productive modality of power. The persistence of this conceptualisation is problematic because it serves to conceal the more pervasive operation of biopower through the operation of the norm. As long as it remains possible to juxtapose "power" and "freedom" by locating power in certain spheres (the law, the state and so on), a wide domain of social practice can be imagined to be outside or beyond the operation of power. In contrast, one of Foucault's major insights has been to show that through the mutually supporting operations of power and knowledge in biopower, almost the entire social terrain is subject to a normalisation which produces subjects in ways which make them both more disciplined and productive. This is not, however, to suggest that power is never repressive in its effect. In Foucault's schema, repression and domination represent extreme versions and limiting cases of the operation of power - they involve a fixing of power relations in "a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and the margin of liberty is extremely limited" (Foucault
1987:12). However, even in cases in which the operation of power may be judged as repressive or negative in effect, power produces certain subjectivities, realities and forms of truth (for example, the social psychopath and the discourses, disciplines, interdicts, and institutions clustered around her/him). Thus normative judgements about whether the operation of power is inherently "good" or "bad" are not Foucault's concern.

This avoidance of normative judgements underscores the modest and located place of the analyst in the Foucaultian interpretive approach. In traditional analyses of domination which view power as operating entirely in the negative, Foucault identifies what he terms the "speaker's benefit" (1981:6). In relation to the question of sex he states:

If sex is repressed ... then the mere fact that one is speaking out about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. A person who holds forth in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; he upsets established law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom (1981:6).

In contrast to this approach to power and politics, in Foucault's schema, politics, rather than being something which requires articulation by intellectuals thereby remaining the preserve of a select group, is always present. A corollary of the omnipresence of relations of power is that "there are no relations of power without resistances" (Foucault 1980b:142). The analyst cannot speak the truth to power because s/he is fundamentally imbricated in the networks of power-knowledge. Rather, by describing the characteristics and operation of power and, in particular, its most dominating contemporary manifestations, the analyst can highlight current dangers and enter into a mutually stimulating relation with other political practice.

To return to Foucault's analytic of power, the overall effects of power, such as the domination of a certain class or the governing of the Third World, emerge through a "concatenation" that rests upon the multiplicity of local power relations and that "in turn seeks to arrest their movement" (Foucault 1980a:142).

22 In his preface to the English edition of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, Foucault states "Do not use thought to ground a political practice in Truth; nor political action to discredit, as mere speculation, a line of thought. Use political practice as an intensifier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier of the forms and domains for the intervention of political action" (Foucault quoted in Hand 1988:viii ix).
This overall effect is neither a random emergence nor, as indicated above, the ruse of a particular group or shaper of history. Instead, "power relations are both intentional and non-subjective" (1981:94). By this Foucault means that while local relations of power form tactics which "becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another... end up forming comprehensive systems ..., it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them" (1981:95).

Faced with this situation, Foucault offers an analytics, a way of approaching the analysis of power relations or the "how" of power rather than its theorisation. Thus he turns his attention to the techniques, technologies and mechanisms of power in order to reveal the political dangers inherent in our current practices. As I discussed in my outline of the shift from the sovereign modality of power in Europe, mechanisms of normalisation are central to the contemporary modality of power. Within the space of a social whole, these mechanisms set standards for subjects to aspire to and against which they are regulated. An operation of normalisation may be congruent with an entire dispositif, or may be set within the operation of particular technologies which form a part of the broader ensemble.

While normalisation is a complete mechanism in itself, it rarely operates in isolation from the technology of hierarchical observation and the technique of the examination. Hierarchical observation enables normalisation by linking visibility and surveillance with the induction of the effects of power (1979:170-171). In elucidating this technology in the context of European penal reform, Foucault (1979:171-172) discusses the emergence of an architecture whose aim was the surveillance of its inhabitants. The paradigmatic form, and Foucault's most well-known example of this architecture, is Jeremy Bentham's panopticon (1979:195-228). The panopticon serves to arrange inmates in space in relation to supervisors such that the possibility of them being observed is omnipresent. However, the inmates cannot be sure if they are being observed at any one time because the supervisor is hidden. This illustrates the general impulse of the mechanism of hierarchical observation: it acts as a central point which "would be both the source of light illuminating everything, and a locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect eye that nothing
would escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned" (1979:173).

Hierarchical observation and normalising judgement come together in the examination. In this technique, the normalising gaze "establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them" (1979:184). It is here, then, that "truth" is established. Individuals are inserted into regimes of knowledge which judge their capacities, and which justify and require both outside intervention and the actions of the individuals on themselves. It is thus in the examination that the superimposition of power and knowledge relations are at their most visible (1979:185).

To summarise this chapter, contemporary developmentalism, including the emphasis on economic relations and the centrality of the concepts of labour and production, belongs to a particular cultural assemblage which emerges in a late eighteenth and nineteenth century metropole-colony nexus through intertwined historical developments in relations of knowledge, power and the constitution of the Western subject. Hence in approaching the postwar development project, neither developmentalism itself nor economic relations and the concepts of labour and production can be accorded an a priori status, and nor can the analyst claim a position beyond the culturally specific practices which have constituted her/him. In this situation, a Foucaultian interpretation allows that developmentalism be considered as a historically contingent discursive formation characterised by durability and resilience to the extent that it is continually re-mobilised in relations of power. This is a way of not taking developmentalism as a given, nor installing an alternative theoretical edifice external to it as a framework for its analysis. Developmentalism is vitally important to the postwar development project, but it must be considered as contingent upon the concrete social relations of development in order that discourse is not reified. The dispositif, Foucault's interpretive framework which deals with this problem, is the major methodological tool I take up in the next chapter.

In line with my focus on relations of power through development, I have also explicated Foucault's analytic of power. Foucault's disaggregated conceptualisation of power, and his explication of normalisation, hierarchical observation and the examination, offer advantages over critical
approaches which view development as a Western imposition or hegemony, or which take up an overtly oppositional stance to development. By drawing on Foucault's analytic of power, we need not elide the fact that Third World subjects actively embrace development, since power effects do not emerge because development is "bad" or "oppressive", but as a result of a concatenation of innumerable local level relations of power beyond the immediate conceptualisation of either development practitioners or participants. Alongside the locating of developmentalism pursued in this chapter, Foucault's notion of dispositif and his analytic of power provide the interpretive and analytical framework for my consideration of the operation of relations of power through the development project in the next chapter.
Chapter Three: From Colonial Power-Knowledge to the Development Dispositif and the Normalisation of the Third World

This chapter undertakes an interpretation and analysis of the postwar development project from approximately the 1940s to the 1970s. It begins with a brief discussion of colonial power and the deployment of developmentalism in the colonial context, before moving to the formation of the development dispositif through the proliferation of the nation-state as a widespread form of socio-political organisation, the formation of developmentalist international institutions, and the emergence of developmentalist discourse in relation to the ex-colonies. I argue that through these developments a broad-scale shift occurs from a sovereign modality of power relations to a normalising-developmentalist matrix. In this matrix, a high rate of economic growth and level of Gross National Product per capita, embodied most completely by the United States, emerge as key standards toward which Third World nation-states must move.

Throughout this chapter, the dispositif emerges as a valuable grid of analysis for coming to terms with the complexity and interrelatedness of the development project. In the last section of the chapter, I consider the central place of the World Bank in the development project, and demonstrate how the dispositif framework can account for the centrality of such organisations without lapsing into a sovereign conceptualisation of power.

Colonial Power-Knowledge and Developmentalism

As discussed in the last chapter, colonial power operates through a sovereign modality. It is, in the first instance, a military conquest of territory, it is characterised by extraction of the products and energies of colonial subjects, and it is based on force or show of force. While some of the technologies of biopower are present in this operation (the different modalities of power are never mutually exclusive), the full-scale emergence of biopower cannot occur in the colonial regime due to this overall sovereign modality. Rather, it is only through the shift from formal

23 While the emergence and proliferation of the nation-state strictly occurred at an earlier time and in Europe, I am referring specifically to the export of this form of socio-political organisation to the ex-colonies, the accompanying rapid rise in the number of nation-states, and the global importance of this form of socio-political organisation.
colonialism to the post-colonial or development era that the full scale emergence of the modality of power explicated by Foucault becomes possible. While there can be no possibility of attempting a full analysis of the shift from colonialism to post-colonialism, developmentalism is important in both contexts. Therefore I begin by discussing the relationship between developmentalism and colonial power-knowledge.

Developmentalism is mobilised in different ways both between metropole and colony and within the colonies as part of the operation of colonial power-knowledge. Between metropolitan and colonial contexts, developmentalism enables a privileged position for European subjects. As I indicated by discussing the modality of colonial travel in the last chapter, the idea that all societies are at different stages of development proceeds through the conceptualisation of global space as a time sequence with "Europeans as the only contemporaries, the sole inhabitants of modernity" (Pieterse 1991:7-8). In this way, developmentalism forms part of the broader discourse about Europe's Others which facilitates their exclusion by viewing them as incapable of civilisation and development, either because they are, by their essential nature, irrational, depraved, lazy, uncivilised, child-like and so on (compare Said 1995:37-39, passim), or simply because they cannot cope with civilisation due to their "savage" or "barbaric" nature (compare Brantlinger 1995). This knowledge of non-Europeans forms part of the justification for their direct government and rule by Europeans. Through its mobilisation as part of what Edward Said (1995) terms "orientalism", developmentalism supports the sovereign modality of colonial power.

However, part of being able to play different games with the same set of concepts (Foucault 1972:36-37) means that discursive formations or lines of knowledge are not stable and cannot be subordinated or tied to serving the needs of a particular individual or group. As Foucault states, "There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse which runs counter to it" (1981:101). Instead discourses are characterised by a "tactical polyvalence" (1981:100). This means that, among other manoeuvres, they can "circulate without changing their form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy" (1981:102).
In the colonies, the possibilities for the emergence of directly opposing strategies are enhanced by the politically precarious nature of the colonial modality of power. At the potentially most costly level, the very act of attempting to coerce and direct others by force, or show of force, runs the risk of confrontation, of the other turning against the operation of power. This is why, as Foucault (1979:73) notes, public executions were dangerous for the sovereign in eighteenth century France: the challenge thrown down by this "emulation of atrocity" may one day be revenged by the violence of the people. While the ceremony and intensity of the public execution makes it the paradigmatic example of this problem, the same difficulty plagues the colonial operation of power. Here the problem manifests in a different way: in the colonial situation atrocity is ongoing; it is constantly underlined through the presence of the coloniser.

In less dramatic terms, comments made in 1895 by Sir Harry Johnston, Commissioner in British Central Africa, allow the drawing out of the differential mobilisation of developmentalism and the fragile nature of the sovereign modality of colonial power. Johnston notes that under the influence of British rule the situation in Malawi had improved such that: 

An increasing number of natives are able to read and write... [and] ... long rows of native carriers pass in Indian file, carrying loads of European goods. ... You will see a post-office, a court of justice, and possibly a prison, the occupants of which, however, will be out mending roads under the superintendence of some very business-like policeman of their own colour. ... The most interesting feature in the neighbourhood of these settlements at the present time is the coffee-plantation, which, to a great extent, is the cause and support of our prosperity (Johnston quoted in Crush 1995b:1).

Here the discipline and management of the indigenous people is pursued through their development, through the bringing out of their forces: they are increasingly able to read and write, walk in Indian file and so on. Equally though, these same forces are appropriated through the institution of sovereign rule: the disciplining of subjects occurs as part of an overall development project - the coffee plantation - which, accorded centrality as "the most interesting feature", results in the extraction of prosperity for the colonial masters. Here the extractive modality of colonial power facilitates oppositional strategies because it draws upon the deployment of
developmentalist disciplinary technologies to increase productivity yet denies those disciplined a share in the results of the project.

In the twentieth century, pressure from the colonies was increasingly being brought to bear upon, and responded to, by colonial rulers, in part through the mobilisation of development discourse. Development was widely taken up by colonial elites, from Nehru in India to Sukarno in Indonesia, and deployed as part of anti-colonial struggle and claims for independence (compare McMichael 1996:25-26; Cooper 1997:64; Cooper and Packard 1997a:9; Cooper and Stoler 1997b:35). In the debates around Britain's Colonial Development Act (1929) and through the League of Nations mandate system, the "development" of Europe's colonies was being presented as a "sacred trust of civilisation" and a "moral duty" (Johnston 1991:157-159; Rist 1997:58-61). Similarly, in the face of labour unrest, a colonial official stated in 1940 that "if we are not now going to do something fairly good for the Colonial Empire, and something which helps them get proper social services, we shall deserve to lose the colonies and it will only be a matter of time before we get what we deserve" (MacDonald quoted in Cooper 1997:67).

Frederick Cooper (1997) argues that the colonial governments of Britain and France attempted to deal with this situation in the 1940s by turning to development as a way of reinvigorating their rule and control by making the colonies both more productive and ideologically stable. However, as an instance of the "faulty calculations that ... [give] birth to those things which continue to exist and have value for us" (Foucault 1984a:81), Cooper (1997) shows that this effort did not have the desired effect, and instead actually became the way in which colonial elites convinced themselves that they could give up tight control over the colonies. A related result was a shift from viewing Africans as incapable of pursuing development without close guidance to the idea that they could pursue development themselves (1997).

This brief survey of the dynamics of colonial power, and the differential and shifting deployment of developmentalism, highlights that at some point or points, the option of using force or any of a range of restrictive measures to quash unrest in the colonies could no longer be taken up and that instead it became necessary for colonial officials to promote the welfare
and benefit of the colonies. During the same period, liberal, humanist and rights discourses were taken up widely at the international level at the end of World War Two through the 1945 formation of the United Nations, whose charter pointed toward colonial emancipation. In short, in the decline of the colonial era, a change in the strategic situation opens the possibility of a different modality of power: one which relies not predominantly on force, but on the mobilising of subjects made possible through the notion of development.

The Emerging Postwar Development Dispositif

In the same late colonial period, many of the political, institutional, academic and technical elements required for the formation of an international development dispositif were beginning to circulate. To select a few, nationalist leaders in the colonies and ex-colonies were mobilising people on the basis of economic development; the Covenant of The League of Nations stated that "the well-being and development of such peoples [those no longer under colonial rule as a result of World War One] form a sacred trust of civilization" (quoted in Rist 1997:60); and United States president Warren Harding signalled the desire for a globalism when he stated in his inaugural address of March 4, 1921 that: "Mankind needs a world-wide benediction of understanding. It is needed among individuals, among peoples, among governments, and it will inaugurate an era of good feeling to make the birth of a new order" (Harding 1989 [1921] ). Moving to the academic sphere, Eugene Staley predicted in his World Economic Development that there would be "an insistent demand in many parts of the world for rapid progress in economic development after the war" (1944:12). Finally, technical assistance was not only provided to dependent territories: China was provided with assistance in education, transport and the organisation of rural communities through the League of Nations from 1929 to 1941 (Rist 1997:65).

Hence the postwar development effort does not emerge from a central (for example, European) point and cannot be characterised as an intentional project conceived by a meta-Subject. Instead, the institutions, policies and practices which constitute the development project emerge from different quarters and arise out of differential deployments of developmentalism, agonistic relations and reversals in approach. However, a dispositif is not
constituted by such a collection of diverse and unconnected events; it only emerges when it becomes possible to identify "strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge" (Foucault 1980c:194). This did not emerge until the end of World War Two. In addition to a climate of postwar superpower rivalry, a number of key ingredients were necessary for the emergence of the development dispositif: the proliferation of the nation-state as an important form of socio-political organisation in the post-colonial era; the formation of international institutions; and the emergence of developmentalist discourse in relation to the ex-colonies. Each of these developments is formative of the development dispositif and has an enabling relation with the normalisation of the ex-colonies to the criterion of development.

**Nation-States and the Development Dispositif**

The early postwar period saw the proliferation of the nation-state as a dominant form of socio-political organisation as increasing numbers of colonies gained their formal independence. While other forms of political and social organisation were available in the move out of the colonial era, the nation-state was both adopted by colonial elites and insisted upon by colonial powers looking to maintain their influence (McMichael 1996:32). As the development project emerged in the 1950s, the nation-state was the unit for pursuing economic growth: national industrialisation policies, modelled along either Soviet or United States and Western European lines, were more or less ubiquitous in the early decades of the development project (1996:35-36). As the dominant form of political and social organisation in the development project and postwar geopolitical relations, the nation-state is a key site and locus of articulation for the operation of normalisation within the development dispositif. As I will show, nation-states are normalised as units in the global system, and they also are the primary bodies which coordinate the normalisation of Third World populations and subjects through development.

This expanded application of Foucault's mechanism of normalisation signals the emergence of the productive modality of power in a very different historical juncture from that which saw its initial emergence in Europe. International institutional and discursive developments allow the emergence of a dispositif on a scale not seen before; a scale which allows the
insertion and normalisation of nation-states as component elements of an overall apparatus. However, while this operation of normalisation at the macro level of the nation-state diverges somewhat from Foucault's (1979:177-184) focus on the normalisation of individual subjects, it falls well within the horizon of his analytic of power because the focus on the normalisation of the nation-state does not preclude but in fact relies upon the operation of normalisation at a range of other levels and sites, including that of individual subjects.

This argument draws upon Foucault's analysis of the contemporary modality of government in which the individualising technologies of disciplinary power are integrated with wider technologies for the management of populations. (Compare Chapter Two, pp 49-51). While the nation-state can be located as central to the development dispositif, it is not possible to regard it as constitutive of power. Although the various instruments and procedures of the development project refer themselves to the state, they cannot be reduced to it because the state is simply not sufficiently omnipresent, omnipotent, or efficient to manage the intricacies and differential motivations of institutions and subjects which emerge at the site of development efforts and constitute the development dispositif. This accords with Foucault's (1991a:103) argument that it is the diffuse and micro techniques of power which support or give rise to the state. This is not to say that the state is not important but rather that it is "superstructural in relation to a ... whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations" which allow the state to secure its existence (Foucault 1980a:122). In short, analysis of the mechanism of normalisation at the level of the nation-state is not at odds with a Foucaultian perspective, since it seeks to "tap into" an overall operation of power rather than reifying the state as constitutive of power.

Hence, in focusing on the nation-state, I do not want to argue that power is exercised by the state but rather through the state, which acts as a fulcrum for operations of power in the early decades of the development dispositif. In other words, there is a continuity in both downward and upward directions between the operation of normalisation recognisable at the level of the nation-state and more micro operations of biopower which permeate development efforts. Local development efforts give rise to the state and have the effect of regulating and producing social action and Third World
subjects, and, at the same time, nation-states are the units through which power operates at the macro level of the dispositif. I discuss the operation of normalisation later in this chapter, but first want to consider the institutional and discursive developments which make possible the emergence of the development dispositif and the accompanying operation of normalisation.

**The Formation of a Global Framework**

As discussed in Chapter Two, normalisation establishes a single social field and operates through a framework of formal equality. In fact, these characteristics of normalisation also constitute the basis for its operation. A single social field is necessary to enable the relevance of a norm which embodies specific behaviours and characteristics. This norm is in turn necessary as a standard against which social action can be evaluated and regulated. At the same time, the delineated social field must be sufficiently inclusive to obviate the accusation of oppression, to assemble enough subjects for a "useful" operation of power, and to allow subjects "freedom" in relation to the norm such that they take responsibility for regulation of their own actions. While these requirements may be established more easily in a traditional operation of normalisation (for instance, one in which the social sciences study populations within the well established terrain internal to Western nation-states), the post-colonial international context is infused with the legacy of sovereign-style colonial political relations. These relations are frequently cast in terms of binary oppositions such as "developed-underdeveloped", and they are in large part grounded in the logic of exclusion.

Despite the persistence of various oppositions within the development dispositif, the overall transformation to an inclusive framework was effected surprisingly quickly. By 1945, the broad institutional framework for an operation of normalisation had in large part been laid through the emergence of three major international institutions, all of which include development as one of their goals. The formation of the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and The World Bank

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24 Development encounters are characterised by a "dynamic of recognition and disavowal of difference" (Escobar 1997:497) in which Third World subjects are recognised as different but, through the processes of development, are incited to become 'Westernised'.
(initially known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) saw the emergence of an international developmentalist whole - a single social field - and, to the extent that the ex-colonies were seen as independent and capable of development, the conferring of formal equality upon Europe's Others. With decolonisation proceeding apace in the early postwar period, freshly independent colonies joined with other nation-states in the UN which came into existence on 24 October 1945. For the first time, an international "community of nations" was formed. The previous attempt at such an international body, The League of Nations, had always been limited in its membership. Notably, a number of European powers as well as the United States were not members or were only members for a short time, and none of the colonies had input (Luard 1982:10-11). In contrast, the UN initially had a membership of 51 states which included all the major Western powers (compare United Nations 1997a).

The formation of this international whole cannot be separated from the principles of formal equality on which it is based. United Nations membership is open to all states, and the Charter endorses the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all people (United Nations 1998 [1945]: Article 4, Article 1.2). It also sets out that the UN and its members should act in accordance with the sovereign equality of all members (1998 [1945]: Article 2.1). These principles are reinforced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the UN on 10 December 1948. The Declaration states that the rights and freedoms it sets out are to be upheld without any distinction, including those of racial, national, or social origin (United Nations 1999 [1948]: Article 2)25. Hence the formation of the UN contributes to the international whole necessary for a macro-scale operation of normalisation.

Other major international institutions emerged out of the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. Here a meeting of 44 financial ministers, steered by the United States Treasury, founded the IMF and the World Bank. In broad terms, these institutions set out to stimulate international trade and create a

25 The declaration also has two other important effects in relation to my argument here. First, in the sense that it is 'universal', it reinforces the idea of an international whole. Second, by according the nation-state a central position and referring to it in many of the Articles, the declaration contributes to the naturalisation of the nation-state as the dominant form of socio-political organisation (compare United Nations 1999 [1948] ).
viable world economy by establishing an international monetary and banking system (World Bank 1999 [1945]; IMF 1999). As with the formation of the UN, their charters and subsequent operations facilitated the emergence of a postwar "international whole". These institutions are particularly central to normalisation of the Third World.

The IMF and World Bank also confer formal equality on Europe's Others, although their avowedly economic focus, including their aims of promoting world trade and economic growth, mean that this "equality" is framed in a more closely articulated sense. At the opening of the Bretton Woods gathering, conference president and chair of the United States (US) delegation, Henry Morgenthau, foresaw the:

> creation of dynamic world economy in which the peoples of every nation will be able to realize their potentialities in peace and enjoy, increasingly, the fruits of material progress on an earth infinitely blessed with natural riches. This is the indispensable cornerstone of freedom and security. All else must be built upon this. For freedom of opportunity is the foundation of all freedoms (quoted in Rich 1994:54-55).

Here equality is identified with freedom of opportunity to "develop" - to participate in "the increasing enjoyment of the fruits of material progress". That developmentalism is framed as the "indispensable cornerstone of freedom and security" in effect means that the equality offered to all nations and people requires that they subscribe to a developmentalist ethos.

While the institutions formed at Bretton Woods were to become central to the development dispositif, it would be a mistake to argue that the dispositif emerged with any density at this early stage. At the conference the idiom of development was not in circulation, and nor was the aim of developing the

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26 The establishment of formal equality which emerges in the postwar period is obviously not without reservation. In particular, differential voting rights in the various organisations which favour First World nations are frequently commented upon. While these certainly are an important part of the operation of power, they are not my focus here. Instead I am interested in the 'in principle' discourses of 'humanisation' and 'equality'.

27 Morgenthau also exhorted conference participants to focus on the "elementary economic axiom ... that prosperity has no fixed limits" (quoted in Rich 1994:55). In closing the conference which also served as his address to the US public, Morgenthau stated that "we have taken the initial steps through which the nations of the world will be able to help one another in economic development to their mutual advantage and for the enrichment of all" (quoted in Rich 1994:56).
ex-colonies high on the agenda (Meier 1984:9). In fact, these countries viewed themselves more as raw-material-producing nations than as underdeveloped, and, from the other side, they were seen as irrelevant in some quarters. For instance, Lord Keynes wrote to the British Treasury in disparaging terms about the invitation of "Twenty-one countries ... which clearly have nothing to contribute and will merely encumber the ground" (quoted in Meier 1984:9).

The UN adopts a similar focus, albeit not quite so economistic, as the IMF and World Bank. The preamble to The Charter - the same section which reaffirms "the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small" - states that the organisation aims to "promote social progress and better standards of life" and to "employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples" (United Nations 1998 [1945 ]). In contrast to the initially somewhat limited involvement of the IMF and World Bank with the nation-states that would come to be called the Third World, the UN assumed an almost immediate active role through its regional commissions, the most notable of which, the Economic Commission for Latin America, was formed in 1948 (Meier 1984:11). The UN also administers the United Nations Development Program, is linked with numerous specialised development agencies, and has sponsored a series of development decades and world conferences on development.

This proliferation of developmentalism as the shared goal of nation-states in the new world whole is essential to the operation of normalising power in relation to the Third World. As I discussed earlier, it enables the specification of the social field which in turn allows for the establishment of a particular standard or norm necessary for the subsequent evaluation and distribution of subjects and, in this case, nation-states. These "humanitarian" developments thus lay the basis for the operation of normalisation28.

Combined with the world-wide emergence of nation-states, the rise of developmentalist institutions at the international level also begins to provide a framework for the connections and relations that can exist

28 The conferring of formal equality on recently formed nation-states and their people defused the danger of outright confrontation with the mechanisms of power which was evident in the sovereign-style operation of colonial power. Furthermore, the operation of power which does not require a presence based on military power also commands significantly less resources for its operation and therefore is more efficient.
between the heterogeneous elements of the development dispositif. While the nation-state would emerge as the primary terrain of development efforts, the institutions, particularly the UN and World Bank in the 1950s and 1960s, would act as reference and coordination points for the production of development discourse, and the planning and implementation of development programs through their sponsoring of development projects, collection of data and other activities.

These institutional changes are accompanied and reinforced by a number of discursive developments. In some senses this is axiomatic because institutions emerge, in part, through discourse, and because discourse is invariably linked with institutions. The UN, IMF, and World Bank have all been involved in the production of large volumes of reports, surveys, and other development literature from their inception. For instance, the United Nations commissioned a major report, published in 1951, into the situation of the "under-developed" countries (United Nations 1951). However, discourse cannot be reduced to some aspect of the operation of institutions since it has its own relations within a dispositif. Furthermore, development discourse emerges from many other institutions including universities and foundations. For these reasons I want to follow the above overview of the emergence of the UN, IMF and World Bank with a discussion of parallel discursive developments.

The Postwar Deployment of Developmentalism

In the early postwar period, a significant transformation occurs in Western academic and intellectual interest in areas outside Europe, North America and Australasia. In the colonial era, interest was focused predominantly through anthropology, travel, and questions of colonial resources and governance; enterprises which spoke both to colonialism in a narrow sense and to the formation, fears, and titillation of the European bourgeois subject. As I have discussed, these interests, and the form of their discourse, were closely linked with the colonial operation of power. However, with the end of the war and the decline of colonialism, a demand emerges for new types of knowledge, or, at the least, the redirection of existing knowledges. This sees a very different project emerge in the form of developmentalist social science.
As an instance of such knowledge, John Sharpless (1997) shows that the remarkable gains in the prestige of demography in the 1950s and 1960s in the US were a result of its role as a policy science. Concern among policy makers that population growth in the Third World would thwart economic growth and lead to political subversion and, in particular, the expansion of communism, led to the internationalising of demographic knowledge and a major change in US public policy. By exploring the linkages between the discourse of foreign policy experts, corporate leaders, government economic planners, major philanthropic organisations and domestic attitudes to family planning, Sharpless shows not only how demography flourished, but how it was transformed from a largely academic concern prior to the war to a discipline of a distinctly political nature which reflected US foreign policy concerns and enabled widespread programs of population control.

The burgeoning of developmentalist social science - and the development project more broadly - is signalled by the famous Point Four of United States president Harry Truman’s inaugural address. On 20th January 1949, Truman stated:

we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. ... I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. ... The old imperialism - exploitation for foreign profit - has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing (Truman 1989 [1949]).

While the "new program" did not initially attract significant resources and had a difficult passage through Congress, the Act for International Development was signed by the President in May 1950 (Tannous 1957:287), and by the late 1950s significant funding was available for empirical studies in the Third World (Harrison 1988:15).

Truman's speech served as a focal point for the emergence of social science discourse. In his opening article in Underdeveloped Areas: A book of readings and research, Lyle Shannon states that "Underdeveloped areas became a focal point of world interest early in 1949 when President Truman gave
almost singular attention to their problems in his inaugural address" (1957:1). Similarly, in his preface to The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, Bert Hoselitz (1952:v) states that the increase in interest by social scientists in the "problem of economic development and associated cultural changes" is partly due to "the publicity given to the fourth point in President Truman's Inaugural Address" 29.

Reflecting the centrality of economics to developmentalism, development economics emerged as most prominent among the refocussed knowledges. As with other fields of study, this specialised branch of economics emerged as a response to policy imperatives driven by demands from freshly independent nations coupled with paranoia about communist influence. Although three publications emerged in the 1940s on international reconstruction, economists were generally not equipped with the intellectual tools to deal with the situation presented by the early postwar conjuncture (Meier 1984:4-8). However, this situation was to change rapidly and economics was to gain and retain a dominant position in development discourse. John Kenneth Galbraith notes that while in 1949 the study of the economic development of the "poor countries" was considered nonexistent, the following fifteen years saw a reversal to the extent that "No economic subject more quickly captured the attention of so many as the rescue of the poor countries from their poverty .... To be involved with the poor countries provided the scholar with a foothold in the field of study that would assuredly expand and endure" (Galbraith quoted in Escobar 1995:57).

Given its centrality to developmentalism and its early rise to prominence in development discourse, the economic framework to a large extent underwrites the two major competing manifestations of developmentalist social science in the early decades of the development dispositif. As I indicated in Chapter One, these two approaches are modernisation theory, which dominated in the 1950s and 1960s, and dependency or

29 While Truman's Point Four is important, we should avoid investing this speech with undue intention or centrality. Instead, there is a need to give chance and error their appropriate place in history (Foucault 1984a:81). The appropriateness of this approach is demonstrated at this point because Truman's Point Four, which has retrospectively been invested with much importance, can in fact be considered 'accidental'. Rist (1997:70) shows that Point Four was in fact an afterthought in the schema of Truman's overall speech. Suggested by a civil servant, the idea was taken on board as a public relations exercise and only after some hesitation.
underdevelopment theories which contested modernisation particularly in the late 1960s and 1970s.

The study of the "underdeveloped areas" in the 1950s and 1960s attracted a wide range of interest and formed what is termed modernisation theory (Harrison 1988:1). Contributing social science disciplines included economics, anthropology, geography, sociology, political science and psychology. In its broadest formulation, modernisation theory refers to a variety of perspectives and approaches applied to Third World nations by non-Marxists in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, it is possible to briefly thematise modernisation theory and early development studies. First, as I have already indicated, the economic dimension was central. Not only was economics the most prolific discipline in taking up the question of development, but the contributions from other disciplines were from the beginning somewhat secondary in that they were focused on ways of overcoming barriers to economic growth, or on tracing the cultural dimensions of a presumed change in which economic growth was at the centre.

Second, people, institutions, values and societies were typically typologised as either "traditional" or "modern", or as inhabiting distinct stages as part of a "traditional" to "modern" transition, with the implication that the former can, should, and will be supplanted by the latter. Economic historian Walt Rostow presented his "stages of growth" from the "preconditions for take-off" to the stage of "high mass-consumption" (Rostow 1960), and sociologist Neil Smelser theorised changes from premodern to modern social structures (for an overview see Smelser 1968: Part II; Harrison 1988:23). An exception to the dichotomous typology appears in Daniel Lerner's (1964 [1958]) influential *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Here Lerner (1964 [1958]:72-73) identifies several categories of "Transitionals"; people who share some modern traits while desiring and lacking others. Again though, the implication is that the "traditional" will pass over into the "modern". Lerner writes that:

The *Transitionals* are our key to the changing Middle East. What they are today is a passage from what they once were to what they are becoming. Their passage, writ large, is the passing of traditional society in the Middle East (Lerner 1964 [1958]:75).
Third, modernisation theory focused upon the nation-state as the unit of development. Change was viewed as occurring within nation-states, while the impetus for this change would come from outside, through, for instance, technical assistance from the West. Traditional or pre-modern values and culture were to be replaced through a process of "diffusion of modernity" from outside a given nation-state. This involved the transfer of "modern values" such as rationality, a future and achievement orientation, and entrepreneurialism as valuable resources in the pursuit of economic growth. Finally, modernisation theory focused on individuals and groups which might act as "change agents" to get the process of economic growth and modernisation underway. These agents or innovators may embody an entrepreneurial spirit, be well educated, part of a modernising elite, responsive to mass media and so on. In the 1950s and 1960s, numerous manuals published by UN agencies instructed development workers on how to identify such people and increase their influence (Harrison 1988:31).

The emergence of modernisation theory in the 1950s and 1960s represents a massive redeployment and proliferation of developmentalism in relation to Europe's colonial Others. The cumulative, directional, teleological and economistic elements of the developmentalist conceptualisation manifest in modernisation theory as a distinctly "Western" project is globalised to include the ex-colonies. In this redeployment, and in contradistinction to the colonial era, Europe's Others are not excluded as incapable of development as part of a justification of their management and rule by Europeans. Rather, discourse about the Other's capacity for civilisation as linked to their essential nature begins to fade. If we return to Truman's speech, there is no suggestion in Point Four that the people of post-colonial nation-states may not be capable of making use of "scientific advances and industrial progress" for their "improvement and growth". While "tradition" is identified as a barrier or blockage to modernisation theory, it is not seen as insurmountable. Instead the shift in discourse about Europe's Others positions them, including their future subjectivities, within a global developmentalist framework. In short, it reinforces the formation of an international whole and the conferral of formal equality upon Europe's Others, and thereby contributes to the conditions for a shift from a sovereign regime of power.
In developing a critical approach to postwar development, this shift cannot be imbued with intentionality by reducing it, for instance, to a Western initiative or response. The globalisation of developmentalism and the economic approach to social change does not involve a simple imposition of Western ideas but rather relies upon the mobilisation of interests and aspirations of Third World subjects. In the early postwar period, development represented a liberating possibility which was mobilised in the establishment of the nation-states of the Third World (Cooper 1997:64; Cooper and Packard 1997a:9). This was in part possible because material progress and development, often denied under colonialism, clearly did alleviate many of the burdens of colonial life. "Development" also presents as a relatively self-evident and "natural" conception of social and cultural change, and it appears only fair and equitable that, as President Truman (1989 [1949] ) said, the benefits of material progress be available to the "underdeveloped areas".

Hence, along with the formation of international institutions, the emergence of modernisation theory in the early postwar period sees a shift in the "rules of the game" such that the Others are now widely viewed as capable of economic growth\textsuperscript{30}. In the most simplistic terms, through a set of more or less universal stages, they can change and become like the West. This signals not only the obvious conceit of the West and the emergence of a new form of power which I will turn to in the next section, but also a transformation in the problematic of alterity. Whereas non-Europeans had previously not been recognised as possessing the capacity for development and had thereby served as a counterpoint for Western civilisation, they now enter the space of the Western subject and her/his culture as they are able to pursue the same project. While the implications of this cannot be explored in detail here, this change signals that which can be both lost and gained by Western development practitioners and scholars. On the first count, the production of Europe's Others as developmentalist subjects, if successful, limits access to alternative subjective modalities and approaches to social and cultural change. Conversely, the ways in which Third World subjects disrupt Western developmentalism through various appropriations and negotiations at the site of development efforts opens up

\textsuperscript{30} This transformation is obviously not without its ambiguities and complexities. Difference continues to be mobilised - sometimes as racism - and is recurrent throughout development projects and programs.
subjective modalities and approaches to social change if scholars and practitioners are open to their consideration.

While modernisation theory was dominant throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the competing and critical approach of the dependency and underdevelopment scholars had begun to emerge among Latin American economists in the early 1950s. As discussed in Chapter One, the different variants of this approach, which became popular in the late 1960s and 1970s, share an argument that economic development and underdevelopment are part of the same process. In contrast to modernisation theory, which focuses on factors internal to nation-states, these theories stress the incorporation of Third World nation-states into a capitalist world system and the active underdevelopment of the Third World through unfair terms of trade and reliance on primary industries to generate export income. These unequal exchanges, it is argued, contribute to the development of the First World and, as a result, the underdevelopment of the Third World. Underdevelopment theory thus challenged the focus on factors internal to nation-states and the theory, proposed by Rostow (1960) among others, that growth would naturally follow a series of stages according to the model set by the West. Similarly, dependency theory did not see the Third World as intrinsically "backward" but instead viewed the situation as a product of international capital relations.

However, these points of opposition between modernisation and dependency theory belie similarities at a deeper level. The relationship of underdevelopment theory to modernisation theory and developmentalism parallels that between Marx's discourse and nineteenth century analyses of wealth as explicated by Foucault. Just as Foucault (1972:176) argues that Marx's concepts may be "described on the basis of the system of positivity that is already in operation" (compare Baudrillard 1975), underdevelopment theory assumes the same economic principles of scarcity and the centrality of labour as much modernisation theory. It also places the cumulative, directional and teleological conceptualisation of change at its centre, both through its negative as underdevelopment, and by promoting national industrialisation including capital accumulation and technical progress as the means for development. At the same time, though, just as Marx's critical discourse cannot be reduced to that of classical
political economy, underdevelopment theory clearly belongs to a quite
different discursive practice. This is not achieved, however, by breaking
away from developmentalism (Foucault 1972:176). Rather, just as with the
relationship of Marx's discourse to that of political economy, the different
discursive practices of underdevelopment occupy a different position in
developmentalism. The new discourse of underdevelopment is thus not a
transformation of modernisation theory; rather it is at once a radical
critique of it and a theory which belongs to the discursive formation of
developmentalism.

Similarly to the way in which the centring of economic relations in Marxist-
derived approaches does not allow adequate analysis of relations of
domination in general (compare my discussion in Chapter One pp 8-10), the
location of underdevelopment theory in relation to developmentalism
allows only a partial (albeit important) analysis of the operation of power
through development. While the criticisms advanced by underdevelopment
theory serve to explicate economic domination and thereby amount to a
substantial challenge to bourgeois modernisation theory, they remain
internal to developmentalism and thus do not engage the possibility of the
operation of power or domination being transmitted through a historically
contingent conceptualisation of social and cultural change. The
underdevelopment approach elides, in other words, the possibility of
domination through the designation of the Third World as
underdeveloped. This has been signalled by Esteva (1992:11) who has
labelled underdevelopment theory as "colonising anti-colonialism". In
short, in order to consider the operation of power, there is a need to
sidestep the economic framework and turn to the implications of the
proliferation of developmentalism in relation to the ex-colonies which is
engendered by both the major competing paradigms in development
studies.

In turning to this operation of power, it is necessary to keep in mind that
developmentalist social science has a mutually supporting relation with
international development institutions and national development efforts
through a wide range of scholarship, research and institutional connections.
The interconnections between developmentalist discourse, international
institutions and nation-states signal the emergence of the international
development dispositif and a new modality of power in relation to Europe's
Others which is based on formal equality. It is in this context rather than in relation to sovereign-style colonial power that Foucault's conceptualisation and analytic of power is more completely applicable. I now want to consider the operation of power through the international developmentalist whole by discussing the normalisation of the Third World according to the standard of development embodied by the West.

The Normalisation of the Third World

As indicated in my introduction, critical development studies, including post-development literature, have only recently begun to draw on Foucault's work. The notion of normalisation has been drawn upon before, but as far as I can ascertain only in a limited way and rarely in combination with the notion of dispositif. Marc DuBois' (1991) use of Foucault is more rigorous than most others in the post-development literature. However, while Dubois makes reference to the importance of norms, his article focuses strongly upon the exercise of disciplinary power in relation to individuals and the documenting and ordering of populations through development rather than drawing out the operation of normalisation. Debra Johnston (1991) outlines a possible genealogy of development in which normalisation features, but this could be developed further both in its detail and by locating it within the framework of the dispositif. In his influential book, Escobar (1995) makes several references to the normalisation of the Third World alongside his mentioning of the development apparatus, but he does not elaborate how normalisation operates. In short, contemporary critical development studies can be furthered by consideration of the operation of normalisation in the framework of the dispositif. While the following falls well short of completing what needs to be done in this area, it complements and extends the current limited literature and is a framework for further study.

Establishing the Norm of "Development"

Within a specified social field, normalisation requires a norm against which subjects, and, in the expanded notion of normalisation I am proposing, nation-states, are evaluated and distributed. In the postwar international developmentalist whole, this norm is signified by the US, which held the premier position in the world economy and heavily influenced the
characteristics of the world whole through its dominant position in the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank. The US represented the apotheosis of the Western world and thus symbolised the norm toward which other nations should move. Once the norm is identified, it serves as the reference point for the identification of the abnormal (Foucault 1979:183). In a fledgling operation of normalisation, this identification must be made forcefully in order to underline it as an undesirable state which no reasonable person could wish to inhabit; it needs to be installed at the outset and reproduced in discourse as a constant reminder of what is undesirable.

In the postwar development dispositif, this negative position is signified by "underdevelopment". Given that the US embodied the norm, it was fitting that the pronouncement of this condition came from the US president. As a number of observers (Sachs 1990; Esteva 1992) have pointed out, Truman's Point Four designated the majority of the earth's population as "underdeveloped". Henceforth an array of different societies, including hunter-gatherer peoples, pastoralists, small-scale horticulturalists and centralised agrarian empires, were reduced to a state of "underdevelopment" (Alvares 1992; Escobar 1995:53). Esteva (1992:7) provides a sense of the force of this initial differentiation. He argues that with the use of the term "underdeveloped areas" by Truman,

...two billion people became underdeveloped. In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of others' reality: a mirror that belittles them and sends them off to the end of the queue, a mirror that defines their identity, which is really that of a heterogenous and diverse majority, simply in the terms of a homogenizing and narrow minority.

Following Truman's speech, this differentiation was quickly taken up in social science literature through the modernisation approach. Discourse about the "underdeveloped areas" proliferated with a growing number of publications and research programs dedicated to their study (compare Cooper and Packard 1997b). In some instances the descriptive language used was very provocative: in an introductory paper to Shannon's (1957) edited collection, Underdeveloped Areas: A book of readings and research, it was possible to write about "an impoverished and disturbed two-thirds of the world" (Dowd 1957:12). Such discourse served to concretise the notion that
such a thing as "underdeveloped areas" and "underdevelopment" actually existed. Other labels, designations, and terms would proliferate as the various programs of the development project and its operations of power-knowledge unfolded. The Others would be poverty-stricken, illiterate, malnourished, uneducated and, most notably, their economies would be lacking savings and capital. Countries would come to be termed in different ways but the "frontier of the abnormal" (Foucault 1979:183) and an undesirable condition had been defined - no one could say they wanted underdevelopment regardless of whether, in a Cold War climate, they followed the Soviet or American model. In short, the operation of a new regime of power had a profound "truth effect" which produced the "underdeveloped Third World" (Escobar 1995).

While this production of "underdevelopment" is an important operation, it is not the end-goal of normalisation and nor should it be read as a variation on the colonial theme of exclusion. Normalisation does not operate by excluding subjects or entities but by assiduously integrating them into the regime of power, by measuring gaps and by the "art of distributions" (Foucault 1979:141). Rather than identifying a limited number of more or less desirable positionings within the whole, normalisation aims to set up a continuous space of differentiation. It measures gaps and determines levels with the aim of distributing nation-states and subjects within its purview in order to rank them in relation to the developed norm. Thus the identification of "underdevelopment" serves primarily to identify the need for development and thereby to include Europe's Others in the international developmentalist whole.

The closer distribution of the Others in relation to the norm requires the operation of mechanisms of hierarchical observation, which combine the rendering of visibility with the operation of power (Foucault 1979:170-171). Those observed must continually feel scrutinised and adjust their behaviour accordingly. While Foucault's (1979) explication of this mechanism focused on the organisation of military camps and the architecture of Jeremy Bentham's panopticon, the global space of the development dispositif requires a different operation. Here the seemingly innocuous collection of data about the Third World, structured by developmentalist social science and pursued by nearly every agency engaged in development efforts from local government research operations to country-level studies
commissioned by the UN, IMF, and World Bank, performs the same function. This proliferation of writing and statistics renders the nation-states and subjects of the Third World sufficiently visible that they may be distributed against the norm of development.

Differentiating Nation-States: The Centrality of Economy and the GNP per capita Measure

It is in the table that a body of data achieves its most streamlined form. Thus the table is both a "technique of power" as well as a "procedure of knowledge"; it is a way of "organising the multiple", of "providing oneself with an instrument to cover it and master it" (Foucault 1979:148). The exemplar of this operation is the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita income measure, the most frequently quoted statistic in development studies. As early as 1951, a United Nations statistical publication grouped countries of the world according to GNP per capita income levels (United Nations 1957 [1951] )31. In this table, many of the countries of Asia and Africa occupy the lowest band of under $100 (GNP figures are by convention quoted in US dollars), while other countries are distributed over various gradations through to the over $900 band occupied solely by the United States (1957 [1951] ). In this formulation, Third World nation-states are not simply "underdeveloped". Rather, they are attributed a specific social-scientific status in developmentalist social science as a country whose GNP per capita falls within a given range. Through such tables Third World nation-states are made visible and referred to the international developmentalist whole, as, in the space of a few pages, their economic standing is compared to all other nation-states and is judged against the optimum and standard embodied by the United States. While frequently used to refer to the standing of nation-states, the GNP per capita measure also calls up the life of the individual Third World subject, thereby producing the "impoverished Third Worlder" as a basis for comparison by First World experts and philanthropists.

31 Underdevelopment and GNP per capita were linked at an early stage. The UN's influential report on Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries no doubt contributed to this, since while the authors noted that they had some initial difficulty in interpreting the term underdeveloped, they subsequently defined it as a low income compared to those of the US, Canada, Western Europe and Australasia (United Nations 1951:3).
Like other measures, such as those of education, nutritional levels, literacy and rate of investment, GNP per capita enables a finer distribution of the nation-states of the Third World than is effected in this early UN table. Categorisations of GNP per capita typically proceed by the quoting of specific dollar values for a country's GNP. Of particular importance in the publication of such statistics is the World Bank's popular *World Development Report*, which has published GNP and a range of other statistics on an annual basis since 1978. This style of reporting - which belies the statistical inaccuracy inherent in the figures - allows a refined differentiation in relation to the norm of development. This creates the effect of a "natural distribution" which elides the inherently arbitrary nature of the GNP measure. In short, to the extent that they are able to map out a shared economic or social terrain and report in statistical detail, measures such as GNP per capita both become naturalised as vehicles of objective knowledge and naturalise the "underdevelopment" of the Third World, as they render nation-states and subjects visible and distribute them against the developed norm.

Given the emphasis on national output and economic growth in early development efforts and definitions, the GNP measure became, despite its limitations, a key reference point for economists and other social scientists to highlight the necessity for development. For instance, level of national income is important to Douglas Dowd's (1957) characterisation of *Two-Thirds of the World*:

> Although precise national income statistics for the underdeveloped areas are notoriously meagre, the general quality of their income situation is clear. These are, in the fullest sense of the term, poor countries. ... The net national income of the United States in 1949 was around $216 billion, for a population of roughly 150 million - over $1400 per capita. After making all conceivable adjustments for purposes of a realistic comparison, one is struck if not shocked, by the vast difference in per capita income between ourselves and the underdeveloped countries (Dowd 1957:18).

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32 The numerous problems of the GNP measure limit its value as an accurate measure. Some of these problems include the difficulties in obtaining accurate statistics in many countries and the fact that non-monetised exchanges and subsistence consumption are not accounted for. See J. E. Goldthorpe (1996:73-75) for an overview of these and other criticisms.
Here the use of the measure of national income both reduces a diversity of cultures to "poor countries" and calls the reader to recognise her/his privileged and presumably humanitarian position.

Most often employed in the form of a national average through the per capita measure, tables of national incomes form an essential component of readers and textbooks on economic development, and are routinely referred to by national governments, agencies and development practitioners as a justification for their efforts. In this context, the persistence of the GNP measure as a primary development statistic (it is the first statistic cited in the World Bank's Key Table which opens its World Development Indicators), despite widespread criticism regarding its inaccuracies and normative assumptions, can be understood not in terms of its part in the delivery of a humanistic development, but as an integral part of the operation of power in relation to the Third World.

The GNP per capita measure is an important locus of the operation of normalisation within the development dispositif because of its centrality as a reference point for development efforts. This focus on both the economic factor and the nation-state as the hub of early development efforts means that they can be used as a conceptual fulcrum and reference point for orienting the totality of the development dispositif and the relations of power which proliferate through it. This should not be interpreted as a reification of economics and the nation-state as "loci of control", since there is a need to maintain the development dispositif in its appropriate dispersion. Instead, I want to develop a way of thinking about the development project which simultaneously accounts for its most salient characteristics while acknowledging its heterogeneity. As will become clear, the state links broader institutional operations of power with local level operations. First though, the ranking of Third World nation-states against each other and the standard of the West cannot be reduced to purely economic terms since its operation also proceeds in other ways.

Complementing the Economic

While economic growth is central to the development dispositif, the development project has been multi-faceted from its inception, drawing many aspects of the social and cultural life of the Third World into a
developmentalist matrix and transforming them through the imbrication of research, reports and projects which have the effect of acting upon the actions of Third World subjects. The group of experts who prepared the UN report on *Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries* stress the importance of "psychological and social prerequisites of progress" as part of the pre-conditions of economic development (United Nations 1951:13). As I have indicated previously, institutions, religion, values and their transformation from "traditional" to "modern" are prominent in modernisation theory (compare Harrison 1988:29-31; Webster 1990:50-51). Thus what was advocated was not an isolated focus on economic issues but a "comprehensive social transformation", which in many countries is "tantamount to social revolution" (Dowd 1957:12,22). Hence while economic growth is central to development efforts, this cannot be separated from efforts to transform Third World societies more widely and to produce developmentalist subjectivities.

One of the most notable and influential non-economic efforts at "organising the multiple" in the Third World belongs to sociologist Daniel Lerner (1964 [1958] ). In *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Lerner presents the results of his study, begun in 1950, which involved approximately 1600 interviews in the Middle East (Lerner 1964 [1958]:80). This study and the subsequent organisation of data exemplifies a microcosmic operation of discursive normalisation. Lerner establishes a single social field by presenting Ita theory of modernisation that articulates the common compulsions to which all Middle Eastern peoples are subject" (1964 [1958]:77). Having grounded this "unifying principle" in "human history", the next step is to attempt "to clarify the manifest diversity of the living Middle East" (1964 [1958]:77). The result is the assembly of the "principal indices of modernisation" - urbanisation, literacy, voting, media consumption, media production, education - in a table headed "Auditing Modernisation". This is framed as part of a more general attempt at "Ranking the Nations" which refers the nations back to the single social field established by modernisation theory (1964 [1958]:86, 85).

Central to Lerner's study is his aim of showing the importance and relationship of personality types to modernisation. He therefore aims to show that the order in which the countries are ranked corresponds with the attributes of personality types in each country (1964 [1958]:80). In this way
Lerner's work contributes to the development approach which takes the production of subjectivities as its aim. McClelland, a psychologist and contributor to this approach, claimed that personality traits could be correlated with indices of development, and that people should therefore be educated in the value of self-help, competition and enterprising behaviour (Harrison 1988:19). More generally, Lerner's work, as a famous and influential study in early modernisation theory, informs the training of development practitioners and contributes to the density and naturalisation of developmentalism.

While Lerner's approach operates at a relatively theoretical level through an established discipline, many knowledges within the development dispositif are more closely entwined with its dynamics; they emerge as part of policy directions or through the operation of development programs and projects. For instance, Sharpless (1997) discusses the emergence of demography as a postwar discipline, and DuBois (1991) outlines the power effects of its deployment in the Third World. Escobar (1995) has excavated the birth of a more specific professional knowledge - the field of food and nutrition policy and planning - as an operation of power-knowledge, and I will discuss this further shortly.

In the 1970s, the revealing of the many shortcomings of approaches focused on economic growth, and of the GNP per capita measure, led to the emergence of the basic needs approach (McMichael 1996:121-124) and the search for more broad-based human development indexes. (For a discussion of a selection of these indexes, see J. E. Goldthorpe [1996:75-77]). While this shift is frequently framed as part of the humanisation of development, these measures operate in an analogous way to GNP per capita in terms of the operation of power. They serve to evaluate standards of performance in relation to other countries and the developed West, and justify programs and interventions accordingly. As with GNP, these measures are easily divisible thereby effecting a fine and apparently natural distribution from the developed norm.

The wide range of academic disciplines, professional knowledges and statistical measures contributes to the density of the development dispositif. By increasing the facets of Third World life which these disciplines map, they help naturalise the form and standards of development embodied by
the West which Third World nation-states interiorise as a developmentalist ethos. These operations thus lend a density to the developmentalist operation of power, increasing both its durability and that of the developmentalist-normalising framework. In this way they simultaneously contribute to the normalisation of the Third World and to the truth effect of producing the Third World as "underdeveloped".

Thus far I have focused on one aspect of the operation of normalisation: the way it operates in a lateral manner to distribute nation-states against the norm of the developed West, in particular the United States. However, this proliferation of development discourse and statistics cannot be isolated from the dispersion of power through the development dispositif at a range of levels. The operation of power proliferates throughout international development institutions, the nation-states of the Third World, national institutions, regions, municipalities, individual towns and villages, and Third World subjects. It is not therefore undifferentiated: the operation of power exhibits differing levels of density as lines of force come together or move apart at different points in time and space in the dispositif. Key loci of this operation in the early decades of the development project include, as I have already indicated, nation-states and international development institutions. In addition, particular programs and projects are further loci in which the operation of developmentalist power attains density at the more local level. Escobar's (1995:118-144) case study of Food and Nutrition Policy and Planning in Latin America and its application in Colombia illustrates these connections between the international, national and local levels of the dispositif.

The Levels of the Development Dispositif

In the 1970s, interest began to grow in food and nutrition planning among health and agriculture ministries and representatives of international organisations in Latin America. In 1971, an international conference on the topic was held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a number of UN agencies came together to create the Inter-Agency Project for the Promotion of National Food and Nutrition Policies. The Colombian government agreed to participate in the Inter-Agency project at this early

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33 The following four paragraphs draw on Escobar (1995:113-144).
stage. The Inter-Agency group subsequently developed a methodological guide which saw the adoption of a comprehensive and integrated approach in order to formulate a national food and nutrition plan which would be integrated with the national development plan.

The first step in the Colombian plan involved the accumulation of data on the food and nutrition situation of the country to establish an overall picture. This provided the basis for planning, policy formulation, and establishment of financial and technical cooperation. As part of its involvement in funding for the project, the World Bank scrutinised the planned projects closely and ran at least four missions to Colombia before the first loan agreement was signed. One of two major components of the food and nutrition strategy was an integrated rural development plan. This plan set out to provide infrastructure in the form of roads, electrification and water supply, and training and technology to small peasant producers through programs to improve production, education and health. Through this web of institutional and technical operations, local producers were subjected to a range of programs which act upon them to transform them into rational entrepreneurs.

Through its integrated farm management methodology, the integrated rural development program operated a technical register (which contained detailed information on production practices, health, family life and so on) in combination with technical packages for farmers. Here the technique of the examination, which combines hierarchical observation with normalising judgement (compare Chapter Two, pp 62-63), is in operation as a form of knowledge is intimately bound with the operation of power. Through the technical register, peasant practices were observed, scrutinised and evaluated against the norm generated through the national program. In this way local practices are displaced or modified as Third World subjects become integrated into the national program and the development dispositif. In a final process of examination, it is not uncommon for

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34 Two caveats are important at this point. First this operation of power should not be read as unambiguously oppressive since in such situations a complex dynamic of subjection, accommodation and resistance is at play as people negotiate these efforts to transform them into developmentalist subjects. Second, while the Inter-Agency group, the nation-state, and the integrated rural development program are identifiable loci of the development dispositif, other events and sets of relations at a range of levels and sites are important to the genesis of the Colombian program. These include the world food crisis and subsequent UN Food and Agriculture...
development programs and projects such as those studied by Escobar to be evaluated by reference to GNP per capita and a range of other social science statistics effecting a further referral to the development dispositif. Hence the operation of power through development is integrated across local, national and international levels as Third World subjects are subjected to the economistic and technocratic standards of development of the West.

While the foregoing discussion signals the complexity and interrelationship of forces within the development dispositif, it is possible to organise our analysis of the operation of power in the early decades of the development project in relation to the centrality of economism (including the pursuit of economic growth), the nation-state as a key unit of development and, as I have just shown, in relation to key loci at the international, national and project levels. The analytic framework of the dispositif provides a way of coming to terms with the complexity and interconnectedness of the relationships in development. However, to this point I have not discussed the place of the IMF and World Bank; organisations which are typically considered "powerful" in development efforts. Given the importance of such organisations, I further outline the operation of power through development in the rest of this chapter by focusing on the World Bank as an exemplar of the international development institutions and as central to the development dispositif35.

**Positioning the World Bank in the Dispositif**

The World Bank is a lead development institution. It is the largest single lender to the Third World and it designs and oversees the projects which it funds. It also exerts a high level of influence over national economic and development policies and plans as well as other development lenders and agencies. Gustav Ranis, professor of international economics at Yale University, has stated "Other lenders, public and private, may carp, resent,

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Organisation conference in 1974, graduate work at Harvard University by Colombian professionals and ensuing relationships between Colombia and Harvard, and the political economy of Colombian agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s. My aim is here is not to present a comprehensive genealogy of this program but instead identify a way of approaching the complexity of the development dispositif.

35 The World Bank liaises with and in some cases operates in close conjunction with the IMF, UN, and other international institutions. My limited consideration of these linkages is due purely to the limitations of this study rather than any judgement about the place or importance of these other institutions.
at times criticize, and occasionally even deviate from Bank positions ... but there is little question that the Bank dominates the scene in virtually every dimension" (quoted in Caufield 1996:2). Hence the Bank operates as the "head" of the development dispositif, and, as I will show, the centre or the "eye" for the hierarchical observation and regulation of the nations of the Third World in relation to the norm of development.

This operation of power needs to be distinguished from the notion that the World Bank or other international organisations such as the IMF, UN and, more recently, the World Trade Organisation, hold a type of sovereign, imperialistic or hegemonic power over the Third World. As recent World Bank and IMF publications note, these organisations do not have the power to force their members to adopt particular policies or follow particular courses of action (Driscoll 1998; World Bank 1999a). This does not mean that an operation of power is not occurring, but that it cannot be readily elucidated by viewing power as operating entirely through imposition and interdiction. Although it seems permanent, such power rests upon the concatenation of a multiplicity of force relations which flow through the development dispositif not only from top to bottom, but also from the bottom up and throughout the apparatus.

The World Bank is only able to exercise power within the context of the development dispositif, and only because lines of force flow through it at a high level of density. As Foucault argues, while the pyramidal organisation of relations of power gives a dispositif a "head", "it is the apparatus as a whole that produces 'power'" (Foucault 1979:177). Without the continual reproduction of the desire for development within subjects on a widespread scale in the dispositif, this power could not function. For instance, although somewhat inconceivable, if a country were to decide to operate solely on the basis of a subsistence economy with no external exchange relations, the World Bank would not be able to exercise power in relation to that nation-state. In other words, the Bank only gains the "control" it has because it channels (and promotes) a developmentalist rationale installed and legitimated, both at the global level and throughout the development dispositif, through relations of discourse, power and subjectivity.

Studies which are critical of development either avoid or have been slow to take up this conceptualisation of power. For instance, radical critiques of
the Bank tend to speak of the way the Bank has "steadily gained power" in a way that "For many in the Third World, ... harkens back to colonial times" (Danaher 1994:2). Even Escobar's broadly post-structuralist account which makes use of Foucault's conceptualisations of power by noting, for instance, that development should be "seen as a 'strategy without strategists' in the sense that nobody is explicitly masterminding it" (1995:232n26), also states that the World Bank "should be seen as an agent of economic and cultural imperialism at the service of a global elite" (1995:167). Here an unsympathetic reading would see Escobar as arguing that some form of oppressive and imperialistic power is being masterminded through the World Bank on behalf of a semi-conscious global elite. In short, there is a problematic tendency in critical development studies to aggregate the operation of power. What is at stake here is the way power is conceptualised: while the colonial analogy (including use of words such as "imperialism") is evocative and rhetorically powerful, it misses the way in which power operates through the Bank and within the dispositif.

The operation of power through the Bank can be more appropriately analysed by conceiving of the Bank as an influential "panoptic technology" (Foucault 1979:200-208). In other words, the Bank both effects an operation of power, and, through its role as a leader and trainer, influences other institutions and agencies. Central to the operation of panopticism as a political technology is its control of visibility: its makes the subjects and objects of the operation of power visible while limiting its own visibility. This is achieved by the Bank through its closed rather than transparent managerial structure, the use of the tools of modern social science (in particular statistics, economics, and research missions to the Third World), and control of the flow of information gleaned through these tools.

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36 Foucault (1979) presents the panopticon not only as a localised and specific disciplinary technology which allows the supervision of inmates (compare my discussion of hierarchical observation, Chapter Two, pp 62-63), but also as a "generalizable model of functioning" and "the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form" (1979:205). In short, it is "a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use" (1979:205). Hence this technology frequently emerges in a less fully articulated form than in Bentham's panopticon. However, the distribution of individuals or groups in relation to one another, a focus on the surveillance or visibility of the objects of power, and the hierarchised observation or study of the targets of the operation of power are key elements which recur across a wide range of contexts and settings including the international development dispositif.
As a starting point for tracking the rise of the operation of power through the Bank, it is important to note that it was not designed as a panoptic technology and that the characteristics which allow it to operate as one only emerge through a mixture of chance and the negotiations of a range of forces and actors. Following the Bretton Woods meeting of 1944 where Articles of Agreement were drafted for the Bank and IMF, support for the new organisations was not widespread, and it was only after a substantial public relations campaign in the US that they formally come into being on 27 December 1945 (Caufield 1996:43-45). The Bank also had difficulty attracting presidents to head the organisation and there was a widespread perception that it would be unsuccessful (1996:49-50).

Following an initial period of turmoil and the resignation of the Bank's first president after only six months in the position, the situation stabilised with the appointment of John McCloy as president in 1947 (1996:52). Key to McCloy's appointment and the future operation of the Bank was the negotiation of the terms of his acceptance of the position. McCloy managed to negotiate a high level of autonomy from the Board, which saw the Bank become a management-driven institution rather than one accountable to the executive directors who reported to member countries (Rich 1994:67; Caufield 1996:52).

From these early beginnings the Bank has been very closed about its operations and although its overtly economistic focus was indicated in both its operations, and Articles of Agreement, little was known about the Bank's opinions and activities in its early decades (Hayter 1971:21). Even the executive directors (EDs) of the Board of the Bank were not particularly well informed of its operations. In the early decades of Bank operations, EDs were denied access to all documents classified "internal", and while this situation has changed more recently, EDs are sometimes required to sign confidentiality agreements before being provided with documents (Caufield 1996:237-238). As a former US director says, "The overriding principle is that the management is in charge of the Bank and they should only provide the directors with the information they feel the directors need" (Patrick Coady quoted in Caufield 1996:238). In this way, the Bank limits its visibility, ensuring that it is screened from scrutiny by the representatives of member countries.
At the same time, the Bank renders Third World nation-states visible through processes of surveillance, evaluation and judgement carried out by World Bank personnel and consultants during Bank "missions". These analyses are typically focused upon either evaluating specific project proposals or determining a country's general creditworthiness by considering the regulatory and economic environment provided by government (Hayter 1971:65, 51). Both types of surveillance are exercises in "examination" which combine relations of power and knowledge to make it possible to observe hierarchically and judge against the norm embodied by the Bank.

The results of such examinations, in the form of Bank reports on particular projects or countries, are typically restricted to the government of the country concerned, the Board of the Bank and a few select individuals (Hayter 1971:21; Caufield 1996:29). Jonathan Cahn (1993) outlines the tight control of these and other documents produced by the Bank. Some highly classified documents, including those generated in the lending cycle, do not circulate within (or outside) the Bank. Documents arising out of final review and approval stages of a loan are made available to the Bank president, to Executive Directors and hence member countries. United States corporations and citizens are able to access these documents through a reading room once the loan is approved, and they may be provided to NGOs at the Bank's discretion. However, at no point do Third World country citizens have access to the documents. In short, the Bank operates as a panoptic technology by maintaining control over information flows. Through this control the Third World is rendered visible while the Bank remains protected from scrutiny. At the centre of this process is the examination. To explore the examination and the power-effects generated therein, it is useful to again return to the early years of the Bank's operations.

In its early years, the Bank made relatively few loans. This was in part because the massive disbursements to European countries under the Marshall Plan made the Bank irrelevant for reconstruction in Europe, and because of the much lower than expected level of demand from

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37 This is obviously the general situation and does not preclude 'shocks' to the Bank's modus operandi such as the Morse report on the Narmada river dam in 1992 (compare Caufield 1996:25-28).
"underdeveloped countries" (Rich 1994:68; Caufield 1996:53, 56). A second reason is found in the Bank’s hesitancy, from the very beginning of its operations, to loan for non-specific purposes. This reflects the Bank's Articles of Agreement and its requirements for credibility with financial markets. These factors were manifest in the caution of its early presidents, including their refusal to lend for projects which were not closely specified. As a result, many projects were judged not viable by the Bank in its early years (Rich 1994:68).

The Bank was also only inclined to lend for particular types of projects. The 1947-48 Annual Report reflected the Bank’s Articles of Agreement (World Bank 1999 [1945] ) and heavily economistic focus by concluding that increased capital investment, trade and technological development were required for the increasing of production and incomes in underdeveloped countries (Rich 1994:72). The 1951 annual report stated that "an adequate supply of power, communications and transportation facilities is a precondition for the ... industrialization and diversification of the underdeveloped countries" (quoted in Caufield 1996:62). This approach, and the accompanying focus on large infrastructure projects, was to dominate the Bank's lending focus for approximately the next two decades, and to become the dominant approach in the provision of foreign assistance.

Given its lack of credibility due to a poor lending record in its initial months of operation, the Bank began to both heavily influence the projects put forward by "underdeveloped nations" - both in type and presentation - and to create demand for its services. A prominent Bank official, Warren Baum, admitted in 1970 to the need to stimulate and assist in design of projects: "We do not get enough good projects to appraise unless we are involved intimately in their identification and preparation" (cited in Rich 1994:68). Teresa Hayter (1971:50) notes that, from the 1950s, the Bank increased its level of influence over both the types of projects and their design. In particular, acting upon the organisations responsible for administering the projects, specifying requirements for financial viability, and thorough preparation of feasibility studies involving the use of foreign consultants all became part of the Bank's mode of operation (1971:50).
Escobar's (1995:86) discussion of the case of a loan to Chile in 1948 - the World Bank's first loan to an "underdeveloped" country - exemplifies this process and the disciplinary technique of the examination. Chile initially applied for the loan in September 1946, but the Bank's study of the loan application described it as vague and insufficiently prepared (Escobar 1995:86; Caufield 1996:51). In short, the proposal put forward by the Chileans was judged as unsatisfactory according to the norm embodied by the Bank. Here the superimposition of power and knowledge relations is most evident; the modalities of knowledge drawn upon by the Chileans to prepare their application are rendered illegitimate as they are scrutinised through the knowledge practices and standards of the Bank. The Bank came upon "a completely undigested list of projects", and "more of an idea about a project" than something which allowed the requirements of the various dimensions of the project to be "accurately forecast" (World Bank economist quoted in Escobar 1995:86). In this exchange, the Chilean way of proceeding is simultaneously obscured and displaced by a technocratic and economistic modality and the normalising gaze of the Bank.

How though, was power exercised in the early stages of this exchange? The hierarchical position the Bank held in relation to the Chilean officials is no doubt linked to the decision-making power it exercises in relation to whether or not the funds would be disbursed. However, power also comes from below and it can only be articulated within the dispositif. In other words, the exercise of power by the Bank was only possible given that the Chilean officials had a desire for development, and because the Bank was (and still is) accorded a position of importance in the development dispositif given its connection with the developed West.

Over the course of negotiations which led to the granting of the loan, various disciplining and training operations were completed: Chile reached a settlement on outstanding loans with existing creditors, and the Bank was involved in assisting with economic analysis, financial planning, and engineering and organisational design (Caufield 1996:51-54; Escobar 1995:86). By the time the loan was made, the project in question was substantially modified, signalling an operation of power in which Chilean officials were "trained" and moulded to the aims and modalities of the World Bank. Here Chilean officials could not be said to have been forced into accepting the Bank's terms. Rather, their actions were modified by
another set of actions hence constituting an operation of power. In this process, requirements for the future were also signalled. The Bank had demonstrated what it required in the preparation of loan applications, and therefore, as Escobar (1995:86) argues, the need for social technicians who manage (and reproduce) the discourses, practices and symbols of the development dispositif.

From its early years, the operation of power through the Bank was not limited to the influence it exerted over the type of projects or their administration. Despite the specification in the Articles of Agreement that the Bank should only lend for specific purposes and that it should not interfere in the political affairs of its member countries (Rich 1994:57), it nevertheless extended its influence. For instance, the 1947-48 annual report declared that technical and intellectual leadership would be important to its relations with underdeveloped nations: technical aid would "define the shape of a sound over-all development program" (1994:73).

One way this occurs is through the administration of technical assistance provided through projects. In the case of the provision of a series of loans to Thailand's State Railways (SRT), the Bank recurrently analysed rail operations and negotiated policy and other changes deemed necessary for the SRT's efficiency (Muscat 1990:106). Again in Thailand, the involvement of a US engineering firm in the electricity industry demonstrates the substantial effects of technical assistance.

Robert Muscat states that:

Rogers Engineering established close relationships with the small cadre of senior Thai power officials and found itself in a position to provide fundamental training, institution-building, and system design services, including preparation of the first master transmission and distribution plan for the country as a whole, a plan the Thai authorities followed for many years (1990:109).

The involvement of Rogers Engineering was followed by World Bank funding for a series of large hydroelectric projects (1990:109).

A further way in which the bank engages in "technical leadership", and thereby creates demand for its services, is through "institution-building".

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38 This assistance was in fact provided by USAID (United States Agency for International Development). However, the Bank was subsequently heavily involved in funding of power projects in Thailand.
This practice sees the provision of funding and other assistance, for example, guidance with drafting legislation, for the establishment of semi-autonomous agencies within Third World countries which are more directly accountable to the developmentalist orientation of the Bank than to national representatives (Rich 1994:74-75; Caufield 1996:59-60). Institution-building serves to create and sustain the demand for Bank financing: by the early 1970s, more than half of the Bank's loans were to agencies it had helped to establish (Caufield 1996:60).

This is not to suggest that the Bank operates independently of nation-states. As I have discussed previously, it is only able to exercise power through the development dispositif on account of the desire of nation-states, other agents and innumerable subjects for development. The Bank's arrangements for such semi-autonomous agencies are negotiated with member countries, and while the Bank may loan directly to the agencies or to private organisations, the loan must be guaranteed by the state. The centrality of the nation-state in the early decades of the development project, and the necessity that the Bank be seen to not transgress its sovereignty, is evident in the Bank's mission to Colombia in 1949; despite the fact that the Bank organised the mission, it depicted the resulting report as a Colombian document (Caufield 1996:59).

The Colombian mission also signals the way the Bank began to act more broadly upon Third World nation-states from the 1950s, and simultaneously take up a central role in the development dispositif by governing development directions and economic policy. The preface of the Bank's 1966-67 annual report includes the following statement from its then president, George Woods:

> We early concluded that any developing country would benefit from having some kind of programme as a framework for development.... We have therefore developed a practice of organizing expert missions to visit individual countries and to draw up comprehensive recommendations that serve as a basis for working out a detailed development programme. ... This is more and more what we find ourselves talking about with our member countries - fundamental policies to govern their day-to-day economic decisions (quoted in Hayter 1971:53).
The mission to Colombia in 1949 was the first expert Bank-sponsored effort to develop a comprehensive development plan. In this examination of Colombia, a team of foreign experts prepared a comprehensive analysis of the Colombian economy, which included a 642 page report and a $2.5 billion program of investment in a wide range of sectors (Caufield 1996:58). The mission resulted in Bank assistance in the setting up of a National Planning Council (to improve the Bank’s confidence in Colombia’s ability to manage projects), in Colombia becoming one of the Bank’s biggest clients, and in the proliferation of power-knowledge throughout Colombian society, including its transformation according to the modalities and requirements of the development dispositif (compare 1996:58-61). From these early beginnings the Bank undertook similar missions in other countries (compare 1996:60).

These examinations of Third World nation-states according to the standards of the Bank played a large role in establishing it as a sort of official policy guide in development efforts (Escobar 1995:164). However, such country-missions are also complemented by a range of other activities which extend the Bank's influence over Third World nations and throughout the development dispositif. To select a few of these activities, continuously and rigorously examining the economies of the nation-states of the Third World has become a common practice of the Bank. Hayter notes that this is "a continuous process, based on work at Head Office, visits to borrowing countries to gain first hand knowledge of their economies, and frequent contact with government and other officials" (1971:152). The Bank provides "intellectual leadership" through the Economic Development Institute (EDI). Formed in 1956, the EDI provided courses in development theory and practice for senior officials from its borrowing countries. Soon after its formation, the EDI began to offer practical instruction on World Bank project appraisal techniques (Rich 1994:75) - in short, training in the symbols and practices of economistic and technocratic developmentalism.

Finally, from the late 1950s, the Bank has set up and led consortia and

39 The EDI and the Learning and Leadership Centre are now incorporated within the World Bank Institute. This organisation:

...provides training and other learning activities that support the World Bank's mission to reduce poverty and improve living standards in the developing world. WBI's [The World Bank Institute's] programs help build the capacity of World Bank borrowers, staff, and other partners in the skills and knowledge that are critical to economic and social development (World Bank Institute 1999).
consultative groups of other lenders, donors and agencies. These groups, which can coordinate all foreign assistance to a particular country, have also served to extend the Bank's influence (Hayter 1971:79, 108; Rich 1994:76).

In sum, the operations of the World Bank are a particularly dense and key locus of force relations in the development dispositif. The Bank operates as a panoptic technology which engages in hierarchical observation and normalising judgement of Third World nation-states. The economism of the Bank is manifest in all its activities, including its processes of examination through which it creates the demand for projects, and influences the characteristics of projects, how projects will be carried out, the overall shape of a country's development program, and other agents of the development dispositif. Thus the World Bank is a leader in the regulation, surveillance and training of Third World nation-states: it mobilises agents to fit the requirements of the Bank and the development dispositif. This centrality of the World Bank and the power it exercises emerge as a result of its managerial structure, and the way, as an influential panoptic technology, it has been able to channel the lines of force of the development dispositif.

Nevertheless, the fact that this same centrality has only emerged over time through various contingencies and following unstable beginnings indicates the relational and contingent nature of the power exercised by the World Bank. The central position of the Bank cannot be isolated from other elements of the development dispositif. The Bank liaises directly with the nation-state, which, in the early decades of the development project, is the key organising and coordinating body for the implementation of development. In turn, national development planning and programs encouraged by the Bank are integrated with and gain their justification in individual projects and programs which are further loci of the operation of power. By facilitating this conceptualisation, the analytic framework of the dispositif allows us to account for the centrality of organisations such as the World Bank without lapsing into a sovereign or imperialistic view of power which obscures the chance events and multiple negotiations which have led to its central and influential position. The deployment of Foucault's notion of dispositif and his conceptualisation of power highlight that institutions such as the World Bank do not impose power, but rather occupy a powerful position as a result of a concatenation of innumerable power relations at a
range of levels. Hence such institutions channel lines of force through the mobilisation and reproduction of the desire for development which circulates throughout the dispositif in innumerable agents and actors.

In summary, the decline of the colonial era saw a change in strategic possibilities for the operation of power. This included the differential deployment of developmentalism and allowed the possibility of the macro-scale mobilisation of subjects of the (ex)colonies through the notion of development. This shift from a sovereign modality of power signals the relevance of Foucault's conceptualisation of power as predominantly productive rather than repressive or negative. In the shift to a developmentalist modality of power in the early postwar period, three key ingredients led to the formation of the international development dispositif: the emergence of the nation-state as a widespread form of social and political organisation, the formation of developmentalist international institutions, and the emergence of developmentalist discourse in relation to the ex-colonies. These phenomena result in a deployment of developmentalism in relation to the Third World (particularly through developmentalist social science), the generalisation of a Western economistic approach to social change, the formation of an international developmentalist whole, and a transformation in the problematic of alterity including the conferring of formal equality on Europe's others within the constraints of the norm of development. Within this framework, Third World nation-states and subjects are normalised through the proliferation of developmentalist social science, including statistics such as GNP per capita and publications and research reports which are imbricated with development programs and projects. Development thus emerges as a massive operation of power-knowledge through its efforts to introduce developmentalist machinery and produce developmentalist subjects.

The analytic framework of the dispositif provides a way of organising analysis of these relations of power by allowing the importance of particular loci (such as the pursuit of economic growth or the nation-state as a key unit of development) without reducing development to them, or eliding the interrelationships between international, national and local levels. It similarly provides a way of coming to terms with the concentration of force relations through certain points of the dispositif such as the World Bank without lapsing into sovereign conceptualisations of
power. Thus while I have only provided a brief outline of the operation of power through the early decades of development efforts, the framework elaborated here may prove a valuable basis for further study. This is not to suggest that the notion of dispositif can be used as an abstract framework. Such an approach is not possible because a dispositif emerges through the multiplicity of contingent relations of power, knowledge, and subjectivity which are played out in various locales. This signals the flexibility of the dispositif as an analytical tool and hence its usefulness for analysing the way in which development shifts direction and reinvents itself. For this reason, it increases our analytical purchase on the recent reshuffle of development in the 1980s and 1990s, which includes the rise of neoliberalism, the weakening of nation-states, the rise of non-government organisations (NGOs) and "new" initiatives such as sustainable development. I turn to this reconfiguration of development in the next chapter.
Chapter Four: The Changing Development Dispositif

From the late 1970s and into the 1980s, a number of events and shifts signal a significant reshuffle of the development dispositif. These include the emergence of the "basic needs" approach, a shift from import-substitution industrialisation to export-oriented industrialisation in the pursuit of economic growth, the debt crisis of the 1980s and the associated shift in policy, the weakening of nation-states, the rise of non-government organisations (NGOs), and the proliferation and increase in popularity of approaches such as eco-, participatory, community, autonomous, and sustainable development. In this reshuffle "development" is both dispersed and reinvented; it is no longer tied so closely to the nation-state and economic growth, but its tropes recur across a range of contexts and "new" development initiatives.

In this chapter I consider this reconfiguration by drawing upon the interpretive and analytical grid developed so far in this thesis. This allows for the drawing out of continuities and discontinuities between recent shifts and initiatives in development and sets of relations of the earlier development dispositif. Drawing upon the dispositif as an analytic framework allows for the increased heterogeneity of development introduced by these shifts, and an analysis of the rise of NGOs, the growth of interest in civil society and associated notions of autonomy and empowerment which does not view these changes as necessarily emancipatory, or prejudge their power-effects. To demonstrate this approach, I discuss the high-profile microcredit movement. In the later part of this chapter I consider the widespread reinvention of development as sustainable development within the context of contemporary developmentalism and the development dispositif. The limitations and possibilities explicated in this process allow me to conclude by highlighting the critical approaches available to development scholars and practitioners given the contemporary state of play of development efforts. Given the centrality of economic growth to development, I begin by discussing major economic shifts, and their relation with the operation of power, before turning to other aspects of the reconfiguration of the dispositif

The following section draws on Philip McMichael (1996:79-143) for the discussion of shifts in political economy.
In the economic sphere, the two most notable aspects of the reshuffle of the development dispositif are the shift by Third World nations from import-substitution industrialisation to export-oriented industrialisation and the debt crisis of the 1980s. These events were associated, particularly in the 1980s, with the neoclassical counter-revolution in development economics (compare Todaro 1989:82-85). By the 1970s it had become clear that economic growth through the development project was not unfolding in the uniform way that had been expected, with significant divergences emerging in levels of industrialisation and economic growth among Third World nation-states. In particular, the growth rates of a select few countries, the newly industrialising countries (NICs), were higher than other countries in the 1960s and 1970s. This was due in large part to a combination of substantial foreign investment resulting from their strategic geopolitical positions, preferential access to the US market, and authoritarian domestic regimes\textsuperscript{41}. An export orientation and access to First World markets were particularly important to the economic success of these countries.

While the inconsistencies and disparities in wealth generated by the dominant approach saw the emergence of the "basic needs" approach, which emphasised factors other than increases in income, and interpretations of "underdevelopment" as a historical condition by Neo-Marxist dependency theory, the norm of economic growth and higher levels of GNP per capita remained firmly installed. At the same time, problems were seen to be emerging in the effort to achieve economic growth, especially in Latin America, because of the argument that industrialisation based on import substitution strategies led to growing foreign exchange bills and saturated domestic markets. The resulting need to generate foreign exchange and external markets in the pursuit of economic growth, combined with the demonstration-effect of the success of the NICs, resulted in national governments pursuing an export orientation which drew on the networks of transnational corporations (TNCs).

\textsuperscript{41} The NICs are Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, and Mexico. Hong Kong and Singapore are peculiar because, as port cities, they serve as centres for trade, marketing and financial services. In the context of the Cold War, all the other NICs held strategic positions as important states in their regions (McMichael 1996:82-83).
In a move which signalled the beginning of the shift from a nationally to globally pursued development effort, Third World governments began to favour export market considerations to pursue economic growth by adopting policies to attract foreign investors to their export-oriented industrialisation programs. A range of concessions were facilitated through the establishment of export processing zones (EPZs). Advantages and concessions offered for TNCs operating in the zones included location convenience for exporting (for example, on border zones), tax exemptions or concessions, infrastructure support, and free trade for exports and imports. A further concession is cheap labour not protected by domestic laws and regulations on working conditions. Through these policies the role of Third World governments as agents facilitating the incorporation of their subjects into the development dispositif is intensified; by 1995, there were more than 230 EPZs across over 70 countries employing nearly 4.5 million workers, often in very harsh conditions and with limited protection from labour laws (Abott 1997:232-233). The mobilisation of the labour force for the EPZs emerged through the strenuous disciplining of workers both in dormitories attached to company operations and in the factories themselves (1997).

The shift to export-oriented industrialisation was also pursued through a massive increase in state lending, enabled by a surplus of funds for loan in the global economy in the 1970s. Private banks freely made unsecured loans to Third World states, which led to a dramatic rise in the proportion of financing of Third World industrialisation from private sources: by the 1980s, approximately 60% of loans to the Third World were by private banks (McMichael 1996:127). The servicing of these loans became more difficult for Third World countries from 1980 when the United States reduced its money supply leading to a rise in interest rates - a period in which Third World nations also had to contend with recession in the First World and falling primary export commodity prices.

Combined with the recently adopted export orientation, the management of the potential defaulting on these loans signals the beginning of the reconfiguration of the position of the nation-states of the Third World within the development dispositif. In a situation in which widespread default was likely, the responsibility for the problems in meeting loan
repayments was placed with the national economic policies of Third World countries, as the IMF and World Bank took the leading role in the management of debt. Through the by now infamous stabilisation and structural adjustment measures, the IMF and World Bank insisted on reductions in public spending, currency devaluation, privatisation of state enterprises, and reduction of wages and other measures to attract foreign capital. These measures involved the downsizing of the state, increased pressure to generate foreign exchange through exports, and the weakening of the position of the nation-state as the unit through which development is pursued.

The management of potential default on loans in the 1980s required that Third World nation-states accept the vision of economic policy and development co-authored by the Bank and the IMF, and that they transfer this vision and its impacts to local populations. One of the main ways this occurred was through the imperative to provide an attractive investment opportunity for transnational capital through measures such as EPZs. This new role for the nation-state involved a reshuffle of the lines of force in the development dispositif, including a consolidation of the position of the World Bank and IMF and intensification of their role as institutions of governance at the expense of the sovereignty of the nation-state. World Bank and IMF documents openly state their practices of linking funding with economic policy and governance factors in the countries they negotiate with. For instance, the World Bank states that it takes "governance factors" into account when considering a loan. "Good governance" consists of "improving public sector management ..., ensuring economic and financial accountability, maintaining predictability in applying rules and regulations, and ensuring the availability of and access to information about the economy" (World Bank 1999a:6). There is a similarly strong linkage between the IMF's financing activities and conditionality requirements which foreground a governance role: "the central purpose of its [the IMF's] financial activity is to buttress a code of international behaviour" (Guitián 1992:24).


For more on the linkage between IMF financial assistance and conditionality, see David Driscoll (1998), Harold James (1998), Masson and Mussa (1997), and IMF (1998). Manuel Guitián, Associate Director of the Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, argues in a 1992 IMF publication that "economic policy surveillance is at the heart of the institution's
Nation-states assume a weaker position in the development dispositif, as development is no longer defined as nationally managed economic growth but instead involves global market participation by producers, communities, regions and states driven by neoliberal principles. Economic growth, in the framework of neo-classical economics, is derived from efficiency gains made in the world economy by each region or country pursuing its comparative advantage. In this uneven process, Third World states must promote their comparative advantage to compete with other states. This typically involves the provision of cheap labour and raw materials and a sensitivity to the requirements of world capital, particularly transnational corporations, in order to attract sufficient investment. In short, they become more like actors pursuing development in a global developmentalist order rather than autonomous coordinators of national development.

The shift to an export orientation by Third World nation-states and the management of the debt crisis of the 1980s are thus accompanied by a neoclassical economic orientation and reconfiguration of the position of nation-states in the development dispositif. While development was previously strongly mediated by relatively autonomous nation-states, which, although pursuing similar goals, set independent development objectives, states now take up the position of actors within the global market framework. Economic relations and power relations interact in a way which see lines of force become more dense through the IMF and World Bank as these institutions assume a larger governance role in development, while nation-states take up a less autonomous role under the former's guidance. This change has uneven impacts in the Third World. Some nation-states, regions and subjects are integrated into the world economy, thereby gaining the benefits on offer. Equally though, other nation-states, regions and subjects are marginalised as production shifts to other sites, as their land is appropriated for development, or as they are otherwise excluded from the benefits of economic growth.

This aspect of the reshuffle of development sees a recasting of the norm for the operation of nation-states in the international development dispositif.

 responsibilities" and that "most of the other functions of the IMF are ultimately diverse modalities of surveillance" (1992:5, 22). In this sense the IMF deserves to be considered primarily as a governance institution.
Economic growth is still the goal and hence GNP per capita remains an important reference point. However, in the shift to an export-orientation and the policy direction encouraged by the IMF and World Bank, a large portion of that part of development efforts which pursues explicitly economic goals becomes privatised through the courting of TNCs. Economic wealth remains central, but the new and more diffuse norm to which states must strive is a "neoliberal orientation". As Philip McMichael (1996:111) argues, development is redefined as successful participation in the world market.

The rise of neoliberalism and the associated shift in the role of the nation-state, particularly the downsizing of the functions of social welfare and development at the expense of banking and financial systems, also sees a greater role for NGOs in development efforts. For instance, Abu Sarker (1996:4) notes that in the case of Bangladesh, reduction in public services and state spending was accompanied by increased support for NGOs by Bangladesh's external development partners. More generally, this has resulted in the emergence of NGOs as prominent players in development efforts. The World Bank states that:

From 1970 to 1985 total development aid disbursed by international NGOs increased ten-fold. In 1992 international NGOs channelled over $7.6 billion of aid to developing countries. It is now estimated that over 15 percent of total overseas development aid is channelled through NGOs (1999b).

NGOs are also at the centre of the proliferation of a range of approaches including eco-, participatory, autonomous and sustainable development which are, in many respects, less directly informed by the drive for economic growth. (For further discussion of the increase in the role of NGOs see Julie Fisher [1998]). In other words, these diverse shifts see the dispersion of development beyond the economic sphere.

In moving to consider the rise of NGOs and the dispersion of development which began with the basic needs approach and has continued with the above-mentioned approaches, there is a need to move beyond political economy approaches such as that of McMichael (1996). McMichael's argument is that the reshuffle of development over the 1970s represents a shift from the "development project" to the "globalisation project": a shift
from a nationally to a globally managed pursuit of economic growth. His argument very usefully highlights, as I have indicated above, numerous significant events in the sphere of political economy. However, the adherence to this framework also puts limits upon his analysis.

As I have discussed both in Chapter One and in my comments about the relationship of underdevelopment theory to developmentalism in Chapter Three, the centring of economic relations is not a satisfactory basis on which to reveal domination in general nor in the particular case of the operation of power through development. While McMichael's approach is slightly different, his continued centring of economic relations leads to similar problems. His assessment of the changes in development, and his thoughts about future prospects, tend to be framed in terms of the extent to which non-economic elements arising as part of the reshuffle of development resist or have the potential to challenge the dominant economistic paradigm. For instance, he argues that globalisation (conceived primarily as an economic process) weakens nation-states, but where this occurs, "citizens have fresh opportunities to renew the political process... [and generate] opposition" (McMichael 1996:211). These "responses to globalisation" include fundamentalism; new social movements such as environmentalism, feminism and the cosmopolitan localism exemplified in the Chiapas indigenous movement; and the reinvigoration of civil society more generally. The importance of the new social movements is particularly manifest in the approaches adopted by NGOs.

McMichael's summary of these movements and the prospects for development lead him to offer an opposition between economic "globalists" who embody a rational and neoliberal economistic ethos, and cultural "localists" who advocate local knowledge, small-scale communities, and expressivism and self-empowerment (McMichael 1996:255-256). This separation of economic sets of forces and relations from the non-economic exhibits two main problems. First, while this approach does serve to critique the economistic paradigm, it also delineates and highlights economic discourse and practice, thereby helping to give it shape and coherence. In other words, it privileges the economic to the extent that non-economic elements of the development dispositif are framed against economism. Second and more problematic is that, as with underdevelopment theory, the approach which takes one set of relations,
which are internal to developmentalism, and makes them the centre of the consideration of domination, elides the way in which relations of power also proceed through non-economic relations.

In other words, the investing of expressivist, culturalist and localist movements with the power to subvert dominant economism and development (McMichael 1996:256) limits the analytical purchase we can bring to bear upon the reshuffle of the development project and the current conjuncture, because it elides the extent to which development is much more than an economic phenomenon. In doing this it limits interpretation of developmentalism as a culturally and historically contingent conceptualisation of social change, and diverts attention from the ways in which the movements that have emerged with the reshuffle may themselves be part of an operation of power. It also diverts attention from the likely linkages between the "economic" and "non-economic" in the "new" initiatives which emerge through the reshuffle of development.

In this context the interpretive and analytical grid developed so far in this thesis provides a framework to both deal with this complexity and extend the analytical purchase we can bring to bear upon the reconfiguration of development and the current conjuncture. The broad interpretive grid developed in Chapter Two allows for the location of development and its shifts in a cultural and historical frame, thereby providing a broad means to assess how "new" initiatives relate to or displace developmentalism. The notion of dispositif allows us to maintain the various elements of the reshuffled development project and the accompanying relations of knowledge, power and subjectivity in their appropriate dispersion. This means that an initiative need not be reduced to any particular set of relations. The dispositif also allows the drawing out of the interconnectedness among various sets of relations that emerge in "new" initiatives in development, such as autonomous development, the microcredit movement and sustainable development, in order to consider how development reinvents itself. To develop and concretise this framework in the remainder of this chapter, I first consider the relationship between liberalism and relations of power and governance, before turning to the rise of neoliberalism and NGOs as the most notable general shifts in the reconfiguration of the development dispositif. I then discuss the notions
of autonomy and empowerment which are prominent in NGO discourse before turning to the microcredit movement and sustainable development.

**Neoliberalism, Power and Governance, and NGOs in the Shifting Development Dispositif**

A central theme in Foucault's work on power and his discussions of governmentality is the correlation between the rise of the self-regulating and self-producing subject of liberalism and the increasing penetration of the mechanisms of power and governance into both the social and individual body. Foucault disrupts conventional political theory by showing that while liberalism, as both a political theory and rationality of government, concerns itself with a self-determining and autonomous subject, it is actually under the cover of and through such a view and modality that contemporary power and governing proceeds (Foucault 1991a; 1997a; 1997b). The "free subject" of liberalism is produced as s/he is acted upon and acts upon her- or himself without the need for the operation of power as imposition or interdiction. Hence the extension of a certain type of control and governing of human subjects is consistent with the principle of liberal political rationality that "One always governs too much' - or, at any rate, one always must suspect that one governs too much" (1997b:74).

Through their work on governing in advanced liberal societies, other scholars - for example, Barry, Osborne and Rose (eds) (1996), Miller and Rose (1990), Rose and Miller (1992), Nikolas Rose (1991; 1993) - have extended Foucault's somewhat schematic remarks on governmentality. Central to the work of these authors and Foucault is the mapping of the role that seemingly non-political technologies such as social work, teaching, town planning and the human sciences play in the operation of contemporary power and governance in Western liberal societies. These technologies incite subjects to act upon themselves and thereby engage in self-production and regulation with certain effects. These "non-political" technologies were reinvigorated from the 1970s through the rise of neoliberalism which "reactivates liberal principles: scepticism over the capacities of political authorities to govern for the best... [and] vigilance over the attempts of political authorities to seek to govern" (Rose and Miller 1992:198). In this schema, markets replace government planning, social
services and welfare are to be discouraged, and economic entrepreneurship is to be promoted. Although the context is different, there are clear resonances with the programs of the World Bank and IMF and the decline of nation-state involvement in development efforts in the Third World.

In the Third World as in the West, the rebirth of civil society and the rise of NGOs are frequently posed as a counterpoint to both the new neoliberal orthodoxy (the tyranny of the market), and the corruption, inefficiency and mismanagement of the state. However, the relationship of NGOs to more "official" elements of the development dispositif is not easily characterised. On the one hand, NGOs appear to be opposed to neoliberalism and neoclassical economics in their emphasis on community, mobilisation of local people and opposition to IMF and World Bank programs such as structural adjustment. Yet on the other hand and despite these obvious differences, NGOs, often with their roots in Western populisms, notions of civil society and local level organisation of citizens, eschew the involvement of state bureaucracies in the lives of "local people" - a perspective which is broadly consistent with the aims of the structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank. On this point Watts (1995:58) notes that World Bank discourse has changed to emphasise the powers and capacities of ordinary people at the same time as there has been a hardening of development economics. Similarly, Doug Porter (1995:82-83) detects a parallel between the metaphors of "market" and "community". He notes that in the application of neo-classical economic rationality to public life, it is argued that these metaphors, if let alone, tend "toward wise equilibria" (1995:82-83).

I do not propose to resolve this issue by offering a view on whether or not the rise of civil society and NGOs challenges mainstream or official developmentalism, or the nation-state. Such an effort would invariably be without any clear resolution, and mirrors the traditional philosophical opposition of state and civil society which obscures the operation of

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44 My aim here is not to present a comprehensive review of the governmentality literature. While this body of work is primarily interested in operations of power which both integrate subjects into and at the same time give rise to the modern state, I am more interested in the general formulation of how subjects become more involved in the operation of power via neoliberalism. However, it should be pointed out that my slightly broader approach is not at odds with the governmentality literature. For instance, following Foucault, Miller and Rose argue that the state does not equal, or give rise to, government but rather is "a particular form that government has taken, and one that does not exhaust the field of calculations and interventions that constitute it" (1990:3).
contemporary power through seemingly non-political technologies as explicated by Foucault and other governmentality scholars. In other words, efforts which seek to dichotomise development actors and efforts in terms of an a priori assumption about their position in terms of the operation of power do not allow for adequate analysis. In place of such approaches, the view of development as a shifting coagulation of heterogenous elements consisting of a range of interrelationships allows that development initiatives be considered without overly predetermining or simplifying analysis. The dispositif thus guards against overly general interpretations of recent developments.

From the above discussion it is apparent that the rise of NGOs should not necessarily be read as emancipatory. To the contrary, the combination of the winding back of state involvement in development, the rise of neoliberalism and the status of NGOs as "non-political" technologies, are bases for the emergence of a range of practices which enable a greater penetration of power into the social body of the Third World through the development dispositif. To explore this further I want to consider the popular NGO operative notions of autonomy and empowerment.

**Beyond Participation: Autonomous Development and Empowerment**

Notions of autonomy and empowerment are prominent in NGO discourse as a means for locating ethical practice. For Raff Carmen, autonomous development contrasts with any "interventionist project orchestrated from the outside", and instead promotes an approach which is "rooted in autonomous human agency" (1996:6-7). From this perspective, the closely related ideas of community development and participation are critiqued to the extent that they integrate Third World subjects in interventionist projects. Hence Carmen (1996) outlines a critique of Robert Chambers' (1983) influential Rapid Rural Appraisal, or "putting people first" methodology, and the notion of participation in development efforts:

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45 My discussion here does not aim to be a comprehensive study of the NGO sector or the way it operates, but rather to tap into the key themes of autonomy and empowerment. For one example of the centrality of these themes in the popular rhetoric and practice of 'capacity-building', see Deborah Eade (1997). For a more general entry into people-centred or self-development see the People-Centred Development Forum (1999).
If participation is to be a vehicle, a feel-good enhancer or a cost-cutting device, - [sic] in a word, a means towards an end such as fitting projects to people or empowering people in the 'we must help them' or 'we must enable them' mode - let this be clear. If, on the other hand, participation is genuinely about power - about people's ownership and control - then participation is not the most obvious nor the first term which springs to mind (Carmen 1996:51).

This critique leads Carmen to arrive at the idea of "autonomous development"46.

For Carmen, "autonomy" means that Third World subjects are quite capable of alleviating and eradicating poverty themselves, and refers to "the development of their [the poor's] bargaining power to an extent that [interveners] cannot unilaterally impose their conditions and regulations upon the poor as passive recipients" (Verhagen quoted in Carmen 1996:52). In short, Carmen, and the movement of which he is part, advocates a shift to "people's self-development: autonomous human agency and people's power" (Carmen 1996:53). (On self-development, see Md. Asinur Rahman [1993]). However, while the critique of more conventional approaches to development is well taken, the ideas of people-power, empowerment and autonomous human agency also deserve to be scrutinised.

Carmen's implicit understanding of power, which he does not elaborate, emerges as a commonsense one in which preconstituted individuals exercise free will as they direct their own actions. The version of subjectivity in operation here is that of the liberal free subject. However, through analysis of contemporary liberal governance in the West, governmentality literature has shown that subjects are constituted through processes of subjectification which are infused with operations of power, and that the directing of our own actions is bound with this government. The (self-) positioning of our individual lives within the objectives set by reformers - whether activist or expert - in search of some social good links us "to a subjection that is the more profound because it appears to emanate from our autonomous quest for ourselves, it appears as a matter of our freedom" (Rose 1991:256). It is in this context that Barbara Cruikshank argues that

46 For a more detailed critique of the notion of participation, including the way it serves to 'co-opt' subjects to development, see Majid Rahnema (1992).
we have wildly underestimated the extent to which we are already self-governing. Democratic government, even self-government, depends upon the ability of citizens to act upon their own subjectivity, to be governors of their selves (1996:235).

Cruikshank goes on to show how self-esteem, and also empowerment, serve as political technologies in this operation of government (1996:236, 238).

In the Third World context, the political technology of empowerment is currently in the process of being developed. Rahman, long-term practitioner and advocate of self-development, autonomy and empowerment, notes that "the absence of an authentic people's point of view remains a serious limitation on how we define the dimension of social development" (1993:205). This requires

a process of empowering and enabling the people to articulate and assert, by words and by deeds, their urges and thinking .. [as] one of the core dimensions of social development itself, for social development cannot have started if the people are unable to thus express and assert what social development means to them (1993:205-206).

While empowerment is always a complex and contradictory process, there are striking parallels with the production of the liberal subjects as analysed by governmentality scholars. Here development and empowerment are intimately bound, signalling that the latter is not an apolitical process but one linked with a particular project.

Rahman's version of empowerment is fundamentally about the production of self, and, in particular, that version of subjectivity promoted through the Western social sciences which enables subjects to generate and act upon their selves. It engenders "the feeling of knowing from self-inquiry and reflection", is directed toward building the "self-confidence of the disadvantaged", and is about

a process of 'awakening' or 'animation' ... [which] implies not merely learning, knowing and understanding but also experiencing and grasping one's own intellectual powers in the same process, experiencing, in other words, self-discovery,
Empowerment in development, along with the related notion of autonomy, is thus both about the construction and positioning of a particular type of self, and a linking of one's self to the question of social development. Hence, the application of the notions of autonomy and empowerment in the Third World context signal both the export of the technologies of subjectification of Western governmentality and the enrolment of Third World subjects in developmental projects through these technologies. Autonomy, empowerment and related notions thus deserve to be further scrutinised as part of critical development studies.

One way to redirect our discussion of these notions in order to begin to take account of subjectivity as a political terrain is to consider development efforts in general as processes in which people are both acted upon by others and act on themselves. In this schema, notions of autonomy and empowerment are not accorded a special status. In order to consider the power-effects of particular development practices, we can ask how particular practices, initiatives or projects on the one hand reinforce conventional developmentalist modalities, integrate subjects into the development dispositif, displace or write out other subjective modalities, or, on the other hand, disperse and proliferate modalities beyond developmentalism. This analysis requires the consideration of "new" practices both in terms of continuities and shifts from previous approaches, and simultaneously in terms of interrelationships between relations of discourse, power and subjectification. To illustrate this approach I want to briefly consider the current popular development practice of microcredit in these terms.

**Microcredit: Neoliberal Developmentalism**

The provision of credit, particularly that targeted at rural populations, has been a longstanding strategy in national development efforts. In Bangladesh, the birthplace of microcredit through the now famous and globally influential Grameen Bank, rural credit was touted as central to development efforts in the 1970s (compare Abdullah [1979:48-59]). However, targeted and subsidised credit was identified as a failure from...
the mid-1970s by neo-classical economists, who argued that such practices resulted in a distortion of the market for scarce investment funds (Sharif 1997:61). During this same period, a number of NGOs were experimenting with mechanisms for the alternative delivery of credit. Termed "micro-credit", these mechanisms involve the provision of collateral-free small loans to jointly liable people for the purposes of income generation and self-employment. The people who receive the loans are those typically not eligible for credit from traditional commercial lenders, and they are predominantly women.

From the early 1980s, microcredit programmes have expanded rapidly in Bangladesh and attracted international interest to become a major movement in the quest for sustainable and equitable development. The Grameen Bank had 2.3 million borrowers as of August 1998 (Peoples Fund 1999), and the Microcredit Summit Secretariat (MCS) reports that the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee serves one million families (1997:13)47. Wood and Sharif (1997:29) note that the Grameen Bank model "is developing 'panacea' status" as most bi-lateral and multi-lateral lenders, including the World Bank, are eager to promote and fund microcredit programs (compare Sharif 1997:62). Microcredit has also been well-received in mainstream development circles, with numerous quantitative studies revealing positive effects. (For example, see Khandker, Samad and Kahn [1998] ).

A focal point of the enthusiasm for microcredit was the Micro-Credit Summit held in Washington (DC) in 1997. The Summit Secretariat declared that:

The time has come to recognize microcredit as a powerful tool in the struggle to end poverty and economic dependence. We have assembled to launch a global movement to reach 100 million of the world's poorest families, especially the women of those families, with credit for self-employment and other financial and business services by the year 2005 (MCS 1997:5).

Microfinance, or the combination of microcredit and related financial services, is emerging as a key element in the development efforts of the

47 Microcredit has also expanded outside Bangladesh: the Foundation for International Community Assistance has affiliated microfinance programs in fourteen countries which serve 70,000 borrowers (MCS1997:13).
coming decades. To explore microcredit as a new initiative in development efforts, I want to consider the Grameen Bank which is frequently touted as a model for the development of other microcredit programs.

In recounting the story of the foundation of the Grameen Bank, founder and managing director Muhammad Yunus recalls his frustration with economic theory, which led him to "run away from the textbooks ... to confront real life as it unfolded each day" in the villages around Chittagong University in Bangladesh (1997:27; compare 1998). The situation Yunus found in the villages led him to provide small collateral-free loans which he had no trouble in having repaid. Although Yunus initially had difficulty finding mainstream support for his venture, these early successes led to the formation of the Grameen Bank in 1983 (1997:27).

Grameen operates on very different principles from traditional banks: borrowers own 92% of Bank shares, collateral is not required, and loans are made exclusively to poor people, 94% of whom are women (1997:28). As Yunus states, "The less you have the higher priority you get in receiving loans from Grameen. If you have nothing, you get the highest priority" (1997:28). There is also a major contrast with traditional forms of lending for development: when Grameen loans are compared with those of organisations such as the World Bank and national foreign aid bodies, the difference in size of loans is striking, foreign development experts are absent, and faith is placed less in technocratic programming and more in the resourcefulness of local people. Credit is also channelled directly to the local poor, thus avoiding the commonly cited problems of mismanagement and corruption. This shift from more traditional development approaches has no doubt contributed to the popularity of microcredit. Microcredit is also viewed as positive for other reasons: the provision of credit to those would not otherwise have been able to obtain it except perhaps through an exploitative relationship with a money lender is readily seen as a step forward. Jessica Matthews goes so far as to comment that microcredit may have "found a spark to revolutionary change" (1994:185).

However, if we return to Yunus' experience in the villages around Chittagong University in the mid-1970s which led to the formation of Grameen, his evaluation of the situation is striking for both its neoliberalism and economism, and thus its concurrence with emerging and
established trends in the shifting development dispositif. The problems he encountered were viewed as eminently solvable with "some individual initiative and determination" and "working capital" (Yunus 1997:27). (Later in the same document, Yunus states that "Handouts take away initiatives from people. Human beings thrive on challenges not on palliatives" [1997:28].) Yunus states he "ran away from the text-books", but the solution which was so self-evident to him falls entirely within the developmentalist framework: the notions of individual initiative, determination, and provision of capital to improve people's situation and increase economic growth are a micro version of the dominant economistic development approach, and resonate with aspects of modernisation theory discussed in Chapter Three. Thus while it is possible to view microcredit as a radical departure from conventional development practice, it also exhibits significant continuities with the approach of previous decades and does not introduce a rupture or significant shift at the level of the serious speech acts of the development dispositif.

This continuity in relations of discourse is paralleled by a continuity in relations of power and governing. In illustrating a contrast with conventional banks, Yunus writes that:

Grameen literally runs after poor women who are terribly alarmed at the very suggestion of borrowing money from the bank, do not have any business experience whatsoever, may never have touched paper money in their lives, and never dared to think about running a business of their own. Grameen tries to convince them that they can successfully run a business and make money (1997:28).

While the aim of this statement is to highlight the liberating role Grameen plays, it also illustrates continuities between Grameen operations and the World Bank's creation of demand for loans which I discussed in Chapter Three: as with the World Bank, local people need to be convinced of the need for Grameen involvement. This effort at enrolment of subjects in the developmentalist Grameen Bank project signals the operation of related processes of subjectification and discipline.

The directions of subjectification promoted by Grameen and the wider microcredit movement, including their consistency with a neoliberal approach, are made explicit in various microcredit promotional
publications. The focus on income-generation, self-employment, and the encouragement of developmentalist subjectivities is a consistent theme in the microcredit approach, with the MCS noting that one of the characteristics of successful microcredit programs is the provision of "appropriate management expertise" to their "microentrepreneurs" (1997:17).

The result is that microcredit exhibits a consistency with the aims of mainstream neoliberal developmentalist institutions such as the World Bank, and promotes a valorisation of developmentalist subjectivities. President of the Bank James D. Wolfensohn stated approvingly in 1996 that:

[M]icrocredit programs have brought the vibrancy of the market economy to the poorest villages and people of the world. This business approach to the alleviation of poverty has allowed millions of individuals to work their way out of poverty with dignity (quoted in MCS 1997:8-9).

While dignity is no doubt involved, it is defined as a particular modus vivendi embodied in the business approach to poverty. As Yunus states, the aim of Grameen lending is to make "it easy for a poor 'nobody' to take the leap to become an enterprising 'somebody' " (1997:28). Here the entrepreneurial subjectivity is elevated above other subjective modalities that the targets of microcredit programs may already be living or inclined to take up.

Yunus goes so far as to link credit with the discursive archetype of liberal Western subjectification, the notion of human rights. He states that "... credit is a human right... If we can come up with a system which allows everybody access to credit while ensuring excellent repayment, I guarantee you poverty will not last long" (1997:28). He goes even further stating that:

In the 'right' world, we have to instil in people's minds that everyone creates his or her own job. We can build institutions so that each person is supported and empowered to do this. The more self-employment becomes attractive, wide-ranging, and self-fulfilling, the more difficult it will be to attract people for wage jobs (1997:2, my emphasis).
While notions such as empowerment and self-fulfilment have widespread appeal, I have discussed how these notions are not apolitical but a terrain which is socially organised and managed. In the case of microcredit operations, self-fulfilment is simultaneously defined, produced, and managed by institutions such as Grameen as successful entrepreneurialism and a developmentalist approach to wealth. An accompanying effect of this individualisation of poverty is its depoliticisation: as the poor are made responsible for their poverty, redistributive approaches to poverty alleviation are ignored. (Compare Wood and Sharif [1997:35-36], especially for discussion of attempts by the World Bank and other donors to limit the mobilisation agendas of NGOs by pushing them into the narrower role of provision of microcredit).

The process of subjectification necessarily involves a disciplinary operation. This operation, and indeed the disciplinary imperatives of Grameen, are less openly discussed in the literature than other aspects of microcredit. Discipline begins with the enrolment of microcredit members, and the requirement that prospective lenders must form into a peer group or "loan committee" of five (Matthews 1994:184; Yunus 1997:2). The groups are designed to act as a "monitoring, supervising and problem solving body" (1997:2), and to provide social solidarity and a forum for discussion of social development issues. However, Aminur Rahman's (1999:71) fieldwork shows that in recent practice the work group operates primarily as a means for recovering loan repayments. The processes for the formation of these groups and the initial lending processes are illustrative of the disciplinary operation.

A group receives formal recognition from Grameen, and thereby an opportunity to loan money, when all members learn and memorise the rules and regulations of the Bank, and when they pass an oral examination (1999:71, 81 n7). In these early stages, the role of the bank loan officer is to "convince the borrower that she can use money to improve her life" (Matthews 1994:184). Once groups are formed, between six and eight groups then create a loan centre (Rahman 1999:71).

Women who belong to a new loan center take the responsibility of building a center-house or finding an available free space within their vicinity for the weekly meetings and loan operation. Fulfilment of these basic requirements by borrowers at a center
makes them eligible for loans. The Bank grants credits to individual borrowers sequentially by establishing a unique time cycle. In the first sequence of the cycle only two members from a group receive loans. The bank worker observes their loan repayment behaviours for at least two months and their satisfactory completion of the loan repayments entitles the next two in the group to receive loans. In this micro-credit program the individual is kept in line by a considerable amount of pressure from other members of the group (1999:71).

The formation of the loan committee and the deployment of its system of peer accountability represents a multi-stage disciplinary technique. The first stage, which involves an initial period of training and self-learning about Grameen rules and modes of operation, serves to enrol subjects into Grameen entrepreneurialism and associated subjective modalities. In the second stage, this first operation is linked to the simultaneous discipline of both individuals and peers. Here the linking of provision of a loan to one member with the behaviour of other members of the group, initially through the mechanism of a time delay, is a particularly innovative and important part of this technique, since it establishes a direct relation between personal desire or need and the imperative to discipline others. Through the disciplinary technique of the loan committee, examination is deployed continuously from the initial oral examination regarding rules and procedures of Grameen, to the supervision by the bank officer of the initial repayments, to the peer supervision enacted by members. It is in this disciplinary context that stringent loan conditions are able to be met and that the "very poor" are judged a "good credit risk."48

The peer accountability engendered through the structure and operation of the loan committee is complemented by disciplinary rituals carried out at the loan centres. While the operation of power is more diffuse as microcredit recipients go about their daily lives, the loan centre is the site where the lines of force of the disciplinary technology of Grameen microcredit are gathered together and are most dense. Prior to the weekly

48 In Grameen operations, loan rates are 20%, members are required to invest in income-generating productive activities within seven days of loan acceptance, and there is a mandatory savings requirement (Matthews 1994; Rahman 1999:75). The MCS Secretariat confirms the linking of the poor as a good credit risk with disciplinary techniques such as loan committees by stating that "Very poor people are a good credit risk, especially in the context of mutual-responsibility systems" (1997:11).
meetings with the bank officer, recipients gather at the loan centre and assemble in a matrix (usually six by five) according to their loan committee groups (Bornstein 1997:95). When the Bank officer is present and all members are assembled, the members rise, salute, and recite the Grameen Bank credo: "Discipline, Unity, Courage, and Hard Work" prior to physical exercises and collection of payments from members (1997:93). In his observation of Grameen loan centre operations, David Bornstein notes that the "rules [of Grameen] act as a tight web ... ensuring that villagers are brought together frequently in a setting where they are forced to answer for their actions before all eyes" (1997:98). The closing of the meeting involves members reciting Grameen's sixteen decisions which include injunctions such as:

- Prosperity we shall bring to our families.
- We shall grow vegetables all year round. We shall eat plenty of them and sell the surplus.
- We shall always keep our children and the environment clean.
- For higher income we shall collectively undertake bigger investments.
- If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any center, we shall all go there and help restore discipline (quoted in Bornstein 1997:97).

The disciplinary imperative of Grameen operations extends beyond techniques of the loan committee and the operation of the centre meetings to account for the high percentage of women members. While Grameen's practice of targeting poor women is broadly seen as commendable by outside donors and lenders, closer scrutiny reveals a different story. Rahman (1999:69-71) shows that while the official line is that targeting women provides faster improvements in family conditions and solidarity for women, the bank practice of actually excluding men from the program and focusing on women has much more to do with the ease in disciplining the different genders. Through his fieldwork, Rahman (1999) found that men were regarded as arrogant and difficult to deal with by bank workers. As a result they tended to be discouraged or excluded, while women are accepted because they are more easily traced in the village and because they tend to be shy, passive and submissive. Furthermore, loans may in fact end up being provided to men by women, who are placed under pressure by
male husbands and family members. As Rahman (1999) reports, women can thereby find themselves the target of increased pressure and violence as they negotiate *both* the requirements of Grameen and pressure from men\(^{49}\). Thus the disciplinary operation is also strongly gendered. (For discussion of the rules and rituals of Grameen loan operations in relation to women's empowerment see Papa, Auwal and Singhal [1995] and Hashemi, Schuler and Riley [1996]).

This local operation of discipline also systematically integrates microcredit recipients into the financial and economic networks of the microcredit organisation and the development *dispositif* on a long-term basis. The MCS reports that one of the characteristics of successful microcredit programs is "the incentive of access to larger loans following successful repayment of first loans" (1997:17). The result is that people may be recipients of microcredit for many years. In reporting favourably on the operation of Grameen, Matthews (1994:184) states that after 10 years of borrowing, 48 percent of borrowers had crossed the poverty line. Slightly more optimistic is Yunus' (1998) quoting of figures that after 8 to 10 years 57 percent of Grameen borrowers had escaped poverty. That it should take such a number of years to significantly improve the situation of approximately one half of Grameen Bank recipients signals the high repayment rates, lack of concessionality, and linkage of local branches with the rest of the lending organisation and its broader imperatives. In the case of Grameen, branches borrow from headquarters at 12 percent and lend at 20 percent (Matthews 1994:184). The margin is, of course, extracted from the recipients in the microcredit programs. In the spirit of entrepreneurialism, this allows the branches to become profitable and Grameen to expand its operations.

Central to this integration of subjects into microcredit operations and wider financial and economic networks is the question of lender or microcredit institution sustainability (compare Wood and Sharif 1997), including access to capital markets in place of reliance on donor capital. In this context, microcredit programs are distinguished from "the traditional

\(^{49}\) The fact that Grameen loans are not always or entirely used for income-generating or self-employment activities highlights the contested nature of subjectification through microcredit. My earlier comments about the directions of subjectification evident in microcredit and microfinance literature cannot be taken as evidence that developmentalist subjectivities *are* effectively or comprehensively produced. Instead, an analysis of subjectification through microcredit could only be approached effectively through extensive fieldwork.
moneylender's crippling rates of interest", while rates of interest determined by the global capital market are accorded a quasi-natural status, with the "marriage of microcredit and commercial financial markets" high on the MCS agenda (MCS 1997:17). Where borrowing from commercial capital markets is currently practised for the provision of microcredit programs, it is viewed favourably. Thus the MCS is able to approvingly note that "the world's most sophisticated capital markets have actually been linked with the promise to pay of a woman microentrepreneur selling her wares on a street corner in La Paz" (1997:24). Beyond the acceptance of market rates as valid as part of the quest for lender sustainability, what can be overlooked is the fact that on-lending involves costs above the market rate, which must be ultimately extracted from the final borrowers in microcredit programs as they are linked with commercial markets through disciplinary techniques.

When funds are provided on a concessional basis outside the market, the MCS sees these as a temporary measure in the microcredit institution's graduation to self-funding through commercial markets. Thus "soft loans should be provided in an environment of market discipline", which includes "clearly articulated and measurable performance measures" (MCS 1997:21). This graduation process, which is viewed as a key way in which microcredit programs can be expanded to meet the MCS goal of providing microcredit to 100 million of the world's poorest families by 2005, signals the potential for a massive extension of the disciplinary techniques associated with joint-responsibility systems and the accompanying valorisation of developmentalist subjective modalities. In short, it signals the possibility of a greater penetration of power into the social body of the Third World, and the closer integration of Third World subjects into the development dispositif through the political technology of microcredit.

In reinscribing the neoliberal and developmentalist approach at the microlevel through innovative disciplinary techniques, microcredit programs have the effect of promoting entrepreneurial subjective modalities over

50 Because it diverges from typical models of individual enterprise in the West, the production of developmentalist and entrepreneurial subjectivities within the context of mutual-responsibility systems is an interesting phenomenon and a potential topic for future study. In particular, the exploration of the ways in which pre-existing socio-cultural frameworks are blended with neoliberal individualism could improve our understanding of microcredit, and throw light on an important confluence in contemporary development efforts.
other ways of being, and of integrating Third World subjects into financial and economic networks and the development dispositif. In this process, poverty is depoliticised through an individualistic rather than redistributive approach to its alleviation. This is not to suggest that people are not empowered by microcredit, or that it is not of assistance in improving the lives of Third World subjects. Rather, it is precisely through the empowering nature of microcredit that entrepreneurial subjectivities and approaches to poverty alleviation are valued and promoted over others. The point is not that microcredit should be viewed entirely in the negative, but that "new" initiatives deserve to be scrutinised in terms of the political effects of their continuities and discontinuities with earlier approaches.

While microcredit exhibits clear discontinuities with earlier and more conventional development practices, the deployment of neoliberalism and entrepreneurialism highlights that microcredit deserves not to be viewed as a complete break with the past but as a reconfiguring of development practice and its operations of power. Having discussed microcredit as a specific element in the reshuffled development dispositif, I now want to turn to the comprehensive reconfiguring of development that has occurred through the notion of sustainability.

Sustainable Development

The most prominent and comprehensive reconfiguring of development in recent decades has occurred through the emergence of sustainable development. Sustainability has become a catchword which is equally likely to be found in publications of the World Bank, in national development plans, and in the discourse of local level NGOs (see World Bank 1992; Fisher 1998). It has also become a major basis upon which NGOs seek an increased role in development efforts in the Third World. To consider sustainable development, this section begins with an introductory discussion before drawing upon the interpretive grid developed so far in this thesis to explore how environmental constraints have been negotiated in the context of contemporary developmentalism and the development dispositif. I then briefly consider how relations of power are reconfigured in the reinvention of development as sustainable development. Finally I discuss how my consideration of this negotiation of environmental constraints as sustainable development highlights the critical and analytical approaches available to us in the current conjuncture.
Approaching Sustainable Development

Sustainable development has multiple origins and beginnings. These include the various strands of Western environmentalism (ranging from "deep ecology" to technocentric and solution-oriented approaches); local challenges to large-scale industrially-oriented development practices which have disrupted ecosystems and cultures; and the globalisation of ecological degradation and the accompanying rise of technologies to detect and measure this degradation. This diversity is exhibited through ongoing negotiations of the meaning and practice of sustainable development. A wide range of organisations from the World Bank to local-level activist NGOs are involved in sustainable development efforts, with "sustainability" interpreted differently in accordance with the needs of actors and the views of their sponsors or constituents (Adams 1995:87). In turn this is reflected in the lack of clarity about what sustainable development means: Thaddeus Trzyna (1995:23 n1) notes that at least seventy definitions of sustainable development are available.

In response to this heterogenous reality, some authors (for example, Trzyna 1995) argue there is a need to clarify the notion of sustainability to make it operational, while others suggest that the tensions in sustainable development expose those attempting its implementation to "significant risk of failure" (Adams 1995:99). Here I contend that such normative evaluations and other commentary which laments the confusion about the meaning of sustainability should be avoided, because they obviate the fact that, regardless of its multiple meanings, much development practice is being undertaken in the name of sustainable development. The desire for coherence and singularity expressed in such statements is problematic from an analytical point of view because it elides the possibility of analysing the capacity of sustainable development to assemble and legitimate sometimes divergent approaches and practices as its greatest strength. It is also problematic from a political point of view because it signals a move to close down and more tightly specify what can be legitimated as sustainable development, thus delegitimating and excluding certain approaches. In this context, viewing (sustainable) development as a shifting coagulation of heterogenous elements emerges as both an appropriate analytical and political strategy.
While respecting the heterogeneity of sustainable development by leaving different interpretations and practices in their dispersion, it is important to note that a dominant meaning of sustainability has been forged through a number of international publications. These include the *World Conservation Strategy* jointly published in 1980 by the World Conservation Union, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980); *Our Common Future*, the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987); *Caring for the Earth* by the publishers of the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1991); and *Agenda 21*, the action plan arising out of the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio in 1992 (United Nations 1993).

As indicated by the origins of these reports, the dominant meaning of sustainability has its roots as much in Western environmentalism as in an outgrowth of development theory and practice.

Most interpretations of sustainability, including those which dominate, typically proceed from the recognition that natural resources are finite and that processes of environmental degradation have resulted from economic growth and development. Concerns about environmental trends were a major impetus for the establishment of the WCED by the UN in 1983. The major report published by the commission, *Our Common Future*, identifies "environmental trends that threaten to radically alter the planet, that threaten the lives of many species on it, including the human species" (WCED 1987:2).

It may be thought that a recognition of problems such as desertification, deforestation, acid rain, and global warming (WCED 1987:2-3) may lead to a widespread reassessment or even rejection of notions of growth and development. However, this has not been the case. To the contrary, mainstream sustainable development literature does not threaten economic growth and in fact often sees it as necessary. The *World Conservation Strategy* (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980:1) asserts that conservation and development are mutually dependent. *Our Common Future* states that "technology and social organization can both be managed and improved to make way for a new era of economic growth", and that this economic growth is necessary.
for meeting essential needs (WCED 1987:8). This stance is implicit throughout sustainable development discourse of the 1980s and 1990s. As W. M. Adams notes, although "zero growth" arguments featured in 1970s environmentalism, they have "been largely ignored in debates about sustainable development" (1995:89). At this point I want to explore this negotiation of environmental constraints within dominant developmentalist discourse.

**Negotiating Environmental Constraints**

In Chapter One I showed that the way in which Europeans entered into relation with their world at the beginning of the modern era through a new modality of power and the study of life, labour and language generated a developmentalism which both required and promised constant increases in wealth through production and economic growth. This same conceptualisation of social change, including the emphasis on economic growth, has been redeployed and continually reinscribed in the postwar project to develop the nation-states of the Third World.

The rise of the environment movement, and the realisations which have resulted from scientific and ecological forms of analysis and inquiry associated with it in the past two decades, introduce something new into this schema. In particular, the recognition of the life-threatening hazards strongly publicised in *Our Common Future*, and in environmental discourse more generally, leads to the realisation that the developmentalist effort itself may now be threatened because of the potential for the compromising of ecosystems and destruction of life. Engagement with these new constraints, and the contests, conflicts and multiple negotiations which take place at the site of sustainable development, necessarily occurs within the cultural location of the contemporary episteme, and, more specifically, in the context of contemporary developmentalism and the relations of knowledge, power and subjectivity of the development dispositif. Just as, on a micro scale, Muhammad Yunus interpreted the problems of people around Chittagong University through a neoliberal economistic frame, so environmental constraints are negotiated in the contemporary episteme through a particular discursive formation of serious speech acts about social change and the relations of the postwar development dispositif which have
established a level of resilience over several decades of development efforts since the end of World War Two.

To briefly recapitulate my argument concerning developmentalism and its epistemic conditions of emergence, the serious speech acts of contemporary developmentalism link events and sets of relations to one another in order to conceptualise social change as cumulative, directional, and teleological. Central to the developmentalism that infuses the postwar development dispositif are notions of increasing wealth and economic growth. This conceptualisation of social change emerged in the contemporary episteme at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as constraints posed in the emergence of political economy through a new understanding of processes of production were folded back upon humans through the problems of scarcity, diminishing returns in production and so on. This gave rise to an effort to continuously pursue material wealth through economic growth, and, in part, to the contemporary "Man-form" or subject; that being which pursues developmentalist social projects such as the postwar effort to develop the Third World. Conversely, contemporary developmentalism assists in providing, in Foucault's (1972:12) terms, a "privileged shelter for the sovereignty of consciousness": it allows that humankind be led endlessly toward its future.

The sets of relations and imperatives engendered by developmentalism form the space from which serious speech acts can emerge. Hence when the issues of environmental constraints and development are brought together in a single frame, as is the case in the deliberations of the WCED, the result is that the Commission cannot simply declare that economic growth and development must end because of environmental constraints. This is not to say, of course, that it is impossible for any individual to say that environmental constraints should put an end to economic growth and development - s/he clearly can. Rather, what is at stake is the regulation of serious speech acts. From this viewpoint, which is concerned with what statements are viable in the contemporary order of knowledge and in the development dispositif, environmental constraints must be negotiated without interdicting or violating developmentalism. Equally compelling and inseparable from this imperative is the requirement that the Commission provide a report which does not excessively disturb current
relations of power: it must, in other words, accommodate the material interests of West.

The effect of the consideration of environmental constraints within the contemporary episteme and the development dispositif is that the new order of constraints is folded back upon the already-folded. The radical environmentalist approach which sees these restraints as necessitating a fundamental reassessment of economic growth and a challenge to developmentalist notions of history cannot find a strong place. Instead, environmental constraints fold force back upon development. Thus the aim is no longer, in Rostow's (1960) terms, an era of high mass consumption embodied in the level of development of the United States, but instead a form of development which does not cause major environmental problems or inappropriately deplete natural resources. This allows future generations to pursue a developmentalist project (WCED 1987) and maintains a cumulative and directional conceptualisation of change. Environmental constraints are thus reframed as "sustainable development" in a way which engenders the possibility of ongoing development and maintains developmentalism.

This should not, however, be interpreted as a formula for "more of the same". The folding of environmental constraints fundamentally changes the terms upon which the serious speech acts of the contemporary development dispositif can proceed. Even within dominant sustainability discourse, the folding of environmental constraints upon developmentalism generates both continuity and discontinuity with the previous development dispositif in nondeterministic ways. The nature of sustainable development cannot be "read off" from the above discussion, but instead depends upon a multiplicity of manoeuvres and negotiations which occur through, among other processes, the interpretation of "sustainability". Such processes also fold back upon the epistemic order and can thereby contribute to its transformation. Deleuze (1988:130) refers to the folding of the already-folded as the Superfold and posits that such foldings indicate an epistemic formation of the future. The "active mechanism" is not therefore infinity as in the classical episteme, nor finitude as in the contemporary episteme, but unlimited finity (Deleuze 1988:131). While an exploration of the contribution sustainable development may be making to a contemporary shift in epistemic order is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to
reinforce that the episteme is a historical *a priori*. Thus while it frames that which can be said within it (in terms of serious speech acts), it is also able to be transformed by those same events.

In the manoeuvres which have seen the negotiation of the dominant meaning of sustainable development, a major continuity with the earlier development *dispositif* is evident in the maintenance of the central position of economics. John Foster (1996) notes that David Pearce, British economist and author of the British government's Pearce Report, has stated that sustainable development is simply defined as

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\text{continuously rising, or at least non-declining, consumption per capita, or GNP, or whatever the agreed indicator of development is. And this is how sustainable development has come to be interpreted by most economists addressing the issue (Pearce quoted in Foster 1996).}
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This definition, which maintains the central place of economism in a First World context, is mirrored in the WCED's (1987) emphasis on the need for economic growth, and in all the major international publications on sustainable development (compare IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980; IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1991; United Nations 1993).

While the maintenance of the centrality of economics signals a continuity with the earlier development *dispositif*, a major metamorphosis is signalled in the introduction of scientific discourse (and imperatives), and the blending of this discourse with economic, social science and management discourses in the definition and pursuit of sustainable development. Central to the perception of environmental constraints and to the emergence of this discourse are new technologies of visibility which make it possible to view the planet as a single entity\(^{51}\). Sachs argues that when the Earth begins to be photographed from the late 1960s its

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\text{... form is no longer a scientific deduction but an obvious reality, accessible to its inhabitants' senses. Previously, the planet's existence may have been an empirical certainty, but it possessed no empirical magnitude since the earth's gigantic mass exceeded anything that could be taken in at a single glance (1994:171).}
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\(^{51}\) Foucault (1973) shows how shifts in perception are important to changes in both knowledge and power.
The widespread dissemination of the photographic image of the planet reinforces a notion of "spaceship earth": a sense of global finiteness and of the earth as a contained biophysical system in which environmental impacts previously viewed as local are now globalised.

The vision of "spaceship earth", which is often deployed to emphasise the gravity of environmental constraints, is also deployed in managerialist calls for action to deal with the problems. For instance, in its opening paragraph, Our Common Future recounts the image of planet earth from space and the environmental hazards with which we are faced, before stating that "This new reality, from which there is no escape, must be recognized - and managed" (WCED 1987:1, my emphasis). Throughout dominant sustainable development discourse, a focus on management is linked with ecological, economic and social science approaches. The World Conservation Strategy links management and economic return by defining "strategy" as "the management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit..." (IUCNjUNEPjIWWF 1980). Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living, adopts a more comprehensive approach by defining "strategy" as:

A combination of communication and consensus building, information assembly and analysis, policy formulation, and action planning and implementation, to enable a society to conserve its natural capital (conservation strategy) and to achieve sustainability by integrating economic development and conservation of natural capital (strategy for sustainability) (IUCNjUNEPjWWF 1991:211).

This integration of social science, ecological and economic approaches is also emphasised by Burrows, Mayne and Newbury (1991) in their Into the 21st Century: A handbook for a sustainable future, in which they stress the need for combined approaches and, above all else, the need for holistic thinking.

In accordance with this integrative approach, systems thinking has become particularly popular. Bernardy, Boisgontier and Goyet (1993:62) note that the ecological approach is an extension of systems analysis, which is "widely acclaimed as it is better able to take the complexities of our society into account than any other approach". Burrows et. al. (1991:187) identify systems thinking, including general systems theory, as an essential
component within the holistic approach. In brief, systems models are composed of variables which describe the state of the system, parameters which define the functional relations between variables, and policy variables which specify the policies and decisions applied to the model (1991:285). The formulation of such models needs to be based on "detailed analysis of the complex interlocking network of world problems and human problems, with the aim of identifying them, and mapping their inter-relationships" (1991:283-284). Burrows et. al. state that, when applying systems thinking to the planet, "it is necessary to examine and evaluate at least ten different systems [and their interrelations] which are subsystems of the overall human-planetary system" (1991:195). The aim of such models is the management of all aspects of the planetary system for sustainable development.

This embracing of integrated and comprehensive types of analysis signals a renewed modernist faith in the capacity of science in mainstream development circles. Thus Porter (1995:82) identifies a "renewed technical confidence" in World Bank discourse. This allows the Bank to state, for instance, that "the principles of sound environmental policy ... are well understood [and] the technical solutions exist" (quoted in Porter 1995:82; compare World Bank 1992, especially pp. 10-24). This technocentric and managerialist approach to environmental constraints signals (and in fact requires) a rejuvenation and intensification of the social science project of putting human subjects into discourse. This effort, which is made possible by recent developments in science and technology and methodologies such as systems analysis, is driven on by the rescue of the planet as a new moral imperative.

Hence in the mainstream of development and social science, the negotiation of environmental constraints in the context of contemporary developmentalism and the postwar development dispositif sees economic growth retained as a central goal of sustainable development, and a

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52 This discourse resonates with more limited economic modelling popular in approximately the first three decades of the development project. While economic planning has been less grandiose in recent decades, in part because of a questioning within development economics about the capacity to apprehend and model the reality of Third World countries, sustainability discourse, arising out of ecology and environmentalism, does not have the same experience with modelling social behaviour and therefore can pursue what may be seen as naive from other disciplinary perspectives.
blending of economic, ecological, social science and management discourse in a dominant technocentric and managerialist sustainable development discourse. The self-appointment of the Western expert as planet-manager in dominant sustainable development discourse reinstalls the sovereign knowing subject as s/he takes up the "God's eye view" (Sachs 1994) of the planet provided through photographs from space.

At the same time though, the emergence of sustainable development also generates new possibilities. While development efforts were previously heavily inscribed with a relatively self-evident teleology embodied in the idea of increasing incomes leading to increasing levels of high mass consumption, this conception, which has been progressively undermined through notions such as basic needs, is now challenged further by environmental constraints. This allows development to be defined (and therefore contested) more widely. For instance, in defining sustainability and sustainable development, authors canvas possibilities such as principles of humility (compare Viederman 1995:38), and deploy strategies such as linking sustainability with wider definitions of "authentic development", which include recognition of diverse cultures and reference to local symbolic systems and meanings of life and history (compare Goulet 1995). Thus although developmentalism and the contemporary episteme define and delimit the space from which it is possible to speak about development and social change, the contests and conflicts around the definition of sustainable development emerge as a key political terrain.

To turn more directly to relations of power, the dominant approach to sustainability includes continuities with the regulatory and normalising characteristics of the earlier development dispositif. For instance, Our Common Future states that "sustainable development can be secured only through international co-operation and agreed regimes for surveillance, development, and management in the common interest" (WCED 1991:261, my emphasis). Furthermore, in the reconfiguration of development as sustainable development, the comprehensive and integrated approach which takes in ecological, economic and social aspects signals the possibility of a more comprehensive regulation of Third World nations and subjects. While the power effects of sustainability are not obviously apparent at this stage - and a comprehensive analysis of these incipient relations of power is beyond the scope of this thesis - indicators of such an
operation are clear in discourse on, and efforts toward, the measurement and monitoring of sustainability, particularly as this applies to policy rather than explicitly scientific objectives.

Measuring and Assessing Sustainability: The Reconfiguring of Power and Governing in the Development Dispositif

In 1991, the IUCN noted that "the search for reliable and efficient indicators of sustainability is just beginning" (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1991:198). From this time, there have been ongoing calls for greater efforts in data collection and the construction of indicators, most notably in the action plan arising out of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992 (see especially Chapter 40 of United Nations 1993). While the contributions of a wide range of institutions and factors are important in any shift in development indicators, the primary site for any such shift is the United Nations Statistical Commission, which specifies the guidelines for the calculation of national accounts used to produce GNP per capita and numerous other measures. In 1993 the Commission adopted a revised System of National Accounts after a decade of work on altering the accounting procedures for member countries (Steer and Lutz 1993). This involved the publication of a handbook providing detailed guidance on integrating environmental and economic accounting. The new methodology was subsequently successfully tested in two case studies through UN-World Bank collaboration (1993).

Although countries are not required to fully integrate environmental measures into core accounts (Sheng 1995:222), the Commission suggests that they prepare "satellite" accounts consistent with the core accounts (Steer and Lutz 1993). From 1994, reference to these satellite accounts has been included as a caveat on the GNP per capita measure as an indicator of development success in the influential Selected World Development Indicators which form part of the World Bank's World Development Report (for example, see World Bank 1994:230-231). More recently the question of environmental sustainability has received a higher profile in the Selected Indicators, with inclusion of statistics on carbon dioxide emissions and compilation of an environmental series of tables corresponding to environmental sustainability as one of six international development goals (compare Selected World Development Indicators in World Bank 1994; World
Bank 1996; World Bank 1999c). In short, these developments see the beginning of the supplementation of the GNP per capita measure with environmental indicators in the procedures and publications of lead international development institutions.

In the pursuit of sustainable development, there is a high demand for such environmental indicators. As Eric Rodenburg states, "Setting sustainability goals, assessing the current state of the environment, and monitoring the conditions and trends of relevant environmental sectors are information-hungry activities" (1995:77). However, environmental indicators do not necessarily translate into the sorts of indicators which are able to be deployed in the pursuit of sustainable development. John O'Connor reports that the earlier efforts of experts were geared toward the production of "ever-expanding lists of items to be monitored" and the organisation of these items into "accounting schemes" (1995:89). In what O'Connor sees as a recent improvement, work has "shifted toward analytical clustering of items around issues, which entail using models of natural processes and how humans impinge on them" (1995:89, my emphasis).

Rodenburg similarly argues that one of the major problems in monitoring for sustainability is that a "surprising number of information activities have no defined audience, except to serve otherwise-undefined 'decision-makers'" (1995:81). In the quest for sustainable development, this is seen as unsatisfactory. Instead, Rodenburg argues for a new policy relevance for scientific efforts in monitoring for sustainability, in which "the type of information gathered should be determined by the end-user's needs" (1995:81). In accordance with the managerialist and integrated nature of dominant sustainability discourse, he argues for an integration of the techniques of knowledge - the efforts of scientists involved in preparing information - and the audience, whether this be "public health officials, elected leaders, or the public" (1995:81). In other words, there is a perceived need, as O'Connor states, to "squeeze more policy-relevance from the data that exist and are currently being collected" (1995:112).

In dominant sustainability discourse the change advocated by O'Connor and Rodenburg is seen as necessary to establish a basis from which policy-making for (and evaluation of) sustainability efforts can proceed. However, in terms of the relations of power-knowledge of the development dispositif,
it also signals the possibility of a new and more comprehensive regime of normalisation, including regulating human subjects by the standard of technocentric indicators abstracted from particular cultural contexts. "Monitoring for sustainability", which Rodenburg (1995:79) defines as "the institutionalised and ongoing observation of the conditions and trends in a target sector to answer the specific information needs of a policy-maker, policy-shaper, or resource manager", provides a basis for the ordering of populations and subjects of the Third World.

Numerous organisations, including the World Bank, the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) of the United Nations, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), and the IUCN are currently involved in preparing indicators which will allow assessment, monitoring, and policy-making for sustainable development (see World Bank 1997; United Nations 1997b; IISD 1999a; IUCN 1999a). The range of (non-mutually exclusive) ways in which this effort has been taken up are illustrative of both the centrality of sustainability in the reconfigured development dispositif and the accompanying shifts in relations of power.

One major current within efforts toward monitoring and assessment is the move toward aggregation, or the specification of a single indicator or small number of indicators for sustainable development. For instance, at a 1993 meeting, the World Bank's external advisory group on environmentally sustainable development decided that aggregation was desirable in principle for the measuring of progress toward sustainability, regardless of the various difficulties (such as large numbers of environmental indicators and differences among countries or contexts) which may emerge in practice (O'Connor 1995:91). The Consultative Group on Sustainable Development Indicators of the IISD similarly states that its "overarching goal... is to help arrive at an internationally accepted sustainability development index" (IISD 1999a). The rationale given for this direction by IISD is that decision-makers demand indices that are easy to understand and use (IISD 1999b), while Eurostat (the statistical office of the European Union) states that "the formulation of a rational policy will not be possible if we remain on the level of several hundred physical indicators" and that to "evaluate the

53 While it does this in relation to all countries depending upon their capacity to resist or bargain, my focus is on the Third World.
benefits of measures, the reduction of [environmental] pressures must be
given in a common unit" (quoted in O'Connor 1995:90).

This trend signals the emerging (re)configuration of a single-index norm for
development which has much broader footing and popular support than
the by now much maligned GNP measure. This does not suggest a
definitive break with GNP, but a metamorphosis in which the GNP
accounts are modified or "greened" (Steer and Lutz 1993; O'Connor
1995:94). In this reorientation a neoliberal orientation is maintained through
an insistence that the transmission of "incorrect signals" to polluting and
resource intensive industries through subsidies needs to be eliminated, and
that "'market-friendly' ... policies can enable better environmental
management" (World Bank 1992:10).

Beyond these continuities with the earlier development dispositif,
sustainability introduces the possibility that much more of the life of Third
World nations-states and subjects can be inserted into the ordering and
disciplinary mechanisms of the development dispositif through their
reduction to a single index. Just as Third World nation-states and subjects
have been evaluated, disciplined, intervened upon and trained according to
their GNP per capita in past decades, a sustainability rating is likely to
provide the basis upon which bilateral donors, international institutions
such as the World Bank, IMF, UN, and (increasingly) NGOs mediate their
interactions with the Third World. As early as 1992 the World Bank
suggested that the "composition and level of aid programs need to reflect
the costs to health and productivity of a damaged environment" (1992:23).
In short, the trend toward aggregation of sustainable development
indicators provides the possibility of both a continuity and an
intensification of the normalisation and governing of Third World nation-
states and subjects in a reconfigured development dispositif by the standard
of technocentric indicators.

These moves toward a single index of sustainable development are
accompanied and complemented by more pluralistic and dispersed
mechanisms for monitoring and assessment, which are more consistent
with the current neo-liberal conjuncture and emphases on reduced direct
involvements of governments, the importance of civil society and so on. In
its efforts toward monitoring and assessment, the CSD has been heavily
involved in national testing of indicators through the trial of a working list of 134 indicators and related methodology sheets in a range of countries, with an aim to having an agreed set of indicators in place by the year 2000 (United Nations 1997c:1, 4). In contrast to the more universal methods indicated above, the CSD approach involves the enrolment of countries in the formation of comprehensive indicators through an "action and learning process" (1997:1), in which the countries involved test the sustainability indicators over three years in relation to their own national priorities and interests (1997c:passim).

The CSD approach signals the general shift in the operation of power through the development dispositif which I discussed earlier by considering the increased emphasis on civil society, the rise of NGO activity, notions of autonomy and empowerment, and the rise of the microcredit movement. In this shifting operation of power, nation-states, organisations and individuals are increasingly mobilised to regulate and produce themselves as certain types of social bodies and subjects in a neoliberal climate according to the advice and injunctions of "non-political" agents. As one such group of agents, sustainability experts provide information which is used in policy formation, disseminated to other experts and institutions, and embraced by development organisations in their projects and programs. Most illustrative of this shift in power are those processes which overtly promote and engender the reflexivity of organisations and subjects in relation to the assessment of sustainability. To discuss these processes, I want to briefly outline an approach to the monitoring and assessment of sustainable development which is being pioneered by the IUCN.

Nancy MacPherson (1995:169-171) outlines the genealogy of the IUCN assessment methodology by recounting the experience of IUCN staff. After experiencing frustrations with the traditional approach of attempting to identify indicators of sustainability, the team working on the project regrouped to approach the problem from a different perspective. The result was a more general methodology for assessment which foregrounded issues of participation and communication and a focus on participants assessing their own actions. The IUCN methodology is designed to be applicable to a wide range of contexts, including "any endeavour by which individuals, families, communities, corporations, governments, or combinations of these try to improve the well-being of people and..."
ecosystems" (1995:152). Within the methodology, the key feature of assessing both the "progress of society toward sustainable well-being ... and progress of particular strategies toward their objectives and their contribution to sustainable development" (1995:153) is the involvement of subjects in the assessment of their own activities. While external assessments are seen as desirable, "internal assessments by stakeholders are essential" (1995:156). The logic, of course, is that if assessment is driven by local participants this encourages community ownership of the assessment process and outcomes (1995:156, 165).

The methodology outlined by MacPherson has since been developed through field trials and is now available through the IUCN. In the IUCN's documents which outline their "participatory approach to engaging stakeholders in defining the key sustainability issues affecting their lives" (1999a), stress is placed on developing assessment as an ongoing process which is an integral part of any strategy for sustainability. The IUCN states that "To learn as they act, and thereby to act more effectively, organisations, governments, NGOs, communities, [and] corporations need to develop a culture of assessment", which takes in "system assessment", "project assessment", and "self-assessment" (1999b). This methodology has potential for widespread usage not only because it is able to be applied across a range of contexts but because it accords with recent popular changes in development practice. In particular, it values the participatory and self-empowerment approach to development which has gained increased currency in approximately the past decade. It further accords with the contemporary neoliberal orientation by encouraging self-reliance: the IUCN notes the need to "start people thinking about what they can do for themselves; and to reduce expectations of assistance from external agencies and governments" (1999c).

The effort of the IUCN team to move beyond a particular methodological problem, and the subsequent development of their methodology for assessing sustainability, indicates the broader reconfiguration of the operation of power in the development dispositif. In this shift, the use of external indicators and assessments is complemented by participatory processes which bring organisations and subjects into a self-reflexive proximity with the development dispositif and its established norm/s, through, for instance, the promotion of a culture of self-assessment. This
practice of self-assessment and regulation - something long-practised in the West but typically not recognised as a practice with political implications (Rose 1991; Cruikshank 1996) - signals both the fragility and potency of contemporary operations of power through the development dispositif.

On the one hand, participatory development processes always take place, as I showed through the earlier discussion of microcredit programs and the emergence of sustainable development, within the context of the development dispositif. This means that as NGOs and others guide their practice through the operative notions of "autonomy" and "empowerment", Third World subjects are likely be repeatedly brought in contact with the developmentalism embodied in development programs and practitioners. The reproduction of developmentalist practices and norms through seemingly non-political technologies such as microcredit and participatory planning and assessment for sustainability allows developmentalism to proceed unchallenged in many settings.

At the same time, though, the notion that communities should themselves determine the "benchmarks of changes in their environment and livelihoods" (IUCN 1999b) no doubt allows participants in development projects to exercise power in ways which have not been possible in earlier decades. Through processes designed to promote local decision-making, subjects draw upon cultural traditions and their contemporary experience to forge plans for how they wish to live and deal with their various problems. At the sites of these processes, mainstream notions and practices of "development" may be transformed, subverted or even displaced. In this way the contemporary operation of power through development emerges as both potent and fragile, thereby presenting both challenges and opportunities.

In sum, the negotiation of sustainable development within the space of the contemporary development dispositif results in continuity and discontinuity with earlier development efforts. The goal of economic growth is retained in the form of neoliberal economism and the notion that growth is necessary for good environmental practice. Current approaches to assessing and monitoring sustainable development demonstrate continuities with the relations of power of the earlier dispositif, through efforts to modify the GNP per capita measure to provide an aggregated measure for sustainable
development. This and other efforts toward measuring sustainability indicate potential for the further normalisation of Third World nation-states and subjects through a technocentric and managerialist sustainability framework, including an emerging standard of sustainability. At the same time, development must now be negotiated within environmental constraints, and here the notion of sustainability provides opportunities for contestation and redefinition of development. Shifts toward participatory development, including the involvement of subjects in assessing the sustainability of their own livelihoods, provide support for developmentalism but they also open up the possibility of its subversion through the redefinition and transformation of the meaning of sustainable development in local contexts.

**Critical Approaches in the Current Conjuncture**

Consideration of the reconfiguration and reinvention of development within the interpretive and analytical framework developed in this thesis highlights the critical approaches available to us in the current conjuncture. At the level of discursive relations, it is possible to objectify contemporary developmentalism and to analyse the relations of power which give rise to and are supported by it; it is possible, in Foucault's terms, to understand what overhangs us and marks the border of our presence (1972:130). However, following my discussion of the folding of environmental constraints on developmentalism and the development dispositif, it should also be clear that it is not possible to leap beyond the current serious speech acts of developmentalism and the relations of knowledge of the development dispositif. Relations of power similarly exhibit a certain durability in their effects through an outgrowth of their technologies in the reinvention of development. In the neoliberal context they increasingly operate through modalities of subjectification and self-regulation. A number of conclusions derive from this.

First, our consideration of shifts to initiatives and directions such as empowerment, autonomy, microcredit and sustainable development should avoid according them an oppositional status or viewing them as possessing inherent transformative potential. While the advocates of new approaches are likely to seek to differentiate their initiatives by contrasting them with earlier efforts, their approaches are necessarily negotiated within
contemporary developmentalism and the development dispositif. Similarly, the operation of power through development should not be linked with only the economic (or any other) paradigm, which would then allow it to be challenged and resisted on a wholesale basis from elsewhere. Such moves elide the broader cultural dimensions of developmentalism, and the fact that "new" initiatives and shifts away from economism can also be part of the operation of power. Instead, the dangers and possibilities of "new" approaches can be elucidated by seeking their continuities and discontinuities with contemporary developmentalism and the development dispositif by drawing upon the interpretive and analytical grid developed in this thesis.

Second, once various new or "alternative" initiatives are divested of inherently transformative potential they can be returned to the place they occupy in practice as operative concepts. Here an understanding of contemporary developmentalism and the major dimensions of the development dispositif, coupled with recognition of the continually renegotiated nature of developmentalism and development efforts, highlights the sites and possibilities of critical engagement with development. While it is not possible to think or speak (in terms of serious speech acts) beyond contemporary developmentalism, it is possible to critique this same developmentalism and, in particular, its effects in terms of relations of power. This effort opens the possibility of turning developmentalism on itself (for example, by drawing on notions of sustainability), or of challenging the limiting of subjective modalities though development practice. It also allows us to draw upon other discourses, including those which have been written out in our tradition and those of other cultural traditions, which hold potential for subverting and transforming dominant Western conceptualisations of social change and "development". The location of development efforts at the intersection of cultures offers particularly rich opportunities in this regard.

In summary of this chapter, the interpretive and analytical grid I have drawn upon to consider the reconfiguration of development provides an understanding of how development reinvents itself through endogenous ruptures such as the debt crisis, approaches such as autonomy and empowerment, initiatives such as microcredit, and challenges to development such as those posed by environmental constraints. This
approach provides insights into the operation of power through "new" development initiatives by mapping their continuities and discontinuities with earlier relations of knowledge and power in the development dispositif. These contributions serve as a critique of developmentalism and highlight the continual (re)negotiation of the development dispositif and development efforts. They thereby signal that more research could be undertaken making use of the interpretive and analytical framework developed here, and that development discourse and practice are themselves potent political sites.
Chapter Five: Conclusion and Further Implications

At this stage it should be clear that a historically and culturally specific developmentalism, which has exhibited a certain regularity, durability and permanence through time, is crucial to the contours and characteristics of the postwar development dispositif. I have argued that the postwar development project emerged through a convergence enabled by differential deployments of this cumulative, directional, economistic and teleological conceptualisation of social change by colonial elites, and subsequently by national administrations in the Third World, by both sides of the Cold War, and by a range of other institutions and agents, including the UN, World Bank, and IMF. This discursive formation of serious speech acts has been variously deployed throughout the decades of the development dispositif in programs that range from national industrialisation to sustainable development. These development efforts have effected a shifting operation of power in relation to the nation-states and subjects of the Third World. However, this is not to suggest that developmentalism is immutable or peremptory, nor that development is a form of "iron cage", which will, in the future, engender only more oppressive practices. Rather, what is possible and required through critical development studies is a reflexive understanding of development's cultural specificity and mode of operation which allows us to engage with both our cultural tradition and the site of development efforts as loci of political action.

To this end, the concepts of labour, production and economic relations more generally, all of which are typically foregrounded in conventional analyses of development and social change, have been treated as cultural products rather than self-evident analytical categories in this thesis. In approaches such as political economy, regulation theory and dependency theory, the orientation or subordination of other sets of relations (such as those of knowledge, power and subjectivity) to the economic rest upon dubious theoretical assumptions about the primacy of a subject acting upon objects in processes of production. In the case of world systems theory, this problem manifests in the definition of the form of the historical world system on the basis of the division of labour. This is not to suggest that economic relations are not important in the lives of human subjects, nor, least of all, in questions of development and social change. In not couching
my interpretation in terms of economic relations, I have not sought to
simplistically suggest that they are somehow less relevant than the sets of
relations I have focused on here. Rather, I have been motivated by an aim to
draw out relations between knowledge, power and subjectivity.
Consideration of these relations allows us to reveal developmentalism as a
cultural phenomenon, and, in relation to the postwar period, to more
adequately come to terms with development as an apparatus which effects
operations of power and governing in and of the Third World.

In mapping the cultural location of modern developmentalism, I have
drawn on the works of Foucault (1970; 1972) to argue that a shift in the
order of knowledge at the beginning of the modern era is fundamental to
the transformation and expansion of developmentalist conceptualisations of
social change. The negotiation of the analytic of finitude results in a
tendency to construct teleological and developmentalist conceptualisations
of social change. The knowing subject is fundamentally implicated in these
conceptualisations: her/his sovereignty as the ultimate source of
knowledge may one day be revealed if s/he is part of an ongoing and
progressive project. Within this broad framework and through the new
discipline of political economy, the notion of "labour" comes to be viewed
as basic to human existence and occupies a central position in the
framework of "production" and economic relations. The deployment of
these ideas both encourages developmentalist conceptualisations of social
change and secures their central place in theories of change; a place which,
for instance, subsequently allows world-systems theorists Hopkins,
Wallerstein and Associates (1982:44) to state that the general concept of the
division of labour "is of course basic to all theories of social change, in one
version or another, and it is central to modern anthropology, economics,
and sociology".

This proposition, and the proliferation of the concept of division of labour
throughout a range of social science disciplines, cannot serve the truth and
legitimating function which Hopkins and others desire. Instead, such
propositions belie a particular historical event, which is the emergence of
the European human subject as a labouring and productive being, in part
through the social sciences, at the beginning of the modern era. The idea
that labour is basic to human existence and that it and related concepts
form the basis upon which we should consider social change is a
historically contingent proposition - and one which, as Poster (1984:53) points out, increasingly appears less convincing. Rather than serving as the *a priori* of our considerations of social change, labour, production and economic relations are key ways in which a particular developmentalist conceptualisation of social change as cumulative, directional, teleological and linked to economic processes was proliferated in nineteenth century Europe.

The shift in the order of knowledge mapped by Foucault is inextricably bound with relations of power: the negotiation of finitude and the ordering of social multitudes provide support for each other and proceed in ways which bring about simultaneous increases in the knowledge of subjects, their utility and their order. This linkage speaks to the shift in the operation of power mapped by Foucault. Rather than the constraint and destruction of bodies, which had been the dominant *modus operandi* of power in previous eras in Europe and which characterises the overall modality of colonial power, the mechanisms and technologies Foucault explicates effect the simultaneous regulation, ordering and incitement of "life" through more humane methods. In the factory, discipline, "while remaining a way of enforcing respect for the regulations and authorities, of preventing thefts or losses, tends [more and more] to increase aptitudes, speeds, output and therefore profits" (Foucault 1979:210). In short, discipline operates through a modality which reinforces and promotes developmentalism. While this new modality of power emerged in nineteenth century Europe and promoted developmentalism in this context, its incongruity with the colonial modality of power meant that neither it nor full-scale developmentalism could emerge at the international level prior to the decline of colonialism.

Foucault has shown that relations of power are not best understood by constituting the social field as based in relations of production but instead by viewing power as an operation of techniques, technologies and mechanisms in which human subjects are both the conduits and effects of power. His focus on the practices and mechanisms of power rather than a "theory of power" allows that relations of production and relations of

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54 This is true of Foucault's work in general, but for his explicit comments on power and the persistence of analyses derived from economic relations, see Foucault (1980d:88-89, 100; 1982:209).
power not be subordinated to one or the other in a theoretical schema through the elaboration of causal propositions. Instead, relations of power and production mesh with each other - sometimes in ways which makes one set of relations more visible than others and vice versa - in different fields of action. Thus in Foucault's work, capitalism and the new forms of power he analyses are placed in "noncausal parallelism" - "The two depend on each other for their spread and successes" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982:135).

The notions and practices of development proliferate when the questions of population and wealth are joined in the new discipline of political economy in the nineteenth century. From this time, developmentalism and the modality of power explicated by Foucault are synthetically bound. Political economy serves a rationality of government that aims to increase the wealth of the nation by increasing the welfare and productivity of its subjects (compare 1982; Foucault 1991a; 1997a; 1997b). This effort proceeds in a developmentalist modality which links the drawing out of individual forces with broader developmentalist projects. Central to this operation of power-knowledge is the way that it implicates and constitutes human subjects both as subjects of knowledge which pursue developmentalist projects and as objects of knowledge which are organised and enjoined to act upon themselves in ways which increase their utility for the good of the nation. The emergence of developmentalism in Europe can thus be studied on a broad grid of intelligibility of relations between knowledge, power and subjectivity, as an alternative to the notions of labour and production.

The emergence of political economy and accompanying developmentalism cannot, however, be separated from colonial rule and the process of locating European subjects in relation to colonial Others. The notion of undeveloped and "undevelopable" Others both legitimises colonial rule and provides a counterpoint for European culture and subjects as developed and developing. In this sense, charges that development is Eurocentric can belie the more complex proposition that developmentalism is negotiated in a metropole-colony nexus. This contrapuntal deployment of developmentalist notions signals both the tactical polyvalence of developmentalism and the inherent contingency of social practice, and therefore a methodological difficulty for critical approaches to the post-World War Two development project. There is a danger, as I indicated in Chapter One (p 15) and Chapter Two (p 53), of attributing a
methodologically untenable coherence to developmentalism, and of generating a "functionalist master-narrative" (Crush 1995b:11) for interpretation of the current conjuncture.

This thesis has dealt with this problem by conceptualising developmentalism as a system of dispersion. This enables analysis of the way in which discourse exhibits regularity across a range of contexts yet at the same time opens up a complex field of strategic options, including the possibilities of "reanimating already existing themes, of arousing opposed strategies, of giving way to irreconcilable interests, of making it possible, with a set of particular concepts, to play different games" (Foucault 1972:36-37). In the colonial context which serves as the geographic precursor for much of the Third World, developmentalism is deployed in a multitude of ways in the operation of colonial power-knowledge. While the exploration of these ways is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is clear from my discussion in Chapter Three that in the decline of the predominantly sovereign-style colonial regime of power, developmentalism is increasingly deployed by colonial elites in claims for independence and by colonial regimes looking for new ways to secure their colonies. In short, the tactical polyvalence of developmentalism is apparent as development discourses are mobilised with different aims.

It follows that my reading of the shift from the colonial to the post-colonial era has not emphasised the no doubt humane shift away from an oppressive exercise of power, but rather a shift in the strategic possibilities engendered by the decline of colonial power and the proliferation of developmental discourse. These strategic possibilities are played out in the postwar global development dispositif, which is continually infused with the developmentalist approach to social change forged in the metropole-colony nexus. The dispositif emerges from the mid-1940s to early 1950s with the formation of international institutions, the emergence of modernisation theory, and, over a wider period, the widespread formation of nation-states out of the former colonies. The fundamental shift which occurs through the emergence of the dispositif is the more or less comprehensive enrolment of those countries outside the West in the pursuit of economic growth and the Western development project. Europe's Others, including their future subjectivities, are now positioned within a global developmentalist whole. In this framework, development initiatives are embraced, accommodated,
resisted and transformed by Third World subjects in local contexts. While the extent and potential of the differential appropriation of development should not be underestimated, development exerts a powerful influence through the mechanism of normalisation. As I have argued in Chapter Three, Third World nation-states and subjects are positioned within a global field of expectations, in which the standard of material development embodied by the West is the goal to strive toward.

Normalisation is effected through a refocussing of social science disciplines and the emergence of professional knowledges, both of which focus on the problem of "underdevelopment". Through vast amounts of statistics and reports which have the criteria of development as their raison d'être, the designation of "underdevelopment" and the accompanying imperative for development attain a level of density which made the basic perception of the requirement for development difficult to challenge in the early decades of the development dispositif. These discursive exercises, which refer the social and cultural life of Third World nation-states and subjects to the criteria of development, are imbricated with programs carried out by national governments, international development institutions and philanthropic organisations which act on the actions of Third World people in attempts to produce them as developmentalist subjects. In short, development efforts emerge as an operation of power-knowledge which organise and direct Third World subjects in certain ways while simultaneously contributing to a set of truisms about the Third World and giving shape and density to the development dispositif.

In this operation, the economic factor and the measure of GNP per capita emerge as most prominent. Throughout the early decades of the development dispositif, economic development was the primary development goal, and it was on this basis that nations were most frequently compared and evaluated against the norm of the developed West.

This way of considering economic relations contrasts with the approach of political economists and world systems theorists. While the latter approaches make a convincing argument that the economic underdevelopment of the Third World is an effect of the appropriation of its surplus by the developing West or the dynamics of an unequal (and
iniquitous) world system, they do not provide an adequate basis for coming to terms with wider relations of power. A Foucaultian approach elucidates an operation of power in which the very designation of the Third World as underdeveloped - a designation to which political economists and others contribute a certain legitimacy through the place they claim for themselves as critical intellectuals - is part of an operation of power-knowledge which sees the nations, cultures and subjects of the Third World subjected to developmentalist conceptualisations of social change and the redefinition of valued modes of existence as consistent with those of the West. In short, there is a wider operation at play. This cannot be reduced to the realm of economic relations because the question of increases in economic wealth is internal to developmentalism.

What is partly at stake here in terms of critical approaches to development is the place which critical reason and the theorist/analyst appropriate for themselves. Approaches based in economic relations necessarily claim to understand domination through an elaborate series of arguments, which, although usually remaining implicit, claim a pre-eminent position for both critical reason and the knowing subject (Poster 1984:50-59). This approach embodies its own form of domination: that of theory over practice. As Poster (1984:59) states: "it removes from the popular forces the ability to define the limits and aims of practice, and ... it gives the intellectual power over the liberation movement". Although it does not share the same premise, world systems theory is similarly problematic. By beginning with the rational subject who contributes by "adding abstraction upon abstraction [until] we have arrived at a comprehensible picture of what has existed over time and space" (Wallerstein 1980:xii), world systems theory embodies a similar domination of theory over practice through an attempt to impose a rational grid on the multiplicity of human experience and existence.

In avoiding such difficulties, it follows that while I have referred above to an operation of power which is wider than economic relations, I do not suggest that power comprehensively structures the social field, including economic relations. Rather, analysis of relations of power should be placed alongside other critical approaches in order that each does not appropriate more power than is necessary to elucidate the set of relations it is concerned with. In short, power relations should not be reduced to economic relations,
nor vice versa. Foucault's notion of *dispositif* provides an interpretive framework which does not require that the analyst claim that s/he is external to the cultural practices under analysis, and which does not privilege one set of relations over others. To recapitulate, the *dispositif* is both a heterogenous ensemble of discursive and material elements and the system of relations of knowledge, power and subjectivity which circulate among and through the former (Foucault 1980c; Deleuze 1992). This conceptualisation maintains complexity and acknowledges differential motivations and contingency, and is useful for understanding particular loci of force relations and the centrality of institutions such as the World Bank in relations of power of the development project.

There is no doubt, as I showed in Chapter Four, that the World Bank exercises much power in the development *dispositif* through its loan requirements, provision of technical assistance, "institution-building", assistance with development planning, leading of consortia of donors and lenders and so on. In this situation, well-worn conceptualisations of power tend to attribute sovereign or imperialistic power to the Bank - to suggest that it *holds* power. This view of power as operating through imposition, interdiction and as "power over", exerts a strong hold over our critical imagination, including that of some post-development writers. Even scholars such as Escobar (1995) and Ferguson (1990), who make explicit use of Foucault and his notion of *dispositif*, have not entirely shifted from a negative or repressive view of power. A more rigorous deployment of the interpretive and analytical framework of *dispositif* acknowledges that development and power are synthetically bound, and allows that the *operation of power*, as distinct from its effects, be viewed as positive in the sense that it is productive. In the case of the World Bank, the notion of the *dispositif* allows the argument that while lines of force flow through the Bank with a density which places it at or near the pinnacle of the pyramidal organisation of relations of power of the *dispositif*, it is the concatenation of a multiplicity of force relations and thus the apparatus *as a whole* which produces power (1979:177; Foucault 1981:93).

The operations of the Bank are invariably connected with, and, to lesser or greater degrees, reliant upon nation-states, various other international development agencies, particular national development projects, individual programs, and Third World villages and subjects. Hence, power comes
from everywhere including from below (Foucault 1981:94), in the sense that the Bank is only able to exercise power by channelling the developmentalist ethos and rationale which circulates throughout the development dispositif through relations of discourse, power and subjectivity. This is not to suggest that the Bank should not be the target of political action, but that there is also a broader and more diffuse political terrain which requires an engagement with developmentalist conceptualisations of social change and desires for development. This elaboration and application of Foucault's notion of dispositif and the displacement of a negative or repressive view of the operation of power through development extends upon and makes a contribution to post-development theory.

The dispositif is also a powerful framework for considering both the ways development reinvents itself and the relations of power which operate through these reinventions. This is particularly important to contemporary critical development studies given the reconfiguration of development in approximately the past two decades through the rise of neoliberalism and NGOs. In considering these recent developments, McMichael's (1996) approach, which is grounded in political economy, opposes the rationalism and economism of globalisation with the culturalism and localism of new social movements embodied in NGOs and civil society. This approach elides the ways in which the rise of NGOs and civil society are part of the operation of power. In contrast, the dispositif enables a less programmatic approach by conceptualising development as a shifting coagulation of elements which exhibits certain continuities and discontinuities with previous formations. Shifts in development are negotiated within, and therefore can be analysed in terms of, the framework of the earlier dispositif and, more broadly, developmentalism.

Using this conceptualisation demonstrates that the reconfiguration of development involves a shift in the operation of power which is linked with but not dependent upon economic relations. This shift involves a greater penetration of power into the Third World through development as the role of nation-states in development efforts is wound back, along with increased pressure from institutions such as the World Bank and IMF for a neoliberal economic policy environment. This link with changes in economic relations cannot be separated from the rise of NGOs, increased emphasis on civil society, and contemporary popular and alternative approaches which
emphasise notions of autonomy and empowerment. Following the problematisation of the terrain of the self explicated by Foucault and other governmentality scholars, these developments cannot necessarily be viewed as emancipatory, but instead need to be considered as part of the operation of power. Widely-held views of power which adhere to the liberal notion of "free subject" elide subjectification and "self-regulation" as key political terrain in contemporary development efforts.

The case of the popular microcredit movement serves as one instance which illustrates the reinscription of developmentalism, the importance of subjectification, and the greater penetration of power into the social body of the Third World. The micro scale of these interventions and the recognition of and focus on the resources of the poor distinguishes microcredit from many conventional development operations. At the same time, though, it signals certain continuities with the earlier operation of power through development. Through microcredit, poor subjects (predominantly women) are enrolled in entrepreneurialism and developmentalism through disciplinary mechanisms. A business approach to poverty alleviation is promoted as subjects are engaged in disciplining one another in the context of mutual-responsibility systems. Here the corollaries of empowerment include the valorisation of entrepreneurial and developmentalist subjective modalities and the depoliticisation of poverty through neoliberal notions of individual responsibility. This local-level subjectification and disciplining integrates microcredit recipients into the funding arrangements - either concessional or commercial - of the microcredit organisation. Given the trend for microcredit programs to increasingly turn to commercial capital markets for funding, microcredit has the potential to bring about the closer integration of Third World subjects into world markets and the development dispositif.

While the entrepreneurialism of microcredit results in its relatively easy shift into the mainstream of the development dispositif, environmental constraints which have emerged in recent decades have required a more macro reinvention of development as "sustainable development". The negotiation of environmental constraints within developmentalism and the development dispositif results in the folding of this new order of constraints upon development. The outcomes are both similarities and differences with the previous order as development is reconfigured as ongoing or
sustainable development. This is not, therefore, a cynical reading of the burgeoning of sustainability discourse which sees only "more of the same" emerging from sustainable development. The folding of environmental constraints on development efforts changes the terms upon which the serious speech acts and programs of the contemporary development dispositif can proceed, thereby generating both continuity and discontinuity with previous practices.

To this point in time, strong continuities are apparent, with economism and technocentric managerialism dominating mainstream sustainable development discourse. While other approaches have certainly been less visible, sustainability discourse has been mobilised to contest conventional development through reference, for instance, to local cultures and value systems. In terms of relations of power and governance, I have outlined the potential for both the continuation and intensification of the operation of power which characterised earlier decades of the development dispositif, as well as a greater penetration of the Third World social body through "self-regulation" and "self-assessment" practices promoted by NGOs. At the same time though, it remains to be seen how sustainable development is negotiated in practice. In particular, the approaches by NGOs have potential to transform and subvert development to the extent that they include local subjects in decision making.

In looking to the implications of this thesis, the approach adopted here offers a number of advantages over approaches which centralise economic relations and concepts such as production and the division of labour. A Foucaultian approach shows that economic relations and concepts should not dominate our considerations of social change, as they are part of a historically specific developmentalism which can be located as a cultural phenomenon on a grid of relations between knowledge, power, and subjectivity. This does not suggest that economic relations are not important, but shows that the economic approach can be objectivised as a cultural trait as part of a critical strategy. By not orienting or reducing relations of power to economic relations, the approach pursued here allows a more direct engagement with the mechanisms of domination which proceed through development, and avoids according new initiatives and approaches which emerge in the reinvention of development any inherent emancipatory potential following from their position in terms of relations
of production. The notion of dispositif is particularly useful as it allows "new" initiatives to be located in terms of their continuities and discontinuities with earlier formations, thereby establishing a critical approach which acknowledges the congruity of modalities of development and power. This engagement with Foucault's notion of dispositif and his analytic of power represents an extension of contemporary post-development theory, and offers a framework for further research of contemporary development practices and programs.

Of particular value is the way drawing on Foucault allows us to expand the political terrain to include the position and constitution of the subject. For scholars and practitioners of development, this suggests a reflexive and critical engagement with the place of the critic, the role of theory, and our developmentalist cultural tradition. Here the deployment of theory to place a rational grid over human existence can be replaced by an effort to understand the cultural location of our study and practice of development; to know what surrounds and overhangs our presence (Foucault 1972:130). This serves to denaturalise our conceptualisations of social change. Such knowledge can then be deployed not to predict the future or make broad political recommendations, but to be "attentive to the unknown that knocks at the door" (Deleuze 1992:165), such that various approaches might proliferate in both scholarly and other practice.

In terms of relations of power through development, the constitution of the subject emerges as a political terrain which has largely been ignored in development studies. Of particular interest and concern in the current neoliberal conjuncture is the increased emphasis on notions of autonomy, empowerment and participation, as these represent the potential for an operation of power through development which closes down the range of possible subjective modalities. The point here is not that these recent developments are bad, but that "everything is dangerous" (Foucault 1984b:343). Whether these practices are judged as limiting or contributing to progressive social change through development will depend upon how they are negotiated in practice, and the possible living arrangements and ways of being they close down or open up. For this reason, participation, empowerment, and capacity building programs deserve to be considered key political sites for scholars and practitioners of development in coming decades.
To recall my quoting of Esteva and Foucault at the beginning of this thesis, the ways in which "development stinks" shift as it is renegotiated within developmentalism and the development dispositif. Foucault's challenge to our conceptualisations of change, his notion of the dispositif, and his conceptualisation of power facilitate an understanding of the cultural location of development and the operations of power which proceed through it. This highlights the site of development scholarship and practice as a political terrain and the possibility of using this site to proliferate and disperse subjective modalities, ways of beings, and meanings of "development".
References


