The Military Media of ‘The Islamic Resistance’ - the Military Arm of Hezbollah: History, Messages, and Objectives

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Declaration

I, Hatem El Zein, declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted in any form for another degree at this or any other university. I have acknowledged information derived from the published work of others in the text and in the list of references.

Signature: Hatem El Zein

Date: April, 2015
Dedication

To the souls of my grandfather, Ali and his wife, Labiba, who loved me more than themselves and endowed me with all that they possibly could for me to succeed, I dedicate this thesis.
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**Abstract**

In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, *Islamic Resistance*, the military arm of *Hezbollah*, was an early guerrilla movement, which established a military media unit in 1984. This unit developed its work to specialise in the following procedures: issuing statements about the activities of *Islamic Resistance* and its fighters' obituaries; filming the military operations initiated by *Islamic Resistance* against the Israeli army in Southern Lebanon; and, producing videos of fighters' testimonials, video songs and flashes. This unit uses the official website of *Islamic Resistance* and cooperates with media outlets established and operated by *Hezbollah*, particularly *Al-Manar* satellite station, to transmit its messages. However, the success of this unit has demonstrated, particularly the significance of media units, to the Palestinian military arms in the Gaza Strip in the context of psychological warfare against Israel, as shown in the recent war with Israel in 2014.

The establishment of media units by military arms of many militant organisations in the Middle East has promoted new forms of discourse. These forms, when accompanied with developments in communication technologies, have allowed the military arms to develop their media platforms by which they freely convey their discourse; the latter forms are embedded with signs and frames, and have objectives aimed at a wider audience. This thesis identifies and analyses the media discourse of *Hezbollah's* military arm, contextualised by reviewing the use of media by militant organisations in the Middle East and the spawning of military media units.

The point of departure in this thesis resides in identifying the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. Thus, the thesis critically reviews the current literature and the organisational structure of *Hezbollah*; in doing so, it reaches the conclusion that such media discourse is comprised of the output of the military media unit and the speeches of Resistance of *Hezbollah's* Secretary-General, who is also the leader of its military arm. In contrast to previous studies, the present review explores that the establishment of *Hezbollah's* military arm, *Islamic Resistance*, is likely to have occurred before that of its parent organisation.

This thesis bridges the gaps in the studies existing in the literature, which have never identified the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, nor analysed the total
output of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance. Thus, there is a dearth of studies relating to the following outputs: the written statements, fighters' testaments, video songs and flashes, and the footage of the capturing of Israeli soldiers. However, this thesis analyses the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. It analyses samples of archival data representing the total output of the military media unit, as well as the speeches of Resistance of Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah. Under its aim and sub-aims, it explores the embedded signs, codes, frames and objectives of the discourse. To achieve its aim, this thesis has developed a critical discourse analysis (CDA) model, utilising tools from the fields of (critical) linguistics and (social) semiotics, and guided by framing theory. The findings of this thesis bridge a gap in the current studies relating to the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. In addition, the theoretical foundations and the approach utilised here can be replicated in future studies of the media discourses of other guerrilla groups in the Middle East, particularly the Palestinian military arms.
List of Publications Emerging from this Research

The following papers and publications have been produced from this research:


Preface

“Much as I have no wish to hurt anyone's feelings, my first obligation has not been to be nice but to be true to my perhaps peculiar memories, experiences and feelings”


In this preface, I wish to present, in brief, my story, and thereby reveal that which led me to this research journey.

It was June, 1982. I was five years old. My parents rushed to school to take my brother and I home. I remember that, on that day, many parents were gathered near the school gate, looking to the shimmering sky. I did not then have words to describe what later became known to me as 'surface-to-air missiles'; they were exploding in the spewing decoy flares issuing from the military aircraft above. Years later, I was able to identify that day as the one when the Israeli army invaded Lebanon under the pretext of expelling the PLO; the invaders were faced by the Arab Syrian Army and many Lebanese and Palestinian guerrillas.

During my childhood, I was keenly aware of the presence of war. I was always hearing the Israeli air raids on targets in the Bekaa valley, aimed particularly at the Hezbollah's radio transmitter on the outskirts of Baalbek. I was also hearing horrible stories about sectarian kidnapping and slaughtering during the Lebanese civil war.

I was born in a village called Iaat, nearly five kilometres to the west of the old Greek-Roman historic castle in the city of Baalbek. I was the eldest child of five brothers and three sisters. As a kid, I grew up in poverty in a house built of claybricks, its roof covered with soil over wide wooden bars, which required continuous flattening with a concrete roller during the winter to prevent water leaking into the house. My safe haven was our black and white Taiwanese television on which I would watch cartoon programs. Even when I moved one hundred metres away, at seven years old, to my grandfather's house, I was keen to watch the channels that ran cartoon programs, particularly the Syrian TV. I remember I used to wait for nearly four hours, watching all the educational
programs until the television started airing my favourite cartoon series. Luckily, this indirect education allowed me to achieve well in school. When the electricity was off, we used a car battery to operate the small television!

Until I turned 14, my personality was formed, in my grandfather's house, somewhat differently to many of my peers. My grandfather was old and deaf and my grandmother was disabled and suffering from an advanced stage of cancer. They loved me unconditionally and encouraged me to study well. They considered me as their son, having lost their four sons in different tragic circumstances. I used to pick up my grandfather's old books to read; I read all of them! Although the electricity was only available six hours per day, I would light a kerosene lamp at night to read and complete my homework.

When I turned 15, I moved with my grandparents to my father’s renovated home. He bought a new television. That was a period of relative political stability in Lebanon; thus, we were able to watch a number of newly private TV channels, such as *LBC*, *Future* and *Al-Manar*. While I was watching these private stations, I began to hear news items about the clashes in Southern Lebanon between Hezbollah's military arm and Israel. However, the turning point was in April, 1996, when Israel attacked Hezbollah and Lebanon in a war named the Grapes of Wrath. After that war, I started hearing the news statements, issued by Hezbollah’s military media unit, of *Islamic Resistance*. Also, I was watching videos filmed by that unit and screened primarily on *Al-Manar* of military operations against the Israeli army in Southern Lebanon. I cannot forget the images of dozens of children killed in Qana village who had sought protection under the wing of a regiment of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon. I remember vividly that the soldiers of this international force were crying and trying to extinguish the fire around the dead children by any means available to them, including the green branches of trees.

The communication developments that accompanied the Israeli army withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May, 2000 were another turning point in the context of war, because the satellite channels – particularly *Al-Jazeera* and *Al-Manar* – started airing, alongside their daily coverage of the second Palestinian intifada (uprising), the rejoicing of people in Southern Lebanon and, later, videos depicting attacks on the Israeli army barracks in the Lebanese Shebaa farms.
At that time, I was studying journalism in the Lebanese University in Beirut and I was gaining experience in editing the daily *Assafir* newspaper. My passion for journalism required me to trace the news of the conflict in such a way as to understand how such items are edited; this was in order for me to become a professional editor.

I graduated after five years with two bachelor degrees, which included two different major projects: Communication (majoring in audio-visual), in 2003, included producing a documentary film; and Journalism, in 2004, included publishing a professional magazine with four of my colleagues. My documentary film project was awarded *First Prize – Best Documentary Film* in the Beirut Festival of Media Outlets, in 2004. However, my other passion – that is, research – led me to complete, in 2005, a third bachelor degree in Political and Administrative Sciences; this course of study had an intense focus on research in subjects that I find fascinating – international relations and international law.

Shortly before I finished my last degree, I was working with a leading Kuwaiti newspaper, *Alraialaam*, through its Beirut office; this publication was later renamed *Alrai*. However, the upheavals returned to Lebanon in February, 2005 after the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, which shook the political landscape in Lebanon and the Middle East. I heard constantly the sound of terrorist explosives and the answering barrage of explosions across Beirut. I was thinking that I might die in one of these scenes of chaos. I left my beloved Mediterranean city with a small suitcase and travelled to Kuwait, after receiving a job offer from *Alrai*; I did not know that my journey away from my homeland would be for so long.

At the *Alrai* offices in Kuwait, I was a senior editor of opinion pieces, books, interviews, studies from American thinktanks, and daily reports from the Israeli press translated into Arabic. In addition, I conducted interviews with high-profile political and intellectual figures, travelled overseas to cover some conferences, and participated in workshops in Kuwait and Egypt, organised by the International Committee of the Red Cross on International Humanitarian Law, which had a particular focus on how journalists secure themselves while they cover conflicts.
Nearly one year after my arrival in Kuwait, Israel attacked Lebanon, aiming particularly at Hezbollah strongholds, in response to the capture of two Israeli soldiers. For thirty-three days, I watched the massacre of children and innocent civilians. I wept for days, and I cried again when I saw children killed in the Gaza Strip during the war in 2008-2009. The stories and the bloody images of these wars are lodged in my memory forever.

Although I was working in the field closest to my heart, I was looking beyond Kuwait to complete my academic journey. When I became financially able, I quit my job and all the accompanying material temptations and came to Australia in July, 2009 to study and complete, successfully (with Distinction), a Masters Degree in Journalism and Communication at the University of New South Wales.

Subsequently, I decided to do a PhD research degree. At that time, I met my soul mate Saba. We married within four months and then moved to Chinchilla, a rural town in southwest Queensland. My wife is a general practitioner, who fled Iraq for Australia after extremists tried to kill her due to her work with NGOs. They also assassinated her mother, who held a PhD in English literature and was the Associate Dean in the Faculty of Education in Misan Province, as well as a member on the Governorate Council.

In trying to find the topic of my research, I was enthusiastic about choosing a topic that would draw on my memory of war and also benefit from my academic background and professional experience. I came to the decision to study the media discourse of Hezbollah's military arm, because I found a huge gap in this area of the literature. I believed and hoped – and still do – that such research may present a paradigm to study the media discourses of other spawning jihadist organisations in the Middle East.

After three years of hard work on my thesis, I do not remember a day without reading and writing, even if it was only a note. As the late Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish said, “Put the letters with the letters for words to be born, mysterious and clear, and for speech to begin” (Darwish, 2007, p. 257).
Chapter 1. Introduction

“Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings”.

1.1 Overview

The recent fifty days of war waged by Israel on the Gaza Strip, which Israel named the ‘Protective Edge Operation’ in 2014, has displayed the role of media units of the military arms of Palestinian organisations, particularly the Ezzeddeen Al-Qassam Brigades of Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the Al-Quds Brigades of Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine. These two military arms have learnt media lessons from Hezbollah's military media unit on how to utilise this platform effectively in the war with Israel.

However, this awareness of the significance of the military media units in the conflict mirrors two stages in the Middle East: firstly, the developments in communication technologies provided many guerrillas with access to the new media platforms, such as satellites and online mediums, to broadcast their statements and activities; secondly, the prolonged successful media experience of Hezbollah’s military arm, Islamic Resistance, has been a catalyst for the establishment of military media units by a number of military wings in the region, the aim being to utilise such units in a conflict in order to galvanise support and/or wage psychological warfare. As a result of these two stages, every military arm in the Middle East has established its own media discourse.

In contextualising this thesis, the next chapter sheds light on the historical use of media by militant organisations in the Middle East, and the emergence of media units linked to military arms in Iraq and the Gaza Strip.

1.2 Why Media is Significant to Militant Organisations

Media can provide militant organisations with a platform to achieve three goals; “to get attention, thereby get recognition and aspire to achieve legitimacy for their actions” (Qureshi, 2009, p. 227). Furthermore, some messages of militant organisations may have another goal – that is, sending hidden codes to their
followers and supporters (Dadge, 2006; Martin, 2010; Suter, 2008). These goals coincide with the major aim of militant organisations, which is to gain publicity through media outlets that can transmit their actions and messages to a wider audience (Qureshi, 2009). If militant organisations do not have their own media outlets, they can only gain publicity from other media outlets that cover and report their actions (ibid; Schlesinger et al., 1983; Weimann & Winn, 1994). In the latter scenario, advancing objectives and achieving agendas through media remain in the hands of other media outlets. These outlets may have different agendas, or may impose censorship on the contents of certain messages; thus they may report the messages of militant organisations from their own perspectives and according to their editorial policies. As a result, such coverage may have a negative impact on the agenda of a militant organisation. Based on the identified goals, as shown earlier, Figure 1 illustrates how publicity of militant organisations that do not have their own media outlets is boosted, and to what extent their objectives are advanced when other media outlets cover their news and events.

Figure 1: Model of how media advances objectives of militant organisations
However, militant organisations that have their own media outlets can report their military actions and transmit their messages to boost publicity, advance their objectives and consequently achieve their agendas – for example, Islamic Resistance in Lebanon has an official website (http://www.moqawama.org) and cooperates with Al-Manar, which is operated by Hezbollah, to air its messages. Access to one’s own or affiliated media outlets can provide a militant organisation with a route by which to transmit a steady flow of original messages and reports from its own particular perspective. These messages, which enhance the objectives, are not limited to military actions and are embedded within the agenda of the militant organisation. Based on this literature, Figure 2 illustrates how militant organisations that have their own media outlets are able to boost publicity, advance their objectives, and achieve their agendas.

![Figure 2: Model of how militant organisations use their own media to advance their objectives](image)

In a comparison between the two models (Fig. 1 & Fig. 2), it can be argued that the second model is more effective in terms of militant organisations achieving
their agendas. It provides them with the control over time and space to transmit their original messages, which reflect their identities, and advance and enhance their objectives.

1.3 Identification of the Problem

The problem in a number of studies concerning the media discourse of Hezbollah and its military arm is that these studies either based on the way in which other media outlets and news agencies report this discourse (e.g. Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012; Ranstorp, 1997) or based on translated excerpts, because the researcher does not have the adequate knowledge in the original language of the discourse - Arabic (e.g. ibid; Karagiannis, 2009). This problem has indirectly distorted the content and consequently the embedded meanings in the discourse, thus obscuring how the military wing of Hezbollah may represent 'the self' and 'the other'.

In addition to this problem, attempts to study the discourses of guerrilla groups in the Middle East have lacked theoretical foundation. For example, El Houri (2012), who studied the way in which Hezbollah's discourse about the Resistance articulates people, did not identify the analysed discourse and its parameters. Except analysing videos of military operations initiated before 2000 by Islamic Resistance against the Israeli army, El Houri (2012) did not pay attention to the total output of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance. Apart from the lack of contextualisation in his study, the same author did not shed light on Hezbollah's organisational structure, and thus he did not sketch, sufficiently, the position of Islamic Resistance, and consequently its media unit, to be able to identify the analysed discourse and its components.

An earlier attempt was made by Harb (2011), who studied, from an ethnographical perspective, the propaganda contained in a number of videos of military operations initiated by Hezbollah's military arm against the Israeli army before 2000. Although Harb paid attention to the military media unit of Islamic Resistance, interviewed its head and pointed out its relation with Al-Manar television, she focused only on the significance of the liberation agenda, comparing, in this regard, Al-Manar television and the Lebanese state television, Tele Liban.
Similar to these attempts, Jorisch (2004) investigated *Al-Manar* programs, shedding light on the contents of video songs and the fillers. However, both Jorisch (2004) and El Houri (2012) did not distinguish between the productions of the media unit of *Hezbollah's* military arm and other materials produced by civil music bands, which were aired via *Al-Manar* due to their contents supportive of the line of Resistance against Israel.

As noted earlier, there are studies concerning the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. However, what have been missed are the critical discourse studies that enable identifying and analysing the media discourse of this military arm. In revisiting the studies of El Houri (2012) and Harb (2011), there is neither identification nor analysis of the signs and the frames embedded in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. Owing to these gaps, both authors missed identifying the major objectives in the discourse of this military arm. Thus, this research bridges the gaps in the existing literature, as it is concerned with analysing the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* as it is produced from its source. With the emergence of a number of media units established by Palestinian military arms, and with the spawning of many jihadist organisations, who all benefitted from the spread of satellites and the social media platforms, this research may be considered the first in, hopefully, an ongoing line of research identifying and analysing the media discourse of military organisations in the Middle East.

1.4 Rationale and Significance

As noted earlier, the existing studies have paid scant attention to the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. Thus, its written statements, videos of fighters' testaments and videos of military operations depicting the capturing of Israeli soldiers have not been subjected to analysis (e.g. El Houri, 2012; Harb, 2011). In addition, these studies did not analyse the flashes and video songs produced by the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance* (e.g. Jorisch, 2004). As a result, the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* has been ill defined and misinterpreted, because these studies did not identify the media discourse of *Hezbollah's* military arm and consequently they did not analyse it. However, this research identifies and analyses this media discourse and, as such, it:
identifies and analyses the embedded signs and codes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

identifies and analyses how Islamic Resistance enriches its messages with religious beliefs.

identifies and analyses the frames in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

explores the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

The significance of this research derives from the fact that no other study has incorporated all the various productions of the military media unit of Hezbollah's military arm. In addition, the multimodal approach utilised in this research provides it with further significance, because it allows analysis of the identified media discourse from different angles and perspectives in order to unveil the embedded meanings and agendas. Thus, this research contributes to the existing knowledge through exploring the total outputs of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance, identifying and analysing the media discourse of this military arm. It may benefit concerned researchers to apply a similar approach to analyse the media discourses of other militant organisations in the Middle East and it may allow concerned scholars and even policy makers to have fuller understanding of the discourse of Hezbollah's military arm.

1.5 Research Aims

The overall aim of this research is to analyse the media discourse of Islamic Resistance – the military arm of Hezbollah.

Within this context, the sub-aims are:

- to categorise the media outputs of Islamic Resistance and identify its discourse.
- to identify the signs and codes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
- to identify and interpret the religious concepts and beliefs embedded in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
- to identify and interpret the frames and reframes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
to identify the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* and their implications

1.6 Research Questions and Objectives

To achieve the aim of this research, and consequently its sub-aims, the following questions are proposed:

RQ.1: What are the signs and codes in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*?

RQ.1.1: What are the types of messages of the military media of *Islamic Resistance*?

RQ.2: How does the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* frame its identity and other identities?

RQ.2.1: How does the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* express its core ideology and cultural values?

RQ.3: What are the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*?

The following procedures attempt to address the research questions:

- the undertaking of a review of the literature relating to the history of *Hezbollah*, its structure, its policy, its ideology and its military wing, *Islamic Resistance*;
- the collecting of archival data about media outputs of *Islamic Resistance* from its website, *Al-Manar*, and other Lebanese media outlets;
- the conducting of textual and visual analysis to identify and interpret the signs and codes in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*;
- the conducting of textual and visual analysis to show and interpret how *Islamic Resistance* frames itself, its followers, its supporters and Israel;
- the undertaking of a brief review of the literature relating to Shi'ism, *Ashura* (the commemoration of the death of Imam Al-Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad) and *Wilayat Al-Faqih* (the Rule of the Jurist Theory) – a theory of governance in Islamic ruling – in order to interpret and understand the religious implications of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.
the undertaking of a brief review of the literature relating to the context of media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* in order to contextualise the analysis of the embedded objectives

The link between the sub-aims, questions and objectives of the research, as well as, the methods used to address the research questions, are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Connection between the sub-aims, questions, objectives and methods of the research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Sub-Aims</th>
<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Research Objectives</th>
<th>Research Methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To identify and categorise the media outputs of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> and identify its discourse.</td>
<td>RQ.1.1: What are the types of messages of the military media of <em>Islamic Resistance</em>?</td>
<td>To undertake a literature review relating to the history of <em>Hezbollah</em>, its structure, its policy, its ideology and its military wing, <em>Islamic Resistance</em>.</td>
<td>Search the written books and academic journals relating to <em>Hezbollah</em> and its military wing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To identify the signs and codes in the media discourse of <em>Islamic Resistance</em>.</td>
<td>RQ.1: What are the signs and codes in the media discourse of <em>Islamic Resistance</em>?</td>
<td>To conduct textual and visual analysis to identify and interpret the signs and codes in the media discourse of <em>Islamic Resistance</em>.</td>
<td>Search archival data from the website of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> (<a href="http://www.moqawama.org">www.moqawama.org</a>), <em>Al-Manar’s</em> archive and other Lebanese media outlets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct textual analysis of a sample of written statements issued by the military media unit of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> using critical linguistics and social semiotics to identify and interpret their signs and codes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct visual analysis of a sample of fighters’ testimonies videos produced by <em>Hezbollah’s</em> military media unit using social semiotics to explore their signs and codes.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct visual analysis of a sample of videos of military operations filmed by <em>Hezbollah’s</em> military media unit using social semiotics to explore their signs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research Sub-Aims | Research Questions | Research Objectives | Research Methods
--- | --- | --- | ---
To identify and interpret the frames and reframes in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. | RQ.2: How does the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* frame its identity and other identities? | To conduct textual and visual analysis to show and interpret how *Islamic Resistance* frames itself, its followers, its supporters and Israel. | Conduct textual and visual analysis of a sample of flashes and a video song produced by Hezbollah’s military media unit using critical linguistics and social semiotics to explore their signs and codes. Use critical linguistics and social semiotics to analyse the identified frames in media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. Link the findings of textual and visual analysis of the identified media discourse to their religious contexts in order to identify the ideological and cultural values of *Islamic Resistance*. |
To identify and interpret the religious concepts and beliefs embedded in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. | RQ.2.1: How does the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* express its core ideology and cultural values? | To undertake a brief review of the literature relating to the history of Shi’ism, *Ashura* and *Wilayat Al-Faqih* in order to interpret and understand the religious implications of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. | |
To identify the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* and their implications. | RQ.3: What are the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*? | To undertake a brief review of the literature relating to the context of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* in order to contextualise the analysis relating to the objectives. | |

### 1.7 Limitations

To analyse the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, the researcher collected archival data, the vast majority of which is in Arabic. Thus, the translation of some metaphoric words and metonymic expressions may not, in terms of total precision, be completely at one with the intentions of the organisation; however,
the translations are made in good faith in the interests of achieving the stated aims of the current study.

In addition, the multimodal approach utilised in this research stems from the discipline of critical discourse analysis and allows the gaining of an insight into the media discourse of Islamic Resistance after the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Southern Lebanon on 25 May, 2000. Thus, the results of this research cannot be generalised to include the discourse of this military arm prior to this period. Moreover, it is difficult to apply critical discourse analysis to the texts translated from Arabic into English, because the translation changes the structure of the sentence.

In a similar vein, the results of this research can also not be generalised to include the media discourses of other guerrilla groups who are fighting Israel.

1.8 Outline of this Thesis

This thesis consists of eleven chapters. It is organised after this Introduction chapter as follows:

Chapter Two: Media and Militant Organisations in the Middle East. It aims to contextualise the thesis. Thus, it reviews the literature relating to militant media outlets in the Middle East.

Chapter Three: Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance – the Military Arm of Hezbollah. This chapter reviews the literature relating to Hezbollah and its military arm, Islamic Resistance. It pays attention to Hezbollah's organisational structure to sketch the position of Islamic Resistance and its media unit. In this regard, it reviews, critically, the current literature on analysing the outputs of Hezbollah's military media unit. It identifies the gaps in the literature, arguing which media outputs constitute the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

Chapter Four: Ideological Contexts of the Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance. This chapter delves into the relevant literature about the religious belief of Hezbollah and, as a necessary consequence, its military arm. It contextualises the analysis and allows understanding of the religious frames in the analysed media discourse; thus, it shows the religious strategy of this military arm.

Chapter Five: Research Methodology. This chapter outlines the approach used to answer the research questions. It identifies the paradigm and approach
adopted. Thus, this chapter identifies the theory of social constructionism, the denotation of discourse, the emergence of discourse analysis and the key approaches within the discipline of critical discourse analysis, in order to develop a research model for the thesis. In this regard, this chapter identifies the tools, selected from relevant approaches, used in the analysis.

*Chapter Six: The Structure of the Written Statements of Islamic Resistance and their Linguistic and Semiotic Implications.* This chapter analyses textual samples of one of the media outputs of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance. It shows their contexts, structures and contents before extracting the embedded signs and codes.

*Chapter Seven: The Structure of the Audio-Visual Outputs of the Military Media Unit and their Semiotic Implications.* This chapter analyses, textually and visually, videos of fighters' testaments, films of military operations, flashes and a video song produced by the military media unit. It shows the macro- and microstructure of the analysed samples. On the microstructural level, this chapter extracts the embedded signs and codes from the analysed samples.

*Chapter Eight: The Structure, Rhetorical Implications and Signs in the Speeches of the Leader of Islamic Resistance.* This chapter sheds light on the notions of ethos, logos and pathos in three speeches delivered by the leader of Islamic Resistance, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah. Thus, this chapter shows how this leader maintains the flow of the discourse of his organisation and how he argues for its objectives. In addition, this chapter extracts the embedded signs and codes from Nasrullah's analysed speeches.

*Chapter Nine: Frames in the Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance.* This chapter commences in the data finding. It links the religious frames to their contexts. However, other frames are linked to the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, this chapter delves into interpreting the frames linguistically and contextually.

*Chapter Ten: Objectives in the Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance.* This chapter presents the identified objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. It delves into the findings to shed light on the strategy of this discourse, and how Hezbollah works to secure its military arm and benefits from the public sphere created by its military arm.
Chapter Eleven: Summary and Conclusions. This chapter summarises the thesis and its results. Additionally, it sheds light on further implications in the analysed discourse.

References: This section includes all the publications referred to in this thesis.

1.9 Key Terms

Transliteration
This thesis includes a number of transliterated terms. Although this research points out the different transliterations of a term that can be used, it adopts only one throughout the thesis, for example, *ben* (lowercase ‘b’) instead of *bin*, which appears in either form in the middle of Arabic names to connect the name of a person to his father. However, when quoting from references, the transliterated term, as it appears in the source, is retained.

Word Choice
*Allah*, as it is spelled in Arabic, instead of the term, ‘God/god’ because, in Arabic, *Allah* is always singular due to His ninety-nine attributes in Islamic theology. Even in English, the term, *Allah*, is always singular. However, ‘God/god’ (*ilāh* in Arabic) can be plural (*alīha*) and may signify a worshipped person(s), or an object(s).

Punctuation
1. *The Islamic Resistance*: the full title of this organisation will be referred to as *Islamic Resistance* throughout the thesis.
2. Resistance: This thesis capitalizes the term, Resistance, because it is used in some archival data to signify *Hezbollah’s* military arm — *Islamic Resistance*. In this form, it can also refer to the climate of resistance formed during the years of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
3. *Hezbollah*: although this term is now familiar to western readers, it is highlighted to emphasise its association with *Islamic Resistance*.
4. *jihad*: this term appears regularly in the media and in reputable English dictionaries; thus it requires no punctuation.
Chapter 2. Media and Militant Organisations in the Middle East

This chapter aims to present the literature relating to the importance of media to militant organisations. It focuses chronologically on the use of media by militant organisations in the Middle East, particularly in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Thus, this literature sheds light on the media outlets owned and used by militant organisations in these four countries; it thus provides a context for understanding the military media of Islamic Resistance. However, this literature does not distinguish between militant and terrorist organisations, because that is outside the scope of this research.

This chapter consists of five sections: the first one provides an overview of the importance of media for countries and militant organisations engaged in warfare; the second section outlines the history of militant media in the Middle East since the 1950s; the third section refers briefly to the establishment of so-called military media units by some militant organisations in the Middle East; the fourth section sheds light on the studies of Resistance Movements in the Middle East other than Islamic Resistance; finally, the fifth section presents the findings of this chapter.

The data in this chapter has been gleaned from various sources, including books, studies, reports, websites and archival articles from The Arab Documentation Center, which is operated by the Lebanese newspaper, Assafir.
2.1 Overview

The use of media by militant organisations can be traced back to 1939, when the Nazis provided the Irish Republican Army with a radio transmitter, which was used in disseminating the latter’s propaganda (Coogan, 2002; O’Donoghue, 2010). Prior to this, the Irish Republican Army was supported by *The Irish Press*, an American newspaper established in 1918 by the Irish-American, Joseph McGarrity (Tarpey, 1976). This example points to the important role of media outlets, such as newspapers and radios, in the operations of militant organisations and provides an early demonstration of how militant organisations utilised communication developments.

During the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the Viet Cong transmitted their propaganda through leaflets, newspapers and periodicals. They transmitted their leaflets by hand in the areas where they could not organise rallies (Horton, 2011).

In Pakistan, the growth of religious militancy, especially during the ruling of General Zia-ul-Haq at end of the 1970s, turned every *mullah* (cleric) into a journalist and a soldier at the same time (Masood, 2010). This provides an early example of the significance of media to militant organisations that hold religious creeds.

In Europe, however, debates arose at that time as to whether television channels should or should not cover the activities of militant organisations, and if so, how (Schlesinger et al., 1983). In this vein, the former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, warned the media against giving space and air to the Irish Republican Army, arguing that “publicity is the oxygen of terrorism” (Qureshi, 2009, p. 237). Thus, militant organisations, whether they are listed as terrorist or not, need a media outlet to boost publicity and achieve their political agendas (Nacos, 1994; Schaffert, 1992). Even if they do not have their own outlets, militant organisations entice the mainstream media to cover and report their military actions as news stories (Weimann & Winn, 1994).

In an interview with *Der Spiegel*, Hans Joachim Klein, a former German militant of the Revolutionary Cells, who participated in the attack against the headquarters of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna in 1975, confirmed this argument: “We… asked ourselves… what
would be an action that no one can disregard, that everyone must talk about in the media and report on? We found it: a bomb. Even though the bomb did not explode, this story went halfway around the world” (Weimann & Winn, 1994, p. 118).
2.2 Media of Militant Organisations in the Middle East

The history of media outlets of militant organisations in the Middle East goes back to the establishment of the Palestinian guerrillas in the second half of the last century, to assist in their face-off against Israel ("The Palestinian Press," 2011). The first militant organisation making use of the media and utilising its own outlets was the PLO (Elkhalbawda, 2007). However, more recently, other militant organisations, such as Harakat Al-Moqawama Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement, Known as Hamas), Harakat Al-Jihad Alislami (Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, known also as Palestinian Islamic Jihad) in the occupied territories, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, have used media for disseminating propaganda and messages related to their struggle against Israel (Otte, 2009). Nowadays, the militant organisations in the Middle East largely use their own media outlets and utilise the Internet (Otte, 2009). However, those militant organisations that do not own satellite televisions, such as Al-Qaida (also transl. as Al-Qaeda), air their messages primarily through Al-Jazeera (Abusalem, 2007).

The militant organisations in the Middle East address different audiences in their media reports and messages. In this regard, Hezbollah’s Islamic Resistance targets its followers and supporters, and also Israel (Harb, 2011; Matar & Dakhlallah, 2006). However, some Iraqi militant organisations, which formed after the invasion in 2003 to expel the coalition forces, tried to reach not only the local and Arab audiences, but also the American and British audiences through providing information to Western journalists (Garfield, 2007).

Media outlets of militant organisations in the Middle East vary from print to online format; the next subsections trace these different outlets and classify them.

2.2.1 Newspapers and Periodicals

In parallel with the formation of its secret organisational body, Fatah, which became its key party, the PLO established its first magazine, Falasteenona-Nida’ Alhorriya (Our Palestine: The Call of Freedom) in Beirut in 1959. This magazine was supervised by Khalil Alwazir (Abu Jihad), who later became one of the key figures in Fatah (Matar, 2013). In 1965, when the Palestinian
Revolution began, *Fatah* replaced this first magazine with the weekly bulletin, *Fatah*, established in Beirut in 1966 (ibid). As a result of the revolution and the spawning of many Palestinian guerrillas and military arms of the PLO, numerous newspapers and magazines appeared on the scene, especially in the surrounding capitals, Beirut, Amman and Damascus (Israeli, 1983; “The Palestinian Newspaper,” 2011). However, during the First Intifada at the end of the 1980s and early 90s, the Palestinian guerrillas in the occupied territories used leaflets as a media tool to address the Palestinian people (Hammami & Tamari, 2000).

After the Oslo Agreement in 1993, Palestinian guerrillas, such as *Hamas* and *Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine*, established newspapers in the occupied territories (“The Press,” 2011).

In Lebanon, many militant organisations used their own media outlets, especially newspapers, during the civil war waged between 1975 and 1991 (El Khoury, 2008). During the 1970s and 80s, Beirut was turned into the centre of the militant media in the Middle East, due to the dozens of newspapers and periodicals that were established by Lebanese and Palestinian militant organisations (ibid).

Table 2 shows, chronologically, the newspapers and periodicals established by the Palestinian guerrillas between 1966 and 2005. This table reflects the historical significance of media to Palestinian militant organisations in their war against Israel.

Table 2: Newspapers and periodicals established by the Palestinian guerrillas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Newspapers and Periodicals</th>
<th>Militant Organisations</th>
<th>Date of Issuing</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Place of Publication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Fatah</em></td>
<td><em>Fatah</em></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Revolution</td>
<td>Palestinian Revolution</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Fortnightly</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Maaraka</em> (The Battle)</td>
<td><em>Fatah</em></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Atalee</em> (The Vanguard)</td>
<td><em>Vanguards of Liberation War- The Thunderbolt</em></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ath-Thaer Alarabi</em> (The Arab)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the Newspapers and Periodicals</td>
<td>Militant Organisations</td>
<td>Date of Issuing</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Place of Publication</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Rebel)</td>
<td>Liberation Front</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Masira (The Journey)</td>
<td>The Storm</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawt Falasteen (The Voice of Palestine)</td>
<td>The Palestinian Liberation Army</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Fortnightly</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ela Alamam (Forward)</td>
<td>The Popular Front-The General Command</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah (in Arabic)</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah (in English)</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah (in French)</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Moqawama (The Resistance)</td>
<td>The Democratic Front</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aylol (September)</td>
<td>The General Command</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawt At-Talee Al-OMalya (The Voice of Labour Vanguard)</td>
<td>The Thunderbolt</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sho’on Falasteeniya (Palestinian Affairs)</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Every two months</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falasteen Ath-Thuowra (Palestine Revolution)</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Beirut/Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Moqatel Althawri (The Revolutionary Fighter)</td>
<td>The Popular Front</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ath-Thaowri (The Revolutionary)</td>
<td>The General Command</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ofoq (The Horizon)</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Front</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Saiqa (The Thunderbolt)</td>
<td>Vanguards of Liberation War</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedal Al-Shaeb (People’s Struggle)</td>
<td>The Popular Struggle Front</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine Revolution</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulletin</td>
<td>The Popular Front</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As-Somod (The Resistance)</td>
<td>The Rejectionist Front</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Fortnightly</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falasteen Al-Mohtalla (The Occupied Palestine)</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sada Al-Maaraka (The Eco of the Battle)</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaida (The Principle)</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Front</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tareq Al-Intisar (The Road to Victory)</td>
<td>The Communist Labour Party</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Beirut/Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As-Sakhra (The Rock)</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Fortnightly</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of the Newspapers and Periodicals</td>
<td>Militant Organisations</td>
<td>Date of Issuing</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Place of Publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Watany</em> (My Country)</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Fortnightly</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Ashbal</em> (The Cubs)</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Irregular</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Fath</em> (The Victory)</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Kefah</em> Al-Arabiya (The Arabic Struggle)</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Front</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Masser Ad-Demograty</em> (The Democratic Determination)</td>
<td>The Democratic Front</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Beirut/Damascus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bayader</em> (Threshing Floors)</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Watan</em> Homeland</td>
<td><em>Islamic Resistance Movement</em> (Hamas)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza Strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Istiqal</em> Independence</td>
<td><em>Islamic Jihad Movement</em></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>West Bank and Gaza Strip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Ahrar</em> (The Free People)</td>
<td><em>The Palestinian Free Movement</em></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which led to the evacuation of the PLO’s leadership to Tunisia, minimised the number of Palestinian newspapers published in Beirut ("The Palestinian Newspapers," 2011). However, the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1989, achieved by the *Taif* Agreement¹, led to the dissolving of all Lebanese militias – that is, the military wings of the Lebanese parties – except for Hezbollah's military arm, *Islamic Resistance* (Alagha, 2006). In Iraq, the militant organisations that formed after the American invasion in 2003 did not publish newspapers or print periodicals. Instead, some of these organisations distributed leaflets to threaten their enemy or provide instructions related directly to their warfare agenda. These leaflets warned their people, or a group, for example, against going to a certain place (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007).

### 2.2.2 Radio

The history of militant radio in the Middle East is linked to the history of the Palestinian and Lebanese militant organisations. In 1964, the PLO, in what can

¹ The *Taif* Agreement was brokered by Saudi Arabia to end the 16 year-Lebanese civil war, and thus it is named after the Saudi city, Taif, where the then key Lebanese political figures met and negotiated between 30 September and 22 October, 1989. The delegates agreed to redistribute the political power on a sectarian basis and included the agreement in the Constitution. The agreed amendments were written into the Constitution on 21 August, 1990 and ratified by the Parliament (Alagha, 2006).
be interpreted as acknowledgement of the role of radio in the struggle against Israel, established the *Sawt Falasteen* radio station (The Voice of Palestine); this station started broadcasting three hours per day from Cairo (Elkhawalda, 2007). The consequences of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 led to the establishment, by *Fatah*, of *Sawt Al-Assifa* radio station (The Voice of the Storm) on 11 May, 1968. However, the PLO, which was comprised of eight Palestinian groups, merged the two transmitters and named the new radio station *Sawt Falasteen-Sawt Alhawra Al-Falasteeniya* (The Voice of Palestine: the Voice of the Palestinian Revolution) (Elkhawalda, 2007).

At the beginning of the First Intifada, the General Command of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) established *Sawt Al-Quds* radio station (The Voice of Al-Quds) in 1988 (Mattar, 2005). However, the life of this pirate radio in the occupied territories was short (Hammami & Tamari, 2000). During the Palestinian National Authority era, *Hamas* established its radio station, *Sawt Al-Aqsa* (The Voice of Al-Aqsa) in 2003 (http://www.alaqsavoice.ps/) and by the end of 2004, *Palestinian Islamic Jihad* established its radio station, The Voice of Al-Quds (http://www.qudsradio.ps/).

The above indicates that the establishment of radios by guerrilla groups is linked directly to the conflict with Israel and is used by the former as a propaganda tool (Elkhawalda, 2007).

Table 3 shows the number of radio stations owned by Palestinian guerrillas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radios</th>
<th>Militant Organisations</th>
<th>Year of Establishment</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Falasteen</em> (The Voice of Palestine)</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Movement</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Broadcast only 3 hours per day from Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Al-Assifa</em> (The Voice of the Storm)</td>
<td><em>Fatah</em></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The radio held the same name of the military arm of <em>Fatah</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Falasteen</em>-<em>Sawt Alhawra Al-Falasteeniya</em> (The Voice of Palestine-the Voice of the Palestinian Revolution)</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>This radio united the previous two radios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Al-Quds</em> (The Voice of Al-Quds)</td>
<td><em>The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -General Command</em></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Short-lived</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Lebanon, the history of the radio stations of militant organisations is related to the Lebanese civil war and conflict with Israel. The mid-1980s witnessed a boom in radio stations in Lebanon and nearly every militia had its own transmitter ("Lebanon 13," 1986). However, most of these radio stations were shut down when the Lebanese government finalised the amendment of the audiovisual media law in 1996 (Abbas, 2005).

Table 4 shows the radio stations established by militant organisations in Lebanon. Most of these radios are still transmitting after obtaining a licence from the Lebanese communication authorities in the mid-1990s. These radio stations belong to political parties.

Table 4: Lebanese radio stations established by militant organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radios</th>
<th>Militant Organisations</th>
<th>Year of Establishment</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Al-Aqsa</em> (The Voice of Al-Aqsa)</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Established in Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Al-Quds</em> (The Voice of Al-Quds)</td>
<td>Palestinian Islamic Jihad</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Established in Gaza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Lobnan</em> (The Voice of Lebanon)</td>
<td>The Lebanese Brigades</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Still Transmitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Izaat Lobnan Al-Hor</em> (The Free Lebanon Radio)</td>
<td>The Lebanese Forces</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Still Transmitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Lobnan Al-Hor Al-Mowahad</em> (The Voice of Free United Lebanon)</td>
<td>El-Marada Forces</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Stopped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Ath-Thaowra Al-Arabiyya</em> (The Voice of the Arab Revolution)</td>
<td>Workers’ League</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Stopped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Ash-Sha'ab</em> (The Voice of People)</td>
<td>Lebanese Communist Party</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Still Transmitting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>Militant Organisations</td>
<td>Year of Establishment</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Nour</em> (The Light)</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah</em></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>It is the only radio existing in Lebanon owned by a party that has a military wing. However, <em>Hezbollah</em> has had another radio called <em>Al-Mustadafeen - Sawt Al-Islam</em> (Hamzeh, 2004).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This literature reveals that, for the Palestinian and Lebanese militant organisations, the establishment of their own radio stations, during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, was of great importance. However, the significance of radio declined in later decades when satellite television channels and electronic media came to occupy the media landscape in the Middle East.

### 2.2.3 Television and Satellite Television

The use of television (and satellite television, as well) by militant organisations to broadcast their messages reveals their awareness of the nature of this platform and its importance (Chaliand, 1987; Martin, 2010). Militant organisations in the Middle East acknowledged early on the importance of propaganda in their struggle, particularly via television. In this regard, the PLO produced “‘resistance’ propaganda films in the 1970s – films that were, in turn, inspired by the idea of Third Cinema and the camera as a weapon that emerged from Latin American revolutionary contexts” (Khatib, 2012, p. 40).

The history of television channels owned by militant organisations in the Middle East can be traced back to the 1980s. The first television owned by a militant organisation was *Sawt Lobnan Al-Arabi* television (The Voice of Arabic Lebanon TV), which was operated by the *Independent Nasserite Movement – Al-Murabitoun* – in 1982 and closed after the Israeli army invaded Beirut in the same year (Abbas, 2005). In 1985, the *Lebanese Forces* launched *LBC* (The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation), which developed, in the mid-1990s, into a licensed station and thus no longer belongs to a militia (ibid).

*Al-Manar* television, which is operated by *Hezbollah*, was established in 1991. Before the Israeli army withdrawal from South Lebanon in May, 2000, *Al-Manar* was receiving, from the military media unit, statements and videos
depicting the military activities of Hezbollah's military arm, before sending them to other operating media outlets in Lebanon (Harb, 2011). This channel started broadcasting to the Arab world through the operated satellites by the end of May, 2000, when Israel's army was withdrawing from Southern Lebanon. Prior to this time, Al-Manar was broadcasting only in Lebanon and some areas of the Occupied Territories in Palestine (Harb, 2011).

In this vein, the satellites operating in the Middle East demolished the monopoly of television ownership held by Arab states and provided some militant organisations in the region a space to broadcast their own satellite television channels (Fandy, 2008; Zanotti, 2011).

Hamas was the first Palestinian militant organisation to launch, in 2003, a satellite television station – Al-Aqsa. (“France Takes,” 2013), and later on, in 2011, another militant organisation, Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched the satellite television station, Filasteen Alyoum (“Palestine Today,” 2011).

In Iraq, there are no satellite televisions owned by militant organisations. However, the satellite televisions, Al-Zawra, launched in 2005 and closed in 2007 (ibid), and Al-Rafidayn, launched in 2006 and still operating from Cairo, both supported many insurgents by airing their military videos (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007).

Some militant organisations in the Middle East, mainly Al-Qaeda and its former leader, the late Osama ben Laden, utilised Al-Jazeera as an international platform from which to broadcast their messages after the September attacks in 2001. "Although Aljazeera had been hardly known outside the Arab world its rise to international media fame began on October 7, 2001 thanks to its exclusive coverage of Bin Laden’s series of tapes" (Abusalem, 2007, p. 75). Notably, Al-Qaeda is aware of the importance of media in its activities, because:

one of four committees that formed its organisational structure was tasked with media and publicity. The importance behind that action was stressed in a letter sent by Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi where Zawahiri said that the media represent two-thirds of the battle [my italics] (Qureshi, 2009, p. 238).
As a result, it can be argued that the satellites operating in the Middle East enable militant organisations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to have their own television stations. However, even the guerrillas that do not own satellite televisions also benefit from the existing satellite televisions, mainly from Al-Jazeera, by being able to air their messages and videos (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007).

Table 5 shows the existing satellite televisions in the Middle East, including those established by militant organisations as well as those exclusively broadcasting the messages and videos of militant organisations.

Table 5: Satellite television stations that promote the discourses of militant organisations in the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satellite Televisions</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>Year of Establishment</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jazeera</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Broadcasts videos of some insurgent groups (Kimmage &amp; Ridolfo, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manar</td>
<td>Unofficially owned by Hezbollah (Lebanon)</td>
<td>2000 (the channel established in 1991)</td>
<td>Known for broadcasting exclusively videos of military operations of Islamic Resistance (Harb, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Masirah</td>
<td>Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>It is considered the mouthpiece of Houthi movement (Hawi, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aqsa</td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>It is considered as the mouthpiece of Hamas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Rafidayn</td>
<td>Iraqi private satellite</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>It is based in Cairo and supports some Iraqi insurgents (Kimmage &amp; Ridolfo, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filasteen Alyoum (Palestine Today)</td>
<td>Palestinian Islamic Jihad</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>It is considered the mouthpiece of Palestinian Islamic Jihad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2.4 Internet

The revolution in communication technologies has allowed militant organisations in the Middle East to use the Internet in order to approach wider audiences without any obstacle (Otte, 2009). As Otte (2009) asserts, the militant organisations were aware early of the importance of the Internet in their war. Thus, they accompanied the development in communication technology and
benefitted from facilities such as social networks to broadcast their messages and videos. Furthermore, some organisations affiliated with *Al-Qaida*, such as the *Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant for Syria* (ISIL or ISIS - hereafter ISIS) and *Jabhat An-Nusra* in Syria, used social media to recruit European fighters (Likmata, 2014). After it occupied the Iraqi city of Mosul and some Syrian territories, ISIS published an online magazine called *Dabiq*, its first issue appearing on 5 July, 2014 (Gambhir, 2014).

Generally, every militant organisation has now established a website or websites alongside its media outlets to create its own media network; for example, *Hamas* has several websites, one of which belongs to its military wing, *Al-Qassam Brigades*. Furthermore, every media outlet which belongs to a militant organisation has its own website. This illustrates that these organisations use all the available means to emphasise their warfare agenda and propaganda (Otte, 2009). However, other organisations, such as *Al-Qaida* and many insurgents in Iraq, only have websites (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007). Thus, these organisations benefit from the existence of some satellite televisions that broadcast their videos (Abusalem, 2007; Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007). Other organisations use the websites to transmit their messages and videos, for example, *Al-Fatihin Army in Iraq* transmitted its messages through *Al-Boraq* and other websites.

Despite the American withdrawal from Iraq, the websites of some insurgents in Iraq still exist. However, many websites, especially those that belong to organisations classified as terrorist (such as *Al-Qaida* and its branches), have disappeared from the Internet “either because hosts remove them, governments block them, or their creator decides to change addresses” (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007, p. 46). Table 6 shows the websites established by many militant organisations in the Middle East and, more specifically, the websites and web pages that are linked directly to the military arms and insurgents.
Table 6: Websites and web pages established by militant organisations in the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Palestinian Guerrillas</th>
<th>Websites or Web Pages</th>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.3asfa.com/ar/index.php">http://www.3asfa.com/ar/index.php</a></td>
<td>Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade</td>
<td>It is the military wing of Fatah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.kataebabuali.ps/ar/">http://www.kataebabuali.ps/ar/</a> &amp; <a href="http://www.palestinesons.com">www.palestinesons.com</a></td>
<td>Abo Al Mustafa Brigades</td>
<td>It is the military arm of the PLO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/KtaybAlshhydAhmdAbwAlrysh">https://www.facebook.com/KtaybAlshhydAhmdAbwAlrysh</a></td>
<td>PLO – General Command</td>
<td>The first website has not been updated since 2008; the second no longer exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="https://www.facebook.com/">https://www.facebook.com/</a> NRB.DFLP</td>
<td>National Resistance Brigades</td>
<td>It is the military wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/">http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/</a></td>
<td>Ezzeddeen Al-Qassam Brigades</td>
<td>The military arm of Hamas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.saraya.ps/">http://www.saraya.ps/</a></td>
<td>Al-Quds Brigades</td>
<td>The military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://www.alahrar.ps/">http://www.alahrar.ps/</a></td>
<td>The Palestinian Free Movement</td>
<td>The movement was founded in 2007.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lebanese Guerrillas</th>
<th>Websites or Web Pages</th>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.moqawama.org/">http://www.moqawama.org/</a></td>
<td>Islamic Resistance</td>
<td>It is the military arm of Hezbollah. However, Hezbollah established, in 1997, the Lebanese Multi-confessional Brigades to allow secularists and nationalist to join the Resistance against Israeli occupation (Alagha, 2006). This new guerrilla group does not have a website, but there is a page on Facebook under its name in Arabic.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iraqi Guerrillas</th>
<th>Websites or Web Pages</th>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://iaisite-eng.org/">http://iaisite-eng.org/</a></td>
<td>Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI)</td>
<td>This website also broadcasts the news and videos of insurgents, such as the <em>Front for Jihad and Reform</em> and the <em>Mujahedeen Army in Iraq</em>. The army established an electronic magazine, <em>Alforsan</em> (The Knights) and an electronic bulletin, <em>Hasad Al-Mujahedeen</em> (The Harvest of Mujahedeen) (Alrawashdi, 2007).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Websites or Web Pages</td>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>Comments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.nasrunminallah.net">www.nasrunminallah.net</a> &amp; <a href="http://www.moj-irq.com">www.moj-irq.com</a> &amp; <a href="http://www.jaishalmugahideen.net/">http://www.jaishalmugahideen.net/</a></td>
<td>Mujahedeen Army in Iraq</td>
<td>These websites were shut down.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.jaami-irq.info/about.html">http://www.jaami-irq.info/about.html</a></td>
<td>Salah Ad-Deen Al-Ayyubi Brigades</td>
<td>It is the military wing of the Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.iraqisasaeb.org/">http://www.iraqisasaeb.org/</a></td>
<td>Jihadist Brigades</td>
<td>This website was shut down.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://iraqislami.own0.com/">http://iraqislami.own0.com/</a></td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq</td>
<td>Belongs to Al-Qaida.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.alnakshbandia.net/army/">http://www.alnakshbandia.net/army/</a></td>
<td>Army of the Men of the Naqshibandi Order</td>
<td>This army has an electronic magazine and a page on Facebook.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://al-rashedeen.info/">http://al-rashedeen.info/</a></td>
<td>Al-Rashidin Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.ktb-20.com/">http://www.ktb-20.com/</a></td>
<td>1920's Revolution Brigades</td>
<td>This brigade has an electronic magazine, Al-Kataeb (The Brigades).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://ansar-sonnah.8m.com/">http://ansar-sonnah.8m.com/</a></td>
<td>Ansar As-Sunnah Army</td>
<td>The website no longer exists. However, the army established an electronic magazine Ansar Al-Sunnah (The Supporters of Sunni) (Alrawashdi, 2007).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.jaishhabibaker.net">www.jaishhabibaker.net</a></td>
<td>Abo Bakr As-Siddiq As-Salafi Army</td>
<td>The website no longer exists. However, the army established an electronic magazine Sada Al-Mujahedeen (The Echo of Mujahedeen) (Alrawashdi, 2007).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.saadarmy.com">www.saadarmy.com</a></td>
<td>Saad ben Abi Waqas Army</td>
<td>The website no longer exists.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://almhajralaslamy.blogspot.com.au/">http://almhajralaslamy.blogspot.com.au/</a></td>
<td>Al-Qaida in Iraq</td>
<td>This website was used as well by Syrian insurgent Jabhat An-Nusra after the merger between the two groups (“Iraqi al-Qaeda,” 2013).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.almaaoad.net/">http://www.almaaoad.net/</a></td>
<td>The Islamic Resistance ... The Promised Day Brigade</td>
<td>It belongs to Al-Mahdi army.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.kataibhizbollah.com/">http://www.kataibhizbollah.com/</a></td>
<td>Hezbollah Brigades in Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="http://jalnosra.com/vb/forumdisplay.php?f=2">http://jalnosra.com/vb/forumdisplay.php?f=2</a> or on Twitter @jabhalp</td>
<td>Jabhat An-Nusra (An-Nusra Front)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
By and large, many militant organisations in the Middle East utilise virtual space and the available communication technologies to transmit their messages. In this vein, some Syrian rebels use Skype to provide interviews, and utilise communication devices, such as Inmarsat and Bgan to transmit their messages and videos to the world (Mortada, 2013). Thus, the advanced communication devices allow militant organisations to transmit their messages and videos online.

2.2.5 Social Media and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

One of the first usages of social media, in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, was in October, 2000, when the ongoing peace negotiation between the Palestinian Authority and Israel failed to reach an agreement. As a result of the failure and the subsequent outburst of the Second Intifada, Palestinian and Israeli hackers utilised the cyberspace to attack websites and other existing virtual mediums (Kuntsman & Stein, 2010). Another historical point of utilising social media in the Arab-Israeli conflict was in the July War of 2006 between Hezbollah’s military arm and Israel. Hezbollah’s official website (www.hizbollah.org) was shut down after facing a cyber attack (Lyme, 2009). However, the website of Hezbollah’s military arm, the official website of Islamic Resistance (www.moqawama.org), was broadcasting daily statements issued by the military media unit, the speeches of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, and news about Israeli casualties during the war. In a similar vein,
supporters of Hezbollah and its military arm, including journalists and activists, utilised the available virtual platforms, and particularly the blogosphere, during the July War, in order to counter the Israeli propaganda machine by reporting the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure and the massacres against civilians (Harb, 2009). Thus, Hezbollah was aware of the importance of social media in the war with Israel (Kuntsman & Stein, 2010).

During the 2008-2009 Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, Hamas utilised social media platforms, mainly Twitter, through launching a hash-tag, QassamCount, to report “where Hamas rockets landed, when they landed, and what type of rocket was used” (Zeitzoff, 2011, p. 943). According to the Jerusalem Post newspaper, it was estimated that 10,000 users signed up to display QassamCount in the conflict’s first three days” (Ward, 2009, p. 1). However, Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine opted, during the war on Gaza in 2012, to send SMS messages in Hebrew to the mobile phones of nearly 5000 Israeli soldiers and officers (Othman, 2014a). Similarly, Hamas used this form of hacking to communicate with Israeli soldiers during the recent war on Gaza, penetrating the broadcasting of a number of Israeli media outlets to send messages to the Israeli public in the context of psychological warfare (Othman, 2014b) and hacking Facebook pages of some Israeli companies to broadcast warning messages (Fowler, 2014).

In spite of the suspension of the military media unit of Ezzeddeen Al-Qassam Brigades – Hamas’ military arm, which operated a number of accounts on Twitter to provide up-to-date news about the Palestinian casualties and news about launching rockets towards Israel, other accounts from Gaza emerged to continue this mission, such as #GazaUnderAttack, #Gaza, #StopIsrael, and #PrayForGaza. The strategy of using social media was to falsify Israel's story that Hamas’ fighters were using civilians as human shields, and civil infrastructure, such as schools, from which to launch rockets towards Israel (Fowler, 2014; O’Regan, 2014). This strategy also aimed to change the international perception of the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip by broadcasting images of children injured and killed by Israeli airstrikes (Fowler, 2014).

Notably, the #FreePalestine hash-tag, which was launched by supporters of the Palestinian cause, enticed many people around the world, including celebrities,
who tweeted this hash-tag to show their sympathy with the Palestinian civilians suffering from Israeli airstrikes (O’Regan, 2014).

To demoralise the Israeli spirit, the military media unit of Hamas’ military arm provided the combatants with brand new cameras fixed on their shoulders and heads to film their military actions in order to document them and extract suitable videos for online broadcasting after editing. Furthermore, the unit broadcast, on its website, video songs in Hebrew – such as, The End of Hope, which is an opposite version of Israel national anthem - and short films to document the continuous manufacturing of rockets in Hamas’ factories and the transporting of them to the battlefields (Othman, 2014a).

The length of the recent war in 2014 and the amount of destruction resulting from the Israeli army airstrikes enabled many journalists and civilians to broadcast online the shocking images of the war on the Gaza Strip (Lejeune, 2014). The images and videos broadcast on Instagram provided a visual narration of this beknighted area (Mekouar, 2014). However, Palestinians sympathisers among Arab populations launched a media campaign against the Israeli army spokesman Avichay Adraee and urged the online users to stop following him on Twitter (Abdul-Rahman, 2014).

2.3 Establishment of the Military Media Units

Some militant organisations in the Middle East have established military media units linked directly to their military arms. In this context, Hezbollah’s military media unit is linked directly to Islamic Resistance (Harb, 2011). Furthermore, Ezzeddeen Al-Qassam Brigades (transl. also to Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades) of Hamas, and Al-Quds Brigades of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, also have military media units, according to their official websites (http://www.alqassam.ps/arabic/; http://www.saraya.ps/). The main mission of these units is to: publish the statements released by the militant organisations, about their military activities; film military operations; and announce the killing of their fighters (ibid, Harb, 2011; Osipova, 2011). Similarly, Iraqi insurgents, such as Ahluhaq Islamic Resistance Movement and the Islamic Resistance - the Promised Day Brigade (http://ahlualhaqmedia.com/videos-2.html; http://www.almaoaod.net/) have, according to their websites, established
military media units to film military operations against American and British troops. 

The establishment of media units by the military arms of militant organisations reflects a level of professionalism that depends on their ability to manipulate this platform effectively in the context of war. In this regard, the military media unit of Islamic Resistance - the military arm of Hezbollah - works, for example, to wage psychological warfare against Israel through airing, via Al-Manar, videos of military operations against the Israeli army in Southern Lebanon (Harb, 2011). The next chapter of this thesis will shed light on the role of this unit, its relationship with Al-Manar and its outputs, which constitute a major part of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

2.4 Discourses of Resistance Movements in the Middle East

The general paradigm about studies of Islamic Resistance movements other than Hezbollah's military arm, Islamic Resistance, in the Middle East, mainly in West Bank and Gaza Strip, is historical and ideological. In this vein, there are studies about Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which trace their origins and their religious belief in the context of their conflict with Israel (e.g. Abu-Amr, 1994; Hroub, 2010; Zawwawi, 2011). In his study of Hamas, which was established officially on 14 December, 1987, Hroub (2010) points out that the discourse of this Islamic movement resists the Israeli occupation, but it:

has become more aware, embracing legal jargon and basing itself on the norms of international law. Yet Hamas still struggles to keep alive the principle of the 'liberation of Palestine' as a whole, in the mildest way possible, within the context of the immediate challenges faced by the movement and Palestinians at large (p. 20).

The same author points out that the shift of the discourse of Hamas is political not religious, because the strategy of this organisation is to face the Zionist occupation through mobilisation; considering other Arab and Muslim countries
the source of aid; continuity of struggle against the occupation; and finally considering the political activities as a part of struggle to liberate the land. Regarding the religious content, Alshaer (2008) reviews the Islamic implications of the discourse of Hamas, including the use of Quranic verses to legitimate its actions and referring to old Islamic parables, arguing that this movement:

continuously evokes the past in its Islamist discourse to make it relevant to the present. For example, it refers to people and places, military sites, battles and state institutions from an appropriated past. Hamas’ model of Islamist politics thus can be understood as being both mobilizational and agitational in the sense that events become critical, gaining urgency and requiring action. In fact, one would be inclined to reflect that there is also an element of dramatization ‘of the present’ in Hamas’ discourses, as in the discourses of other Islamist groups. Dramatization suggests the present is dramatized against the background of a glorious past whose restoration can only happen through paying it literal attention. As such, one could say, the past is used to substantiate the present, thus referencing, indexing and authenticating it (p. 108).

However, the discourse of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which was established in the early 1980s by a group of Palestinians inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, "offered a new version of nationalist Islam which incorporated the struggle against Israel into the very heart of Islamic discourse and practice" (Hroub, 2010, p. 10).

Abu-Amr (1994), who provided a historical narration about Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, compared the political and ideological perspectives of these two movements, which share the same hostility towards Israel, and their roots go back to the Muslim Brotherhood Society. In his tracing of the history of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Abu-Amr (1994) pointed to some ideological impacts of the late Imam Khomeini regarding this movement, particularly his political-Islamic views and his critical position with regard to Israel. Thus, there are similarities between this movement and Hezbollah regarding this point.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad emulated Sheikh Ezzeddeen Al-Qassam in the concept of jihad who "combined the call for jihad for the sake of God with the call for jihad for the sake of the country, raising the slogan 'God's book in one hand, and the rifle in the other' [and who] believed that blood and revolution are the way to freedom and independence; therefore, he raised the banner of armed struggle instead of passive resistance" (ibid, p. 99).

In his comparison between the political discourses of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Zawwawi (2011) concluded that both discourses reflect the belief in the armed Resistance against Israel to liberate the occupied territories. However, they differ in their political and ideological visions towards Palestine. According to Zawwawi (2011), Hamas is a pragmatic movement and thus it has engaged in the political life, because it believes that Palestine is an Islamic endowment and its liberation is the duty of every Muslim. However, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which refuses to engage in political life, views Palestine from an ideological angle and considers it a battlefield between justice and injustice and the result of its liberation will be beneficial to Ummah.

Although these studies provided a nuanced understanding of the political discourses of these two movements, it seems there is a dearth in studies about the media discourses of their military arms. As a result, the media discourses of Ezzeddeen Al-Qassam Brigades (the military wing of Hamas) and Al-Quds Brigades (the military wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad) have never been mooted in a scholarly way.

2.5 Findings

Regardless of whether they are classified as terrorist or not, militant organisations, in parallel with their military activities, endeavour to use media and adopt new communication technologies to transmit their messages, advance their military objectives and ultimately win their wars. However, those militant organisations that do not have their own media outlets lack the opportunity to advance their military objectives and achieve their goals effectively.

Based on the literature selected, it can be argued that militant organisations in the Middle East can be divided into three categories:
• Militant organisations that struggle against Israel, such as Palestinian guerrillas and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

• Militant organisations that struggle to achieve their political agenda, such as the Lebanese militias during the Lebanese civil war, Iraqi insurgents after the American invasion in 2003, some rebel groups in Syria, and Houthis in Yemen.

• Militant organisations which struggle to achieve their own ideological and political agendas across the entire Middle East, such as ISIS.

The Palestinian guerrillas were the first ones who utilised media in their war against Israel. In the early stages of their struggle, they used newspapers, magazines and radios to address the audience and advance their propaganda against Israel.

In Lebanon, the militias established their own media outlets during the civil war. However, after the end of the civil war and the dissolving of the militias, these outlets no longer exist. Hezbollah is the only party in Lebanon that has a military wing – Islamic Resistance. Thus, the media outlets of Hezbollah are considered as the mouthpiece of Islamic Resistance.

The use of television by militant organisations was rare, with the exception of Al-Manar TV, which broadcast exclusively the military operations of Islamic Resistance, particularly before the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May, 2000. After the Second Intifada in the Palestinian Occupied Territories at the end of 2000, some operating satellite television stations started airing the messages and videos of the Palestinian guerrilla movements. At the same time, Al-Jazeera started airing videotapes of the then leader of Al-Qaeda, Osama ben Laden.

In Iraq, after the American invasion of 2003, many insurgents started using the Internet to broadcast their messages and videos. Some of them maintained their websites despite the American withdrawal from Iraq. However, many of the insurgents’ websites were blocked or changed. In addition, some insurgents in Iraq benefitted from the satellite televisions operating in the Middle East by being able to air their messages and videos. Presently, Syrian militant organisations are utilising advanced communication devices to access electronic media and broadcast their messages and videos.

The findings in this chapter are:
Except for *Al-Manar*, *Al-Aqsa* and *Palestine Today* and *Al-Masirah* there are no other satellite televisions in the Middle East owned by militant organisations or organisations that have military arms.

It seems that the success of the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance* has inspired some militant organisations in the Middle East to establish similar units.

Except for the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance*, which has been studied partially from a propaganda perspective; there is a dearth of studies concerning the units of other militant organisations in the Middle East.

There is a dearth of studies relating to the media discourse of militant organisations in the Middle East.

The majority of militant organisations do not publish newspapers or own radios.

Many websites of the Iraqi insurgents were temporary and many of those, which still exist, are displaying the archived videos of military operations.

Some websites and forums, which are loyal to *Al-Qaida*, transmit the messages and videos of other militant organisations that hold the same jihadist ideology.

The websites of some militant organisations, especially those that are related to the jihadists, are used to emphasise their religious agenda.

Social media platforms have been utilised in the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly by the Palestinian militant organisations during the three Israeli wars on the Gaza Strip in 2008/2009, 2012 and 2014 in order to galvanise support and falsify the reports of Israel’s actions in these wars.

The discourse contained on many websites of the militant organisations, especially those of the jihadists, reflects the identity of the sender.

YouTube is considered as an active medium for broadcasting videos produced by militant organisations. It also provides a medium for debate through written comments.
In summary, this chapter contextualised the thesis and showed the use of media by militant organisations in the Middle East. It pinpointed their respective media outlets and their adaptation of new communication technologies to transmit their messages. In this regard, this chapter sheds light on the formation of military media units by some military arms of these organisations.

The next chapter reviews the existing studies concerning Hezbollah, its media outlets, and its military arm, Islamic Resistance, which operates its own media unit. It aims to identify the gaps in the existing studies about the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
Chapter 3. Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance – the Military Arm of Hezbollah

This chapter reviews the literature relating to Hezbollah, its military wing and its media outlets. It consists; in addition to the Overview and Conclusion; of four sections: the history Hezbollah and its structure, including its military arm Islamic Resistance; Hezbollah’s media outlets, including Al-Manar and the military media unit; the media discourse of Islamic Resistance; and finally the gaps in the literature.

It intends to provide the thesis with a narrative and a coherent premise about the elements that constitute the military media of Islamic Resistance or, in other words, its media discourse. As a result of this critical review, which discusses the arguments and identifies the gaps in the literature, this chapter is seminal to the following chapters, because it provides a context for the research questions. Thus, the overall aim of this chapter is to develop a model of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, which will be described, interpreted and explained in this thesis.
3.1 Overview

As alluded to in the previous chapter, many militant organisations in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, have utilised the latest developments in communications to establish, or to promote, their own media outlets. Thus, the second model as to how such organisations use their own media outlets to advance their military objectives, as shown in Figure 2 in the Introduction, is the one adopted in this thesis. It allows the researcher to gain insights into the media operations of militant organisations.

The main argument in this chapter is that the Islamic Resistance arm is linked to the leadership apparatus of Hezbollah solely via the Jihad Council or the Military Operational Headquarters, as will be shown later, and it is separated from all other bodies of Hezbollah. As a result of Hezbollah’s organisational structure (Hamzeh, 2004), Islamic Resistance has its own military media unit to broadcast its messages and videos of military operations, mainly via Al-Manar television and satellite television (Harb, 2011).

However, identifying the military media of Islamic Resistance and its dimensions demands, firstly, an understanding of the nature of the head body, Hezbollah, its military wing and its media outlets. The current literature relating to this subject generally overlaps the respective discourses of Hezbollah and Islamic Resistance, and the outputs of the military media unit and Al-Manar, and does not develop or provide a model of the investigated discourse (e.g. El Houri, 2012; Jorisch, 2004); thus, the current research, through a critical review of this literature, will develop a model of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and identify its elements before undertaking an analysis. The goal of the interpretation is to extract the signs and codes from this discourse in order to identify the frames and objectives. Ultimately, the analysis aims to provide an insight into how Islamic Resistance uses its media discourse to frame and advance its objectives in its war against Israel.
3.2 History of Hezbollah

Many scholarly studies have investigated the emergence of Hezbollah, its structure, military arm, policy, ideology and media outlets, especially Al-Manar television. Thus, shedding light on the establishment of Hezbollah in this research helps to identify Islamic Resistance and its media discourse. Understanding the emergence of Hezbollah stipulates the reading of the contemporary history of Lebanese Shiites (e.g. Alagha, 2006; Jaber, 1997; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). However, some researchers, in order to contextualise the emergence of Hezbollah, have delved into Islamic history to know how the Muslim Shiites emerged in the seventh century and to understand their religious identity (Kramer, 1994). The following brief overview of Lebanese Shiite identity will serve only to deepen the understanding of the ideology and policy of Hezbollah provided by numerous researchers (e.g. El Houri, 2012; Harik, 2004; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002); to do more would require an independent study in itself within the field of Islamic history.

Historically, the Lebanese Shiites have long suffered from social humiliation, economic deprivation and political dismissal (Alagha, 2006; Jaber, 1997; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Furthermore, they could not publicly organise their religious ceremonies, such as Ashura - the commemoration of the killing of Imam Al-Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad - until 1926, when the then French mandate authorities recognised, in the newly written constitution, the religious rights of Shiites alongside other Lebanese sects (Alagha, 2006; Jaber, 1997). In this regard, Jaber (1997) argues, "In 1926, France permitted the Shiites to establish their own religious courts and to practice their religion freely. Under the Ottomans, the Shiites had been forced to celebrate their most sacred religious festival, Ashura, in secret" (p. 9).

Apart from procuring their religious rights, the undue suffering of Lebanese Shiites has never changed or improved to make them feel that they are really Lebanese citizens (Alagha, 2006). "Although the Shi* ites had the symbolic post of the Speaker, the National Pact became one of the many sources of resentment for the Shi*ites who felt excluded from political power or any

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1 The National Pact was an oral agreement made in 1943 between the then key political figures to distribute the political power between the major Lebanese sects - Maronites, Sunnis and Shiites (Alagha, 2006).
tangible chance of accretion to it. Thus, they felt as third-class citizens" (Alagha, 2006, pp. 22 & 23). Shortly after the independence of Lebanon in 1943, and the withdrawal of French troops by the end of 1946, the Palestinian crisis, An-Nakba (The Catastrophe) occurred; the declaration of Israel in 1948 and the Israeli occupation of seven villages in Southern Lebanon spurred the political awareness of Lebanese Shiites, who stood with the Palestinian cause (Alagha, 2006; Saad- Ghorayeb, 2002). They supported the Egyptian leader, Jamal Abdul-Nasser and the PLO in a bid to liberate the occupied land from Israel’s hands (Saad- Ghorayeb, 2002). However, the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, called An-Naksa (The Setback), drew many Lebanese Shiites to join leftist parties in order to oppose Israel (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

In that era, and by the end of the 1950s, Lebanese Shiites invited the Iranian cleric, Imam Musa As-Sadr, to settle in Lebanon. As-Sadr, who became a Lebanese citizen in 1963, followed up the policy of openness towards other Lebanese sects and worked to improve the life of Shiites. He did this through organising their religious matters, establishing the Lebanese Shiite Islamic Higher Council in 1967, and demanding that the government establish Majlis Al-Janoub (the Council of the South) to develop the deprived towns in Southern Lebanon. In 1974, As-Sadr formed Harakat Al-Mahromeen (the Movement of the Deprived) followed, after one year, by Afwaj Al-Moqawama Al-Lobnaniyya (the Brigade of the Lebanese Resistance) which is called Amal or the Amal Movement (Alagh, 2006; Blanford, 2011; Jaber, 1997). Unlike the former, which was not a Shiite framework, Amal, since its inception, has been a Shiite organisation enticing leftist Shiites, with its military wing trained initially by the PLO. However, Amal was not as strong as the PLO, who faced, with other existing parties in Southern Lebanon, the first Israeli invasion into the area in 1978; Israel called this the Litani Operation, the aim of which was to create a security zone south of the Litani River to prevent the Palestinian guerrillas from launching rockets against Israel (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Notably, the Palestinian operations against Israel across the Lebanese border were approved by the Lebanese government through the so-called Itifaq Al-Qahira (Cairo Agreement) in 1969, brokered by the Arab League, between the Lebanese Army and the PLO (Alagha, 2006; Blanford, 2011).
By the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s, Islamic ideology, or what was sometimes described as *Al-Hala Al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Milieu), started to crystallise in Lebanon within the Shiite community, when the Baath takeover of power in Iraq in 1968 obliged dozens of Lebanese graduates, or in other words, new clerics, to flee back to their homeland (Alagha, 2006). In the same era, many families of disenfranchised Lebanese Shiites in the Southern Lebanon and Bekaa districts moved to the eastern and southern suburbs of Beirut in order to improve their lives – particularly to the southern suburb, which later turned into *Hezbollah’s* enclave (Alagha, 2006; Hamzeh, 2004). These families were taught their religious duties and political matters by the Shiite clerics in Beirut (Alagha, 2006).

Following their return from Iraq, the Lebanese clerics “including several potential Hizbu’llah officials, set about recreating the Iraqi-based Da’wa Party in Lebanon, while others established the Lebanese Muslim Student’s Union [transl. also as Lebanese Union of Muslim Students] in the early 1970s” (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002, p. 13). Notably, the late Sayyed Muhammad Hussein Fadlullah served the Islamic Milieu in Lebanon through his Islamic lectures, which, after Imam Musa Al-Sadr’s disappearance in 1978, enticed numerous members to *Amal* (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Shortly prior to the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which was led by Imam Khomeini, members of the Islamic Milieu in Lebanon established, with former members of *Amal*, what was called the *Committee Supportive of the Islamic Revolution*, which was considered to be *Hezbollah’s* prospective nucleus (Alagha, 2006; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the occupation of Beirut in 1982 to expel the PLO were significant catalysts in terms of *Hezbollah’s* establishment (Qassem, 2005). In this year, the *Islamic Amal Movement* emerged from *Amal* when *Amal’s* leader, Nabih Berri, joined *Jabhat Al-Inqaz Al-Wataniyya* (the National Salvation Committee), established by the then Lebanese President, Elias Sarkis, in 1982 to replace the PLO in western Beirut (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). As a result of these events, but primarily of the Israeli invasion, nine
people – the *Committee of the Nine*¹ – met and agreed on a final document, which was sent to the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the late Imam Khomeini, for blessing and approval² (Kasser, 2011). The emerging document, which represents *Hezbollah’s* identity, included the united vision of the *Committee of the Nine* of Islam, Islamic rulings, and an expression of sustained faith in struggle against the Israeli occupation (Qassem, 2005). In this regard, the members of the *Islamic Scholars of Bekaa* district comprised Lebanese Islamic scholars who fled from Iraq after the Baath coup (Alagha, 2006).

One of these scholars was Sayyed Abbas Al-Mosawi, who chose the name of *Hezbollah* and later became its second Secretary-General (Alagha, 2006). The chosen name was an outcome of a debate about the choice of a suitable name – *Ummat Hezbollah* (The Nation of *Hezbollah*) or *Hezbollah* (Kasser, 2011). The name, *Hezbollah*, (transl. also as *Hizbollah*, *Hizbullah* and *Hizballah*) is a combination of two Arabic words – *Hezb*, which means ‘party’ and *Allah*, which means ‘God’.

However, *Hezbollah*, which initially held the title, the ‘Islamic Revolution in Lebanon’, appeared officially on 22 February, 1985, when it published its manifesto, *Ar-Risala Al-Mafiha Ila Al-Mustadafeen* (The Open Letter to the Oppressed); this included statements relating to *Hezbollah’s* identity, objectives and the establishment of *Islamic Resistance* (Alagha, 2006). Table 7 summarises the stages and events relating to *Hezbollah’s* history.

Table 7: Stages and events relating directly and indirectly to *Hezbollah’s* history and its military wing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Imam Musa As-Sadr arrived to Lebanon</td>
<td>As-Sadr was endowed the Lebanese citizenship in 1963. He established, in 1967, the Lebanese Shiite Islamic Higher Council and urged the Lebanese Government to establish the Council of the South (Alagha, 2006; Saad-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The *Committee of the Nine* represented different Islamic committees: three members from the *Islamic Scholars of Bekaa* district; three members from the *Islamic Amal Movement*; and three members of the *Islamic Da’wa* (proselytization) *Party*.

² As Imam Khomeini lived in An-Najaf city in Iraq, between 1964 and 1978, the Lebanese Shiites' clerics, who lived and studied in this city in that era, were inspired by his revolutionary idea to form *Hezbollah* (Ranstorp, 1997).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Baath Coup in Iraq</td>
<td>Dozens of Lebanese clerics including figures of Hezbollah’s founders left Iraq. Some of these students established the Lebanese Union of Muslim Students in the early 1970s, while others established the Islamic Da’wa Party branch in Lebanon (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 November, 1969</td>
<td>Cairo Agreement</td>
<td>After the Arab defeat in 1967, the Arab League supervised an agreement between the Lebanese Army and the PLO to allow Palestinian guerrillas to launch military operations against Israel from Southern Lebanon. However, the Lebanese Government abolished this agreement in June, 1987, as well as abolishing, on 17 May, 1983, the agreement between Lebanon and Israel (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Movement of the Deprived</td>
<td>This is the first social framework, established by Musa As-Sadr (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Brigades of the Lebanese Resistance (Amal)</td>
<td>These brigades were established by As-Sadr to face Israel (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 March, 1978</td>
<td>Litani Operation</td>
<td>It was the first Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August, 1978</td>
<td>The disappearance of Imam Musa As-Sadr</td>
<td>As-Sadr disappeared when he visited Libya (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Committee Supportive of the Islamic Revolution</td>
<td>This committee was established by former members of the Islamic Milieu and Amal shortly before the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Alagha, 2006; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 February, 1979</td>
<td>Iranian Revolution</td>
<td>The success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran had a direct impact on Hezbollah’s establishment and its military wing (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1982</td>
<td>Israeli invasion to Lebanon</td>
<td>The Israeli army occupied the Lebanese capital, Beirut (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-June, 1982</td>
<td>Islamic Amal Movement</td>
<td>This was formed by members of Amal who did not support the participation of Amal’s leader, Nabih Berri, in the National Salvation Committee, formed by the then Lebanese President after the Israeli invasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 February, 1985</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah’s</em> Official Declaration</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah</em> launched its first manifesto ‘The Open letter to the Oppressed’ (Alagha, 2006); its second manifesto, or political charter was launched on 30 November, 2009 (Avon &amp; Khatchadourian, 2012). However, <em>Hezbollah</em> was established unofficially after the Israeli invasion in 1982 (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Taif Agreement</td>
<td>This agreement, brokered by the Arab League in Saudi Arabia, ended the Lebanese civil war and, as a result, the new Lebanese government dissolved all the militias, except the <em>Hezbollah</em> military arm, considering it a resistance movement aimed at liberating the occupied territories in Southern Lebanon from the Israeli occupation (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 February, 1992</td>
<td>Israel assassinated <em>Hezbollah’s</em> Secretary-General, Sayyed Abbas Al-Mosawi</td>
<td>Al-Mosawi was <em>Hezbollah’s</em> second Secretary-General, followed by Sayyed Hasan Nasrullah (Alagha, 2006). Also in this year, <em>Hezbollah</em> participated in the first parliamentary election since the end of the civil war (Hamzeh, 1993).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1993</td>
<td>Operation Accountability War</td>
<td>It was a seven-day war between <em>Islamic Resistance</em> and Israel (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1996</td>
<td>Grapes of Wrath War</td>
<td>This was a 16-day war between <em>Islamic Resistance</em> and Israel, ended by a ceasefire called <em>Tafahom Nisan</em> (April Agreement), which prohibited attacks against civilians (Alagha, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah</em> established The Lebanese Multi-confessional Brigades</td>
<td>It is not linked to <em>Hezbollah’s</em> body (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah</em> changed its motto from 'Hezbollah - the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon' to 'Hezbollah - the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon'</td>
<td>It seems that <em>Hezbollah</em> changed its motto before 1998 as a result of its acceptance of the Taif Agreement and its engagement in the Lebanese political system since 1992 (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 May, 2000</td>
<td>The Israeli army withdrew from Southern Lebanon</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah</em> insists that its military wing, <em>Islamic Resistance</em>, will continue to liberate Shebaa Farms from the Israeli occupation (Alagha, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>-------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Israel Second War</td>
<td>Israel attacked Lebanon and <em>Hezbollah</em> 33 days after <em>Islamic Resistance</em> captured two soldiers on 12 July, 2006. The war was ended by Security Council resolution 1701 (El Houri, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 February, 2008</td>
<td>Assassination of commander of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> Imad Mughniyeh</td>
<td>Imad Mughniyeh was assassinated in the Syrian capital, Damascus (Badran, 2009). <em>Hezbollah</em> Secretary-General accused Israel of assassinating Mughniyeh (Levitt, 2013).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contrary to other researchers, Alagha (2006) argues that *Hezbollah* was established in 1978, not in 1982, as a result of the Islamic Milieu in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, are the two critical political and military junctures that led to the emergence of *Hezbollah* (Azani, 2011; Jaber, 1997; Norton, 2009; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). In this regard, Norton (2009) did not ignore the fact that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and occupation of some territories was a direct catalyst for *Hezbollah’s* establishment, quoting this argument from two former Israeli prime ministers, Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak. However, he considers that this invasion only accelerated the emergence of *Hezbollah*. Based on his reading of the social, political and economic history of the Shiites in Lebanon since the 1960s, Norton (2009) concludes that the revolutionary ideas of young Shiites in Lebanon, who were inspired by the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, led to the establishment of *Hezbollah*. Figure 3 shows the factors that led to the establishment of *Hezbollah*.
The next subsection aims to show the structure of Hezbollah to determine the position of its military wing, because this is crucial to the later sections in order to identify the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

### 3.2.1 Structure of Hezbollah

Before it appeared on the scene in Lebanon and the Middle East, Hezbollah launched, between 1982 and 1985, through its combat organ, several military operations and suicide attacks against Israel (Alagha, 2006). However, at that time, Hezbollah did not state clearly its involvement in these operations, because the body of the organisation was still under construction. When Hezbollah emerged officially in 1985, it named itself – as it appeared on its flag and in its statements – *Hezbollah: the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon*. The main body of Hezbollah is the Shura Council (The Consultative Council) which “passed through different stages from nine members to five and was finalised to seven as...
of 1984” (Alagha, 2006, p. 35). Gradually, the structure of *Hezbollah* started to crystallise through the establishment of several councils. However, the Executive Council, which, in 1995, replaced the so-called Executive Shura (Alagha, 2006), directs all *Hezbollah’s* civilian units as well as *Hezbollah’s* members in the districts of Bekaa (transl. also *Beq’a*), Southern Lebanon and Beirut. These districts are called ‘regions’. The smaller cell of *Hezbollah’s* hierarchy is a group directed by a branch. “Each region is divided into twenty to twenty-five sectors, each of which includes tens of branches. Members are organised into hundreds of groups that constitute the main entry to the party” (Hamzeh, 2004, p. 75).

![Hezbollah’s organisational structure](image)

Figure 4: *Hezbollah’s* organisational structure (Hamzeh, 2004, p. 46)

The councils of *Hezbollah*, as shown in Figure 4, can be described briefly as follows:
• The Central Council elects the members of the Shura Council (Hamzeh, 2004). It is “an assembly of almost 200 party founders and cadres” (ibid, p. 45).

• The Shura Council (the Consultative Council) is the highest body of Hezbollah (Hamzeh, 2004). In this leadership apparatus the majority of its elected members since May, 1991 are clergy (Alagha, 2006). This council “is charged with legislative, executive, judicial, political and military affairs and with the overall administration of the party. Decisions made by the Council are reached either unanimously or by majority vote” (Hamzeh, 1993, p. 325).

• The Jihadi (or Jihad) Council. It was established in 1995 and headed in 2004 by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah (Alagha, 2006). Its mission is to identify the enemy and determine ways to face it (Hamzeh, 2004).

• The Religious-Judicial Council. This council is “responsible for the dossier of the shari’i [my italics] matters and Islamic scholars’ affairs” (Alagha, 2006, p. 57).

• The Political Council (or Politburo). It was established as a result of Hezbollah’s engagement in the Lebanese political life and parliamentary election since 1992 (Alagha, 2006).

These councils are headed by a Secretary-General, who is assisted by a deputy, a political assistant and a media advisor (Alagha, 2006). The Secretary-General of Hezbollah is the leader of Islamic Resistance (Hamzeh, 2004). The current Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah (or Nasrallah) is the third in the row secretary-generals. He has held this position since February, 1992, after Israel's assassination of his predecessor, Sayyed Abbas Al-Mosawi (Alagha, 2006).

This subsection has shown the general organisational structure of Hezbollah. However, the next subsection, which is based on this structure, will discuss the position of Islamic Resistance in Hezbollah's structure to later determine its media discourse.
3.2.2 Islamic Resistance

Hezbollah’s first political document in 1985, *The Open Letter to the Oppressed*, stated that there is no military organ separate from the rest of its bodies, and thus every member may turn into a fighter when the leader concerned recalls members for jihad (Kasser, 2011). Furthermore, the letter points out that the Resistance against Israel emerged through people in the occupied territories (Kasser, 2011). In this regard, many researchers point out that Hezbollah faced Israel through its military arm, *Islamic Resistance*, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (e.g. Alagha, 2006; Hamzeh, 2004; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

The point that is missing in the research here is the lack of evidence about the emergence of *Islamic Resistance* (named, in Arabic, *Al-Moqawama Al-Islamiyya*). In contrast to other research, this thesis argues that *Islamic Resistance* is likely to have emerged before *Hezbollah*. According to its website (www.moqawama.org), there is an indication that *Islamic Resistance* existed before 1982. In the obituary for one of its fighters, Nazeh Fadl Harb, *Islamic Resistance* revealed that its ‘martyr’ was from among the first combatants who joined *Islamic Resistance* in 1979, before being killed in 1981 during what so-called a jihadist duty ("The Martyr," 2013). Although this statement provides evidence that *Islamic Resistance* existed before 1982, there is no further evidence to support this argument. Thus, the concurrence of these events suggests that groups, which formed the backbone of *Islamic Resistance*, emerged in that period of time – that is, the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979, and as a result it can be argued that the concerned combatant in the noted obituary belonged to one of these groups. Thus, Alagha (2006) conflated *Islamic Resistance* and *Hezbollah*, arguing that the latter existed in 1978, without providing clear evidence or reference to support his claims.

The development of *Hezbollah’s* military wing can be attributed to the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (*Pasdaran*), which crossed the Syrian border into Lebanon in order to train *Islamic Resistance* fighters in the Bekaa valley (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Thus, the Iranian support, coupled with Syrian facilities provided when the Syrian army was in Lebanon, played a crucial role in creating *Hezbollah’s* military wing (Addis & Blanchard, 2011; Alagha, 2006). In this regard, Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) argues that, without the sizeable Iranian support
on all fronts, *Islamic Resistance* would have needed “an additional 50 years for the movement to score the same achievements in the absence of Iranian backing” (p. 14). As a result of this support, it can be concluded that *Hezbollah* and its military arm are the joint protégé of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Remarkably, it might be worth indicating, in this vein, the noticeable similarity of the flags of *Hezbollah* and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Erlich & Kahati, 2007).

Unlike many researchers who have focused on *Hezbollah*’s history, policy and ideology, Hamzeh (1993, 2004) has paid close attention to the organisational structure of this party. In both charts produced by Hamzeh to describe *Hezbollah*’s organisational structure, (Figs. 4 and 5), it is clearly argued that *Islamic Resistance* is linked directly to the Shura Council or the leadership apparatus, which is headed by the Secretary-General of *Hezbollah* (ibid).

---

1 Although *Islamic Resistance* fought alongside other Lebanese and Palestinian guerrillas at the beginning against Israel's invasion to Lebanon in 1982, it developed to be an independent organised military arm before it became a military school of Resistance (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).
In his latest diagrammatic representation of the organisational structure of *Hezbollah*, (Fig. 4), Hamzeh (2004) points out that “Islamic Resistance [my italics] consists of at least two main sections: the enforcement and recruitment section and the combat section” (p. 70). To understand the role of the former sections, it is crucial to shed light on membership procedures in *Hezbollah* (ibid). Generally, the individual who wants to be a member of *Hezbollah* should join a group (*majmu’ah*) in a region for two years and should be primarily approved by the party’s security section. The enforcement and recruitment section in every region ensures that the new individual passes two periods of education and training. In the first period and first year, which is called ‘enforcement’ (*ta’abia*), the individual receives religious and cultural studies concerning *Hezbollah* and its ideology. Passing this stage successfully is crucial for the individual to engage in the second-year period which is called ‘ordered discipline’ (*intizam*) and which includes physical training. The end of this year
determines “the role and the position of the new member within the majmu’ah [group] at the branch level. Those who excel in military abilities will be fighters. Others will serve in the political and social units of the party” (Hamzeh, 2004, p. 76).

However, the combat section is divided into four units: istishhadyyon (Self-Martyrs), which means those fighters who are willing to commit ‘martyrdom operations’; Special Forces; Rocket Launchers; and Regular Fighters (Hamzeh, 2004). In this regard, the Military Operational Headquarters, which are supervised by the Shura Council and headed by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, organises the military operations of Islamic Resistance to ensure the secrecy of its activities (Hamzeh, 2004). According to Hamzeh (2004), Islamic Resistance consists of groups:

each group is self-contained and semi-autonomous. Thus, if one is plucked from the main branch, the others cannot be discovered easily. In structural terms, groups communicate through military sector commanders who, in turn, communicate through a military regional commander who is usually a member of Hizbullah’s military operational headquarters (p. 71).

Once every member of a group (majmu’ah) is recalled by the military operational headquarters, a military sector commander provides the assembled group with instructions about the required operation (Hamzeh, 2004).

However, the security organ is linked directly to the Shura Council and consists of two bodies: firstly, the Party Security, whose main mission is to protect Hezbollah’s organisation and its members from penetration, and the approval of which is crucial in recruiting Hezbollah’s members and prospective fighters; secondly, the External Security or Encounter Security aims to protect Hezbollah and Islamic Resistance from spies and external intelligence attacks (Hamzeh, 2004). Based on these illustrations, Figure 6 shows the organisational structure of Hezbollah’s military and security apparatus.
In his earliest study of *Hezbollah’s* structure undertaken between 1988 and 1992, as shown in Figure 5, Hamzeh (1993) argues that the military apparatus of *Hezbollah* includes two bodies: *Islamic Resistance* and *Al-Jihad Al-Islami*. However, the second body *Al-Jihad Al-Islami* does not exist in Hamzeh’s second chart depicting organisational structure as shown in Figure 4.

Hamzeh (1993) points outs that *Al-Jihad Al-Islami* named also *Islamic Jihad Organisation* “was in charge of suicidal attacks against Western and Israeli targets” (p. 328). In 1983, it committed two suicidal attacks against the multinational forces in Beirut “which resulted in the death of 241 American and 58 French soldiers respectively” (Alagha, 2006, p. 281). Repeatedly, *Hezbollah* denies the existence of this military organ in its organisational body without condemning its attacks in 1983 (Hamzeh, 2004). This body, which has several names, such as *Hezbollah’s External Security Organisation* and *Foreign Action Unit*, is considered to be a terrorist organisation by the Australian Government (Australian National Security, 2012).
However, what is common between Hamzeh’s two charts depicting *Hezbollah’s* organisational structure (Figure 4 and Figure 5) is the direct linkage between *Islamic Resistance* and the Shura Council headed by the Secretary-General of *Hezbollah*. Furthermore, the Figures 4 and 5 both show that the military wing of *Hezbollah* is separated from other organs and bodies of *Hezbollah*.

In contrast to Rabil (2008), who linked the military apparatus to the Shura Council via the Jihad Council, Hamzeh (2004) asserts on the notion that *Islamic Resistance* is directly linked to the Shura Council. Although Rabil’s argument hinges around the point that the military apparatus is under the direct control of the Shura Council through the Jihad Council, Hamzeh (2004) provides proof that the Jihad Council has no direct control over *Hezbollah’s* military apparatus and its recommendations are directed only to the Shura Council.

It seems that Rabil’s argument is more accurate than Hamzeh’s despite the fact that he did not provide supportive evidence. In an interview with a Lebanese newspaper on the eve of the eighth anniversary of the end July War, the Secretary-General of *Hezbollah*, the leader of *Islamic Resistance*, Hassan Nasrullah noted that he is the commander of the Jihad Council, which is linked directly to the Shura Council and consists of the key Jihad commanders in *Islamic Resistance*. He pointed out that the mission of this council is to take decisions unanimously on sensitive military operations, such as bombing some Israeli cities, or conducting a military operation to capture Israeli soldiers (Al-Amin et al., 2014a). From Nasrullah’s statement about the Jihad Council and Hamzeh’s description of the Military Operational Headquarters, it seems that they are the same, but that they have different names. Thus, the research uses the two names interchangeably, because the literature shows that they have the same function. Figure 7 shows the organisational structure of *Hezbollah’s* military apparatus.
Towards this end, the position of *Islamic Resistance* in the party provides *Hezbollah* with pliability to face its political and military challenges (Hamzeh, 2004). As a result of this position, some countries consider only the military wing of *Hezbollah* as a terrorist organisation (Australian National Security, 2012). Table 8 lists the countries other than Israel that consider *Hezbollah* and/or its military wing to be a terrorist organisation. Not surprisingly, Israel considers the whole of *Hezbollah* to be a terrorist organisation, because it represents a perpetual threat to its security (Azani, 2011; Baranovich & Moorthy, 2011). Remarkably, as Harik (2004) argues, *Hezbollah* endeavours to undermine, globally, the label of ‘terrorism’ directed against its organisation through engaging in Lebanese political life and stressing that the role of its military wing is to liberate the occupied Lebanese territories and defend Lebanon.
Due to its religious and ideological framework, *Hezbollah* established *The Lebanese Multi-Confessional Brigades* (LMCB) on 3 November, 1997, as a military wing separated from its organisational body and *Islamic Resistance* to allow Lebanese seculars and nationalists to join the military efforts to liberate occupied Lebanese land from Israel (Alagha, 2006). In this vein, *Hezbollah*’s engagement in Lebanese political life and its assertions in its discourse regarding the Resistance to the Israeli occupation led this party, in 1990s, to change its motto from ‘*Hezbollah* – the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon’ to ‘*Hezbollah* – the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon’ (Alagha, 2006). This policy aimed also to emphasise the culture of Resistance in Lebanon and to create a virtual society, called the ‘Resisting Society’ (Minzili, 2011; Qassem, 2008). However, *Hezbollah* refused to dissolve its military wing, *Islamic Resistance*, after the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May, 2000 (Alagha, 2006). Instead, the party asserts, in its discourse, that *Islamic Resistance* will continue in order to liberate, from the Israeli occupation, the Shebaa Farms, which are close to the Golan Heights, and to protect the Lebanese territories from Israeli aggression (Azani, 2011; Baylouny, 2006; Qassem, 2008).

In a nutshell, the military wing of *Hezbollah*, *Islamic Resistance*, is separated from other bodies of *Hezbollah* and is linked directly to the Shura Council via the Jihad Council, or the Military Operational Headquarters. Consequently, the leader of *Islamic Resistance* is the Secretary-General of *Hezbollah*. However,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah’s External Security Organisation</em> (ESO)</td>
<td>Known also as <em>Al-Jihad Al-Islami</em>; <em>Islamic Jihad Organisation</em>; <em>Revolutionary Justice Organisation</em>…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Whole <em>Hezbollah</em></td>
<td>Since April, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Whole <em>Hezbollah</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah’s Military Wing</em></td>
<td>Since July, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah’s Military Wing</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherland</td>
<td>Whole <em>Hezbollah</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td><em>Hezbollah’s Military Wing</em></td>
<td>It took this standpoint before the decision of EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>Whole <em>Hezbollah</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hamzeh, did not provide, particularly in his latest study concerning Hezbollah’s structure, information about other sections that constitute Islamic Resistance.

The next section will discuss Hezbollah’s media outlets; it is crucial to distinguish between these outlets and the media of Islamic Resistance, and hence to identify the latter’s media discourse.

3.3 Hezbollah’s Media Outlets

In the early stages of its emergence, Hezbollah acknowledged the importance of media to transmit its messages and to support the mission of its military arm (El Houri, 2012; Hollander, 2006). To win the media war, Hezbollah is working on shaping local and international perceptions about the conflict with Israel, and gaining various types of support to complete its activities (Lyons, 2008). In this regard, the party uses various types of media outlets and utilises developments in communication technology (Lyme, 2009). In both of the structural models of Hezbollah provided by Hamzeh (1993, 2004), there is a section or a unit, such as the Information Unit (in Figure 4), and the Mass Media section (in Figure 5), that is assigned to supervise Hezbollah’s own media outlets and to communicate with external media outlets and journalists (Lyme, 2009; Osipova, 2011). Yet, all Hezbollah’s media outlets have been under the control of the Secretary-General since 30 July, 2001 (Alagha, 2001).

Since its inception, Hezbollah has established several media outlets (See Table 9). Based on reading the literature relating to Hezbollah’s media (Conway, 2003 & 2007; Erlich & Kahati, 2007; Hamzeh, 2004; Lamloum, 2009; and Lyme, 2009) it can be concluded that it is divided into three genres: firstly, the internal media, such as bulletins directed at Hezbollah’s members, which contain analyses of recent events (Erlich & Kahati, 2007); secondly, the advertising and cultural media, such as posters, exhibitions, tapes, CDs, video games and books which are generally Islamic in content (Abo Rida, 2012; Lyme, 2009); and, thirdly, the traditional and online media outlets (Conway, 2003; 2007; Hamzeh, 2004; Lamloum, 2009; Lyme, 2009).

Abo Rida (2012) argues that Hezbollah’s internal bulletins aim to educate and cultivate the members of the party and can be divided into four categories:

The Political Circular This bulletin is issued by the consultative council and directed at the party’s cadres in order for them to be aware of the contemporary
local, regional and global political issues, as well as Hezbollah’s standpoint on these issues.

The Cultural Circular This bulletin is issued periodically by Hezbollah’s cultural department, which is concerned with providing the members with general Islamic concepts, such as Hadith and sermons.

The Supreme Leader Speech The relevant department in the party issues a periodic pamphlet called Mishkat Al-Nour (The Lantern of Light), which includes the recent speeches of Iranian Supreme Leader, Sayyed Ali Khamenei, who is considered Hezbollah’s supreme jurist (Wali Al-Faqih).

The Hebrew Bulletin Under the motto ‘Know Your Enemy’, Hezbollah periodically issues an internal bulletin containing Israeli news translated from Hebrew to Arabic. This bulletin includes up-to-date news about Israel’s social and political status quo.

Regarding the third genre, Hezbollah’s first media outlet was a newsletter. Inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, a newsletter, Al-Mujahid1 (The Struggler), was published by Hezbollah in 1982 (Matar & Khatib, 2014). This publication "came to an abrupt halt with the onset of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June, 1982, when it was replaced with a four-page leaflet called Ahl-al-thugour [The People of the Outpost]" (Matar & Khatib, 2014, p. 9). However, this leaflet was replaced in the same year by Al-Ahed (The Pledge) newspaper (Matar & Khatib, 2014). This weekly newspaper appeared on the scene by mid-June, 1984 (Conway, 2007). In the same month, Hezbollah established a radio called Sawt Al-Mustadafeen – Sawt Al-Islam (The Voice of the Oppressed – The Voice of Islam), which started transmitting from Baalbeck city, in the northern Bekaa valley, soon after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June, 1982 (Darwish, 2002; Lamloum, 2009). This radio station, which is usually headed by an Iranian, was targeting Lebanon, Jordan and the Occupied Territories. Due to its support for the Palestinian Intifada, it was known as ‘The Radio of the Resistance’. As a counter measure, the Israeli air force carried out raids nine times on its transmitter. However, Hezbollah muzzled this radio in 2002, because it was not licensed by the Lebanese communication authorities.

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1 Matar & Khatib (2014) pointed out Al-Mujtahid newsletter instead of Al-Mujahid. However, Al-Mujahid is not correct, because the noted translation of its name ‘The Struggler’ matches only with Al-Mujahid. Thus, it can be argued that there is a typographical error in the transliteration Al-Mujtahid through adding, by mistake, the letter ‘t.’
Following the establishment of *Al-Ahed* newspaper and *Al-Mustadafeen - Sawt Al-Islam* radio, *Hezbollah* published five periodicals and established three radio stations, including *Al-Nour* (The Light), which started transmitting on 9 May, 1988 (Hamzeh, 2004; Lamloum, 2009). This station was followed by *Al-Manar* (The Beacon or The Lighthouse) television on 3 June, 1991 (Alagha, 2006). Both *Al-Nour* and *Al-Manar*, which are considered to be *Hezbollah*’s mouthpiece, constitute a company called the Lebanese Communication Group (Conway, 2007; Lamloum, 2009).

In terms of online media, *Hezbollah* acknowledged early the importance of cyberspace, launching its official website, www.hizbollah.org, in 1996 (Knight & Ubayasiri, 2002; Conway, 2003). This website was followed by many affiliated websites, because the media outlets, *Al-Ahed, Al-Nour, Al-Manar* and some of *Hezbollah*’s units, launched their own web pages (Conway, 2003; 2007, Lamloum, 2009; Lyme, 2009).

In his study of *Hezbollah's* and its affiliated websites, Weimann (2008) points out that there are between 40 and 50 websites, grouping them into several categories, including: news and information; welfare and social services; religious indoctrination; personal websites of *Hezbollah*’s key figures; anti-Israel websites; wartime propaganda online; and, youth-oriented features. Regarding the last category, Weimann (2008) sheds light on the electronic game, 'Special Force’, which was launched by *Hezbollah* in 2003 to allow the zealots to join, virtually, the Resistance.

Due to the importance of cyberspace, *Hezbollah* established what it called an electronic media unit (“A Meeting,” 2013). This unit is missing from Hamzeh’s study of *Hezbollah*’s organisational structure (as shown in Figure 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Outlet</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Sawt Al-Mustadafeen - Sawt Al-Islam</em> (The Voice of the Oppressed - The Voice of Islam)</td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>It was active from June, 1982. It was closed in 2002, because it was unlicensed (Darwish, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Al-Nour</em></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>It is <em>Hezbollah</em>’s famous radio. It has been active since May, 1988. It was bombed by the Israeli air force during the July War in 2006. However, it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Outlet</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Mujahid (The Struggler)</strong></td>
<td>Newsletter</td>
<td>still works effectively and it has a website (Conway, 2007; Lyme, 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ahli-al-thugour (The People of the Outpost)</strong></td>
<td>Leaflet</td>
<td>It was issued for a short time in 1982 (Matar &amp; Khatib, 2014). Published for a short time after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June, 1982 (Matar &amp; Khatib, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Ahed (The Pledge)</strong></td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>According to Al-Ahed's website (<a href="http://www.alahednews.com.lb/">http://www.alahednews.com.lb/</a>), this weekly newspaper was launched on 18 June, 1984, and closed in 2001 because it was unlicensed. This paper was replaced automatically, or in other words, renamed, as Al-Intiqad (The Critique), which is a weekly licensed newspaper (Alagha, 2006). However, Al-Ahed's website has been continually active since 1999 (Conway, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Intiqad (The Critique)</strong></td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>It is the new name of Al-Ahed. (Lamloum, 2009). However, its website is under the name of Al-Ahed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Bilad (The Country)</strong></td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>As-Sabil (The Road)</strong></td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Wahda Al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Unity)</strong></td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Montalaq (The Basis)</strong></td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bagiullah (Allah's Remainder which denotes the twelfth Muslim Shiites Imam Al-Mahdi)</strong></td>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>It is a monthly magazine that appeared in 1991 and which has a website (Osipova, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Maokif (The Opinion)</strong></td>
<td>Newsletter</td>
<td>This &quot;monthly English-language newsletter [...] published by its [Hezbollah] Foreign Relations Unit&quot; (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002, p. 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al-Manar</strong></td>
<td>Television</td>
<td>It has been working since 1991 and aired on satellites since 2000 (Lamloum, 2009). It has an active official website (Lyme, 2009). This website provides content in four languages: Arabic, English, French and Spanish (Osipova, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong><a href="http://www.moqawama.org">www.moqawama.org</a></strong></td>
<td>Website</td>
<td>It is the official website of Islamic Resistance. However, <a href="http://www.hizbollah.org">www.hizbollah.org</a> shut down in 2006 after facing a cyber attack (Lyme, 2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong><a href="http://www.mediarelations-lb.org">www.mediarelations-lb.org</a></strong></td>
<td>Website</td>
<td>Website launched by Hezbollah Media Relations in mid-2014.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section has broadly shown Hezbollah's media history and its outlets. It has revealed that the party started establishing media outlets before its official
announcement in 1985. Furthermore, Hezbollah utilised cyberspace early on to transmit its messages.

The next subsection is about Al-Manar television. It aims to provide prefatory material about this television station in order to state the difference between Al-Manar and the military media unit of Islamic Resistance, and to persist in seeking to identify the latter’s media discourse and its elements.

3.3.1 Al-Manar Television

As noted in the last section, Al-Manar is considered to be Hezbollah’s mouthpiece. In a press interview with the then Al-Manar Chairman, Abdullah Kasser, he refused to name Al-Manar as Hezbollah’s channel, pointing out that the reason this description has emerged because the channel is headed by a Hezbollah member and supports the line of Resistance against Israel. He revealed that Al-Manar is funded by 20 investors, 55% of which belong to Hezbollah; the other 45% are merchants and independent businessmen (Jaballah, 2006).

Before the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May, 2000, Al-Manar was broadcasting, extensively and exclusively, the statements and activities of Islamic Resistance, particularly videos of its military operations, having obtained them from the military media unit of Islamic Resistance (Harb, 2011). In this context, Al-Manar described itself as ‘The Channel of Resistance’ and, after the Israeli withdrawal on 25 May, 2000 as ‘The Channel of Arabs and Muslims’. Since then, Al-Manar has started broadcasting through satellites to other countries in the Middle East and, later, to other parts of the world after obtaining a licence from the Lebanese Government on 5 April, 2000 (Conway, 2007; Harb, 2011; Osipova, 2011).

After the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada, in September, 2000, Al-Manar established what was termed a ‘war room’ to support the Intifada and encourage the culture of Resistance against Israel. Thus, Al-Manar was then called ‘Intifada Television’ (Abo An-Nasr, 2003).

In this vein, Mzanar (2001) outlines Al-Manar’s strategy as follows:
• By supporting Islamic Resistance and the Palestinian Intifada, it seeks to be the first channel in Lebanon and the world primarily concerned about the conflict with Israel.
• Seeks to be the first channel in Lebanon and the Arab World concerned with airing political and jihadist programs.
• Seeks, after May, 2000, to be in Lebanon and the Arab World a channel concerned with scientific, social and educational issues.
• Seeks to train the channel’s cadre in order to entice a big audience.

During the first days of the July War in 2006, the Israeli air force bombed the Al-Manar channel headquarters in the southern district of Beirut. However, Al-Manar, which had earlier put an emergency plan in place, resumed its broadcasting after two minutes of having been muzzled (Lamloum, 2009). After this war, the channel portrayed Hezbollah’s military arm, Islamic Resistance, as being in the frontline to defend Arabs and Muslim (Ajemian, 2008). Thus, undoubtedly Al-Manar considered itself as the mouthpiece of Hezbollah and Islamic Resistance. As Kalb and Saivetz (2007) argue, “Al-Manar was to Hezbollah what Pravda [newspaper] was to the Soviet Union” (p. 20). In this regard, Hezbollah uses this television “to strengthen its discourse and its political religious project within the Middle East” (Fontana, 2010, p. 8).

Al-Manar broadcasts numerous programs, including political talk shows, entertainment, sport, news, religious and cultural programs, music videos or songs, series and programs for youth and children (Jorisch, 2004). According to an investigative issue by the Australian Communication and Media Authority (2010), the themes of Al-Manar programs are as follows: anti-American and anti-Israeli; resistance narratives of Hezbollah; glorification of Hezbollah’s martyrs; and anti-Semitic. In her comparison of Al-Manar and Al-Hurra - the U.S. satellite designed to compete with anti-American outlets in the Arab world - Baylouny (2006) argues that Al-Manar’s messages are focused on “Palestine, the continuing threat posed by Israel, American bias in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the power and importance of community solidarity, and pride in Arab culture and the achievements of the Islamic Resistance” (p. 2).

Al-Manar’s propaganda supporting military actions against the Israeli army and its standpoint on Washington’s role in the Middle East pushed the United States
to ban the channel and classify it as a terrorist organisation on 17 December, 2004. This coincided with the banning of the channel four days earlier in France under charges of anti-Semitism (Alagha, 2006). In the same manner, the Netherlands and Spain banned this channel in mid-2005 and the Asiasat satellite blocked Al-Manar’s transmission to Asia (Lamloum, 2009).

In short, Al-Manar is a licensed media institution in Lebanon. It is considered the mouthpiece of Hezbollah and its military arm, because it exclusively airs the materials produced by the military media unit of Islamic Resistance. It airs programs supporting the Resistance against Israel. The next subsection will shed light on the military media unit before identifying and outlining the elements of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

3.3.2 The Military Media Unit

Islamic Resistance benefitted from the media lessons of other liberation movements, especially that of the PLO, and as a result, it started using the camera as a parallel weapon to its military operations against the Israeli army (Khatib, 2012). For Islamic Resistance, various conflicts, such as the Arab defeat in 1967 in the war against Israel and the Vietnam War provided precious lessons on how to use media effectively in the conflict with Israel, because of the urgent necessity of providing journalists with an “alternative access to information” (Harb, 2011, p. 179).

To this end, Islamic Resistance created a secret unit, the military media unit (named also the War Information Unit and, in Arabic, Wihdat Al-I’lam Al-Harbi), which has military characteristics, because its members undergo military, ideological and artistic training to film military operations and air them professionally (Atrissi, 2000). The cameramen of this unit also carry guns on the battlefield merely for the purpose of self-defence (Harb, 2011). Remarkably, Al-Ahed newspaper unveiled the existence of this unit in 1984, which was its first film of military operations against the Israeli barracks was on 22 November, 1986 (Lamloum, 2009).

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1 Dr Talal Atrissi, referred to in this research, is an academic member of Hezbollah. He is currently the Dean of the Higher Institute of Doctorates – Letters and Humanities and Social Sciences in the Lebanese University.
Although Hamzeh (2004) provides a nuanced understanding of the organisational structure of *Islamic Resistance*, he has failed to outline the military media unit in its structure. Figure 8 shows the position of the military media unit, as linked to *Hezbollah’s* military apparatus structure, or in other words, to *Islamic Resistance*.

Figure 8: Position of military media unit in military apparatus of *Hezbollah*

Harb (2011) points out that the military media unit is monitoring Israeli media outlets, alongside *Al-Manar*, for the purposes of propaganda. In 2004, there were eight translators working in both *Al-Manar* and the military media unit of *Hezbollah*. Their mission was to monitor the Israeli media and translate, from Hebrew into Arabic, all the broadcasted issues relating to *Hezbollah* and *Islamic Resistance*. Harb interviewed the head of the military media unit, who named himself as Haj Maitham; the interview reveals some information about the unit’s mechanism of work and its development. Hence, the unit provides, primarily, *Al-
Manar videotapes and statements about the military operations of Islamic Resistance.

However, the military media unit provided videos of military operations to outlets and companies other than Al-Manar on four occasions: firstly, it provided Assafir newspaper, in October, 2000, with photos depicting the capturing of three Israeli soldiers, causing the newspaper to publish a special Sunday edition (“Hezbollah Joins,” 2000); secondly, in 2006, it sold to the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC), for documentary purposes, a video of a military operation that contains footage of the capture of three Israeli soldiers by Islamic Resistance in October, 2000 (Eljek, 2006); thirdly, it provided Al-Mayadeen satellite chairman, Ghassan ben Jiddo, with a video of a military operation which depicts two Israeli soldiers being captured in 2006, in order to air it through that channel in July, 2012 (Fahs, 2012); lastly, it provided videos to a company producing the drama, The Victorious, in which Islamic Resistance features centrally (Meree, 2011).

In pursuit of the aims of this thesis, this subsection identified the military media unit in Hezbollah’s military apparatus. It showed its history and its cooperation with Al-Manar. The next section will outline the outputs of this unit, because they constitute a major element of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

3.4 Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance

The aim of this research is to identify and analyse the media discourse of Islamic Resistance in order to identify its signs and codes, and consequently to explore its frames and objectives. Thus, it is crucial to identify the elements of this discourse. As discussed previously, the military wing of Hezbollah is linked directly to the highest body in the party, the Shura Council, via the Jihad Council or the Military Operational Headquarters; this is headed by the Secretary-General and separated from Hezbollah’s other bodies to ensure the secrecy of military operations. Furthermore, the military media unit is linked directly to Islamic Resistance. These features depict the basis of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. Moreover, this discourse, as shown in Figure 9, is comprised of the military speeches of the leader of Islamic Resistance, that is, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, and the output of the military media unit.
Figure 9: Elements of media discourse of Islamic Resistance

The identification of the outputs of the military media unit can be traced in several studies (e.g. Harb, 2011; Osipova, 2011) and the website (www.moqawama.org). Remarkably, the literature reveals that there is no study that outlines all the output of this unit. In this vein, Harb (2011) identifies only one element – the videos of the military operations. Osipova (2011) added two elements documenting the military activities (written statements) and films of fighters’ testaments. In addition to these elements, there are video songs and propaganda flashes. The latest outputs can be noticed through observing the video songs and flashes screened on Al-Manar; there are captions on some of them that indicate that they are produced by the military media unit, for example Al-Manar (2010). Thus, the outputs, as will be shown in Figure 10, are: statements, fighters’ testaments, videos of military operations, and video songs, including propaganda flashes¹.

¹Bseiso (2013) analysed four promotional flashes aired on Al-Manar after the end of the July War in the context of the significance of the Resistance to protect and defend Lebanese territories and in the context of calling for Lebanese unity. However, these flashes were produced by Al-Manar.
This section outlines and identifies the elements of Islamic Resistance's media discourse. The next section provides a summary of this chapter, before shedding light on the gaps in the literature.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This review of the literature traced the history of the Lebanese party, Hezbollah, its organisational structure, its military arm, its media outlets and military media unit. It aimed to sketch the media discourse of Islamic Resistance to identify its elements. In summary, the literature revealed:

- the socio-political context of Hezbollah's establishment, and consequently the context of its military wing Islamic Resistance and its discourse;
- the organisational structure of Hezbollah's military apparatus and the position of Islamic Resistance;
- the fact that Islamic Resistance's roots emerged before Hezbollah;
- the fact that Islamic Resistance is linked to the leadership apparatus of Hezbollah solely via the Jihad Council or the Military Operational Headquarters;
• the fact that the leader of Islamic Resistance is Hezbollah’s Secretary-General;
• the fact that the military media unit uses Al-Manar’s satellite television to transmit its messages and air its videos;
• the fact that the media discourse of Islamic Resistance is constituted by the outputs of the military media unit and speeches of its leader the Secretary-General of Hezbollah;
• the fact that the outputs of the military media unit are written statements, fighters’ testaments, military operations’ videos, and video songs and propaganda flashes.

3.6 Gaps in the Literature

Early studies of Hezbollah have focused on its organisational structure, religious belief and its relation with Iran (e.g. Hamzeh, 1993; Kramer, 1994). However, there is a dearth of studies concerning the media discourse of its military apparatus. The first attempt to shed light on the rhetoric of the images contained in the videos of military operations before the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May, 2000, was undertaken by Mzana (2001). The same researcher co-authored another study about the martyrdom implications in a number of propaganda flashes and Ashura’s elegies, screened on Al-Manar between 1999 and 2000 (Mzana & Mohsen, 2001). These two studies emerged shortly after Al-Manar commenced using satellites operating in the Middle East to address Arab audiences.

Another attempt to study the videos of the military operations came after nearly a decade. In her investigation, from an ethnographical perspective, into the propaganda underpinning some of the videos of military operations of Islamic Resistance, Harb (2011) neither outlined all the outputs of the military media unit, nor did she try to explore the propaganda in material other than the filmed operations. In her study, Harb (2011) analysed the propaganda flashes and clips produced by Al-Manar before May, 2000 to address the Israelis, and particularly the mothers of the Israeli soldiers.

In a similar vein, El Houri (2012) attempted to analyse the discourse of the videos of military operations and video songs alongside Nasrullah’s speeches in
an attempt to argue that they represent *Hezbollah’s* religious identity and express its propaganda. However, El Houri:

- did not distinguish between *Hezbollah’s* media discourse and the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.
- linked the military media unit to *Hezbollah*, not to *Islamic Resistance*, without providing an organisational structure of the party or its military apparatus.
- did not outline the outputs of the military media unit.
- did not analyse the statements produced by the military media unit.
- did not analyse the fighter’s testaments.
- did not distinguish between video songs and flashes produced by *Al-Manar*, and those produced by the military media unit.

Similar to El Houri, Jorisch (2004) did not distinguish in his study between the video songs and propaganda flashes produced by *Al-Manar*, and the video songs and flashes produced by the military media unit.

In addition, the review of the literature revealed the following gaps:

- There is a dearth of research about the military media unit.
- There is a dearth of research about the written statements of the military media unit.
- In his explanation of the significance of *Ashura* to *Hezbollah* and its military arm, Atrissi (2012a) points out that the fighters’ testaments from *Islamic Resistance* are embedded with doctrines from the historical tragedy of the Shiites'. With this exception, it seems there is a dearth of studies of the videos of fighters' testaments.
- There is a dearth of research into the video songs and propaganda flashes produced by the unit, particularly after the July War in 2006.
- There are many studies investigating the speeches of the leader of *Islamic Resistance*, the Secretary-General of *Hezbollah*, Hassan Nasrullah (e.g. Khoury & Da’na, 2009; Lahlali, 2012; Matar, 2010). Although Matar (2010) attempted to study Nasrullah's rhetoric in a
sample of speeches, she did not shed light on their rhetorical triangle - ethos, logos and pathos. Thus, there is a dearth of research into the rhetorical triangle and signs in his speeches.

- In her study of Nasrullah’s rhetoric in two speeches that marked the beginning and the end of the July War, Matar (2010) focused on the concepts of ‘Jihad’ and ‘Resistance’. Although she points theoretically to the significance of understanding the profound signs and the political shifts in framing, the study does not delve into the various meanings of Jihad and the meaning of Resistance.

- There is a dearth of research relating to the codes and signs of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.

- The investigations of Harb (2011) and El Houri (2012) of the videos of military operations go back to the 1990s. They did not investigate these videos after May, 2000, the date of the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, and the date when *Al-Manar* started broadcasting through operating satellites to Arabs and later to the world.

- In his study of the images in a number of videos of military operations of *Islamic Resistance* before the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000, Mzanar (2001) discussed their general signification, providing some examples. Although he showed a nuanced understanding of the signification of the iconic images, based only on what he called the ‘rhetoric of the image’, Mzanar’s analysis lacked the appropriate methodology. Furthermore, he did not disclose the number of military videos under investigation.

- Karagiannis (2009) endeavoured to identify and classify the frames in *Hezbollah’s* ideology, policy and excerpts from Nasrullah’s speeches. However, he did not show the frames in the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance*; furthermore, he did not delve into the meanings of the sketched frames.

Drawing on these gaps, which reveal that the studies related to the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* are incomplete, there is a dearth of studies related to the signs, codes, frames and objectives in the discourse of this military
arm. As a result, this thesis identifies the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and seeks to answer the following questions:

RQ.1: What are the signs and codes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance?

RQ.2: How does the media discourse of Islamic Resistance frame its identity and other identities?

RQ.2.1: How does the media discourse of Islamic Resistance express its core ideology and cultural values?

RQ.3: What are the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance?

In summary, this chapter identifies the gaps in the existing studies relating to the media discourse of the military arm of Hezbollah, arguing that the existing studies neither identify this discourse, nor analyse all its genres to provide a fuller understanding of its messages and objectives. Through reviewing the literature, this chapter argues that Islamic Resistance has its own media discourse.

To bridge the gap, this thesis analyses samples from all genres of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, the total output of the military media unit and the speeches of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General calling for Resistance, in order to describe their signs and codes, interpret their frames and explain their objectives. Before identifying the methodology employed in this research, the next chapter outlines the ideological contexts of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
Chapter 4. Ideological Contexts of the Media Discourse of
Islamic Resistance

This chapter aims to outline the ideological contexts of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. The outline of these concepts reveals the religious identity of this military arm.

In achieving its aim, this chapter complements the review of the literature in the previous chapter and contextualises the analysis, because the data embedded within the religious concepts require explanation.

In addition to the Overview and Conclusion sections, this chapter consists of four sections: the first section points to the history of Shi'ism; the second section illuminates the history and implications of Ashura; the third section points to the implication of Wilayat Al-Faqih theory; finally, the fourth section outlines the concept of ‘jihad’.
4.1 Overview

The review of the literature about Hezbollah and its military arm, as shown in the previous chapter, pointed generally to the identity of Islamic Resistance as a Lebanese Shiite organisation that fights Israel in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As religion plays a role in the establishment of this identity, this chapter contextualises the research through illuminating the ideological contexts of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

Discourse is embedded with ideology. Thus, shedding light on the ideology underlying discourse is crucial, due to the possibility of it "contribut[ing] to producing or reproducing unequal relations of power, relations of domination" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 14). The members of Hezbollah and its military arm, Islamic Resistance, are Shiite Muslim Twelvers, who all hold the same theoretical belief about Islamic governance (Alagha, 2006, 2011; El Houri, 2012). In this regard, understanding the ideological contexts of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance necessitates shedding light on the religious belief of this military arm. Thus, knowing these contexts allows the researcher to adequately interpret the frames and consequently to identify the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
4.2 Shi’ism

The origin of Shi’ism goes back to the early history of Islam, when a group of people backed Imam Ali ben Abi Talib to be the successor of the Prophet Muhammad. They claimed that the Prophet Muhammad himself, based on a Divine order, had declared publicly to the then Muslims that Imam Ali was his successor and designated Imam Ali’s sons, Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein as two Imams as well (Al-Hasani, 2012a). Thus, Shi’ism denotes the followers or the partisans of Imam Ali ben Abi Talib (Tabātabā’ī, 1977). This interpretation of the terms Shi’ism (and Shiites) matches with the denotations of this term in the Arabic language, which implies various meanings, such as ‘followers’, ‘partisans’, ‘group’, ‘faction’, ‘sect’, and ‘party’ (Baalbaki, 2005, p. 682).

Although there are many sects among Shi’ism and all Shiite Muslims have a common belief in following the Prophet Muhammad and his infallibles (or Households of the Prophet Muhammad), the majority of Shiites in the world are the Twelvers. The belief uniting this group is the concept of Imamology following the death of Prophet Muhammad. They believe that every Imam after Imam Ali, till the twelfth Imam, nominated his successor (Tabātabā’ī, 1977). As a result of this doctrine, the Twelvers believe in twelve infallible Imams from the Households, considering them the successors of Prophet Muhammad (Al-Hasani, 2012a, 2012b; Tabātabā’ī, 1977). For the Twelvers, the first Imam was Imam Ali ben Abi Talib and the twelfth Imam Muhammad ben Al-Hassan (called Imam Al-Mahdi or transliterated into Al-Mehdi), who, according to the Twelvers, was born in 868, then hid. According to Shiite belief, he is still alive and will appear one day to face global oppression after it reaches its peak, and to establish a state of justice (Al-Hasani, 2012b, Al-Qarashi, 2006; Tabasi, 2003; Tabātabā’ī, 1977).

4.3 Ashura: The Model of Self-Sacrifice

Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah (2000), argues that understanding Islamic Resistance in Lebanon stipulates understanding Ashura:

O’ scholars who are studying The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon;
and we know there are many research centres around the globe which are investigating this organisation; in order to examine
through your studies this Resistance in order [to know] its strengths and weaknesses, I tell you in full view of people - and you may not grasp what I say - the power of this Resistance, its essence, its identity, its quiddity, its spirit, the oxygen of its mujahedeen, the passion of its self-martyrs and the ultimate hopes of its martyrs exist in the secret, soul, mind, blood and pains of [Imam] Abi Abdillah Al-Hussein, the son of Az-Zahra' [Prophet Muhammad's daughter]. If you are able to discover this secret and this identity, you will be able to understand *The Islamic Resistance* in Lebanon (p. 11) [my translation].

As revealed in the analysis of videos of fighters' testaments, *Ashura* is considered by the fighters to be a parable of self-sacrifice. In this vein, Atrissi (2012a) argues that *Islamic Resistance* is a prolongation of Imam Al-Hussein's movement against transgression, tyranny and occupation. In the context of the present analysis, it is significant to delve briefly into the history of Shiism to grasp the implications of *Ashura*.

Shi'ism was a socio-political movement that emerged promptly after the death of Prophet Muhammad against the status quo within Islam, when Imam Ali ben Abi Talib was dismissed from leading the newborn Muslim nation (Tabātabā’ī, 1977). However, when Imam Ali later became the fourth orthodox caliph, the clashes erupted between him and the then Umayyad governor of the Levant, Mu’awiyah ben Abi Sufyan (Al-Hasani, 2012a). After the death of Imam Ali, these clashes with Mu’awiyah continued with the former’s son, Imam Al-Hassan, the Prophet's grandson, who is considered the second Imam for the Shiites *Twelvers* (Tabātabā’ī, 1977).

Although these clashes ended in a compromise, the death of Imam Al-Hassan and later Mu’awiyah created the second cornerstone in crystallising the Shiite Muslim identity (Tabātabā’ī, 1977). Mu’awiyah, before his death, appointed his son, Yazid, to be his successor and as a result of this appointment, Yazid asked the then third Imam of Shiite Muslims and Imam Al-Hassan's brother, Al-Hussein (transliterated also into Imam Hussein, or Imam Al-Husayn and also called Abo Abdillah Al-Hussein) to recognise him as the new Caliph (Al-Hasani, 2012b). The refusal of Imam Al-Hussein to recognise Yazid's caliphate
led to the Battle of Karbala, which resulted in the killing of Imam Al-Hussein along with a number of his family and companions (ibid).

This tragedy has historical and geographical names. The historical name is *Ashura* and the geographical name is Karbala, in Iraq, where the battle between the armies of Imam Al-Hussein and the Umayyad Caliph Yazid occurred (Zaiton, 2007). *Ashura* refers in general to the commemoration of the death of Imam Al-Hussein in the Battle of Karbala. Thus, the Shiites revive the first ten days of the Muharram month in the Hijri calendar to remember the tragic daily events in the Battle of Karbala. However, *Ashura* signifies in particular the tenth day of Muharram when Imam Al-Hussein was killed in that battle.

The outcome of this battle has developed, in Shiite Muslim consciousness, through annual meetings held to eulogise Imam Al-Hussein and remember the tragedy of Karbala, turning this unevenly balanced battle into a model of revolution and self-sacrifice against oppression and tyranny (Al-Haidari, 1999). Thus, Imam Al-Hussein is named by Shiite Muslims as the ‘the lord among martyrs’ (Tabâtabâ‘î, 1977, p. 196).

Throughout the centuries, *Ashura* has charged, and still does, the Shiite discourse with power to resist their suffering from "suppression, psychological oppression, poverty, despotism, occupation and superciliousness" (Baydon, 2001, p. 178). In his observations on the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Foucault acknowledged the significance of *Ashura* in the Shiite discourse, because it energises it with power and resistance to change the corrupted status quo (Alagha, 2011).

As noted previously, the leader and the fighters of *Islamic Resistance* consider *Ashura* a model to inspire the notion of self-sacrifice in their war against Israel. Hence, *Islamic Resistance* employs this historical battle "as a symbol for struggle" (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 46).

This tragedy has been refashioned into a source of energy to endow the fighters of *Islamic Resistance* with the strength to endure their ultimate sacrifice. Thus, the theatre of Karbala and reprisal has, today, become the occupied Lebanese territories, and Yazid's army has become the Israeli forces.
4.4 The Implications of Wilayat Al-Faqih Theory

Wilayat Al-Faqih (or Vilayat-i Faqih in Persian) is a transliterated Arabic term which, according to Shiite Muslim Twelvers, denotes the Authority of the jurisprudent, otherwise known as the Jurist or Guardianship of the Jurist-Consult (Alagha, 2011; Al-Katib, 1998; Khomeini, 1981). It is considered one of the Twelvers' theories of Islamic governance (Kadivar, 2000).

This theory is related to the Twelvers' religious history (Alagha, 2006). After the death of Imam Al-Hussein, the succeeding Imams continued the mission of engagement in Muslim society through a different tactic (Al-Hasani, 2012a, 2012b). They started delivering religious education to the Muslim society without facing any bloody clashes with the current authorities, except for some irritations from a number of Abbasid caliphs (ibid). However, the followers of the Imams were referring to them to know the religious edicts (Sharia law) and to pay the taxes, which included Khums (it means one-fifth and denotes religiously a 20% tithe of the surplus of annual profit) and Zakat (alms giving) to be spent by the Imams themselves on what they saw as necessary, such as paying to people in need (Alagha, 2011; Khomeini, 1981).

After the occultation (or 'hiding from view') of their twelfth Imam, the Shiite Muslim Twelvers emulated the practicing jurists who had the morality and ability to extract the edicts from their sources, mainly from the holy Book, the Quran, and the Hadith, and who thus had religious authority (Tabātabā’ī, 1977).

To understand the denotation of Wilayat Al-Faqih and its theoretical framework, it is crucial to distinguish between the terms: Mujtahid, Marja' and Wali Al-Faqih1. The Arabic term Mujtahid means the ‘diligent’ and according to the Twelvers denotes, in a religious sense, the Jurist (Faqih in Arabic), who has the stipulated qualifications to extract the edicts2, but may not declare his jurisprudential expertise to be known publicly; thus he may not have religious authority (Tabātabā’ī, 1977).

Similarly, the Marja', which in Arabic means, the ‘expert’, is also a Mujtahid. However, Marja' denotes the Jurist who has piety and justice and is known

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1 Alagha (2006, 2011) did not distinguish clearly between these terminologies.

2 The extracted edict (or the statement based on Sharia law) is called, in Arabic, Fatwa (plural Fatawa).
publicly; thus, some believers\(^1\) in the Twelvers\(^{'}\) refer to him in order to know the Fatawa (edicts) and pay the religious tax. Unlike the Mujtahid, the Marja’ has religious authority. Thus, the term Marja’ is intertwined with the term At-Taqlid (Marja’ At-Taqlid) to denote the emulated jurist (Alagha, 2011).

On the other hand, the term Wali in Wali Al-Faqih means in Arabic, "someone in charge or someone charged with authority" (Baalbaki, 2005, p. 1248). Thus, Wali Al-Faqih denotes the authority, or the rule of the jurisprudent, or the jurist. However, Wali Al-Faqih can have originally been a Mujtahid or a Marja’ (Khamenei, 2014), but he is selected by the concerned Experts, according to the amended Iranian constitution in 1989, to be the highest leader (Papan-Matin, 2014). As a result of the obtained power, Wali Al-Faqih holds and practices the ultimate legal and religious authority (Badry, 2001). Due to authorities and the power held by Wali Al-Faqih, this current study prefers to use the term, the Rule of the Jurisprudent or the Jurist, rather than the Authority or the Guardianship of the Jurisprudent or the Jurist, to refer to Wilayat Al-Faqih theory. Notably, El Houri (2012) used the same term the Rule of the Jurist, but he did not illustrate the reasons for his usage, nor did he pay attention to the related terminologies to distinguish between them.

The early jurists of the Twelvers pointed out different levels of authority that could be practiced by them. However, they divided into two camps regarding the establishment of an Islamic state or government. Currently, the first camp prohibits seeking to establish any state, because it is the role of Imam Al-Mahdi when he reappears; however, the second camp believes that establishing an Islamic state or government is legitimate during the occultation and it may pave the way for Imam Al-Mahdi to appear (Al-Katib, 1998). Although early Shiite Muslim governments formed in some regions, Wilayat Al-Faqih did not appear till the eve of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the late Imam Khomeini theorised to the Islamic government (ibid). In his theorisation about Islamic ruling, which concluded that the Jurist has an absolute authority, Khomeini (1981) started from a point that the Jurist, likewise the infallible Imam,

\[^1\] According to the jurisprudence of the Twelvers, the believers who follow the edicts (Sharia law) of the jurists are called, in Arabic, Mukalafeen (plural of Mukallaf). The term Mukallaf, which, in Arabic, means the designated, denotes the religiously entitled persons, who cannot extract the edicts (the Sharia laws), and should emulate a known jurist (Alagha, 2011).
implements the Divine orders, and is considered the deputy of the twelfth hidden Imam.

As a result of this tenet and the success of the Iranian Revolution, Wilayat Al-Faqih, as a theory of Islamic ruling, was adopted by the majority of Iranians via a referendum, and the framework to choose Wali Al-Faqih was included in the Iranian constitution of 1979 (Papan-Matin, 2014). Thus, Khomeini became the first Wali Al-Faqih (Alagha, 2011).

After nearly a decade of applying the theory of Wilayat Al-Faqih in Iran and as a result of a domestic political dispute, Khomeini issued a decree in January, 1988 that enables the Wali Al-Faqih to exercise extreme political power (Badry, 2001). However, a religious dispute erupted shortly after the death of Khomeini in 1989 over the identity and qualification of his successor. The outcome of this debate was the amendment of the 1979 constitution to allow the selection of the new Wali Al-Faqih, Imam Khamenei (Badry, 2001). This amendment in 1989 limited the authority of the choosing of the Wali Al-Faqih exclusively by the Experts (Papan-Matin, 2014). Furthermore, the amendment did not limit the proposed Wali Al-Faqih by the Experts to be an emulated jurist. Unlike the 1979's constitution, the proposed Wali Al-Faqih can be a Mujtahid, but in addition to justice and piety he has a "sound political and social perspective, prudence, courage, sufficient administrative capability, and power for leadership" (Papan-Matin, 2014, p. 185).

As noted previously, the establishment of Hezbollah was approved and blessed by Khomeini and thus the members of this party and its military arm, Islamic Resistance, believe in the Rule of the Jurist Theory in Islamic ruling; their first and second supreme leaders are the late Imam Khomeini and his successor Imam Khamenei, respectively (Alagha, 2006). Thus, the fighters in their testaments expressed their belief in this theory. This belief reveals why the early motto of Hezbollah was 'Hezbollah - the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon', before it changed, after the mid 1990s, to 'Hezbollah - the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon' due to the multi-confessional nature of Lebanese society (Badry, 2001).

However, Islamic Resistance and its fighters express their loyalty to Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Rinehart (2006) points out how, in 1984 in western Beirut, the fighters of Hezbollah's military arm "wore green bands around their heads that carried inscriptions such as Allahu Akbar, or 'God
is Greater', and *Qaaidowna Khomeini*, or 'our leader is Khomeini.' Posters that bore the image of the Iranian leader were everywhere in sight" (pp. 106 & 107). In that era, as shown in images published in a number of *Al-Ahed* newspaper issues, the volunteer fighters of *Islamic Resistance* were willing "to commit self-martyrdom operations, put the emblem of the Iranian flag on the left side of their chest and Imam Khomeini's image on the right side to signify their love to him and belief in Islam. Furthermore, the coffins of the fighters were covered by the Iranian flag" (Asadallah, 2004, pp. 276 & 277) [my translation].

The leader of *Islamic Resistance*, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, is, in Lebanon, the official representative or proxy of *Wali Al-Faqih* Khamenei (Alagha, 2006). This implies that the fighters should obey the orders of their leader, Nasrullah, and ultimately, Khamenei, without any hesitation, because any sort of disobedience is considered a sin (Hamzeh, 1993, 2004). Notably, Alagha (2006) distinguishes between *Hezbollah*’s religious and political ideologies. However, this distinction seems unsound, because *Hezbollah* and its military arm, as noted previously, pay further attention to their religious identity. Under the umbrella of the Rule of the Jurist Theory, which has been adopted by *Hezbollah* and its military arm, there is no difference between its political and religious ideologies. In this regard, Khomeini (1981) argues that Islam “is a religion where worship is joined to politics and political activity is a form of worship” (p. 277).

Figure 11 shows the ideological structure of *Hezbollah* and its military arm.
Figure 11: Religious ideology of Islamic Resistance

After providing an insight into the Rule of the Jurist theory and its implications, the next section intends to show further ideological contexts of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. Thus, it aims to identify the concept of jihad and consequently martyrdom, based on the ideology of Hezbollah's military arm.

4.5 The Concept of Jihad

The concepts of jihad, and consequently, martyrdom have Islamic roots, and their denotations are thus worthy of investigation in the context of understanding the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. As shown in the statements and the fighters' testaments, the terms ‘jihad’ and ‘martyrdom’ are used extensively with their etymologies, such as martyr(s), martyred, mujahedeen (plural of mujahid or mujahed) to frame the fighters' actions and their death in the war. In Arabic, "the etymology of the word 'jihad' is derived from the verb 'jahada', which means to exert a person’s energy or to do ones best to overcome trouble, difficulty, or hardship. Jihad is total devotion in performing one’s religious duty, be it in action or in intention" (Alagha, 2006, p. 82).
From an Islamic perspective, there are a number of Quranic verses and hadith about the merits of jihad and the high-ranking glory of mujahedeen and martyrdom in the line of this duty; however, there are many interpretations of the denotations of jihad and consequently martyrdom between different Muslim schools of thought (Alagha, 2006). For this research, it seems crucial to identify the meanings of jihad and martyrdom in the light of the Rule of the Jurist theory in order to depict a precise image of the denotations of these two ideological terms in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.

In his explanation of the Rule of the Jurist theory and the prospect of Islamic government, Khomeini (1981) declares that, "Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism" (p. 28). As a result of this revolutionary standpoint, Khomeini (1981) considers that "Islam is the school of jihad, the religion of struggle" (p. 132). However, Khomeini (1981) did not limit jihad to the military struggle, quoting a hadith of Prophet Muhammad to early Muslim fighters arriving from a battle, “You have now returned from the lesser jihad; the greater jihad still remains as a duty for you” (p. 387). In interpreting this hadith, which distinguishes between two forms of jihad, Khomeini (1981) considers that the greater jihad is the origin of the lesser jihad, or military struggle, arguing that:

> without the inner jihad, the outer jihad is impossible. Jihad is inconceivable unless a person turns his back on his own desires and the world. For what we mean here by ‘world’ is the aggregate of man’s aspirations that effectively constitute his world, not the external world of nature with the sun and the moon, which are manifestations of God. It is the world in this narrow, individual sense that prevents man from drawing near to the realm of sanctity and perfection (pp. 389 & 390).

According to this interpretation, which widened the concept of jihad to embed all aspects of life and to impact positively on the social order due its reformative nature, the *mujahid* is not limited to an individual or a group who engages in the
military struggle (the lesser or the smaller jihad). Thus, any form of deed in the path of Allah is considered to constitute jihad (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

Moussalli (cited in Alagha, 2011) distinguishes between the two forms of jihad:

Whereas the smaller jihad denotes the combating of activities against the enemies of Islam, the greater jihad was defined by the Prophet as that which encompasses the individual’s service to the cause of religion. Hizbullah broadens the notion of greater jihad to include all efforts that an individual exerts to complete his duty as a believer… Jihad has basic characteristics like realism… Although struggle (jihad) aims at transforming any institution that opposes and does not allow Islam to be freely practiced, it is neither suicide nor a campaign of atrocities (p. 93).

Greater jihad can be described as a noble and peaceful aim, because it calls for the self to transcend the materialistic temptations of life and to follow the right Islamic path in order to promote the self to be productive in the society. The believer who intends to engage in this form of jihad should behave in proper manner through doing good deeds and refraining from committing any sort of sins, because the reward of the struggle to buoy up the self-morale in daily life is the paradise in the Hereafter (Alagha, 2006, 2011).

This form of jihad is not limited to a gender, age, time or geographical area. Hence, every Muslim anywhere and anytime should be a true believer and responsible to his/her own family and ultimately the society in order to satisfy the conditions of this form of jihad even though the believer who engaged in this path does not aware that this form of struggle in life is jihad. Although committing good behaviour (greater jihad) may exist within non-Muslims and military struggle (lesser jihad) may exist in cultures and religions other than Islam, jihad has a particularly Islamic feature and implications and is considered a way of life (Alagha, 2011).

By and large, both forms of jihad may intersect. Contrary to the lesser jihad, which may have an end, there is no termination for greater jihad, because it stipulates continuous monitoring of the self to achieve the noble and peaceful aims (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).
This noble jihad is rarely highlighted in studies. Unfortunately, jihad has attracted a negative label due to the misuse of this concept whether by terrorists and extremists who are thirsty for bloodshed, or by media observers who do not have adequate knowledge about the right Islamic implications of jihad.

For *Islamic Resistance*, which has an Islamic jihadi identity (Alagha, 2006), jihad is defensive against the invader or the occupier, but practicing greater jihad is considered an essential process en route for every fighter to construct his Islamic identity before he engages in the military struggle (Alagha, 2011; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Drawing on this Islamic understanding of lesser jihad and quotes from the leader of *Islamic Resistance*, Alagha (2011) points out that killing innocents or attacking any country, which can be classified as terrorism, is religiously prohibited (or *haram* in Sharia).

Although defensive jihad is a compulsory religious obligation (or *Wajib A'ini* in Sharia) on every individual to face the invader forces or the occupation, it becomes a collective duty (*Wajib Kefai*) if a group of Muslims undertakes this military responsibility (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

Engaging in jihad (or fighters) has, for a fighter, one of two results: victory, which benefits the Islamic nation (*Ummah*) or martyrdom (Qassem, 2008). According to the holy book, Quran, and as shown previously in this research, “*Victory Comes only from Allah*” (8:10); this can be seen in both the verses quoted at the end of a number of statements issued by *Islamic Resistance*, and in the title of Nasrullah's first analysed speech – the ‘*the Speech of Divine Victory*’.

However, the term martyrdom is *Ashahada* in Arabic, and its etymology is martyr (*Shahid*), which means witnessing; in other words, it means testifying the truth in detail based on knowledge, because the martyr is the person who witnesses the truth in life through his martyrdom (Al-Awa, 2010). Thus, “the *shahid* is a witness to a line of conduct that is determined by his social and political context. He testifies to a cause by experiencing a reality that remains abstract when encountered only in writing, and in so doing he embodies it or gives it ‘presence’” (Saade, 2015, p. 728).

Drawing on this meaning, “The martyr witnesses because he ‘exists’ between timeframes, and in so doing produces imaginaries of community conducive to political action” (Saade, 2015, p. 729).
However, there are different meanings of the terms ‘martyrdom’ and ‘martyr’, particularly the latter term (Al-Awa, 2010). However, the common denotation of martyrdom is death in the path of Allah, and who dies in this line of duty is called ‘martyr’ (Alagha, 2006, 2011, Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). Thus, *Islamic Resistance* considers that “martyrdom transcends the materialistic dimension of liberating occupied land; it is a religious duty and a testimony to abidance by God's injunctions as that is why it is martyrdom in the way of God” (Alagha, 2006, p. 105).

Through martyrdom, the martyr achieves two goals: esoteric or spiritualistic through self-satisfaction to gain an eternal life in the heaven; and exoteric or materialistic through providing the nation with dignity, pride and honour (Alagha, 2006, 2011). This interpretation aligns with the content of *Islamic Resistance* obituaries, as shown previously in analysing the written statements, and how they present the martyrdom of its fighters. To achieve its two goals, it can be argued that *Islamic Resistance* derives the esoteric significance of martyrdom from the concerned Quranic verses and hadith, and derives the exoteric significance of martyrdom from historical parables, particularly the lessons of the Battle of Karbala.
4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has shown the ideological context of the media discourse of Hezbollah's military arm, defining a number of the related religious concepts and terminologies. As Islamic Resistance is a Shiite organisation, this chapter reviewed the Islamic history of Shi'ism, because it allows understanding of the meanings of sacrifice, the theoretical implications of Wilayat Al-Faqih and the concept of ‘jihad’ in the analysed media discourse. In this vein, this chapter has shown that Islamic Resistance does not distinguish between politics and religion, because the religious belief governs all the aspects of life of this military organisation. It has illuminated that the historical Battle of Karbala is the inspiring model for Islamic Resistance in its war against Israel.

Derived from its implications in the Quran and Hadith, this chapter has outlined the meaning of ‘jihad’ according to Islamic Resistance. Although this term has a defensive implication of defending the land from invaders, it has a peaceful denotation quite apart from the military struggle, because it calls for purifying the self to be productive in the society.

The next chapter aims to identify the methodology employed in this study and the samples chosen by which this multimodal discourse is analysed.
Chapter 5. Research Methodology

This chapter aims to describe the methodology employed to address the research questions. It points to the research paradigm, the nature of the inquiry, the research design, introducing the research model which links the analysed elements of the analysed discourse and pointing to the theoretical framework. Thus, this chapter discusses the implication of discourse and key approaches in critical discourse analysis; then, it explains the approach utilised to analyse the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, the latter analysis being guided by framing theory. In this regard, this chapter outlines the tools and methods utilised in this research to analyse, textually and visually, the multimodal discourse; additionally, it delves into the meaning of the relevant concepts, such as sign, code, power/knowledge and intertextuality. It also points to the data collected for analysis in this research and provides justification for the selection of such data.
5.1 Overview

The review of the literature about Hezbollah and its military arm, as shown in Chapter 3, pointed out that there is no existing study which identifies the discourse of Hezbollah’s military arm, Islamic Resistance. Furthermore, it revealed that there is no comprehensive research into all elements that constitute the discourse, particularly the written statements and the fighters’ testaments. Even the existing research relating to some outputs of the military media unit has never delved critically into a study of the discourse.

This research considers that identifying the components of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance constitutes the first step towards analysing it. To critically address the research questions, this research aims to employ a relevant approach in the discipline of discourse analysis.

In addition to the Overview and Conclusion, this chapter contains five main sections: the first section points to the philosophical assumptions and the paradigm adopted in this research to analyse the media discourse of Islamic Resistance; the second section points to the theoretical implication of discourse and its discipline, outlining the premise of decoding to extract meaning and identifying in this regard a number of (critical) linguistic and (social) semiotic tools that can be utilised in critical discourse analysis; the third section outlines the adopted research model, the theoretical framework and the theory guiding this research; the fourth section points to the data collection method in this research; finally, the fifth section points to the data analysis model in this research.
5.2 The Philosophical Assumptions

In conducting a research project, it is crucial that the researchers are knowledgeable about the ontological and epistemological assumptions concerning their chosen area of research (Bettis & Gregson, 2001). The term ‘ontology’ is concerned with the nature of reality (Holden & Lynch, 2004). This reality can be viewed in an objective way, which implies one reality, or a subjective way, which implies more than one reality (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). However, ‘epistemology’ is concerned with the knowledge itself in terms of its origin (Hofer, 2008). It refers to the approach taken by the researcher to address the research questions and to his/her involvement in the construction of new knowledge. Thus, ontology and epistemology can be described as belief systems or paradigms.

The paradigm, in defined terms, is “a set of basic beliefs that guide action. Paradigms deal with first principles or ultimates. They are human constructions. They define the worldview of researcher-as-interpretive-bricoleur” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p. 91). Similarly, Bryman (2012) defines paradigm as “a cluster of beliefs and dictates which, for scientists in a particular discipline, influence what should be studied, how research should be done, and how results should be interpreted, and so on” (p. 714). Both definitions imply that such a paradigm guides the entire process and provides the researcher with directions regarding the approach, relevant tools and methods of carrying out research within its philosophical premise.

Table 10 (adapted from Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 100) presents the four basic paradigms. It refers to their assumptions about the nature of reality, the origin of the knowledge itself and the methodology traditionally associated with each paradigm. It also provides reasons why these paradigms are not suitable for this research.

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1 In their new edition, Lincoln et al. (2011) added a fifth paradigm, the participatory paradigm, to their table. However, the table adopted here (Table 11) did not include this paradigm, because it is irrelevant to the purpose of this research.
Table 10: Four basic paradigms and their relevance to this research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm</th>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positivism</td>
<td>Naïve realism—“real” reality but apprehendable</td>
<td>Dualist/ objectivist; findings true</td>
<td>Experimental/ manipulative; verification of hypotheses; chiefly quantitative methods</td>
<td>This paradigm is not suitable for this research, because it assumes that all people experience the world in the same manner (Lincoln et al., 2011). However, this research is concerned with the multiple views of the research participants concerning the outputs of the military media unit. Furthermore, this paradigm is not suitable for this research because it assumes that the researcher must be detached from what is being studied for the research to be unbiased (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). However, this researcher will be part of the research, as he will interpret the multiple views assigned by the research participants. Furthermore, because this research involves textual and visual analyses of the various outputs of the military media unit, the researcher’s worldview consciously or unconsciously will be immersed into the research process. A positivist paradigm assumes that the phenomenon under investigation needs to be tested until a cause-effect relationship between the proposed variables is somehow established. In this context, the research starts with a hypothesis or theory and the researcher, through deductive strategies, either confirms or rejects the proposed hypothesis (Lincoln et al., 2011). However, this research is not concerned with confirming or rejecting a hypothesis. Thus, the positivist paradigm is not suitable for the purposes of this research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-positivism</td>
<td>Critical realism—“real” reality but only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehendable</td>
<td>Modified dualist/ objectivist; critical tradition/ community; findings probably true</td>
<td>Modified experimental/ manipulative; critical multiplism; falsification of hypotheses; may include qualitative methods</td>
<td>This paradigm is not suitable for this research, because this research does not aim to verify a reality through testing hypotheses (Lincoln et al., 2011). It is rather concerned with the multiple views of the research participants about the outputs of “The Military Media Unit.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Theory</td>
<td>Historical realism-virtual reality shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values; crystallised</td>
<td>Transactional/ subjectivist; value mediated findings</td>
<td>Dialogic/ dialectical</td>
<td>This paradigm is not suitable for this research because it aims to challenge or change the social reality (Grant &amp; Giddings, 2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5.2.1 Adopted Paradigm

The adopted paradigm in this research is social constructionism because it enables the researcher to validate that what he sees is real (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). This paradigm is characterised by a relativist ontology and subjectivist epistemology (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). However, social constructionism is ill-defined and is often interchangeably used with a constructivist paradigm (Haar, 2002). De Koster et al. (2004) argue that both paradigms:

hold the notion that people create a construct of reality in common, [but] their theoretical background and focus are different…. Constructivism has its roots in the biological and physiological characteristics of individual perception and consequently has a very individual focus, [while] social constructionism is a community philosophy in which the group and the interaction between the group members is the sole focus (p.75).

Merkl-Davies et al. (2011) note that social constructionists share the constructivist belief about the existence of multiple realities, but they are not concerned to validate all of them.
As was outlined previously, the aim of this research is to analyse the media discourse of Islamic Resistance to show its frames and objectives. In doing so, the meaning-making process will reflect the subjective views of the researcher as he is focusing on the processes to construct knowledge and shape reality.

Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) argue that reality for social constructionists “is what we say it is. If we say it is different, then it is different … it is through ascribing meanings to ourselves and the surrounding world that we can understand and act in the world, and in that sense both ourselves and our world are the meanings we ascribe to them” (p.178). Moreover, they maintain that, because researchers cannot see “things as they really are, and [their knowledge construction] is productive, it creates reality at the same time as representing it” (ibid, p.175). Thus, “there is no possibility of achieving absolute or universal knowledge since there is no context-free, neutral base for truth-claims” (ibid, p. 175).

Furthermore, Crotty (1998) argues that, “social constructionism emphasises the hold our culture has on us: it shapes the way in which we see things (even in the way in which we feel things!) and gives us a quite definite view of the world” (p. 58). However, the philosophical assumptions of social constructionism entail “a critical stance toward taken-for-granted knowledge […], historical and cultural specificity [as well as that] knowledge is sustained by social processes [and] knowledge and social action go together” (Burr, 2003, pp. 2-5).

As reality for social constructionists is constructed through language, Patton (2015) argues that, “The purpose of language is to communicate the social construction of the dominant members of the group using the language” (p. 126). Thus, social constructionism is concerned with notions of hegemony and power in discourse and argues that the ultimate struggle of discourse is to achieve hegemony through asserting a certain meaning in the language (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). However, Foucault’s perception of the notion of power, in that power produces discourse and knowledge (ibid). In this vein, this paradigm is suited to the current research, because one of its sub-aims is to explore the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and consequently, the notion of power in this discourse.

The research paradigm influences the methodology and methods employed to address the research questions. The selection of the social constructionist paradigm aligns with qualitative methodology, because the reasons for any
researcher to choose a qualitative approach are based on the research questions and the paradigmatic stance (Mertens, 2015). Thus, an interpretative research approach, such as in this research, is also well-suited to a qualitative methodology (Lee, 1999). Furthermore, the “What are” and “How does” type of research questions lend themselves to a qualitative research approach (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative research methodology will be discussed in the next subsection.

5.2.2 Qualitative Research

Glesne (2011) defines qualitative research as “a type of research that focuses on qualities such as words or observations that are difficult to quantify and lend themselves to interpretation or deconstruction” (p. 283). Under the umbrella of qualitative methodology, various researchers include various approaches. A number of qualitative methodologies have been considered for this research. However, this research will employ critical discourse analysis. The reason for choosing such approach with social constructionism is because the alignment between them allows the researcher to understand the power relations and the ideological practices embedded in the discourse (Merkl-Davies et al., 2011). In this regard, this alignment enables an in-depth analysis of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, allowing the researcher to consider all the factors that shape this discourse and its meaning.

RQ.1.1: What are the types of messages of the military media of Islamic Resistance? was addressed through searching the archival data and undertaking a literature review to identify the media messages of Islamic Resistance. Addressing this question is crucial before choosing the samples and grounding the analysis in this research. However:

RQ.1: What are the signs and codes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance? RQ.2: How does the media discourse of Islamic Resistance frame its identity and other identities? RQ.2.1: How does the media discourse of Islamic Resistance express its core ideology and cultural values? RQ.3: What are the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance? will be addressed through conducting an analysis of chosen samples. Thus, the role of the researcher is crucial in the analysis of discourse in order to show its signs and
codes, frames and objectives. Consequently, the aim of the anticipated analysis is not to test hypotheses or to generate a theory.

5.2.3 Design of the Study

Yin (2014) points out that “a research design is a logical plan for getting from here to there, where ‘here’ may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and ‘there’ is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between here and there may be found a number of major steps, including the collection and analysis of relevant data” (p. 28)

The design of this study has been grounded in such a way as to align with interpretive inquiry and to consider the multimodality of the analysed discourse. To achieve the aim of this study by analysing the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, the design intends to incorporate the analysis of every genre of the discourse through analysing its macro- and microstructure. As a result, the design shows how textual analysis (of statements and verbal content) and visual analysis contribute together to the overall meaning of the discourse. In addition, the design of the study considers the role of contexts in the process of analysis.

Last but not least, the design of the study may provide concerned researchers with a model of how to analyse media discourse of other militant organisations in the Middle East.

5.2.3.1 Case Study

As noted earlier, this study adopts an interpretive approach to answer the research questions. In this regard, this study is contextualised through providing a background of the utilisation of media by militant organisations in the Middle East. It also illustrates why media is important for militant organisations. In addition to showing the broader context, this study pays attention to other contexts of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. However, the review of the literature in Chapter 3 has identified the gaps in this field of study.

Taking into account these characteristics and the nature of the questions to answer, this research uses a case study strategy. Yin (2014) defines case study as “a study that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and in its real-world context” (p. 237). Thus, the researcher has no control “over actual
behavioral events” (ibid, p. 9). Furthermore, the case study is concerned with questions types, ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Yin, 2014).

Although the first research question is concerned with the question ‘what?’; it has an exploratory nature. However, the second research question is concerned clearly with the analytically driven question ‘how?’ It is considered a premise for the third research question, which has an exploratory nature.

Drawing on the context and various types of research questions to analyse the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, this research uses a case study strategy. The next section introduces the methodology used in this research, starting by the theoretical implication of discourse.

5.3 Discourse

The term ‘discourse’ does not have a common definition, despite the fact that it is an old term and is classified historically in rhetoric as an art of speech for persuasion (van Dijk, 1985). One of the early definitions of discourse is “every utterance (verbal or written) assuming a speaker and a hearer, and in the speaker, the intention of influencing the other in some way” (Benveniste, 1971, pp. 208 & 209). Thus, many scholars define ‘discourse’ as a term associated with language (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

El-daly (2010) outlines some definitions of discourse related to their different usages, pointing out that some researchers use the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘text’ interchangeably, and others use it only for the spoken language. He defines the term in terms of mass and count nouns, pointing out that:

‘Discourse’, used as a mass noun, means roughly the same as ‘language use’ or ‘language-in-use’. As a count noun (a discourse), it means a relatively discrete subset of a whole language, used for specific social or institutional purposes. More specifically, ‘discourse’ as a mass noun, and in its strict linguistic sense, refers to connected speech or writing occurring at suprasentential levels (ibid, p. 248).

However, the development of different branches of science and aspects of social life means that every topic has its own lexicon. This leads to the emergence of
different discourses associated with different fields of knowledge and practice, such as media discourse, medical discourse and political discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). In this context, Hall (2013a) defines discourses in every field as:

ways of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge and conduct associated with, a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society (p. xxii).

Such construction of knowledge posits discourse at the heart of social practice between people who speak the same language or groups who share the same ideas (Fairclough, 1995; van Dijk, 2000). In this sense, discourse represents all features and shapes of language, such as linguistic and non linguistic forms, or it represents a social status quo that can be viewed from different perspectives (Fairclough, 2005). Thus, the notion of discourse goes beyond description, because it categorises the social world and sheds light on issues, turning them into objects (Parker, 2014).

The notion that discourse constitutes its object goes back to Michel Foucault, who gave discourse a profound meaning. Foucault (1972, 1981) traces the history of discourse, its discursive formations, categories, practices and systems that can falsify it, pointing out that true discourse holds power and contributions for the future. In summary, discourse can be viewed, based on all definitions, as a term that refers to several functions and features, which then embed an impact. Thus, discourse is a language or series of statements:

- Expressing and creating social reality
- Representing identity
- Making knowledge
- Holding power

In this research, as shown previously, the media discourse of Islamic Resistance means the outputs of its military media unit and the speeches of its leader, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah. Thus, the media discourse of Islamic Resistance
is considered here as a mass noun. However, this discourse is a Resistance discourse, because the “Resistance discourses are usually constituted by political leaders or media institutions” (Bazzi, 2009, p. 56).

Drawing on its expected functions and features, the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* can be viewed as: a collection of statements that hold meanings; a representation of identity; an expression of social reality where an organised Lebanese group faces Israel in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East; a form of propaganda; and a vehicle of power by which to emphasise a certain culture, such as the culture of Resistance.

### 5.3.1 Study of Discourse

The discipline of discourse analysis is not contemporary. It was related to the study of literature, language and public speech more than 2000 years ago (van Dijk, 1985). However, the study of discourse as an interdisciplinary discipline in humanities and social sciences emerged only in the mid-sixties of the last century (van Dijk, 2007).

The first scholar who used the term ‘discourse analysis’ in early fifties of the last century was the American linguist, Zelling Harris. He (1952) postulated what would seem to be a sociolinguistic method when he took into account the social context of the discourse to analyse the meanings of the morphemes. He (ibid) pointed out that his method considers grammar, because it “states the distributional relations among elements [of the discourse]” (p. 5).

Due to its wide use in several branches of the humanities and other fields, discourse analysis signifies the analysis of every domain through various approaches (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). These approaches are correlated to the historical development of discourse analysis, paradigmatic stances and methodological views of the researchers (van Dijk, 1985).

However, it seems important to illuminate critical discourse analysis and its approaches, as developed by Fairclough, van Dijk and Wodak, before outlining the characteristics of the approach used in this research.

### 5.3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has emerged as a new discipline from the field of discourse analysis. It can be traced to the work of Robert Hodge and Gunther
Kress, who aimed, in the 1970s, to study language in a wider context and as an ideology (Hodge, 2012). However, some researchers do not distinguish between critical discourse analysis and discourse analysis (Powers, 2007), between critical discourse analysis and critical linguistics (Wodak & Meyer, 2009); others have called this new discipline, ‘modern discourse analysis’ (Tesch, 1990).

Norman Fairclough is considered to be one of the key scholars in this field. He points out that, “Critical discourse analysis is analysis of the dialectical relationships between discourse (including language but also other forms of semiosis, e.g. body language or visual images) and other elements of social practices” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 255).

The term ‘critical’ denotes that the analyst should not consider the knowledge about the investigated phenomenon as taken for granted (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). However, Fairclough (2013) links the term ‘critical’ to the way of studying the language within its context. Both explanations of the term ‘critical’ imply that the analysis should uncover the hidden meaning of the investigated discourse. In this regard, van Dijk (2003) argues that the analysis of discourse, to be critical, should be better than other research in terms of being explanatory, focusing on social problems and power relations in the structure of the discourse.

There are many approaches within critical discourse analysis (Bell & Garrett, 1998). However, the key scholars in this field are Norman Fairclough, Teun Van Dijk, Ruth Wodak, Gunther Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen, who together established a critical discourse analysis network in 1991 (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

Fairclough and Wodak (cited in van Dijk, 2003) summarise the main premises of critical discourse analysis:

1. CDA addresses social problems
2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action (p. 353).

However, these premises do not mean that they should be included in every critical study of discourse. Thus, researchers in any field must develop their critical discourse analysis approach based on the nature of their studies and factors that shape the discourse; there is no unique approach that gives a road map on how to do critical discourse analysis (van Dijk, 2003). However, it is important at the beginning to shed light on the key scholars in critical discourse analysis and their approaches to discourse - namely Fairclough, van Dijk and Wodak - before outlining the main characteristics of the critical discourse analysis approach employed in this research.

5.3.2.1 Discourse as a Social Practice

Fairclough (2005) uses the term ‘semiosis’ to point out that discourse represents a social practice in a particular way. In this regard, Fairclough (2013) argues that discourse can be a social activity, or a representation, or a way of shaping the identity, which is called a ‘style’, such as the ‘styles’ of political leaders.

In his approach to studying discourse, Fairclough (2014) outlines three stages in this field: firstly, description of the language used, linguistic choices and identity; secondly, interpretation of the ideological and semiological features; and thirdly, explanation of the elements which affect the process of production.

The next subsection aims to shed light on Fairclough’s approach to the study of media discourse.

5.3.2.1.1 Communicative Events and the Order of Discourse

Fairclough (1995) argues that the critical analysis of media discourse includes the analysis of communicative events and the order of discourse. Fairclough (ibid) points out that the analysis of the communicative event is the analysis of three elements – text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice – clarifying that,

‘texts’ may be written or oral, and oral texts may be just spoken (radio) or spoken and visual (television). By ‘discourse practice’ I mean the processes of text production and consumption. And by
‘sociocultural practice’ I mean the social and cultural goings-on which the communicative event is part of (p. 57).

Figure 12 adapted from Fairclough (1995, p. 59) shows the three-dimensional communicative event model.

However, Fairclough (2013) is influenced, in his approach to the analysis of discourse, by Foucault’s notion of power, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony and Halliday’s systematic functional grammar; by ‘order of discourse’, he means the semiotic nature of discursive practices as a “way in which diverse genres and discourses and styles are networked together” (p. 265). Fairclough (1995) defines a genre as a “use of language associated with and constituting part of some particular social practice” (p. 56).

In applying Fairclough's model containing the two elements of critical discourse analysis – ‘communicative event’ and ‘order of discourse’ – to the media
discourse of Islamic Resistance, the term ‘communicative events’ is given to mean:

- the texts (written, visual and spoken) statements of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance, verbal words in videos of military operations, fighters’ testaments, verbal and written words in the video songs and propaganda flashes produced by the unit, and the speeches of the Secretary-General of Hezbollah;
- the discursive practice, which is how the military media unit produces and displays its outputs and how the Secretary-General presents his speeches; and
- the sociocultural practice, which concerns the Lebanese Shiite group engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict and emphasises the culture of Resistance and ideology adopted in order to defeat Israel.

The second element - the order of discourse - relates to how Islamic Resistance presents its statements, videos and speeches in terms of structure, language used, audience targeted and the relationship of these statements and videos with other texts. This model of media discourse can be applied in this research. However, it is crucial to shed light on other models within critical discourse analysis, before outlining the model adopted in this research. Thus, the next subsection aims to shed light on van Dijk’s approach to discourse.

5.3.2.2 Van Dijk’s Socio-Cognitive Model

The Dutch scholar, Teun Van Dijk, has developed a multidisciplinary approach of critical discourse analysis called, intermittently, ‘socio-cognitive discourse analysis’ (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Van Dijk (2001) explains the elements of his ‘discourse-cognition-society’ triangle and gives a broad meaning to every element; by ‘discourse’ he means the language in use of a ‘communicative event’; by ‘cognition’, the personal and social beliefs and attitudes; and, by ‘society’ the groups or institutions and their social, political and cultural systems. Van Dijk (ibid) points out that critical discourse analysis “focuses on
social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination” (p. 96).

As a result of focusing on social problems in his approach, van Dijk (2000) focuses on racist discourse and how it represents the speaker’s and others’ ideologies. Such groups have developed (mentally) their in-group schema, which focuses on positive self-representation, and their out-group schema, which labels the others, generally under the category of enemy, negatively. This polarisation (such as Us vs. Them) can be viewed clearly in the discourse of two groups who are in conflict.

Van Dijk (1988) points out that the analysis of media discourse is textual and contextual. At the textual level, the analysis should consider all the micro-elements, which form the meaning of the text; thus, the analysis is not limited to linguistics, grammar, syntax and lexical cohesion. Conversely, the contextual analysis also includes the analysis of the processes of production and comprehension.

Van Dijk (2001), who applied this model to news in the press, outlines the steps of his approach, which includes: describing the macro and micro elements of the communicative event; studying the meaning of words to find the elements of representation and ideological objectives to determine the aims of the author; determining the properties of the context; determining the event models; summarising forms of social cognition; and, showing the relation between discourse and society.

The next subsection aims to show Wodak’s approach to discourse.

5.3.2.3 Discourse-Historical Approach

The Austrian discourse studies scholar, Ruth Wodak, developed a discourse-historical approach with a team of five researchers from three different disciplines – history, psychology and linguistics. The team examined the discourse of the Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim in 1986. The various orientations of the team members led to the emergence of a triangulatory approach (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

In her approach, Wodak, who was influenced by van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach, distinguishes between discourse and text, arguing that discourse is “a form of knowledge and memory, whereas text illustrates concrete oral utterances
or written documents” (Wodak & Busch, 2004, p. 109). Wodak and Meyer (2009) consider critical discourse analysis to be a heterogeneous discipline. However, they stipulate eleven characteristics of this approach. These are: interdisciplinary, both theoretically and practically; problem-oriented; contains eclectic theories and methodologies; abductive; includes field work and ethnography; applies recontextualisation process; integrates the analysis of historical context to allow better interpretation; defines the categories and the analytical tools; uses generally middle-range theories and believes that the practice is the desired location where the results should be disseminated. However, Wodak (2002) prefers to call critical discourse analysis a school or a research programme, due to its interdisciplinary nature, and refuses to call it a methodology.

5.3.3 Philosophy of Decoding

Language is a social phenomenon intertwined with human communication (Suleiman, 2011). It consists of different signs used by people to transmit meaning and is not limited to the linguistic form (Hall, 2013b). Although according to the latter constructionist and the social constructionist view of language (ibid), language is considered as an expression of ideas residing in the mind, Ricouer (1976) considers that language “no longer appears as a meditation between minds and things. It constitutes a world of its own, within which each item only refers to other items of the same system” (p. 6). This structuralist view of language seems somewhat questionable, because language was created originally for communication purposes, and consequently enables people to express their ideas. Thus, language is not a purely noetic system in a world of its own; it is a system that cannot be isolated from the social context (Hall, 2013b). As a result, “meaning is produced by the practice, the ‘work’, of representation. It is constructed through signifying – i.e. meaning-producing-practices” (Hall, 2013b, p. 14).

Eco (1984) considers that decoding any text constitutes a process of reproducing it. He classified texts into ‘opened’, which can be understood by the general

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1 As the collected archival data for analysis in this research are in Arabic, any "cognitive readings [...] aimed at mediating the relationship between thought and reality, offer another field for investigating language in the social world” (Suleiman, 2013, p. 279).
public, and ‘closed’ texts, which are open to an interpretation that the author
may not have intended to transmit. It seems from this distinction that rule-
governed decoding of any text is based primarily on the background of the
decoder. In addition, there is a resemblance in decodings of the texts where they
are clearly understandable. Consequently, the classification of texts is based on
the codes they include - that is, whether these codes are ‘open’ or ‘closed’.
These steps, by Eco and Ricoeur, to theorise the practice of decoding and to pay
attention to the concept of message, have been continued by other scholars. In
his outlining of the system of encoding and decoding a media message, Hall
(2007) argues that the researchers may not obtain the intended meaning due to
their different intellectual abilities and their utilisation of different tools.
Furthermore, they may extract, from the messages, meanings which profoundly
differ to that obtained by the intended receiver. Terni (cited in Mills & Barlow,
2013) argues that reading is:

not only the capacity to identify and decode a certain number of
signs, but also the subjective capacity to put them into a creative
relation between themselves and with other signs: a capacity which
is, by itself, the condition for a complete awareness of one's total
environment (p. 248).

However, Hall (2013b) argues that the obtained meaning is not consistent with
that provided by the encoder. Hall’s argument appears to apply particularly in
the case of text that is poetic and has different layers of meaning, or in cases of
interpretation where the decoder does not have the same background as the
encoder. However, this argument falls down when the encoder presents the text
in a simple way in order to allow a wider audience to obtain an unambiguous
message. To avoid misunderstanding and “to make his text communicative, the
author has to assume that the ensemble of codes he relies upon is the same as
that shared by his possible reader” (Eco, 1984, p.7).

In this vein, Hall (2007) points out that the sender of a message should consider
the receiver's ability to decode the codes without any distortion or
misunderstanding. The closer the relation, or the culture, between the sender and
the receiver is, the more the message is understandable. Hall (2007), who paid
further attention in his theoretical analysis to televisual discourse, called the codes operating within a certain culture, ‘dominant codes’.

In applying Hall’s classification to the discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, it would seem, at the outset, that the intended receivers, particularly the followers and supporters, can understand the dominant codes chosen professionally by the military media unit and the leader of *Islamic Resistance*.

This research is concerned with analysing the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. Thus, it aims to show the meaning of the language used, no matter whether this language is textual or visual. However, the analysis is not limited to the meaning open to any receiver; it also intends to show the hidden meaning. This project stipulates delving into the particular elements of this discourse and mediating the contexts.

The next subsection aims to point to the multimodal analysis in this thesis.

5.3.3.1 Multimodality and Analysis

The review of the literature in Chapter 3 has shown that the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* consists of written statements, fighters’ testaments, video songs, propaganda flashes and the speeches of its leader, the Secretary-General of *Hezbollah*. The written statements are only texts. However, the videos of military operations contain an audio-visual combination, and the footages are dominant. Similarly, the rest of the components of the discourse have verbal, visual and auditory modes. However, the analysis in this research is not limited to one semiotic mode such as texts, images or auditory material. Thus, this multimodality in discourse stipulates taking into account, in the analysis, the signification of these three modes, because they jointly contribute to the meaning-making process (Kress & Leeuwen, 2001; Kress, 2010).

Except for the written statements, which have a text genre or a textual mode, the meaning of the rest of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* is obtained from a mixture of visual and auditory combinations. The visual mode includes: images in the videos of military operations; the images in the propaganda flashes and video songs; the images of the fighters’ testaments; and, the image of the leader of *Islamic Resistance*, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, as he delivers his speeches. However, the auditory mode includes the verbal speeches of Nasrullah, verbal testaments, verbal songs, music and sound effects.
Table 1 shows the visual and auditory modes included in the elements of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.

**Table 1: Visual and auditory modes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes</th>
<th>Visual</th>
<th>Audio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighters' testaments</td>
<td>Sequence of scenes such as images of the fighters. Also, the layout design of the videos and the inserted captions.</td>
<td>Verbal testaments of the fighters and music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos of military operations</td>
<td>Sequence of scenes, such as images of the fighters from the battlefield, shooting, etc.</td>
<td>Verbal expressions of the fighters and sounds of fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeches of the leader of <em>Islamic Resistance.</em></td>
<td>Image of Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah while he delivers his speeches, such as his gestures</td>
<td>Verbal speeches of Nasrullah, his tone of voice and the reactions of the audience during the speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video songs and propaganda flashes</td>
<td>Sequence of scenes that show the contents of these videos, and also the images of the inserted captions</td>
<td>Verbal words, sound effects and music</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notably, the verbal speeches and words can be documented into texts or phrases for analysis and, as well, the sequence of scenes can be turned into images for analysis. However, aural music can also contain meaning that contributes to the meaning of discourse, and thus, the researcher should investigate any signification of the music contained in the samples chosen for analysis. The next subsection discusses the aspect of signification in aural music.

### 5.3.3.1 Aural Music and Meaning

As noted earlier, the video songs and videos of propaganda flashes produced by the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance* may include music. Thus, it seems important to pay attention to theoretical investigations of the denotation and possible signification of aural content.

Aural music consists of sounds and it is difficult to be considered a language *per se* (Johnson, 2008). When a composer plays a violin or a piano, he or she aims to read or create a notation, and to express feelings or attitudes through music.
However, understanding the meaning carried by the music is left to the listeners, who may decode different messages (Barthes, 1977). As a consequence, the meaning derived by a listener or an interpreter is not necessarily the same as that intended by the composer. Such heterogeneous interpretations are noetic, because there are no extra-musical context(s) to be considered by the listeners to decode the message of the music.

In his consideration as to whether music has a sort of signification, Barthes (1977) points out that, “There is an imaginary in music whose function is to re-assure, to constitute the subject hearing […] and this imaginary immediately comes to language via the adjective” (pp. 179 & 180). Drawing on Barthes’ offerings, Leeuwen (1999; 2005) intends to be accurate by paying attention to the sound and its origin, such as: musical instruments; an indexical from materials, such as the whiz of a bullet; natural sound to signify non-musical aural, such as wind; or the human voice. In this regard, Leeuwen categorises music in the field of sounds. These endeavours to show that music has signification mean that music has semiotic implications (Leeuwen, 1999; 2005). Thus, music is comparable to language and considered as a mode of communication (Leeuwen, 2005). Likewise, in terms of the role of the context in showing the meaning of a text, Agawu (2009) points out the role of extra-musical elements in generating musical meaning.

As a consequence of classifying music within sound, Leeuwen (1999) argues that, “The semiotics of sound concerns itself with describing what you can ‘say’ with sound, and how you can interpret the things other people ‘say with sound’” (p. 4). This definition postulates that music is an element or a part in the production of meaning. The references to ‘What you can say’ and ‘the things other people (say)’, in Leeuwen’s definition, mean that the interpreter may understand the music in songs and films if it is accompanied by words and/or images. Thus, the verbal and/or visual aids, which are extra-musical contexts, play a pivotal role in decoding what the music means or contributes to the overall meaning. In this vein, the interpretation of music through utilising the extra-musical contexts is non-noetic, because the interpreters can compromise between conscious and external elements to generate meaning.

It seems that the selection of music in the production process is not chaotic, because it aims to align with the intention of the producer (Leeuwen, 2005).
indicated previously, music has a function. Thus, choosing music in advertising, for example, aims to “embrace any style of music, so long as it attracts the target audience” (Leeuwen, 2005, p. 41). In this context, the music and sound effects included in the video songs and propaganda flashes of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance seem to be an accentuation of the meaning that can be obtained from the words and images in these audio-visual products. This understanding aligns with Barthes’ analysis that music has “a mode of signification” (Barthes, 1977, p. 180).

If the music and sound effects are omitted from the videos, neither the embedded signs in the words and images nor the overall meaning will be affected. However, these aural elements, and, likewise, advertising music, seem to impress the audience, or to refer to a certain occasion. This psychological impression implies that music has a mental representation (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014).

After showing the role of aural music in contributing to meaning, the next subsection aims to delve into the notion of sign and its theoretical implications.

5.3.4 The Notion of Sign

The Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, theorised the study of sign and named this science, ‘semiology’ (Hall, 2013b). Saussure (2011) distinguished between language (langue) and speaking (parole), where the first is a homogeneous object and a social product that holds a system of signs, and the second is a heterogeneous and an individualistic product. He also distinguished between language and writing, pointing out that writing exists to represent the language, labelling both language and writing as two different systems of signs.

The distinction between language and speech was crucial for Saussure to establish semiology as a science within psychology in order to study the characteristics of signs. Saussure (2011) pointed out that any change in the linguistic phenomena is internal. To show the difference between external and internal linguistics, Saussure (ibid) gave an example of chess, where its historical move from Persia to Europe was external and had no influence on the game. However, he observed that any change in the number of chessmen would change the rules of the game drastically.
In this vein, Saussure (ibid) defined sign as a combination of the signified (a concept) and the signifier (sound-image), arguing that the relation between the two components is arbitrary as there is no normal linkage between them. However, the symbol can indicate a systematic relation between the signifier and the signified, such as pairs of scale, the symbol of justice. Figure 13, adopted from Saussure (2011, p. 66), shows the components of the sign, or in other words, the signifier and the signified.

![Figure 13: Saussure’s identification of the components of the sign (Saussure, 2011, p. 66). Reprinted by permission of Columbia University Press](image)

Saussure (ibid) outlines the characteristics of language inside and outside discourse, or in other words, between what he called ‘syntagm’ (syntax is a part of syntagm) and associative relations. He points out that the relations of words inside discourse depend on the language. However, he indicates that the coordinations of words inside discourse characterised by linearity (Saussure, 2011).

Building on Saussure’s work, Peirce (1974) provides further understanding about the combination of the sign, pointing out that it is in a triadic relation: the form or perception of the sign (representamen), in what way that form makes sense (interpretant) and the object (referent) of the sign. In this regard, Peirce (1974) classifies the sign as ‘iconic’ when the sign stands for its object, ‘symbolic’ when the link between the sign and its object is conventional, and ‘indexical’ when the sign refers to its objects through one of its characteristics.
Notably, the researchers in the field of discourse analysis have utilised these new approaches into language. Labov (2006) was one of the early researchers who developed and applied an empirical sociolinguistic approach in discourse analysis, benefitting basically from Saussure’s contributions to linguistics. Saussure and, later, Peirce laid the basis of linguistic and semiotic approaches in discourse analysis. In comparative terms, it would seem that Peirce pays greater attention to the relation among components of the sign, while Saussure tends to study language scientifically as an object between two – the signifier and the signified – without considering that the production of meaning is unpredictable. However, they, and particularly Saussure, neglected the question of power relations contained within the language because their focus was on the language itself (Hall, 2013b).

In applying Saussure and Peirce’s models, particularly that of the latter, this research aims to identify the embedded signs and describe them.

### 5.3.4.1 The Expansion of Sign

The French semiotician, Roland Barthes (1964), widened Saussure’s model of sign in order for it to be able to be applied in other fields, such as cinema, images and other aspects of social life, culture and entertainment. However, he (ibid) inverted Saussure’s understanding of linguistics as a part of the general science of signs to argue that semiology “is a part of linguistics: to be precise, it is that part covering the great signifying unities of discourse” (Barthes, 1964, p. 3).

Barthes (1964) points to four groups in semiology: language and speech; signified and signifier; syntagm and system; and, denotation and connotation. Based on Saussure's ideas, Barthes (ibid) acknowledges the dialectic relation between language and speech. As a result of applying this classification into non-linguistic fields, such as fashion and food, he points out that a problem will emerged, because there are languages without linguistic speech. To solve this problem, Barthes (ibid) adds a third element presignifying support for signification, indicating that, “semiological systems three (and not two) planes: that of the matter [presignifying], that of the language and that of the usage” (p. 20).
In explaining the combination of the sign, Barthes (ibid) argues that the signifier and the signified each has a form and substance; the difference is that the first can be described linguistically and the second requires extra-linguistic premises to be described. In this regard, Barthes (1964) suggests calling the semiological sign a ‘sign-function’, because “many semiological systems (objects, gestures, pictorial images) have a substance of expression whose essence is not to signify; often, they are objects of everyday use, used by society in a derivative way, to signify something: clothes are used for protection and food for nourishment even if they are also used as signs” (p. 25).

However, Barthes (ibid) clarifies the correlation between the two planes of the language – the system, which is a vertical group of signs or words, and the syntagm, which is a horizontal chain of statements or combinations of signs to produce meaning. He argues that this correlation between the system and syntagm can be applied in non-linguistic fields, especially cultural aspects, such as food and furniture.

In order to discover the meaning of the message, Barthes (1977) distinguishes between denotation and connotation, where the sign is plain and linguistic at the first order of meaning (denotation); conversely, he points out that connotation is iconic and related to what the interpreters can decode from the message to derive the second order of meaning based on their culture.

As he applied his model also to images, Barthes (ibid) suggests that a third order of meaning depends on the ability of the interpreters. In this context, Barthes (1972) shows how two semiological systems can create a myth, which, such as in the sign, is a combination of a signifier and a signified. Figure 14, adopted from Barthes (1972, p. 113), shows the formation of the mythical sign.

Barthes (1972) argues that the signifier and signified of the first semiological system combine to create another signifier for the second semiological system. He calls the new signifier ‘form’, the new signified ‘concept’ and the correlation between them a ‘signification’, because “myth has in fact a double function: it points out and it notifies, it makes us understand something and it imposes it on us” (p. 115).
Barthes’s semiotic approach, which is contextual, has contributed to discourse analysis, especially in its extension from texts to cover fields such as images and pieces of footage. However, this approach depends on the analysts themselves and their ways and abilities of decoding the messages of the discourse. It postulates an assumption that the researchers should go beyond language or scene to discover the core meaning of discourse, which has been shaped socially or ideologically.

In Saussure's linguistic model, as shown earlier, researchers can only discover the first level of meaning of language (written or spoken) of the discourse. However, the researchers in Barthes’s model are able to discover more levels of the meaning of images, fashions, food and other cultural aspects in the society.

Barthes’s approach to sign can be utilised in this research, because it contributes to the description and the analysis of the embedded signs, particularly the mythical signs and the signs which do not have linguistic forms.

### 5.3.4.2 From Sign to Code

Whilst the sign can be identified or understood due to the relation between the signifier and the signified, whether it is arbitrary or not, the code has a conventional nature within a society, because they are linked to the culture or ideology (Fiske, 2011).

As a result of its conventionalism and usage, the code is similar to the sign¹, which does not correlate an arbitrary relation between its components, the signifier and the signified. However, as Fiske (2011) argues, the code has a semiotic feature, it structures the message and it is “developed in order to meet

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¹ Hall (2007) names visual signs ‘coded signs’.
the needs of a society or culture” (Fiske, 2011, p. 40). Thus, the code within a certain culture determines “what word to use for what concept” (Hall, 2013b, p 45).

Regarding Fiske's (2011) delineation of codes, it seems the context allows the researcher to understand the hidden meaning of the codes, because they have cultural and/or ideological implications within a certain society or culture. This research is interested in distinguishing between the signs and codes embedded in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. Considering their conventionalising nature, the codes represent cultural and ideological frames that stipulate identification and then interpretation, because they reflect the objectives of the organisation.

5.3.4.3 Halliday’s Functional Grammar

One of the approaches, which contributed to discourse studies, was a systematic functional grammar that was developed by the British linguist, Michael Halliday (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014) argue that the language has socio-functional characteristics and the sign should be interpreted in its context, pointing out there are three metafunctions of language: ideational, interpersonal and textual. The first metafunction is about what is going on and the major grammatical system is transitivity, such as actor, location and process. The second is about the social relation between the writer and/or speaker and the receiver, where the major grammatical systems are mood and modality. The third relates to the text itself, where the major grammatical systems are theme and rheme.

This functional approach has contributed to discourse analysis studies, whereby the researchers can approach the text or the speech intrinsically and at an extra-linguistic level (Fairclough, 2013). Whilst this approach has been developed basically on the English language, this does not mean that it cannot be applied to other languages. Indeed, differences may exist between languages at the intrinsic level (texts or speeches). However, the sign systems are similar, because of the universality of the metafunctions of language (Hasan, 2012). In this vein, the analysts of discourse can utilise Halliday’s approach to language in their analysis.
This research considers Halliday’s approach in analysing the issued statements of Islamic Resistance.

5.3.4.4 Deconstruction

Contrary to Saussure’s interpretation of sign, the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida (1997) argues that sign is heterogeneous and has two characteristics: difference and deferment. The first is spatial, where every sign has its own meaning; the second is temporal, where the meaning of the sign should be discovered. Derrida (1997) suggests the terms ‘under erasure’ and ‘trace’ to describe the status quo of the sign, as it is contextual and stipulates another sign in order to explore the hidden meaning. It holds a trace of what is absent in the sign and stimulates the mind to discover it.

In this regard, Derrida (ibid) calls the structure of the sign, ‘writing’, because it is inhabited by the ‘trace.’ He reiterates that the aim of reading any text is not to discover the intentions of the authors, but it is to uncover what they have never said. This idea, which is central to deconstruction, is the result of Derridean understanding about the role of authors who restrict themselves when they propose that their writings are directed to other writers or readers. He aims, through deconstruction, to liberate texts from metaphysics and metaphor.

The use of deconstruction in discourse analysis is an attempt to explore the absent meaning, starting from the structures of the discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). The same authors argue that the aim of using deconstruction in discourse analysis is to uncover indeterminate terrain, to question the taken-for-granted knowledge, and to try to “show that the given organisation of the world is the result of political processes with social consequences” (p. 48).

In applying deconstruction as an analytical tool, occasionally, to some samples in this research, the researcher can illuminate the hidden intentions of the author.

5.3.5 The Notion of Power/ Knowledge in the Discourse

Michel Foucault has contributed to the discipline of discourse analysis and many scholars in this field have referred to his studies, calling his analytical style ‘Foucauldian discourse analysis’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Foucault (1972) defines discourse as a set of statements in a certain discipline, where every statement constitutes its atom.
Like Saussure, Foucault (1972) acknowledges the notion of the sign in the discourse, but he differs from Saussure through focusing further on the production of knowledge as a discursive practice in a discipline, pointing out that the discourse should be analysed historically and contextually, because the context plays a major role in the formation of the meaning. Graham (2011) states that "the main aim of a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis is to trace the relationship between words and things: how the words we use to conceptualise and communicate end up producing the very ‘things’ or objects of which we speak" (p. 668).

However, Whisnant (2012) illustrates that, according to Foucault, there are four functions of discourse: it creates a world; it says something about the people who speak it; it generates knowledge and truth; and it reveals the network of embedded power.

The last two functions are crucial in Foucauldian discourse analysis where knowledge and power are linked together as each function assumes the existence of another. Foucault (1972), who was influenced by his teacher, Louis Althusser, utilises Nietzsche’s notion of power, but he gives power a positive sense in the production of the discourse. Jørgensen & Phillips (2002) point out that, according to Foucault, “power provides the conditions of possibility for the social. It is in power that our social world is produced and objects are separated from one another and thus attain their individual characteristics and relationships to one another” (p. 13).

In an early attempt to identify the notion of power in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, it seems that the organisation has created a 'Community of Resistance' as a result of its power and discourse (Matar & Dakhllallah, 2006; Qassem, 2008). To maintain this 'Community of Resistance', it seems that the steady flow of discourse is crucial\(^1\). Foucault (1972) argues that discourse is constituted by power which reveals what is not said, and the role of the analyst is

\(^{1}\) The leader of Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, delivers speeches periodically to shed light on his organisation and its preparations for any coming war with Israel through gaining the means of power (Noe, 2007). With the absence of military operations and productions of the military media unit, Nasrullah aims to maintain the organisational discourse and its power.
to uncover the power relation and its impact or, in other words, to discover its truth. Meanwhile, Foucault (1981) has never ignored the role of the author in analysis, but he has focused more on the discourse, because some authors of the discourse are unknowns and the validity of the discourse does not draw its legacy from them. However, the role of the author is visible in other discourses. That’s why there are discourses, such as legal and religious discourses, that possess the quality of continuity more than others. In this context, Foucault was criticised because he paid a lot of attention to discourse and ignored other factors that have an impact on power relations (Hall, 2013b).

On the other hand, there is no one personal author of all the components of the media discourse, because its author is organisational – that is, the organisation of *Islamic Resistance*. There are no names of the people who write the statements, or who film the operations in the battlefield. Thus, it seems that the focus is on the content, because it expresses the power of the organisation. However, in the case of the Secretary-General’s speeches, knowing the speaker and its background are important in the analysis. In this case, the speeches may gain power from the speaker.

Shedding light on the notion of power in this research serves to identify the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. As Suleiman (2004) argues regarding the interrelationship between identity and power in language:

> Both the language-power relationship and language-identity relationship operate at the communicative and the symbolic levels of signification. The communicative level allows us to study power and identity in discourse. Typical examples of this are the use of active and passive in news reports, the ideologically loaded exploitation of lexical resources (particularly place-names), the use of personal pronouns in political discourse, and the structuring of role relationships between the interlocutors in interactions across group boundaries. On the symbolic level, language serves as the site of ideological contestation. This level of signification allows us to study power behind *discourse* (p. 14).
Having delineated the tools used in this research, the following section aims to illuminate research model of the study.

5.4 Research Model

After reviewing the key ideas about critical discourse analysis and the related approaches for analysis, it seems that the stated approaches are congruent, because Fairclough, van Dijk and Wodak have theorised generally to the same tools in analysing the discourse, particularly media discourse. They believe in the use of linguistics as a way of analysis and the notion of power in the discourse, because, in their thinking, they have been influenced by Foucault’s ideas about discourse and power. However, they differ in the structure of their approaches, ways of analysis and in the selection of elements to dominate the approach. Fairclough’s early approach is interdisciplinary, before he changed it to be transdisciplinary as a result of his focusing further on analysis, dialectics, elements of linguistics, semiotics and social relations in the discourse. However, van Dijk’s approach is multidisciplinary and he paid further attention to analysing ideology within the discourse. On the other hand, Wodak’s approach is interdisciplinary, focusing further on analysing the historical context of the discourse.

This research considers Fairclough’s (2014) three stages of analysing the discourse - description, interpretation and explanation. In addition, it considers Fairclough (1995) and his amendments to van Dijk’s critical discourse analysis approach to studying the macro- and microstructure of a media discourse. In his comments about this approach, Fairclough (1995) argues that van Dijk pays little attention to the representations in the discourse; moreover, he claims that van Dijk does not consider the intertextual analysis and focuses only on “news-making practices as stable structures which contribute to the reproduction of relations of discrimination and racist ideologies” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 30).

Figure 15 shows the stages of analysing media discourse of Islamic Resistance and how they are linked.
In his approach, van Dijk (cited in Fairclough, 1995) sheds light on the analysis of the macro- and the microstructure of the discourse, or in other words the analysis of its schematic and thematic structures: "The macrostructure of a text is its overall organization in terms of themes or topics. It is a hierarchical organization, in the sense that we can identify the theme of a whole text" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 29). In this regard, the macrostructure of an audio-visual text is “a sequence of events, or a sequence of images” (van Dijk, 1980, p. 8). However, the microstructure of a text is its overall content, and the analysis focuses on units, such as its syntactic structure, lexical choices, semantic relations and rhetorical features (Fairclough, 1995).

The CDA approach adopted in this research is interdisciplinary. It aims to:

- Consider the contexts in analysing the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, including the emergence of this military arm and its media unit. The context enables the author to identify, as well, the objective of the discourse.
Shed light on the macrostructure of the samples chosen for analysis from the outputs of the military media unit and the speeches of the leader of Islamic Resistance before analysing their microstructure and identifying their signs and codes.

Analyse the microstructures of the chosen samples, utilising various tools depending on the nature of the genres.

Integrate the textual and visual analysis to show how Islamic Resistance frames itself, its followers and supporters, and reframes its enemies.

Use Framing as a media theory to provide a framework on which to base the analysis of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

Due to the multimodality of the media discourse of Hezbollah's military arm, this research borrows tools from the following approaches to analyse the microstructure of the identified discourse. These approaches are:

- **Linguistics:** In this field, the researcher can study the grammatical structure of the texts, such as the syntactic properties (Fairclough, 2014). This research aims to show the linguistic usages and choices in the identified discourse of Islamic Resistance. It also aims to provide an insight into a number of linguistic characteristics, particularly in the statements issued by the military media unit of Islamic Resistance, because the linguistic characteristics play a key role in representation and power.

- **Semiotics:** In this field, the researcher can identify and study the embedded signs in the samples chosen for analysis. The signs are not limited to the words. They cover also the connotation of images. Utilising semiotics in analysing the microstructure of the identified discourse of Islamic Resistance allows identification of the signs and the hidden codes, because they play a role in the framing. Within the discipline of critical discourse analysis, the semiotic analysis allows...

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1 Ricouer (1976) considers semiotic and semantic part of linguistics. The first is related to the study of signs and the second is the study of sentence.
categorisation of the signs "underlying opposition between 'us' and 'them"" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 24).

- **Social Semiotics and Critical Linguistics:** Utilising social semiotics allows the study of a sign within its socio-cultural context in order to interpret its meaning (Kress, 2010). It considers the process of meaning-making (Thibault, 1991). As a result of focusing on contextualisation to extract the meaning, social semiotics enables the researcher to analyse non-linguistic forms of signs, such as the aural and visual signs (Leeuwen, 2005). In his theorising on social semiotics and in building its premises, Halliday (1978) suggests that the language has three meta-functions: ideational, interpersonal and textual.

Based on Halliday’s categorisation of language, critical linguistics has emerged as “an enquiry into the relations between signs, meanings and the social and historical conditions which govern the semiotic structure of discourse, using a particular kind of linguistic analysis” (Fowler, 1991, p. 5). In this process of analysis, which considers the chosen vocabularies (Fairclough, 1995), Fowler (1991) pays attention to the context in obtaining the meaning of the signs. Thus, "texts can be studied for the ways that they categorise people, events, places and actions" (Machin & Mayr, 2012, p. 2).

This research utilises critical linguistics and social semiotics in analysing the microstructure of the identified discourse, because they can illuminate the utilised vocabularies and strategies employed to represent ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ and allow the studying of the signs in their social contexts.

- **Rhetoric:** Aristotle laid down the premises of the study of rhetoric (Demirdögen, 2010; Gottweis, 2007). Rhetoric is “often associated with the art of persuasion, rhetoric is typically defined as an integral moment of policy making, and the idea of rhetoric points to the necessity to convince, persuade, and communicate efficiently in the context of shaping and implementing public policies” (Gottweis, 2007, p. 240).
Under the umbrella of rhetoric, researchers can study the notions of ethos, logos and pathos to identify the efficiency of the speech (Demirdögen, 2010; Gottweis, 2007). ‘Ethos’ means the ability of the speaker to persuade and it is generally linked to charisma; ‘pathos’ means the embedded passions in the speech towards the addressees and logos means the speaker’s use of arguments in the speech (Demirdögen, 2010; Gottweis, 2007).

Rhetoric can be utilised in critical discourse analysis (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In this regard, this research intends to utilise rhetoric in analysing speeches of the leader of *Islamic Resistance*.

### 5.4.1 Theoretical Framework

The review of the literature in Chapter 3 has revealed the historical contexts of *Islamic Resistance*, and it has also identified the gaps. In addition, the previous chapter has identified the religious beliefs of this military arm. In this vein, the contextualization of the analysis and the full understanding of the findings are dependent on factors, identified in the literature, that correlate to the research problem. Sekaran (cited in Abusalem, 2007) defines the theoretical framework as “a conceptual model of how one theorizes or makes logical sense of the relationships among the several factors that have been identified as important to the problem” (p. 56). The same author “asserts that a theoretical framework of a research should address [all] of the following:

- The variables
- The relationship between the variables
- The nature and direction of the relationships
- Why these relationships exist
- A schematic diagram of the framework” (ibid, p. 59).

The theoretical framework in this thesis considers the *raison d'être* of the history, messages and objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. As Figure 16 shows, there is an interdependent interrelationship between these three variables.
In this regard, the history of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance stipulates an understanding of the history of Hezbollah in the context of Lebanese Shiite history and in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the interpretation of the messages of the analysed discourse requires an understanding of the ideology of Hezbollah. In a similar vein, the explanation of the objectives of Islamic Resistance stipulates delving into the aims of this military arm and its mother organisation, Hezbollah.

As noted previously and as shown in the schematic diagram, the media discourse of Islamic Resistance is multimodal, and the analysis focuses on its macro- and microstructure under the umbrella of critical discourse analysis guided by the media theory of Framing. In this regard, Figure 17 shows the multimodal theoretical framework of this research.
Following the above elucidation of the theoretical framework, the next subsection aims to point to the denotation and implication of Framing as a media theory in this research.

**5.4.2 Framing as a Media Theory in this Research**

Media and communication theories emerged in the beginning of last century as a part of other disciplines, especially the social sciences. These theories, which focus mainly on media ownership and agenda, messages and effects, are shaped by the ideas of some philosophers and the development of media technologies (Holmes, 2005).

Karl Marx, one of the key philosophers, believed that the ideas of the ruling class are dominant and create a mental representation (Heck, 1980). Under the umbrella of this doctrine, Marxist studies focus on the ownership of the media (as a facet or tool of the ruling class) as a part of the ideological enterprise in order to know the dominant and powerful ideas (Oosthuizen, 2001).

Unlike Marxism, which paid more attention to the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the working class, critical theory, which appeared as a result of
the emergence of the Frankfort School after the First World War, focused further on the ideology that lies behind the media, rather than the economy and ownership of the media (Fourie, 2001). In the same context, Louis Althusser modified the Marxist concept of economy and ideology, focusing more on the role of ideology and politics in the process of media production and ownership (Bennett, 1982).

In the same era, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, theoretical trends, such as hypodermic and magic bullet theories, have emerged to focus on media effects (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). However, this sophisticated and complex trend changed by the end of the Second World War with the emergence of the two-step flow model of communication which considers that opinion leaders change the perceptions of audience and there is a scant effect of the media outlets (radio and newspaper) on the audience (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955).

In the 1970s, the trend towards assessing media impact returned with the development of cultivation theory by Noelle-Neumann and George Gerbner: "Both assumed that [the] mass media had strong, long-term effects on audiences, based on the ubiquitous and consonant stream of messages they presented to audiences" (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007, p. 10). Due to the widespread occurrence of television around the globe and the variety of aired programs at that time, this theory paid attention to the impact of media discourse on a targeted audience (Dominick, 2012). Under the umbrella of this mass media effect theory, the audience's perception, particularly TV viewers “determine the success or failure of any mass media outlet’s options. Investigations of media’s effect on issues relating to viewers and societies are necessary because of their potential influence on cultivation of viewers’ opinion, and maximising the competitive advantage of viewers’ perception" (Abusalem, 2007, p. 310).

Alongside the emergence of cultivation theory, agenda-setting theory has emerged to point to the role of media owners, or operators, and their goals, which are included in the delivered messages (Weaver, 2007). This theory is related to the production of news about a certain issue and “not information about the issue that has the effect; it is the fact that the issue has received a certain amount of processing time and attention that carries the effect” (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007, p. 14).
McCombs and Shaw (cited in Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007) point out that this theory “refers to the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues (e.g., based on relative placement or amount of coverage) and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences” (p. 11). However, the new trend of this theory considers the effect of media (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). Thus organisations use media to transmit messages about a certain issue, or issues from their respective points of view and the messages may have an impact on the targeted audience. However, studying media ownership and agenda does not necessarily postulate an idea of a passive audience (McQuail, 2010).

During the 1980s and 1990s, priming and framing models in political communication emerged "as an extension of agenda-setting theory" (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007 p. 11). Priming suggests that, "mass media can [...] shape the considerations that people take into account when making judgments about political candidates or issues" (ibid, p. 11). However, framing refers "to the selection and salience of particular aspects of an issue rather than to the issue itself" (Entman, cited in Scheufele, 1999, p. 107). In this context, "the media can have quite a large influence on the way the public views their political system, by framing the information that is disseminated" (Abusalem, 2007, p. 198).

Using Framing as a media theory guides the researcher to explore how the media represents information to the public (Abusalem, 2007). The core assumption of framing theory is that an issue could be viewed from various perspectives (Chong & Druckman, 2007). This theory shows how a group or an organisation shapes its discourse about an issue in a certain way. It considers and describes the external and internal factors that have an impact on creating this discourse (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Weaver, 2007). In this vein, David Snow (cited in McAdam et al., 1996) defines Framing as, “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (p. 6).

The analysis of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance takes into account the Lebanese and regional contexts of the discourse. In addition, it pays attention to the internal factors, which shape the discourse and present it in a language that reflects the ideology of Islamic Resistance and its worldview. Hence, the language is crucial in identifying the frames (Vreese, 2005).
As Abusalem (2007) explains, media framing is “the active construction, selection and restructurining of information to organise a particular reality in a meaningful manner” (p. 198).

In the anticipated textual and visual analyses of the media discourse of \textit{Islamic Resistance}, the emergent signs and codes are considered as the basis of the frames. It is expected that these frames, which have visual and/or linguistic forms, represent an organised mechanism of perception by \textit{Islamic Resistance} of the self and others. Thus, the frames, after identification, are considered the basis of the objectives of the media discourse of \textit{Islamic Resistance}.

In summary, the media theory of Framing guides this research and supports its aim – to analyse the media discourse of \textit{Islamic Resistance}. Figure 18 shows the way of identifying the frames in this research, where the language and the contexts are crucial in the textual and visual analysis.

![Figure 18: The process of identifying the frames in this research](image)

The next section aims to introduce the data collected for this research.
5.5 Data Collection

The purpose of this research is to identify and analyse the media discourse of Islamic Resistance – the military arm of Hezbollah. The selected data for textual and visual analysis in this research are archival. Notably, choosing samples for analysis under the umbrella of critical discourse analysis is designed to gain an insight into the analysed media discourse (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In addition to this justification, the chosen samples reflect different genres of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and this aligns with Fairclough's argument about sampling in critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995). Furthermore, the samples chosen for analysis from the outputs of the military media unit have not been analysed before as a result of the dearth of research in this field.

Archival data for this research are divided into two genres: firstly, the issued statements and documented speeches, and secondly the videos. The statements and documented speeches are collected from the official website of Islamic Resistance (www.moqawama.org), which includes links to Al-Ahed and Al-Intiqad newspapers, and from Assafir newspaper’s archive through its Arab Documentation Center. However, the videos are obtained from Dar Al-Manar for Art Production and Distribution, which has access to Al-Manar’s audio-visual archive.

The samples chosen for this research go beyond the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May, 2000. This year witnessed developments in communication technologies in the Middle East, such as the emergence of satellite televisions, which allowed Al-Manar to broadcast to the world, and the influx of the Internet. Thus, the samples chosen are linked to historical and political contexts.

Furthermore, the samples chosen are the most current and relevant ones. Regarding the written statements, it seems that, after the July War of 2006, there is a dearth of statements issued by Islamic Resistance, because the clashes with the Israeli army were limited. Thus, the samples chosen are between May, 2000 and August, 2007 where the majority of the samples chosen lead up to the July War, because Islamic Resistance was issuing statements on a daily basis (33 days of war). The number of statements gleaned is 89.
Similar to the statements, the 32 testaments' videos and propaganda flashes chosen for analysis were aired on Al-Manar after the end of the July War and released separately by Dar Al-Manar for Art Production and Distribution in two DVDs. Regarding the video song chosen for analysis, it relates to the Islamic Resistance commander who died in February, 2008. It seems from YouTube that this video song was released in 2010.

Regarding the speeches of Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, the samples chosen are three archival speeches in the context of Resistance and delivered by him on 22 September, 2006, 14 February, 2008, and 16 February, 2010. However, the videos of military operations are two films depicting the capturing of Israeli soldiers in 2000 and 2006. Each was released by the military media unit after six years in the context of mobilisation and psychological warfare.

5.6 Data Analysis

The analysis of data in this research is textual and visual. It considers the analysis of the macro- and the microstructure of the identified media discourse of Islamic Resistance. Although conducting textual analysis includes analysing visual materials as well (Fairclough, 1995), this research distinguishes between these types of material due to the multimodality of the identified discourse.

5.6.1 Intertextuality and Recontextualisation

As noted earlier, Fairclough (1995) considers textual analysis as a form of analysis for all modes of communication. As a result of this standpoint, visual analysis is considered textual analysis as well. In his theorisation of the conducting of textual analysis, Fairclough (2013) points to the significance of illuminating the connections between the internal and external relations of a text. Based on his approach, the internal relations in the texts are the interdiscursive relations, such as the relations between vocabulary, grammar and semiotic elements, or in other words, the conducting of a linguistic/semiotic analysis. However, the external relations are the relations between the text and the social context, or the relations between the text and other texts served in its formation. According to Fairclough (2013), the external relation between the text and other texts signifies the intertextual relations between texts. It is called
‘intertextuality’. However, ‘recontextualisation’ means the way in which different voices are framed in a text or how elements of a social practice are redistributed.

In his earlier explanation of this linguistic notion, Fairclough (1993) points out that there are two axes of intertextuality. The horizontal axis is related to the production dimension of the text, such as the relation between the author and audience. However, the vertical axis is the contextual dimension of the text, such as historical relations with other texts.

Fairclough (1993) distinguishes between ‘manifest intertextuality’ (when the relation between the text and other texts is clear), and ‘constitutive intertextuality’ (when the focus is on the production of the discourse). He occasionally uses the term ‘interdiscursivity’ instead of ‘constitutive intertextuality’ in order “to underline that the focus is on discourse conventions rather than other texts as constitutive” (Fairclough, 1993, p. 104).

Fairclough (1993) proposes that the dimensions of the framework of discourse analysis are “manifest intertextuality, interdiscursivity [or constitutive intertextuality], textual ‘transformations’ [such as text production and distribution] and how texts constitute social identities” (p. 105). The researcher has adopted the notion of intertextuality in this analysis, because it provides a tool to explore the source of the used signs and codes and consequently serves to identify the frames and their meanings.

5.6.2 Textual Analysis

The textual analysis in this research consists of: the analysis of the written statements of Islamic Resistance issued by its military media unit; the linguistic content of the fighters’ testaments; the speeches of Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah; the videotaped songs; and, the propaganda flashes.

5.6.3 Visual Analysis

The visual analysis in this research is concerned with the analysis of the visual mode in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. It includes: the video footage of the military operations of Islamic Resistance; images in the videos of fighters’ testaments filmed by its military media unit; images in the videotaped songs; and propaganda flashes produced by the same unit. It also includes the image of the
leader of *Islamic Resistance*, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, in the act of delivering his speeches. Table 12 provides the number of chosen samples, justification of selections and the nature of the analysis.

Table 12: Samples chosen for analysis and the justification of choices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Archival Data</th>
<th>Chosen Samples</th>
<th>Justifications</th>
<th>Nature of Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Written Statements</td>
<td>Criterion Sampling. The predetermined samples of statements date from May, 2000 to August, 2007. These statements are short and their number is limited. The vast majority of the statements go back to the July War in 2006. They comprise 89 statements.</td>
<td>To consider the majority of the statements issued by the military media unit after May, 2000, to ensure saturation of data To outline the structure and linguistic characteristics of these statements To show their grammatical structure based on Halliday’s Functional Grammar To classify their contexts and themes To utilise semiotic tools to identify the signs and codes in the statements To explore the frames, ideology and the propaganda elements in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance</td>
<td>The analysis is purely textual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos of Fighters’ Testaments</td>
<td>32 random samples, each video is nearly 3 minutes</td>
<td>The chosen samples downloaded on a DVD by Dar Al Manar for Art Production and Distribution, which cooperates with Al-Manar to distribute the archival data for profit These testaments have a military context To identify the structures and themes of these testaments To observe the images of the fighters To utilise semiotic tools to identify the signs and codes in the testaments</td>
<td>The analysis is textual and visual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival Data</td>
<td>Chosen Samples</td>
<td>Justifications</td>
<td>Nature of Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Speeches of the leader of Islamic Resistance, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah</strong></td>
<td>Criterion Sampling. 3 speeches are as follows: 1) The public speech after July War in September, 2006. 2) A speech after the assassination of the commander of Islamic Resistance, Imad Mughniyeh, in February, 2008. 3) A speech in the Martyrs Week in the calendar of Islamic Resistance in February, 2010.</td>
<td>To identify the signs and codes so as to allow exploring the frames, ideology and the propaganda elements in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.</td>
<td>The analysis is primarily textual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Videos of Military Operation</strong></td>
<td>Criterion Sampling. The two videos of military operations depicting the capture of Israeli soldiers in 2000 and 2006. Remarkably, the first operation in October, 2000 aired after the July War in 2006 in a documentary on the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation Channel (LBCI) and the second operation, in July, 2006, aired in the summer of 2012 by Al-Mayadeen satellite television.</td>
<td>These videos have military content and context. To utilise rhetoric to explore the notion of persuasion and argumentation in the speeches. To observe the image of Nasrullah. To identify the signs and codes in these speeches. To identify the signs and codes that allows the exploring of the frames, ideology and the propaganda elements in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.</td>
<td>The analysis is visual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flashes and Video Songs</strong></td>
<td>Purposeful random sampling. 3 propaganda flashes produced by the military media unit during the July War in 2006. A video song, The Land Narrates its Imad which is produced by the unit.</td>
<td>These videos and flashes have a military context. To outline the characteristics of these videos. To identify the signs and codes in these videos.</td>
<td>The analysis is visual and textual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival Data</td>
<td>Chosen Samples</td>
<td>Justifications</td>
<td>Nature of Analysis</td>
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<td>after the assassination of the commander of <em>Islamic Resistance</em>.</td>
<td>To observe the images in these videos</td>
<td>To utilise semiotic tools to identify the signs and codes in these videos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To identify the signs and codes that allow exploration of the frames, ideology and the propaganda elements in the media discourse of <em>Islamic Resistance</em>.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has delineated the adopted paradigm, the methodology, the theoretical framework and the design in this research. It has provided an insight into the philosophy of decoding and the approaches concerning discourse. Under the umbrella of the discipline of critical discourse analysis, this chapter shows the characteristics of the adopted approach, providing a research model of how to analyse the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.

To identify the chosen approach and tools for analysis in this research, this chapter has revisited the ideas of the key scholars who contributed to the study of discourse. In addition, this chapter has identified the nature of the chosen data for this research and how to analyse it.
Chapter 6. The Structure of the Written Statements of *Islamic Resistance* and their Linguistic and Semiotic Implications

This chapter aims to analyse samples of the statements issued by the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance* to identify their structures, employing linguistics and semiotics in the analysis of their microstructure. In this regard, it aims to identify the embedded signs and codes contained with them. Thus, this chapter intends to partially address Research Question 1 (What are the signs and codes in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*?) and to provide a preface to Research Questions 2 (How does the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* frame its identity and other identities?) and 3 (What are the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*?).

In this regard, the analysed signs and extracted codes represent the basis for identifying the frames and interpreting their meanings in Chapter 9. As a result, this chapter serves in developing an understanding of the messages and objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.

In addition to the Overview and Conclusion, this chapter consists of five main sections: the contexts of statements; their overall contents; their sub-contents; their grammatical structure; and finally and their signs and codes.

The archival data for analysis in this chapter has been collected from the official website of *Islamic Resistance* (www.moqawama.org). These data are taken from the period, October, 2000 - August, 2007 and comprise 89 statements. The original language of the statements is Arabic and the translation pays attention to the details to provide the correct translation, remaining true to the metaphoric usages and the names of geographical locations mentioned in the statements.
6.1 Overview

The written statements of *Islamic Resistance* are considered to be one of its central media outputs and constitute a basic part of its discourse. They are its memory, because they include its archival data regarding its activities and events. The study of statements in this chapter mirrors many linguistic and semiotic features. It shows the linguistic and semiotic simplicity and complexity of the analysed statements, which is precisely what the study intends to do, as there is no existing study that focuses on the written statements of *Islamic Resistance*.

The main argument in this chapter is that the statements imply ideology and objectives because they are rich with signs. As they are politically motivated, they echo “a complex context loaded with specific reasons for hostilities, struggle for power, sympathies towards specific victims and, of course, different ideological beliefs and positions” (Bazzi, 2009, p. 70). Thus, this chapter utilises linguistic and semiotic tools to describe the statements and identify their signs and codes. In this vein, the study of statements covers the macro- and the microstructures of the statements to align with the critical discourse analysis approach adopted in this research.

The analysis in this chapter is considered an essential basis for the coming chapters, in order to classify the frames, provide further interpretation and explore the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. 
6.2 Contexts of the Written Statements

The major context of the written statements issued by *Islamic Resistance*, the military arm of *Hezbollah* is the conflict with Israel. This conflict witnessed several clashes, such as the Grapes of Wrath Operation in April, 1996 and the July War in 2006. Notably, this conflict between *Islamic Resistance* and Israel relates to a wider context, the historical conflict in the Middle East between the Arabs and Israel.

In addition to the major context, it can be observed from the samples of written statements collected for this research that there are some sub-contexts. These sub-contexts, which relate to the major and wider contexts, can be extracted from the content of the statements. The sub-contexts can be classified into: the death of its fighters on the battlefield (Obituaries); capturing Israeli soldiers (Capturing); the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territories (Occupation); the Israeli attacks on Lebanon (Attacks); the Israeli violation of Lebanese sovereignty (Violations); and the Israeli massacres of Palestinian people (Massacres). Figure 19 provides the nexus between the contexts and the sub-contexts.
There are many examples of the sub-contexts in the statements issued by Islamic Resistance. Regarding the death of fighters of Islamic Resistance, the following example shows the sub-context, ‘Obituaries’:

“The Islamic Resistance presented five of its mujahedeen [who were] martyred in the last couple of days during the confrontations against Israeli occupation…”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 24 July, 2006

The following extract provides an example of the sub-context, ‘Capturing’:

“The Islamic Resistance captured two Israeli soldiers this morning, Wednesday, 12 July, 2006, at 9:05 am, …”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 12 July, 2006
The following example shows the remaining four sub-contexts – ‘Occupation’, ‘Massacres’, ‘Attacks’ and ‘Violations’:

"Confirming the decision of The Islamic Resistance to liberate the still-occupied Lebanese territories, perpetually facing the enemy for massacring our kin and people in occupied Palestine and continuing its daily assaults on Lebanon, violating its lands, water and airspace, [...] The Islamic Resistance shot, at 3:20 am, a Zionist convoy in the occupied Shebaa Farms…"

Source: Islamic Resistance, 16 November, 2000

In summary, an understanding of the contexts of the messages is important to the interpretation of the messages of this organisation in order to know their frames and objectives. This contextualisation can be a part of the counter-hegemony strategy in the discourse, which aims to present “the real source of threat, reasons for conflict, claims and anti-claims, belief systems (e.g. social, cognitive, experiential, religious, political) and the politics of identity” (Bazzi, 2009, p. 58).

6.2.1 General Structure of the Written Statements

The written statements maintain nearly the same structure. Generally, every statement contains a general lead – a Quranic verse that aligns with the content and a body containing a paragraph or paragraphs holding the core news.

6.3 Overall Contents

This section aims to categorise the statements of Islamic Resistance based on their overall contents. In this respect, this research extracted, in sum, six types of content from the analysed statements. They are: action, reaction, continuity of Resistance, denial or clarification, obituaries and documentation.

6.3.1 Action

There are statements claiming that Islamic Resistance attacked Israeli forces or towns without providing any reasons. This notion of action can be observed directly in the lead and particularly in some statements during the July War, 2006; for example, “…the heroes of Islamic Resistance directed batches of
missiles towards the settlements of Kiryat Shmona …” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 26 July, 2006).

6.3.2 Reaction
The notion of reaction, retaliation or response to the actions of the Israeli army seems to exist in many statements of Islamic Resistance. Indeed, the organisation focuses on this notion to justify its military activities, for example: “Replying to the assaults and Zionist massacres against unarmed civilians, The Islamic Resistance bombarded…” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 9 August, 2006).

6.3.3 Continuity of Resistance
Although the notion of continuity of Resistance can be considered under the notion of action or reaction, there are statements including this notion in their leads, particularly after May, 2000; for example: “… in its follow-up to the path of jihad and liberating the lands, The Islamic Resistance …” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 15 May, 2001).

6.3.4 Denial or Clarification
Islamic Resistance issues statements to rebut or clarify an Israeli story. Such rebuttal or clarification can be observed clearly in the statements concerned, for example: “Contrary to what has been aired by the enemy’s media that the occupation forces took control of Bint Jbeil city, The Islamic Resistance denies …” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 25 July, 2006).

6.3.5 Obituaries
When a fighter is killed on the battlefield, Islamic Resistance issues a statement that includes the name of the combatant, his/her pseudonym, date of birth and death, and other details, for example: “…The Islamic Resistance presents, to the country and the nation, one of its promised victorious grooms, by almighty Allah and his infallible messengers, the martyr, Jaafar Hassan Jaafar (Mortada), born in Mais Al-Jabal in 1979, joined the ranks of the Resistance in 2001, received several courses in military training, and obtained the commendation of his eminence, the Secretary-General” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 30 July, 2006).
6.3.6 Documentation

*Islamic Resistance* documents the Israeli army assaults on Lebanese territories and violations of Lebanese sovereignty. Generally, the documentation of assaults includes warnings to the Israeli army, for example: “...recorded 74 violations of Lebanese sovereignty between April, 30 and May, 6 [2002]” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 08 May, 2002).

6.4 Sub-Contents

This section will focus on other meaningful elements in the statements, such as the use of Quranic verses and other features, such as timing, place and details.

6.4.1 The Use of Quranic Verses in the Statements

**Note:** This analysis utilises only one *Tafsir* reference - *Al-Mizan: An Exegesis of the Quran* - to extract the meaning of the Quranic verses in the analysed statements. The reason for the use of this Islamic Shiite reference is due to the centrality of religious belief for *Hezbollah* and its military arm. However, the translation of Quranic verses from Arabic into English utilises the translation of the Quran issued by the Royal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought in Amman, Jordan in 2008, because it pays attention to the meaning and the denotations of the Arabic lexicon.

In the words of Suleiman (2013), the "connection between the past and the present is an aspect of language ideology in most cultures and nationalisms. The connection between faith and language is subject to ideological manipulation in nation-building" (ibid, p. 106). The contemporary usage of Quranic verses by the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance* reinforces this notion. As a result of using Quranic verses in the leads, the statements are presented in an Islamic frame, endowing them with an Islamic nature and expanding their meanings. This is at the heart of intertextuality. However, these verses are retained only in the media outlets of *Hezbollah* and they are generally omitted when other media outlets report the statements of *Islamic Resistance*. Thus, these latter media outlets transmit to the readers basically, what Eco (1984) describes, as the ‘open codes’; however, the ‘closed codes’ (Eco 1984) in the statements are directed to those who can understand their meanings, particularly the followers. This notion of relationship between the author and the concerned audience is called inter-
subjectivity. Hence, the Quranic verses in the statements can be considered ‘closed codes’, because they hold Islamic meanings and not all the readers are concerned about them, or able to know their interpretations. At the same time, however, the Quranic verses can be considered open codes as well, because they can be seen as the arguments of Islamic Resistance, where each verse holds a notion of power.

In this regard, understanding the notion of the use of Quranic verses in the statements helps in analysing the messages of Islamic Resistance and consequently its discourse.

This subsection points out the use of Quranic verses, their meanings and how they align with the content of the statements. Thus, shedding light on the meaning of each Quranic verse used and how it links to the statement provide a fuller understanding of the whole meanings of the statements of Islamic Resistance.

The vast majority of the Quranic verses used in the statements, as it will be observed in the following examples, refer to early Islamic battles, particularly the Battle of Badr. This was the first Islamic conquest in history against the then polytheists of Mecca. Although the number of Muslim fighters was 313 and the number of fighters of their enemy was just over one thousand, they won the battle of Badr.

This battle was the first successful step towards achieving the Islamic nation under the patronage of Prophet Muhammad and it witnessed the inception of Imam Ali ben Abi Talib's heroism in the battlefield. Considering the religious belief of Islamic Resistance, the reference to this battle through the use of relevant Quranic verses in the lead of statements reflects the deep eagerness of the members of the organisation to return in their minds to the past, and also reflects a consciousness that the real power is not in the quantity of forces and their sophisticated weapons, but in the quality of the fighters based on their faith and creed.

In observing the available complete statements by Islamic Resistance issued between October, 2000 and August, 2007, the Quranic verses used are limited in scope, as follows:
6.4.1.1 First Verse

“...And you threw not when you threw, but Allah threw” (08:17)

“You did not slay them, but Allah slew them, and you threw not when you threw, but Allah threw” (08: 17)

This Quranic verse refers to a metaphysical power gifted to Prophet Muhammad and his followers, the Muslims, in their first victory against the polytheists in the Battle of Badr (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). This old event at the beginning of Islamic history provides Islamic Resistance with an argument that victory is granted from Allah, and thus its military actions are blessed (Qassem, 2008). In this regard, Islamic Resistance uses either Part One or Part Two of this verse in some statements, to enhance its military success and power. For example,

“Allah the Highest says:

‘...And you threw not when you threw, but Allah threw’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.

They kill our children and women, thus we kill their soldiers. They destroy our homes, mosques and churches, thus we destroy their warships and tanks. They bomb us with American stupid rockets likewise the stupidity of [George W.] Bush, we bomb them with directed rockets from Allah, the Mighty, the Strong and this is the beginning of revenge for the children of Qana [town]. At 4:30 pm, this day, on Monday, The Islamic Resistance attacked with its blessed missiles an Israeli battleship Sa’ar 4.5 subclass, the crew of which consists of 53 officers and soldiers, off the coast of Tyre, and [Islamic Resistance] was able to hit and destroy it...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 31 July, 2006

6.4.1.2 Second Verse

“I shall cast terror into the hearts of the disbelievers; so smite above the necks, and smite of them every finger” (08: 12)

“When your Lord inspired the angels, [saying], 'I am with you, so make the believers stand firm. I shall cast terror into the hearts of the disbelievers...’” (08: 12)
Like the previous verse, this verse belongs to the same Surah, \textit{Al-Anfal} (The Spoils). The verse indicates that Allah helped few hundreds of Muslim fighters in the Battle of Badr to defeat just over a thousand of their enemies, as noted previously. However, this verse holds metonymical expressions by stating how the Muslim fighters should attack the polytheists. The expression “smite above the necks” indicates that Muslims in the Battle of Badr should hit their enemies without mercy, and the expression “smite of them every finger” is aimed at rendering the polytheists unable to continue fighting (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). \textit{Islamic Resistance} uses either Part One or Two of this verse to endorse the power of its fighters who hit Israel without mercy. For example,

\begin{quote}
\textit{In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful}

\textit{‘I shall cast terror into the hearts of the disbelievers; so smite above the necks, and smite of them every finger’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.}

With support from Him the Almighty and the Exalted and at 16:30 pm, The Islamic Resistance pelted the Israeli enemy colonies in Ramot Naftali, Kfar Szold, Ghonen, Sde Eliezer and Karmiel with a batch of missiles...”

\end{quote}

\textbf{6.4.1.3 Third Verse}

\textit{‘Be not faint in seeking the enemy’} (04: 104)

This verse urged the early Muslims to be strong in fighting the polytheists, because Allah promised them victory, or martyrdom and paradise (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). The rest of the verse provides more meaning about the status quo of the early Muslims and the polytheists during war, \textit{“if you are suffering, they are also suffering as you are suffering; and you hope from Allah that for which they cannot hope. Allah is Ever-Knowing, Wise”} (04: 104). \textit{Islamic Resistance} used this verse in a statement during the July War to show the power of its fighters when they confronted the Israeli army and destroyed a tank. The statement is:

\begin{quote}
\textit{In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful}

\textit{‘Be not faint in seeking the enemy’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.}
\end{quote}
The Islamic Resistance's heroes mujahedeen confronted a Zionist enemy's attempt to advance towards center 17 in Bint Jbeil and destroyed a Merkava tank. 

Victory comes only from Allah, the Mighty, the Compeller.”


6.4.1.4 Fourth Verse

“Say to the disbelievers: You shall be vanquished and mustered to Hell – an evil cradling...” (03: 12)

There is a debate about the historical context of this verse and whether it was directed to the Jews in Medina after the Battle of Badr, or the polytheists after the Battle of Ohod. However, the meaning of this verse reveals the fate of disbelievers in the ‘Hereafter’ (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). Islamic Resistance used this verse in the lead of a statement during the July War as a powerful statement concerning the fate of the Israelis. The statement is:

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
‘Say to the disbelievers: You shall be vanquished and mustered to Hell - an evil cradling...’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.

At 6:20 pm, the Islamic Resistance's heroes delivered batches of missiles towards the settlements of: kiryat shmona, Ghonen, Kfar Szold, Sde Eliezer and Ramot Naftali.

Victory comes only from Allah, the Mighty, the Compeller.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 26 July, 2006

6.4.1.5 Fifth Verse

“Fight them, and Allah will chastise them at your hands, and degrade them, and He will give you victory against them, and He will heal the breasts of a people who believe” (09: 14)

This verse refers to a historical occasion in early Islam when the polytheists in Mecca breached a treaty with the Prophet Muhammad by supporting a tribe to attack another one called Khoza’ā, which was allying with the Muslims. The
defeat of the polytheists was celebrated by the Khoza'a tribe and the Muslims. In addition, this verse tells Muslims that their enemy, the polytheists, will be chastised by the true believers before being chastised in the ‘Hereafter’ (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). However, the meaning of this verse can be extended through the ages by sending the message that all believers will feel relief by the defeat of their enemy at the hands of Muslim fighters (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). In this context, Islamic Resistance uses this verse in the lead of a statement to consider its attacks against the Israeli army as chastisement and reprisal. For example,

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
‘Fight them, and Allah will chastise them at your hands, and degrade them, and He will give you victory against them, and He will heal the breasts of a people who believe’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.
A Zionist force composed of two tanks renewed its advance towards the vehicles that were attacked by The Islamic Resistance’s mujahedeen, at a location between Misgav Am and Adaisseh town, in an attempt to retrieve them from the battlefield, when this force too came under attack by the mujahedeen at 10:40 am with the appropriate weapons and anti-shield weapons. The mujahedeen were able to hit two tanks, destroying one, which erupted in flames, killing and wounding its crew.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 6 August, 2006

6.4.1.6 Sixth Verse

“... And on that day, the believers shall rejoice * In Allah’s help. He helps whomever He will; and He is the Mighty, the Merciful * The promise of Allah. Allah does not fail His promise” (30: 4, 5, 6)

This verse refers to a historical occasion, which is the victory of the Romans over the Persians. At that time, the Romans were believers of the Book; however, the polytheists, particularly the Quraysh tribe in the Arabian Peninsula, wished for the victory of Persia over the Romans Thus, this victory aligns with the Muslims’ belief, who later rejoiced when they defeated Quraysh in the Battle of Badr, as Allah had promised them (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). Islamic Resistance used this verse in a statement, as a favourable argument and show of power,
when its fighters captured Israeli soldiers shortly after the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000. The statement is:

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
‘...And on that day, the believers shall rejoice * In Allah’s help. He helps whomever He will; and He is the Mighty, the Merciful * The promise of Allah. Allah does not fail His promise’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.
Fulfilling with Hezbollah’s promise to liberate every prisoner and detainee, every inch of our occupied territories and to assist the grand and combatant Palestinian people in its blessed Intifada, The Islamic Resistance’s courageous mujahedeen attacked many barracks of Israeli occupation forces in the region of occupied Lebanese Shebaa Farms and performed a qualitative operation led to capturing a number of Zionist soldiers […].’”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 7 October, 2000

6.4.1.7 Seventh Verse

“If Allah helps you, then none can overcome you” (03: 160)

The historical context of this verse is the Battle of Badr and the Battle of Ohod. The early Muslims faced a severe war in Ohod after their clear victory in Badr. This verse is directed to Prophet Muhammad and Muslims. It intends to tell them that Muslims will not be defeated if they are true believers of Allah and supported by Him (Tabātabā‘ī, 1997). Islamic Resistance used this verse in the lead of the statement as a justification of the power of its fighters, who captured two Israeli soldiers in 2006. The statement is:

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
‘If Allah helps you, then none can overcome you’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.
Fulfilling with the promise dedicated itself to achieve by liberating the prisoners and detainees, The Islamic Resistance captured this morning on Wednesday, 12 July, 2006, at 9:05 am two Israeli soldiers at the border with occupied Palestine, and the two captives were transferred to a safe place.’”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 12 July, 2006
6.4.1.8 Eighth Verse

“And to Allah belong the hosts of the heavens and the earth. And Allah is Ever-Knowing, Wise” (48: 7)

The historical context of this verse is the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah between the Muslims in Medina and the polytheists in Mecca. The treaty enabled Prophet Muhammad and his followers to go Mecca for pilgrimage without facing any obstacle from the polytheists. This treaty was considered an Islamic victory. In this regard, this verse points out that the causes of victory are Divine (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). Islamic Resistance used this verse during the July War in 2006 in the lead of a statement to show the power of its fighters and their ability to discover and face the infiltrating Israeli troops. The statement is:

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
‘And to Allah belong the hosts of the heavens and the earth. And Allah is ever Knower, Wise’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.
At 1:40 pm an infantry force from Golani Brigade attempted to infiltrate into the road Kantara - Adchit Al Qusayr, [thereupon] The Islamic Resistance’s mujahedeen confronted and clashed with it, inflicting it with many casualties [...].”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 9 August, 2006

6.4.1.9 Ninth Verse

“How often a little company has overcome a numerous one, by Allah’s leave; and Allah is with the patient” (02: 249)

This verse refers to an old battle between Taloot and Jaloit. The soldiers of Taloot, who were believers and belonged to the Children of Israel, defeated Jaloit who have had a big army. Taloot’s soldiers faced a test when they were ordered by Taloot to drink only a fistful of water from a river before the battle. As a result of drinking more than ordered to, a large number of soldiers who breached Taloot’s instruction did not join the fighting, because they had failed in the test of patience. This verse provides the early Muslims with a model of how a small number of patient soldiers who obey their leader (such as what happened in
the Battle of Badr) can defeat a big army if it is Allah’s will (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). Islamic Resistance used this verse in the lead of a statement during the July War in 2006 as an argument and to show its power by facing the Israeli army with a limited number of fighters. For example,

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

‘How often a little company has overcome a numerous one, by Allah’s leave; and Allah is with the patient’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.

The Islamic Resistance pelted at 10:00 am the two Israeli enemy settlements Nahariya and Kfar Giladi with a barrage of missiles. Also, at 10:20 am the mujahedeen destroyed a third Merkava tank in El-Seder region at the outskirts of Aynata [village]…”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 10 August, 2006

6.4.1.10 Tenth Verse

“Assuredly Allah will help those who help Him. Allah is truly Strong, Mighty”
(22: 40)

The context of this verse is the permission from Allah for the early Muslims to fight the polytheists in Mecca after years of patience. However, this verse means that Allah will provide victory for those believers who fight for His sake (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). Similarly, Islamic Resistance considers its struggle to be to obtain victory for the sake of Allah. Thus, it used this verse as an argument in the lead of two statements during the July War in 2006. An example of one of these two statements is:

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

‘Assuredly Allah will help those who help Him. Allah is truly Strong, Mighty’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.

Since 10:00 pm in the evening, the men of Allah, The Islamic Resistance’s mujahedeen carried out an attack against the Zionist forces that had entered the area between Maroun El-Ras and Bint Jbeil. The mujahedeen was able to destroy two enemy’s military vehicles, inflicting casualties among their crews between dead and wounded […]”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 26 July, 2006
6.4.1.11 Eleventh and Twelfth Verses

“And slay them wherever you come upon them, and expel them from where they expelled you” (02: 191)

“Fight them till there is no sedition” (02: 193)

The first verse refers to the clashes between the early Muslims and the polytheists when a Companion of the Prophet Muhammad killed a polytheist in a day of one of the four sacred months, during which fighting is prohibited. This permitted the early Muslims, particularly those who were expelled and fled from Mecca, to fight the polytheists anywhere and expel them in the same way (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). The second verse, which ordered the early Muslims to fight the polytheists for the sake of Allah, has the same historical context (ibid). However, Islamic Resistance used these two verses in the lead of statements, particularly the first verse, as an argument to show its justification and power to fight the Israeli army and turn them back. For example,

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
‘And slay them wherever you come upon them, and expel them from where they expelled you’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.
To confirm the decision of The Islamic Resistance to liberate the still-occupied Lebanese territories, to continue to face the enemy for massacring our kin and people in occupied Palestine, continuing its daily assaults on Lebanon, violating its lands, water and airspace, [thereupon] the Al-Aqsa Intifada Martyrs’ Group in The Islamic Resistance shot at 3:20 am a Zionist convoy in the occupied Shebaa Farms [...].”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 16 November, 2000

6.4.1.12 Thirteenth Verse

“...But if you revert, We [too] will revert; and We have made Hell a dungeon for the disbelievers” (17: 8)

This verse is directed to the Children of Israel as Allah orders them to refrain from transgression, because there will be negative consequences (Tabātabā’ī,
1997). In this vein, *Islamic Resistance* uses this verse in statements to show its surplus of power after attacking the Israeli army. For example,

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
‘...But if you revert, We [too] will revert; and We have made Hell a dungeon for the disbelievers’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.
In the context of its continuous retaliation on attacking the Lebanese civilians, particularly in the villages and towns of the South [district], The Islamic Resistance directed at 6:45 pm a new batch of missiles towards Acre city in the occupied Palestine.
Victory comes only from Allah, the Mighty, the Compeller.”

Source: *Islamic Resistance*, 2 August, 2006

### 6.4.1.13 Fourteenth Verse

“O you who believe! If you help Allah, He will help you and make your foothold firm” (47: 7)

The context of this Quranic verse is encouraging the early Muslims to fight the disbelievers. In this regard, this verse urges the Muslims to fight in the path of Allah as a condition for winning a war (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). Thus, *Islamic Resistance* uses this verse in statements as an argument to show that its power and strength, in fighting Israel, are obtained from Allah. For example,

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
‘O you who believe! If you help Allah, He will help you and make your foothold firm’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.
Ayta ash-Shab [town] is still writing the books of heroism and standing [as] an impregnable fence in front of the enemy army, [thereupon] and after an Israeli military force moved forward to drag the spread casualties out the battlefield, The Islamic Resistance’s mujahedeen confronted it and inflicted on it other confirmed casualties.
Victory comes only from Allah, the Mighty, the Compeller.”

Source: *Islamic Resistance*, 1 August, 2006

As shown earlier in the examples provided, many statements end with quotes
that contain two Quranic verses. The Quranic context of the verse “Victory Comes only from Allah” (08: 10) is the Battle of Badr and the context of the verse “The Mighty, the Compeller” (59: 23) is to state the attributes of Allah (Tabātabā’ī, 1997). Drawing on the context and the meaning of these two verses, it can be argued that Islamic Resistance uses them as arguments to confirm that Allah grants victory to the believers, who obtain strength and power from Him. The notion of victory was pointed to in Chapter 4 and it will be discussed further in Chapter 9, which investigates frames in the analysed media discourse. Islamic Resistance considers its victory to be divine in the July War of 2006 in order to confirm its identity, in the same way an Islamic movement believes in the Quran where there are verses attributing the victory to Allah. This metaphysical belief was emphasised in the discourse of Islamic Resistance during the July War, where the first speech of Nasrullah after that war was named by his organisation as 'the speech of Divine Victory'.

6.4.1.14 Verses in the Fighters' Obituaries

“Among the believers are men who are true to the covenant they made with Allah. Some of them have fulfilled their vow, and some are still awaiting; and they have not changed in the least” (33: 23)

“And if you are slain in Allah’s way, or die, forgiveness from Allah and mercy are better than what they amass” (03: 157)

“Count not those who were slain in Allah’s way, as dead, but rather, living with their Lord, provided for [by Him]” (03: 169)

“... And the witnesses with their Lord; they will have their reward and their light” (57: 19)

“But as for those who struggle for Our sake, We shall assuredly guide them in Our ways” (29: 69)

“So let them fight in the way of Allah those who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter; and whoever fights in the way of Allah and is slain or conquers, We shall give him a great wage” (04: 74)

These six Quranic verses are related to the importance of martyrdom and jihad in Islam. The first verse refers to the early Muslim fighters who were killed in the Battle of Badr and those who were still alive after that battle without changing
their pledge to fight in the coming wars with the Prophet Muhammad to gain victory, or martyrdom (Tabātabā‘ī, 1997). Meanwhile, the second and third verses show the importance of seeking jihad in the path of Allah, because the martyrs gain eternity (ibid). In this context, the fifth verse points out that the true believers are guided by Allah, because they follow and obey Him in their actions, including jihad, and refuse the call of Satan (ibid). However, there is a debate about the meaning of “witnesses with their Lord” in the fourth verse as to whether they are the martyrs, or the believers rewarded for their deeds in the Hereafter (Tabātabā‘ī, 1997). Similarly, the sixth verse urged the early Muslims on jihad, because Allah will reward the fighters in the Hereafter (ibid). In this context, Islamic Resistance uses one of these verses in the leads of obituaries when it declares the death of a fighter, or fighters in the battlefield, or during what it calls "a sacred duty of jihad." The following obituary issued by Islamic Resistance provides an example of this, when a fighter died during what was named as a sacred duty of Jihad:

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful
‘...And the witnesses with their Lord; they will have their reward and their light’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.

The Islamic Resistance presents to its dignified and honourable people and to its generous nation the martyr Mahmoud Ali Mallah who fell martyr on 20 August, 2007 during his sacred duty of Jihad due to a cluster bomb explosion from the remnants of continuous Israeli aggression on our honourable and patient people. The martyr was born in 1980 in the southern town Ayn Qana. He joined the ranks of The Islamic Resistance in 1988. He is married and has two children.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 20 August, 2007

6.4.1.15 Verses in the Context of Addressing the Leadership

“Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah and those who are with him are hard against the disbelievers, merciful among themselves” (48: 29)

This verse describes the relations between the Prophet Muhammad and his followers and how they were treating their enemies (Tabātabā‘ī, 1997). During
the July War, the fighters of *Islamic Resistance* issued a sentimental statement directed to their leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, confirming their pledge to defend the Lebanese territories and release Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails. The statement was headed by this Quranic verse and ended by another verse “*If Allah helps you, then none can overcome you*” (03: 160) which confirms, as shown previously in explaining the meaning of this verse, that reliance on Allah and trust in Him is crucial to winning the battle. The following example, which refers to the use of these two verses, is the statement, titled “*A Letter from the Islamic Resistance’s Mujahedeen to the Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah*”:

“In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful

‘Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah and those who are with him are hard against the disbelievers, merciful among themselves’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.
His Eminence, the cherished Secretary-General… Peace be on you from Allah, His graciousness and blessings…
Peace be on you O our beloved, peace be on you O our dear, peace be on you O the light of jihad and mujahedeen…
Sorry, O our Sayyed, you know us well and we know you as well, and it is not new what we have heard from you about your confidence in us to achieve victory.
We have heard your emotional words whether through media or through [Islamic] Resistance’s communication devices, or through the periodicals issued by [Islamic] Resistance’s operations compartments directed to all garrisoned fighters… We heard those words and what we will say is not new for you. However, likewise the Lebanese, the nation and the world heard your voice and those words, we want them to hear our voice and these words…
We, O our Sayyed, here stand firm along the length of the border of Palestine and in every corner of south Lebanon, the south of pride, dignity and defiance. We are still true to the pledge you made clearly to the Zionists. Some of us have won and clashed with the elite of the enemy’s soldiers in Ayta ash-Shab, Aytaroun and Maroun al-Ras, which astonished the leaders of the enemy, whereas thousands of your fighters are waiting with great yearning and desire
to take the opportunity to clash with whoever dares [to fight] from the enemy’s soldiers to make them join their colleagues from the elite [soldiers who were killed] and to enhance the headache of their leaders.

We, O our Sayyed, are the weapons of Sheikh Ragheb
We, O our Sayyed, are the will written by Sayyed Abbas
We, O our leader, are still on the pledge and vow we made to you and to the martyrs...

We are your true promise...
We are the freedom for Samir Kantar, Nassim Nisr, Yahia Skaff, Muhammad Farran and all prisoners...
We are the liberation for Shibaa Farms, Kfar Shouba Hills and every inch of our dear Lebanon...
We are the sacrifice for the proud and great people of Lebanon...
We are the blood that protects and defends the country... the entire country.
We are the devotees of [Imam] Hussein peace be on him...
We are the surprises...
We are the coming victory if it is Allah’s, the Highest, will...
‘If Allah helps you, then none can overcome you’ Almighty Allah has spoken the truth.

Peace be upon you and the mercy and blessings of Allah”


Table 13 shows the Quranic verses used, their contexts, and examples regarding the publication date of the statements.

Table 13: Use of Quranic verses, their contexts and examples of their date of usage in the statements

<table>
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<th>The Used Quranic Verse</th>
<th>The Context</th>
<th>Date of Use (example)</th>
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<td>Hitting a warship; firing missiles on Israel</td>
<td>22, 23, 26 &amp; 31 July, 2006; 2 August, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(08: 12)</td>
<td>Firing missiles on Israel; heavy clashes with the Israeli troops</td>
<td>24 &amp; 26 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(04: 104)</td>
<td>Facing an Israeli force</td>
<td>25 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(03: 12)</td>
<td>Firing missiles on Israel</td>
<td>26 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(09: 14)</td>
<td>Attacking the Israeli force</td>
<td>6 August, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30: 4, 5, 6)</td>
<td>Attacking Israeli barracks &amp; capturing soldiers</td>
<td>7 October, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30: 4, 5, 6)</td>
<td>Capturing Israeli soldiers</td>
<td>12 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Used Quranic Verse</td>
<td>The Context</td>
<td>Date of Use (example)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(48: 7)</td>
<td>Facing an Israeli force</td>
<td>9 August, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(02: 249)</td>
<td>Firing missiles on Israel and destroying a tank</td>
<td>10 August, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22: 40)</td>
<td>Facing Israeli forces</td>
<td>26 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(02: 191)</td>
<td>Attacking an Israeli force</td>
<td>16 November, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(02: 193)</td>
<td>Firing missiles on Israel</td>
<td>24 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17: 8)</td>
<td>Firing missiles on Israel as retaliation</td>
<td>2 August, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47: 7)</td>
<td>Firing missiles on Israel; Heavy clashes with the Israeli army</td>
<td>24 &amp; 26 July, 2006; 02 August, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(48: 29)</td>
<td>Letter from the combatants to their leader Nasrullah</td>
<td>28 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(33: 23)</td>
<td>Obituary</td>
<td>26 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(03: 157)</td>
<td>Obituary</td>
<td>31 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(57: 19)</td>
<td>Obituary</td>
<td>20 August, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(29: 69)</td>
<td>Obituary</td>
<td>12 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(04: 74)</td>
<td>Obituary</td>
<td>27 &amp; 28 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(08: 10)</td>
<td>End of statements</td>
<td>July and August, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(59: 23)</td>
<td>End of statements</td>
<td>July and August, 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, quoting by *Islamic Resistance* from the holy Quran in the written statements serves to expand the latter’s meanings. In this regard, the use of Quranic verses has unveiled the identity of *Islamic Resistance*. Thus, the parables from Islamic history, as shown in stating the meaning of the verses and their historical contexts, are considered models for *Islamic Resistance* in its war against Israel. In revisiting the implications of intertextuality, the use of Quranic verses in the statements reflects both horizontal and vertical intertextuality. Regarding the horizontal axis of the intertextuality, the author of the statements – *Islamic Resistance* – considers its Islamic identity and the identity of its followers (audience) as well. However, the vertical axis of intertextuality implies the significance of early Islamic history in the contemporary conflict against Israel.

The use of Quranic verses by the organisation cannot be isolated from the notion of power in the discourse, because there is an assertion to show the continuity of meaning of these verses in contemporary life. Although the nature of the conflict is not religious, the use of Quranic verses seems to create an epistemological reality in facing 'the other', Israel, which represents western imperialism and its hegemony (Khoury & Da'na, 2009).

The next subsection provides further examples of this utilisation of religious references in the conflict.
6.4.2 Timing

In reviewing the collected written statements, it can be concluded that there are two types of time - General and Synchronistic. Generally, every statement provides a precise time as to when the military operation happened in terms of day, hours and minutes. Furthermore, the events are distributed chronologically in the statement. However, there are special times included in the statements that impact on their explanation. The special time is an Islamic occasion that synchronises with the time of the military operation. The Islamic occasions, as shown in the statements, are Ashura, the month of Ramadan, and the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad or those of Shiite’s Imams. The following statements provide examples of the synchronisation of military operations with Islamic occasions.

“In concurrence with the birthday of the Commander of the Faithful, Imam Ali ben Abi Talib, peace be upon him (on Rajab 13) and with calling [for help] O’ Ali, the Mujahedeen made a peculiar [military] operation in Naqura area where they attacked the Jabal Alalam territorial garrison which is located in south Naqura and considered one of the most important enemy barracks in the region…”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 8 August, 2006

This example demonstrates how Islamic Resistance benefits from an Islamic occasion, the birthday of Imam Ali, and how it refers to it in the statement. Furthermore, the term, or the code, O’ Ali, the voice in the conquest, will be analysed later, because it is a religious frame.

“... Groups of The Islamic Resistance ... have attacked today ... on the first day of the blessed month, Ramadan, the Zionist enemy’s barracks in Roisat Alalam, Assomaqa and Ramata located in the occupied Lebanese Shebaa Farms ...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 27 October, 2003

This example has shown also that the fasting month, Ramadan, does not restrain Islamic Resistance from attacking Israel.
“In the atmosphere of the month, Muharram, the month of victory of blood over the sword, and Imam Al-Hussein’s Ashura remembrance, The Al-Aqsa Intifada Martyrs’ Group of The Islamic Resistance shot on Saturday, 14 April, 2001, at 2:30 pm, a Zionist Merkava tank, close to Shebaa Lake...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 14 April, 2001

This extract provides two examples of timing. The first is in terms of the timeframe - minute, hour, day, month and year. It exists in nearly every statement and aims to show the credibility of Islamic Resistance. However, the second example of synchronistic timing does not exist in every statement, because it depends on religious occasions and whether the military operation coincides with a religious day. When Islamic Resistance includes a religious occasion in a statement, it aims to show that its power to attack Israel and its army is transmitted from a religious source. Furthermore, the synchronism shows the religious identity of Islamic Resistance to be that of a Shiite military wing.

The next subsection concerns the notion of place in the statements.

6.4.3 Place

In its statements about its own and Israel’s military operations, Islamic Resistance identifies the place and the type of the targets. For example:

“...The Islamic Resistance attacked at 4:30 pm Meron and Branit’s leadership barracks with rockets and artilleries, achieving direct hits.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 12 July, 2006

This statement identifies the targets of Islamic Resistance. It intends, as do similar statements, to provide its audience with evidence that the military operations of Islamic Resistance are real. Furthermore, Islamic Resistance may include statements about the Israeli army movements towards Lebanese territories, for example:
“An Israeli force endeavoured today on Wednesday, 12 July, 2006, at 2:25 pm to move forward into south Ayta ash-Shab, but The Islamic Resistance faced it with suitable weapons.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 12 July, 2006

This statement reveals that Islamic Resistance is monitoring the Israeli army activities on the Lebanese border. However, the following example did not provide a precise location of the military operation of Islamic Resistance.

“Fulfilling the pledge undertaken to achieve the liberation of prisoners and detainees, The Islamic Resistance captured this morning on Wednesday, 12 July, 2006, at 9:05 am two Israeli soldiers at the border with occupied Palestine, and the two captives were transferred to a safe place.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 12 July, 2006

This statement did not reveal the exact location of the military operation and on which side of the border. This intentional ambiguity by Islamic Resistance may be for two reasons. Firstly, the organisation is manipulating the psychological warfare by keeping the Israeli army under pressure to locate the place of the military operation and the name of the captured soldiers. Secondly, the organisation is trying to keep itself away from any condemnation. If Islamic Resistance declares that the two Israeli soldiers were captured on their side of the border, it will provide evidence that will invite condemnation by the international community. In contrast, if Islamic Resistance provides false information about the location of its military operation to save itself from condemnation, it could be shown up as a liar and lose credibility. Thus, the deliberate ambiguity about the location of the operation, as shown in the statement, seems to be a military strategy.

The next subsection concerns the details in the statements and their role.

6.4.4 Details

Generally, Islamic Resistance provides precise details in its statements, such as the weapons used in its operations or the nature of the attacked Israeli targets. The following statement provides an example of the weapon used:
“Responding to the massacres against civilians in the South [Southern Lebanon] and hostilities against infrastructure ... The Islamic Resistance attacked, this morning on Thursday, 13 July, 2006, at 7:05 am, Nahariya colony, north occupied Palestine, with 60 Grad missiles.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 13 July, 2006

In addition, the following statement provides an example of the nature of the attacked Israeli target:

“Responding to the persistence of the Zionist enemy to assault Lebanese territories, The Islamic Resistance attacked at 2:45 pm, Ein Zeitim base close to Safed colony with dozens of rockets, as it is a base for weapon stockpiling and accumulation of big military vehicles.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 19 July, 2006

These examples show that Islamic Resistance intends to gain credibility by providing its followers, supporters and the Israelis with detailed information about its military activities. Such a strategy seems to be in keeping with the overall strategy of Islamic Resistance to achieve its goals in the context of psychological warfare (Harb, 2011).

In summary, the three sub-contents discussed above demonstrate purposefulness because they show the following:

- The military operations of Islamic Resistance are real and there is no chaos, because they are documented in terms of time and place.
- The central and command of the military operational headquarters in Islamic Resistance provide further details of its military operations and of the Israeli army assaults against Lebanese territories.
- Religion is considered a motive for Islamic Resistance in its war against Israel. The organisation quotes verses from the holy Quran as justification, and points out historic Islamic occasions in the statements to support its claim to Islamic identity and power. In addition to the
Islamic parables, *Islamic Resistance* shows its Shiite identity when it includes, in the statements, special Islamic occasions, such as *Ashura* (the commemoration of the killing of Imam Al-Hussein) and the birthday of Imam Ali ben Abi Talib.

The next section relates to the microstructure of the written statements. It is a premise for identifying the embedded signs and codes in the statements.

### 6.5 Grammatical Structure of the Written Statements

This section aims to analyse the microstructure of the statements issued by *Islamic Resistance*. It intends to shed light on their grammatical structure, syntax, lexical cohesion and other embedded rhetorical features.

Based on the three components of meta-functions of language – ideational, interpersonal and textual – as shown in the previous chapter (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014), it can be concluded that the statements include these characteristics. Regarding the ideational function, the statements are representational, by providing news stories about the feature of clashes between *Islamic Resistance* and the Israeli army, for example,

> “The Islamic Resistance bombarded at 6:50 am the headquarters of the Israeli Battalion in Margaliot’s (Hunin’s) barrack with the appropriate weapons and the mujahedeen were able to achieve direct hits.”

Source: *Islamic Resistance*, 3 August, 2006

However, the notion of interpersonal function can be traced in a few statements; for example,

> “Contrary to what has been aired by the enemy’s media, that the occupation forces took control of Bint Jbeil city, The Islamic Resistance denies that and confirms that the city remains outside the control of the occupation forces and the battles are still being fought on its outskirts…”

This statement shows that *Islamic Resistance* is responding to the media bulletin from the Israeli army. This feature embeds an exchange of information between the two parties of the conflict.

The third function - textual - can be observed within the thematic structure of the statements, which reflects the lexical choices made by *Islamic Resistance*, for example:

“The mujahedeen of The Islamic Resistance write one epic after another, as they confront the Zionist enemy, who are devoid of military honour and humanitarian identity each time they dare to desecrate the territories of our beloved homeland...”


The grammatical components of these three functions, according to Halliday and Matthiessen (2014), are transitivity, mood and modality, and themes and rhemes.

### 6.5.1 Transitivity

The use of grammar is often used to justify the activities of *Islamic Resistance*, such as through presenting attacks on Israeli villages as reactions to the Israeli aggressions. Observing the transitivity, which relates to the ideational function of language, *Islamic Resistance* presents itself in statements as an actor. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) argue that, to exist, this system of representation should entail “a configuration of Actor + Process + Goal” (p. 227).

What is important about this configuration in relation to this study are material clauses containing a recipient or recipients, which “construe figures of ‘doing-&-happening’. They express the notion that some entity ‘does’ something — which may be ‘to’ some other entity” (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p. 227).

This grammatical equation can be applied to the clashes of *Islamic Resistance* with Israel (*entity: Islamic Resistance; does: attacked, shot, launched, etc. to other entity: Israel and the Israeli army*). In this context, Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) point out two major types of representation: operative, which is related to this study, because the actor, *Islamic Resistance* is active, and receptive, which is not relevant to this study, because the organisation is not a
passive actor. The same authors postulate this configuration as Actor + Process + Goal + Recipient.

In applying Halliday and Matthiessen’s model to two statements of Islamic Resistance, the results are as follows:

First statement:

“The Islamic Resistance bombarded at 3:00 pm the Israeli enemy’s colonies in Kiryat Shmona and Yiftah with barrages of missiles.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 9 August, 2006

The elements of configuration in this statement are: Actor (Islamic Resistance), Process (bombarded) and Goal (Israeli enemy colonies …).

However, there is a mix-up between the Goal and the Recipient and the question is: what is the real goal? Is it the goal of bombardment (where?) or is it the goal to be gained from bombardment (why?) Notably, the goal of bombardment is contained in the residue of the sentence, particularly, “Kiryat Shmona and Yiftah.” However, this analysis is not adequate in this case, where the sensitivity of such text imposes seeking out the intentional goal (why?) rather than the geographical goal (where?).

In order for this statement to be aired or published by a media outlet, it would require context and background information, as stipulated in the editorial policy of the outlet. Remarkably, this short statement was made in the context of the July War in 2006. Islamic Resistance was producing many statements daily during this period. Thus, some statements did not provide the intentional goal of the bombardment or shooting, while others were longer statements that provided further context and showed that the goal of bombardment is a reactive and defensive one. The next statement, which was published the same day, clearly states the goal of bombardment.

Second statement:

“Replying to the assaults and Zionist massacres against unarmed civilians, The Islamic Resistance bombarded at 11:20 am Beit She’an Zionist colony located at
a distance 68 kilometers from the Lebanese - Palestinian border with a barrage of Khaibar-1 missiles.”


This statement provides two goals. Firstly, the quantitative goal of bombardment is Beit She’an. Secondly, the intentional goal is “Replying to the assaults…” and the recipient is Beit She’an. This intentional goal also contains an actor (Zionist), a recipient (unarmed civilians) and embeds a process of assaults and massacres. Identifying the taxonomical qualities of quantitative and intentional goals is crucial in order to rearrange Halliday and Matthiessen’s configuration, because the author of such statements prioritises the intentional goal. Thus, the modified configuration will be: Goal + Actor + Process + Recipient. Table 14 provides an example of the modified transitivity in the statements of *Islamic Resistance*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Replying to the assaults and Zionist</td>
<td><em>Islamic Resistance</em></td>
<td>bombarded</td>
<td>Beit She’an</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>massacres against unarmed civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the intentional goal, there are statements that encapsulate many goals. These goals are related to the context and sub-contexts of the statements, as shown previously. Thus, the goals cannot be isolated from the context of the statement and the wider context, which is the conflict. Generally, *Islamic Resistance* extensively uses causative objects (called, in Arabic, *Mafo'ol Li-Ajlihi*, or *Mafool Laho*) in the leads of the statements. This usage seems to be purposeful, because it provides the statement with an argument to justify the military operations of *Islamic Resistance*. As a result, this grammatical strategy, through shifting the focus of the receivers, shows that the organisation’s goals are in the context of reactions against Israeli assaults.
6.5.2 Mood and Modality

Reflecting on the media statements during the July War, it can be argued that Islamic Resistance pays attention to directing its discourse in an interactive way towards its audience and Israel in the context of mobilisation and psychological warfare. Contrary to statements issued before this war, the notion of mood\(^1\) can be observed in some media statements. For example, the following sentences, which will be further explained in Table 15, provide examples of mood in the statements of Islamic Resistance:

“The South will remain disobedient against the occupation.”
Source: Islamic Resistance, 6 August, 2006

“Its soldiers will not experience stability on our land.”
Source: Islamic Resistance, 7 August, 2006

“They are as they promised their leader, the Secretary-General.”
Source: Islamic Resistance, 14 August, 2006

Table 15- Examples of mood in selected statements of Islamic Resistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mood</th>
<th>Residue</th>
<th>Mood Tag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Finite</td>
<td>remain disobedient against the occupation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The South will</td>
<td></td>
<td>Won’t it?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Finite</td>
<td>experience stability on our land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Its soldiers will not</td>
<td></td>
<td>Will they?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Finite</td>
<td>as they promised their leader the Secretary-General.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aren’t they?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The statements are in Arabic and I translated them into English for this research)

In the interpersonal function of language, the speaker or the author may judge a certain issue in a clause by using some prepositions or a proposal to impress the receiver of the message (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). Notably, the degree of

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\(^1\) The grammatical notion of mood and modality is related to the interpersonal meta-function of language. The system of mood is determined by its clause, which entails a subject and a finite and suggests a mood tag. However, the verb works as a predicator and the rest of the clause is called a ‘residue’ (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014).
Inclination in the statements is high, because it reflects clearly the obligation of Islamic Resistance to fight and its desire to kill Israeli soldiers. Thus, the organisation uses assertive and modal verbs, for example:

“After the battles restarted, certain hits were inflicted upon the ranks of the enemy that admitted two deaths and six injuries.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 20 July, 2006

In this declarative statement, there is a preposition ‘certain’ and an assertive verb, ‘admitted’. In this vein, the verb ‘confirm’ or the level of confirmation can be observed in many similar statements, such as: “inflicting the enemy forces with eight confirmed casualties”; “one dead and 9 wounded could be counted; some in critical condition”; and “inflicting the enemy with a confirmed high number of casualties of dead and wounded” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 6 August, 2006).

The last clause did not provide information about the number of casualties. It only indicated that the number of dead and wounded was ‘high’. This quantification represents another form of modality as it showed the level of inclination. In the second clause, there is a modal verb, ‘could’ and a modal quantifier, ‘some’. In this regard, Islamic Resistance uses modal quantifiers, such as ‘dozens’ and ‘scores’, in the statements in order to show its power and superiority. For example, “due to the Resistance fighters' hunting scores of them...” and “pounded dozens of Zionist settlements with its rockets” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 7 August, 2006).

Furthermore, the organisation uses adjuncts, as in the following example:

“The occupation army keeps hiding the real number of its human and material losses fearing that this issue might negatively mirror and increase the deteriorating morale of its public and soldiers.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 14 August, 2006
This final clause includes a clear judgment and an adjunct, ‘negatively’, revealing the level of subjectivity. Such use seems to be purposeful, because it is directed at the followers of the organisation and Israelis.

In summary, mood and modality represent a system that shows the subjectivity and intentions of *Islamic Resistance* as an entity that responding to or declaring a subjective message directed particularly at its enemy.

### 6.5.3 Theme and Rheme

*Islamic Resistance* has organised the texture of its statements through the presentation of the thematic structure and the order of vocabulary in such a systematic way as to influence the receivers' interpretation. Under the umbrella of texture, theme-rheme is related to the structural resources of this third meta-function of language. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) point out that, to form a message, the clause should entail two connected components – the theme, which always comes first, and the rest. Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) define these components:

> The Theme is the element that serves as the point of departure of the message; it is that which locates and orients the clause within its context. The speaker chooses the Theme as his or her point of departure to guide the addressee in developing an interpretation of the message; by making part of the message prominent as Theme, the speaker enables the addressee to process the message. The remainder of the message, the part in which the Theme is developed, is called in Prague school terminology the Rheme (p. 89).

Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) distinguish between marked and unmarked theme within the thematic structure, and between thematic structure itself and information structure (Given + New), because “Theme + Rheme is speaker-oriented, while Given + New is listener-oriented” (p. 120).

Generally, the statements of *Islamic Resistance* are rich in declarative clauses, particularly in the statements that start with a preposition or a causative object. Examples on such marked themes are as follows:
“In the context of its continuous reply to Zionist assaults (Marked Theme), The Islamic Resistance (subject) bombarded at 1:45 pm Nahariya colony (Rheme).”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 19 July, 2006

“At 9:00 am this morning (Marked Theme), The Islamic Resistance (Subject) intercepted an Israeli force Altaybeh-Project (Rheme) ...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 04 August, 2006

These examples demonstrate the linkage between marked theme and rhyme, separated by a subject. However, the unmarked theme is the subject. Examples on unmarked themes in the analysed statements are as follows:

“An Israeli armoured force (Unmarked Theme) attempted at 17.30 to advance towards Adaisseh hills (Rheme) ...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 30 July 2006

“The mujahedeen heroes of Islamic Resistance (Unmarked Theme) attacked at 09:15 am a Zionist enemy congregation in Hunin valley with the appropriate weapons (Rheme) ...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 06 August, 2006

Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) point to another theme, calling it a ‘predicated theme’, “which involves a particular combination of thematic and informational choices” (p. 122). However, the configuration (it + be + …) of a predicated theme exists basically in the imperative clause or speeches when the speaker intends to provide new information, departing from the Given (Theme) to a New (Rheme). Thus, this configuration exists, rarely, in some of the analysed statements. The following clause provides an example of a predicated theme:

“It is the historical epic books which the heroes of Islamic Resistance write day after day.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 20 July, 2006
In this example, the author uses metonymical expressions to show the strength and steadiness of the fighters of *Islamic Resistance*. This clause, which introduced a written statement made during the July War, 2006, consists of two themes and two rhemes. Table 16 shows the information elements and the location of themes and rhemes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Rheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It</td>
<td>is the historical epic books which the heroes of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> write day after day.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Given</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>Rheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>Rheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It</td>
<td>is the historical epic books which the heroes of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> write day after day.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding this study, the relevant themes are the marked ones, because they are chosen by the author of the statements to foreground the clause. Such usage entails semantic features, because the author identifies its theme or themes and provides a subjective meaning (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014).

As shown previously, and as will be shown in this subsection, the statements are rich in causative objects and prepositions to show that *Islamic Resistance* is a legal actor in the process of self-defence against the Israeli army assaults and occupation. In this vein, unmarked themes, which can be noticed in some statements made during the July War, may no longer exist, and even may be considered as marked themes if the analyst takes into consideration the number of statements produced by the organisation every day in the context of facing Israeli army attacks against Lebanon.

Notably, some statements, particularly those made during the July War, 2006, included many themes and rhemes. For example:

“In executing its decision and pledge (Marked Theme) and in retaliation to the Zionist enemy’s brutal attack, which expanded to include the entire Lebanese land, targeting the civilians and unarmed innocents and employing the systematic destruction of the residential buildings and infrastructure (Marked Theme), The Islamic Resistance (Subject) shelled with support from Allah, the
Exalted, and His blessing, the Zionist area of Afula, beyond Haifa (Rheme), with a barrage of its missiles, type Khaibar-1 (Rheme). Thus (Marked Theme), The Islamic Resistance (Subject) starts a new stage of the fight (Rheme), defiance (Rheme) and confrontation with a relentless determination and full certainty in the Divine victory and constant preparation to offer the most precious sacrifices in defense of the dignity, pride, sovereignty and independence of our dear homeland, Lebanon (Rheme).”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 28 July, 2006

This statement shows contrasts between actions. Based on the meaning of the marked themes, it can be concluded that the Israeli army is the attacker and Islamic Resistance is the defender. Likewise, the other statements show that same meaning, and even the same words and similar foreground clauses, in the marked themes, due to intentional repetition by the author. Such repetition in the statements of negative representation of the Israeli army and positive representation of Islamic Resistance will turn unmarked themes into marked ones, as argued previously. In this regard, Halliday and Matthiessen (2014) point to the importance of such analysis of the thematic structure of all clauses in a text in order to “gain an insight into its texture and understand how the writer made clear to us the nature of his underlying concerns” (p. 133).

In summary, theme-rheme analysis shows how the author presents the statements. This representation, through grammar, holds semantic characteristics, because it unveils the image of both sides in the conflict. However, this image represents the reality as portrayed by Islamic Resistance. In this vein, Bazzi (2009) argues in relation to the implications of theme and rheme in the biased texts reporting the conflict:

Words and themes must be capable of creating and organizing relevant discourse. Hence, thematic structuring or thematic foregrounding and lexical classification are aspects of skilful linguistic delivery that can foreground the commonsensical meanings of a particular society or institution. This is achieved by vocabulary choices (collocations, synonyms, reference chains that have a particular naming system, diminutives and stereotypes),
theme selection and framing and sequencing of propositions. These crucial tools can legitimate inequality, power relations, bias and group prejudices and can equally influence text interpretation by the reader (p. 87).

Another analysis of the texture, which is related to non-structural resources, is lexical cohesion (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). However, this research intends, in the next subsection, to firstly unveil the syntax of the statements, before pursuing an investigation of the lexical cohesion and other linguistic usages to show further linguistic features and semantic relations.

6.5.4 Syntax

As the original language of the statements issued by Islamic Resistance is Arabic, it is crucial to outline their syntactic structure in order to point to whether the axis in their leads it is the subject (actor), or the verb (action). However, before outlining the syntactic structure in the statements, it is important to shed light on the characteristics of the language in which they appear - that is, Arabic - which is classified within the Semitic language branch. With regard to its historical development, Arabic can be categorised into Classical and Modern Standard Arabic. Classical Arabic is known as a poetic language and the language of the Quran. It became the language of the Islamic state in the seventh century (Aoun, Benmamoun & Choueiri, 2010). However, Modern Standard Arabic relates to two factors: Arabic nationalism, or in other words, to the emergence of Arabic national identity, which started crystallising in the nineteenth century; and, later, the academic efforts early last century to modernise Arabic and preserve its entity from the influence of foreign languages (ibid; Suleiman, 2003).

Based on this taxonomy of Arabic, every written statement that contains a Quranic verse holds both categories. This combination of Classical and Modern Standard Arabic identifies the notions of intertextuality and ideology in the statements, as shown previously in the explanation of the meaning of the Quranic verses and their relation to the content.

To this end, the original language of the statements of Islamic Resistance is Arabic. Based on Arabic grammar, the sentences of the statements are verbal.
In observing the leads of the statements of Islamic Resistance that contain the core news, it can be concluded that there are three types of Arabic verbal sentences:

sentences starting with a verb, such as

أطلقت المقاومة الإسلامية عند الساعة 15:15 دفعتين من الصواريخ على مدينتي صفد وحيفا.

“The Islamic Resistance launched at 15:15 two batches of missiles on the two cities Safed and Haifa”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 24 July, 2006

sentences starting with a prepositional clause, such as

عند العاشرة قبل الظهر وجه أبطال المقاومة الإسلامية دفعة من الصواريخ باجاه مستعمرات معلوت وكفر قدوم والشورمة.

“At 10 am, The Islamic Resistance’s heroes launched a batch of missiles towards Ma’alot, Kfar Vradim and Ech Choumara colonies.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 27 July, 2006

and sentences starting with a verbal clause, such as

ردًا على الاعتداءات المستمرة من قبل العدو الصهيوني هاجمت المقاومة الإسلامية عند الساعة 18:15 دقيقة من فجر هذا اليوم 13-7-2006 موقع قيادة العمليات الجوية في جبل ميرون بصواريخ عدة من الصواريخ...

“Responding to the continuous assaults by the Zionist enemy, The Islamic Resistance attacked at 5:18 early this morning on 13 July, 2006 the aerial operations leadership barrack in Meron’s mountain with several barrages of missiles...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 13 July, 2006
The following Arabic syntactic structure of a sentence, extracted from a statement of *Islamic Resistance*, provides an example of all statements starting with a verb.

![Arabic syntactic structure of a sentence](image)

The Arabic syntactic structure of a sentence, as shown in Figure 20, demonstrates that the verb *‘launched’* is the axis of the subject and the complement. Hence, the action (verb: launched) is the dominant in the sentence. However, the translation from Arabic into English will reframe the focus of the sentence and consequently its syntactic structure (Darwish, 2009).
The English syntactic structure of the sentence, as shown in Figure 21, has pointed out that the subject *Islamic Resistance* is the axis of the verb and the complement. Thus, the actor (Subject: *Islamic Resistance*) is the dominant in the sentence.

Similarly, the verb is the axis of the Arabic statements starting with a prepositional clause. However, the actor is not *Islamic Resistance* in the verbal clause (Responding to the continuous assaults by the Zionist enemy...). In this clause, “the Zionist enemy” is the actor and *Islamic Resistance* replied to as a defender. Such a shift in actor, based on Halliday and Matthiessen’s functional grammar, has an impact on the receiver in the text, because it emphasises the theme that *Islamic Resistance* responds to Israeli army assaults.

Studying the syntax of the statements underpins proceeding further in the analysis of other microstructural aspects. In every language, there is a deep
structure of the sentence that holds semantic features and appears on the surface (Chomsky, 1965). Hence, syntax reveals the structure and the coherence in the sentence (Matheson, 2005). Thus, the following subsections intend to delve into the statements before identifying their signs and codes.

6.5.5 Lexical Cohesion

Islamic Resistance carefully chooses its lexemes in the statements to contextualise its actions in the context of reacting against Israel to defend Lebanon and liberate its occupied territories from the Israeli army. The lexical choices in the text identify its linguistic and semantic features (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). Thus, the lexical cohesion in any text is translated by the systematic choices of words to assert certain meanings. These choices are various, but not limited to synonymy, hyponymy and repetition (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014). However, it is important to shed light on some aspects of lexical cohesion in the statements of Islamic Resistance before outlining the linguistic choices and semantic relations.

As shown previously, the written statements of Islamic Resistance are generally short and hold news value. Nevertheless, the sample of chosen statements for this research provides example of the choices of lexemes, because these texts have the same author and context.

The following two excerpts show the chain of lexemes that demonstrates the lexical cohesion of the statements of Islamic Resistance:

First excerpt:

"To confirm the decision of Islamic Resistance to liberate the still-occupied Lebanese territories, to continue to face the enemy for massacring our kin and people in occupied Palestine, continuing its daily assaults on Lebanon, violating its lands, water and airspace, [thereupon] the Al-Aqsa Intifada Martyrs’ Group in Islamic Resistance shot at 3:20 am a Zionist convoy in the occupied Shebaa Farms..."

Source: Islamic Resistance, 16 November, 2000

Second excerpt:
“Responding to the persistence of the Zionist enemy to assault Lebanese territories, The Islamic Resistance attacked at 2:45 pm Ein Zeitim base close to Safed colony with dozens of rockets, which is a base for weapon stockpiling and accumulation of big military vehicles.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 19 July, 2006

Figure 22: Sample of lexical choices made by Islamic Resistance

The lexical cohesion of these two statements, depicted in Figure 22, provides an example of how Islamic Resistance constructs a binary opposition of lexemes between itself and Israel (Islamic Resistance vs. Israel). It names itself Islamic Resistance and its groups belong to its body. However, it names Israel as an “enemy” or “Zionist Enemy”, which occupies Shebaa Farms and Palestine and has colonies. In addition to these reframes, Islamic Resistance signifies its
actions and goals by these words: ‘replying’, ‘facing’, ‘shot’, ‘attacked’ and ‘liberate’. Also, it signifies the Israeli actions by these words: ‘assaults’, ‘massacring’, ‘violating’ and ‘occupied’.

These lexical choices reveal that Islamic Resistance considers the conflict with Israel not only military, but also cultural and ideological. As a result of these lexical choices, the following segments or phrases can be extracted from Figure 22:

Islamic Resistance facing enemy; enemy assaults Lebanon; enemy assaults Lebanese territories; enemy violating Lebanon; enemy occupied Shebaa Farms; Shebaa Farms Lebanese territories; enemy-occupied Lebanese territories; enemy massacring people [in] occupied Palestine; Islamic Resistance liberate[s] Lebanese territories; Zionist enemy assaults Lebanese territories; Zionist enemy assaults Lebanon; Islamic Resistance responding to Zionist enemy; Islamic Resistance attacked Ein Zeitim base; Ein Zeitim base [close] Safed colony [of] Zionist enemy; Islamic Resistance shot Zionist convoy; Zionist convoy [in] Shebaa Farms.

These sixteen phrases show that Islamic Resistance sets a chain of chosen lexemes in its statements to provide a constructed meaning and textual cohesion. The collocation in the phrases shows the relation between the words used and includes descriptions of the actors, their actions and goals. In the same manner, some statements include further details that can aid an interpretation of other terms or phrases in other statements. For example, the term, ‘Safed colony’, which is found in a previous statement without providing further details about its location, can be found in another statement with the required details “…Safed colony, north occupied Palestine” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 17 July, 2006).

In addition to collocation, there is another element of lexical cohesion – elaboration – that can be observed in the long statements. The following aforementioned statement provides an example of elaboration and enumeration:

“A Zionist force composed of two tanks renewed its advance towards the vehicles that were attacked by the mujahedeen of The Islamic Resistance, at a location between Misgav Am and Adaisseh town, in an attempt to retrieve them
from the battlefield, when this force too came under attack by the mujahedeen at 10:40 am with the appropriate weapons and anti-shield weapons [end of sentence one]. The mujahedeen were able to hit two tanks, destroying one, which erupted in flames, killing and wounding its crew [end of sentence two].”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 6 August, 2006

The first sentence in the statement introduces the news story, including enumeration about the event. The second sentence also includes enumeration about what happened later to the force by providing further details. In observing the statement further, there are elements of cohesion. They are as follows:

**Repetition:** Force; mujahedeen, tanks; weapons

**Reference:** its

**Substitution:** them

**Ellipsis:** In the phrase “destroying one” the word “tank” was omitted.

**Meronymy:** the “tank” is a meronymy of ‘vehicle’.

The lexical choices align with the aim of Islamic Resistance to posit itself as a resistance movement whose actions are legitimate. To delve further into the meaning of resistance and its implication, the next chapter provides a glimpse of how the organisation frames the self in the films of military operations in the light of international law; also, in Chapter 9, in the denotation of Resistance and how it is framed in the analysed discourse is discussed.

Similar to the examples of the notion of lexical cohesion, there are additional aspects of grammatical features to be considered. The next three subsections shed light on the linguistic choices made by Islamic Resistance. These choices are at the core of semantic relations in the statements.

### 6.5.6 Metaphor

Islamic Resistance uses metaphor in its discourse to dehumanize and vilify its enemy, the Israeli army, and this use can be classified in the context of mobilisation and psychological warfare. In this context, the use of metaphor
“intend[s] to imply that there is a serious threat coming from outgroups and also to communicate an ironic force about the Israeli security myth” (Bazzi, 2009, p. 174). Metaphor exists in the language as a rhetorical tool to express “the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar… The jargon terms are ‘vehicle’ for the familiar, ‘tenor’ for the unfamiliar” (Fiske, 2011, p. 86). It “is classed among the single-word figures of speech and is defined as a trope of resemblance” (Ricoeur, 2003, p. 1).

Metaphor has an ideological denotation, because it directs minds towards certain embedded meaning intended by the author (Fiske, 2011; Ricoeur, 2003). This implies the notion of signification.

Regarding the analysed statements, some metaphoric usage can be observed in the following excerpts:

“The Islamic Resistance pounded at 5:25 pm Haifa city with a batch of missiles.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 20 July, 2006

In this sentence, as in many sentences, Islamic Resistance used the metaphoric term, ‘pounded’. However, this original term in Arabic, as used by the organisation, is ‘Dakkat.’ By reviewing the lexical root of ‘pounded’ in Arabic, it can be seen that this term exists in some Quranic verses and it means to flatten a thing to the ground and make it soft (Alasfahani, 1972). However, Islamic Resistance uses this metaphoric term to signify its actions and intentions towards Haifa and other Israeli villages and cities.

“…The Islamic Resistance showered again at 9:45 am Haifa city with a meal of Raad-2 (Thunder-2) and Raad-3 (Thunder-3) missiles.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 16 July, 2006

In this sentence, there are two metaphoric terms – ‘showered’ and ‘meal’. The first one, which is borrowed from ‘rain’, signifies how the missiles fall on Haifa city; the second term is borrowed from ‘food.’ The signification of this term will
be discussed in the following two excerpts:

“... to feed them [the Israeli soldiers] the taste of defeat in our beloved homeland.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 6 August, 2006

“... to feed them [the Israeli army] the pain of confrontation…”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 2 August, 2006

These two metaphoric expressions have their roots in Quranic verses, such as “Then taste the chastisement for what you used to disbelieve [in]” (46: 34). As a result, Islamic Resistance borrowed the two terms, ‘feed’ and ‘taste’ from food vocabulary and used each of them with ‘defeat’ or ‘pain’ to show the strength of its fighters in the battlefield confronting the Israeli army. Based on intertextuality, the organisation makes the Israeli army feed on and taste chastisement. It seems that Islamic Resistance aims to show that tasting the defeat is stronger than feeling the defeat, because tasting and eating are materialistic and they may be considered an introduction for feeling in the second stage:

“... Later, the enemy retreated with his tail between his legs.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 2 August, 2006

The aim of using this metaphoric expression by Islamic Resistance is to describe the miserable status of a defeated Israeli force obliged to withdraw from the Ayta ash-Shab frontline during the July War in 2006.

The organisation used this expression in Arabic and added a term, ‘shame’, to add a negative characteristic to the withdrawal of an Israeli force. However, the organisation seems to be unaware of the meaning of this expression in English, particularly the tenor of it.

In this regard, this metaphoric expression shows the impact of defeat on a person who will run away like a beaten dog (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibanez, 2002). Furthermore, the meaning of this expression, which entails humiliation and shame in English, may coincide with some Arabic meanings of ‘tail’, based on
the context (Manzur, 2003). Thus, the usage of this metaphorical expression to
describe the withdrawal of a defeated force may entail the reframing of the
image of Israeli soldiers.

“...The beloved villages which the enemy wants scorched and the houses
demolished on the heads of children and women, but the Resistance’s men have
turned it into a trap for enemy’s soldiers and tanks.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 2 August, 2006

“Adaisseh frontline: turned into a trap for enemy’s vehicles where the
mujahedeen destroyed 2 tanks and 2 bulldozers the morning, killing and
wounding their entire crews.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 7 August, 2006

These two excerpts from two statements included a metaphorical term – a ‘trap’. 
Islamic Resistance borrowed this term from hunting. Thus, the organisation
considers the Israeli vehicles as animals and hunts them through traps. The next
excerpt confirms this meaning.

“...Due to the mujahedeen’s hunting scores of them [Merkava tanks], as well as
armoured vehicles and personnel carriers...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 7 August, 2006

Similar to the previous excerpts about targeting vehicles, Islamic Resistance
clearly uses the term, ‘hunting’ in this excerpt. Thus, the organisation borrowed
this term from seeking to kill animals and used it to indicate the shooting of
Israeli military vehicles.

In his studying of the language in the news, particularly the use of abusive terms
against Arabs in the British press, Fowler (1991) points out that using the term,
‘hunted’ emphasises the non-human nature of the other, because “‘hunted' is a
term appropriate to humans hunting animals” (p. 118).

“...to find its tanks and soldiers a bait for the Resistance’s missiles, bombs and
As in the previous two statements, there is the metaphoric use of the term, ‘bait’, which is borrowed from hunting animals. Such usage by Islamic Resistance indicates that this organisation seeks to dehumanise the Israeli army.

“...Nevertheless, the mujahedeen who are fighting the invaders at the enemy frontline... began searching operations to looking for any existing hostile forces in the outskirts of the villages or hills and valleys with an aim to clean them.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 14 August, 2006

In this excerpt there is a metaphoric term, ‘clean’. Islamic Resistance used this term to indicate wiping out the Israeli forces from Lebanese villages. Based on this metaphoric meaning, the organisation considers itself a cleaner or a hygienist that wants to clean Lebanese territories from the Israeli forces.

“... Its result was destroying two tanks to make the crop of the Resistance on this frontline four tanks and a bulldozer, all destroyed completely.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 8 August, 2006

“The Resistance continues cropping the enemy tanks...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 13 August, 2006

In these two excerpts, there is metaphoric use of the term, ‘crop’. This term is used in agriculture. Islamic Resistance used this term to show the simplicity of destroying the Israeli tanks and vehicles as harvesting produce.

“With pride and self-esteem, The Islamic Resistance presents the mujahid martyr Hassan Waheb Yassin...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 19 July, 2006

Contrary to the previous metaphors, the metaphor in this sentence is religious, because Islamic Resistance frames in a celebratory way its fighters killed in the
battlefield. This sentence includes, as all obituaries, the term ‘presents’, which is, in Arabic, ‘tazuffo.’ The reason for the translation of ‘tazuffo’ as ‘present’, instead of ‘announces the martyrdom’, is because it is a metaphoric expression and its lexical root holds a meaning common with Arabic wedding glossaries. Based on ‘Lisan Al-Arab’ (The Tongue of the Arabs), which is a well-known Arabic dictionary, this term is generally connected to the bride when she is presented by someone (such as her father) to her husband (Manzur, 2003). As a result, the term, ‘presents’ seems to be the appropriate translated word, because it is intertwined with ‘gifts’ and ‘groom’. Hence, Islamic Resistance presents its martyrs as gifts to the Lebanese people and the Islamic nation, and grooms to their new life in the heaven. In many statements, there are other words that follow the term, ‘presents’, which support this interpretation, such as “…presents to its dignified and honourable people and to its generous nation the martyr…” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 20 August, 2007), and “… The Islamic Resistance presents to the country and the nation one of its promised victorious grooms…” (Source: Islamic Resistance, 30 July, 2006).

In this regard, Islamic Resistance signifies its ‘martyrs’ as gifts and grooms, presenting them ‘with pride and self-esteem’ to the followers and supporters. This signification holds a feature of happiness and contradicts any feeling of sadness associated with death. Thus, Islamic Resistance intends to receive congratulations instead of condolences when it announces the martyrdom of its fighters. This meaning coincides with the interpretation of previous Quranic verses in obituaries, which do not identify the ‘martyrs’ as dead people, because they are immortal and their destiny is in paradise.

Table 17 shows the elements of metaphor in these excerpts.

Table 17: Vehicles and tenors of the metaphoric terms used in the analysed statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphor</th>
<th>Tenor</th>
<th>Vehicle</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pounded</td>
<td>Pounder <em>(Islamic Resistance)</em></td>
<td>Haifa city</td>
<td>Flattened to the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showered</td>
<td>Pourer <em>(Islamic Resistance)</em></td>
<td>Haifa city</td>
<td>Rained with missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meal</td>
<td>Feeder <em>(Islamic Resistance)</em></td>
<td>Haifa City</td>
<td>Fed on missiles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In summary, *Islamic Resistance* uses metaphoric expressions in its statements. These expressions signify meaning intended by the organisation about itself and the Israeli army.

The next subsection is about the use of metonymy in the statements.

### 6.5.7 Metonymy

*Islamic Resistance* uses metonymy in its statements to show both linguistic superiority in producing the texts and epistemological superiority in the context of mobilisation and psychological warfare. In language, metonymy denotes “a part stands for the whole…[or when] whole stands for part” (Hartley, 2011, p. 173). However, the relation between part and whole is connected extra-linguistically (Ricoeur, 2003). Metonymy has many figures of substitutions. In this context, Darwish (2009) argues that, “Within the same language, there are at least four types of metonymy:

- Substitution of cause for effect
- Substitution of effect for cause
• Substitution of proper noun for one of its qualities and
• Substitution of one of the qualities of a proper noun for the proper noun

Metonymy follows the principle of economy in language. It is culture and situation informed” (p. 151).

Similar to its use of metaphor, *Islamic Resistance* uses metonymy, which show additional linguistic features embedded in the statements. For example:

“It is the historical epic books which the heroes of Islamic Resistance write day after day.”

Source: *Islamic Resistance*, 20 July, 2006

This excerpt indicates to the heroism of *Islamic Resistance’s* fighters in the battlefield. The organisation used the term, ‘write’, as a metonymy referring to the fighters’ hands that fire bullets and missiles. The organisation substitutes the cause, ‘fighters’ hands’, with the effect, ‘write’.

“Those martyrs who provided a model of steadiness will on continuing the fight despite of fire falls released from land and air.”


This excerpt shows the heavy fire on *Islamic Resistance* in the battlefield. Thus, the author of the statement used the term, ‘fire falls’, as a metonym of Israeli bombardment and raids. Furthermore, the author omitted the terms, ‘by the Israeli army’ after the term ‘released’, substituting the cause by the effect.

“The Islamic Resistance presents to the Lebanese people and the Islamic nation a knight of the Resistance’s mujahedeen, the martyr...”


In Arabic, the term *Faris* (knight), signifies the man who rides his horse properly. However, *Islamic Resistance* links this term to its fighters, particularly martyrs, to signify their courage. This overt metonymy shows that the
organisation substitutes the effects, ‘the courage’, with one of its cause, ‘the knighthood’.

“... Lebanon immersed in blood and victorious by blood.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 31 July, 2006

This metonymical expression aims to show that the level of sacrifice entails a religious meaning gleaned from Christianity, because immersing is an act of baptism or purification. However, the baptised, according to this expression, is Lebanon and the material of baptism is blood instead of water. As a result of this metonymy, Islamic Resistance substitutes the Lebanese (part) by Lebanon (whole) and water by blood as a condition for defending Lebanon and achieving victory.

Islamic Resistance used this Christian term as a sign of sacrifice by the self to defend all Lebanese and as a sign of openness towards Lebanese Christians to mobilise them against Israel. This meaning aligns with the beginning of the statement, “They destroy [the Israeli army] our homes, mosques and churches…” Thus, the organisation, which presents itself as a defender of all Lebanon, insists that victory needs blood, or in other words sacrifice.

“O' people of the Resistance. Here are your sons at the advanced borderline with occupied Palestine, taking their heroic epics from village to village, pushing the elites of the enemy army back off our land with blood, fire and resilience.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 1 August, 2006

This excerpt includes three metonyms – ‘blood’, ‘fire’ and ‘resilience’. The author substitutes the cause by the effects, such as ‘blood’, instead of ‘fighting until martyrdom’, ‘fire’ instead of ‘firing bullets or missiles’, and ‘resilience’ instead of ‘not fleeing from the battlefield’.

“...it [Islamic Resistance] renews its pledge to its people and leader to be the watchful eye, and to continue confronting the invaders and resist their occupation...”
In this excerpt, the term, ‘watchful eye’, means that Islamic Resistance is monitoring the Israeli army activities. This metonymy, ‘watchful eye’, which is part of a body, stands for the whole – the eyes of the fighters. The use of this metaphorical expression aims to present a power relationship between Islamic Resistance and Israel, especially through showing the epistemological superiority of ‘the self’ over the enemy and through objectifying the Israeli army as an object of the gaze.

“After turning the most highly trained Merkava tanks MK-4 in the world into the mobile coffins of the occupation soldiers ...”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 7 August, 2006

In this excerpt, the term, ‘mobile coffins’, is a metonymical expression where the author substitutes the cause by the effects. This indicates the destruction of the Israeli army Merkava tank, which holds Israeli soldiers, by fighters of Islamic Resistance.

“They confronted [the Israeli army] with heavy clashes where the soil of our dignified land transforms into bombs devouring the enemy’s soldiers and armoured vehicle and where the breeze of air transforms into missiles destroying its tanks turning them into coffins.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 31 July, 2006

This excerpt includes a metonymical expression “coffins”, as in the previous statement. However, this excerpt includes further metonymical expressions to describe what the Israeli soldiers will face in the Lebanese territories. In the expressions, “soil... transforms into bombs” and “the breeze ... transforms into missiles”, the author substitutes the cause by the effect. Thus, if the Israeli army advances towards Lebanon, it will face the bombs planted by the fighters of Islamic Resistance and the missiles fired on the tanks.

“Aynata frontline: This village has turned into a real cemetery for the invaders
and their tanks...”
Source: Islamic Resistance, 8 August, 2006

“... and turns our beaches into a cemetery for the enemy’s battleships”
Source: Islamic Resistance, 11 August, 2006

There are many statements made during the July War in 2006 that include the metonymical expression indicating that the villages in Southern Lebanon have been turned or will be turned into cemeteries for Israeli soldiers and their vehicles. The author of these statements substitutes the cause by the effect where the cemetery indicates the killed soldiers and the destruction of their military vehicles or ships.

In summary, Islamic Resistance used metonymy in its statements, particularly during the July War. This usage shows the linguistic choices made by the organisation in the line of achieving its objectives and provides an insight into the syntagmatic choices.

The next subsection is about euphemism to show further linguistic usages and semantic relations.

6.5.8 Euphemism

In the line of showing its epistemological superiority, Islamic Resistance includes some words in its statements that indicate euphemism and dysphemism. Unlike dysphemism, euphemism means substituting a word(s) with another considered less offensive (Duda, 2011). In this context, Darwish (2009) points out that:

Both euphemism and dysphemism are frequently used in political and social discourse, defining the social or political stance of those using them. Words such as “war on terrorist”, “insurgents”, “martyrs”, “line of duty”, “bring to justice”, “target” (versus “liquidate”), are all euphemisms or dysphemism used for maximum effect, that constitute a specific epistemic reality (p. 234).

In this regard, Islamic Resistance chooses words, as shown in some previous
excerpts of statements, such as the fighters (not militants) of the Resistance, and martyrs (not killed) to describe its fighters. In addition to these choices, the organisation uses the term, ‘capture’ (instead of ‘kidnap’) to describe its fighters’ actions when they take Israeli soldiers to liberate Lebanese prisoners and detainees from Israeli jails. For example:

“Fulfilling with the pledge dedicated itself to achieve by liberating the prisoners and detainees, The Islamic Resistance captured [...] two Israeli soldiers at the border with occupied Palestine, and the two captives were transferred to a safe place.”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 12 July, 2006

In the first instance, the observer may consider the terms, ‘prisoners’ and ‘detainees’ in Arabic, according to the original language of this excerpt, as hendiadys, because they are used together, and consequently they may be translated into one English word (prisoners or detainees) instead of both. However, these two synonym words, whether in English or Arabic, seem to be used intentionally by the author of the statement, Islamic Resistance, to provide two different meanings. The author intended to mean, by ‘prisoners’, those who engaged in fighting and were captured by the Israeli army (that is, ‘prisoners of war’). Also, the author intended, by the term, ‘detainees’, those civilians who were held in custody by the Israeli army.

In retrospect, when Islamic Resistance captures Israeli soldiers, the result of its action, in grammatical terms, is ‘captured soldiers’ (nomen patientis)\(^1\). However, this asymmetric relation between the verb and its nomen patientis does not exist when the organisation describes the Israeli action. For example:

“… the Zionist army intelligence [...] targets the civilians and kidnaps some from their homes…”

Source: Islamic Resistance, 2 August, 2006

This excerpt includes dysphemism by the naming of the Israeli army action as

\(^1\) In Arabic nomen patientis translates as Isim Mafoo and it means passive participle.
‘kidnaps’ instead of ‘captures’. However, the nomen patientis of the first example, ‘prisoners’ (from the verb ‘imprison’), or ‘detainees’ (from the verb ‘detain’) does not match with the nomen patientis of the verb, ‘kidnaps’, which should be ‘kidnapped’. This distinction postulates that there is a semantic split between the action, ‘kidnaps’, and its result, in which it is left to the receiver of the message to conclude the meaning.

The next section is about the signs and codes in the statements.

6.6 Embedded Signs and their Structure

The previous chapter relating to the methodology of the thesis delved into the meaning of the sign and its structure, based on the linguistic and semiotic studies of Saussure (2011), Peirce (1974), Barthes (1964) and Derrida (1997).

As shown previously, Saussure is considered to be the father of much subsequent research, in which linguistic and semiotic approaches were further developed. However, the important notion in this section is to shed light briefly on the structure of some signs in the statements, showing their syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, before stating the signs and extracting the codes.

In retrospect, the sign is a combination between a ‘signifier’ – that is, a word, an image, or sound – and the signified, which is a mental concept (Saussure, 2011). In this regard, the concept is not necessarily congruent between all the interpreters of the political and ideological signs. For example, the term ‘Occupied Palestine’ may have three different connotations, depending on the political and ideological attitudes of the interpreters. According to Islamic Resistance and other organisations or states that consider the existence of Israel illegal, ‘Occupied Palestine’ is taken to mean all of historical Palestine, and Israel is the occupier. However, ‘Occupied Palestine’ may be connoted by Israel and some allied countries as an offensive term that denies the existence of Israel.

From a middle standpoint, ‘Occupied Palestine’ may signify, to the Palestinian authority and many other countries, only the occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and previously, the Gaza Strip. Thus, the model developed by Peirce (1974), which indicates that the sign has a triadic relation - representamen, interpretant and referent - seems to be a more appropriate one to interpret the meaning of the signs embedded in the statements, because each may signify two different meanings, depending on the background of the interpreter.
Table 18 shows some triadic signs in the analysed statements.

Table 18: Triadic signs in selected statements of *Islamic Resistance*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representamen</th>
<th>Interpretant</th>
<th>Referent (Object)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Islamic Resistance’s</em> (Hezbollah’s military arm) mujahedeen or fighters</td>
<td>Liberators or defenders vs. Ravagers</td>
<td>Members in a liberation organisation vs. Members in a terrorist organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah</td>
<td>The leader of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> vs. A terrorist leader</td>
<td>The head of a liberation movement vs. The head of a terrorist organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyr(s) of <em>Islamic Resistance</em></td>
<td>Fighters killed by the Israeli army vs. Killed ravagers</td>
<td>Killed fighters of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> vs. Ravagers in a terrorist organisation killed by the Israeli Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli army; the Zionist Army or the Zionist Forces</td>
<td>Enemy army or forces vs. Legitimate forces</td>
<td>Occupation or invasion army vs. the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colony or colonies</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian villages and cities vs. Israeli villages and cities</td>
<td>The Israeli colonialism in Palestine (creates colonies) vs. the Israeli independence (creates villages and cities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement(s)</td>
<td>Occupied Palestinian lands vs. Israeli villages and cities</td>
<td>Villages and cities built by the Israeli settlers vs. Kibbutz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This model used to study the signs embedded in the words allows the former to be viewed “‘from above’ — that is, semantically: verbs typically refer to processes, nouns to entities and adjectives to qualities (of entities or of processes)” (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014, p. 59). Furthermore, the signs “can also be viewed ‘from round about’, at their own level, in terms of the relations into which they enter: paradigmatic relations (the options that are open to them) and syntagmatic relations (the company they keep)” (ibid).

As noted previously, in showing the two axes of the signs, according to the method employed by Barthes (1964), the paradigmatic structure is a system, which indicates a vertical chain of alternative signs. The following structure provides an example of alternatives regarding the names of *Islamic Resistance*:
Islamic Resistance

Heroes of Islamic Resistance

Fighters of the Resistance

The mujahedeen

Allah’s men

Similarly, there are many verbs used by Islamic Resistance to describe its actions. The following structure provides an example of the alternatives in the verbs used:

Targeted

Hit

Showered

Pounded

Pelted

On the other hand, the syntagmatic relation indicates a horizontal chain of signs or linearity of signs to produce meaning. In this vein, the analysed statements show a consistency in syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations of the sign. Table 19 provides an example of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations in some of the analysed statements.
Table 19: Example showing the alignment between syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations in four statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigmatic Structure</th>
<th>Syntagmatic Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Islamic Resistance</em></td>
<td>launched... two batches of missiles ...cities...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Heroes of the Resistance</em></td>
<td>launched... a batch of missiles ...colonies...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Islamic Resistance</em></td>
<td>pounded... Haifa city with a batch of missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Islamic Resistance</em></td>
<td>showered... ...Haifa city... ...missiles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section has shown the structure of some signs. However, it is important to identify the embedded signs in statements before extracting the codes. Such identification is crucial for the following chapters, which deal with the frames and objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. Table 20 shows the embedded signs in the analysed statements. These signs are related to *Islamic Resistance* and Israel; as such, they are essentially based on their names (as actors), actions, places and results of their actions.

Table 20: Many of the embedded signs in the analysed statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamic Resistance</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Aqsa Intifada Martyrs’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Places</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Shebaa Farms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitting (a Zionist convoy)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assauls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Places</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli criminal aggression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Resistance</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The heroes' mujahedeen</td>
<td>Hit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters of the Resistance (or the fighters of Islamic Resistance)</td>
<td>Launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups of the martyred leader of Islamic Resistance, Sayyed Abbas Al-Musawi</td>
<td>Delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahedeen (or the patient mujahedeen)</td>
<td>Targeted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Ad-Durrah Group</td>
<td>Pelted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allah’s Men</td>
<td>Pounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal mujahedeen of the Resistance</td>
<td>Showered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The protectors of the homeland and territories</td>
<td>Faced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Resistance</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>Captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heroes of the Resistance (or heroes of Islamic Resistance)</td>
<td>Confronted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units of the Resistance</td>
<td>Bombed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of the Resistance</td>
<td>Shelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attacked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section has focused on the embedded signs in the analysed statements. However, the next subsection will identify the codes, which will lead, in a later
chapter, to discussion and analysis of the frames or reframes.

6.6.1 Codes in the Analysed Statements

As noted previously, there are signs that do not correlate arbitrary relations between the two structural components of the sign - the signifier and the signified. These are considered to be codes, because they hold cultural and ideological meanings (Fiske, 2011).

Islamic Resistance has established and used some codes to represent or reflect a certain reality, whether it is cultural or ideological. The organisation repeatedly employs these codes, as shown in the analysed statements, to enhance their usage and make them familiar to the audience. This continuous usage of cultural codes is named conventionalisation (Fiske, 2011). As a result, these codes seem to have profound meanings and require going behind the text to decode them.

The codes extracted from the analysed statements are as follows: Allah’s Men; Settlements; Colonies; O’ Ali; Victory of blood over the sword; Islamic Resistance responds or replies; the Rapist Entity; Deadly Adventure.

In this respect, these codes will be discussed in a later chapter when discussing the frames in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has shown the contexts, the structure and the microstructure of the written statements of Islamic Resistance. It revealed their linguistic and semiotic features, because they imply the ideology and objectives of this military wing. It outlined the overall contents and sub-contents of the analysed statements and focused on the notion of intertextuality in the statements beginning with Quranic verses. In this vein, this chapter identified the Quranic verses used, their meanings and their linkage to the statements.
As this chapter delved into the microstructure of the statements, it focused on their grammar, grammatical structure, syntax and lexical cohesion. It also showed the use of metaphor, metonymy and euphemism in the statements, because they contain profound meanings, as provided in the analysis.
In addition, this chapter outlined the structure of signs in the statements based on Peirce’s model, before identifying the embedded signs in the statements and extracting the codes in order to show, in the ensuing analysis the frames and objectives in the discourse of Islamic Resistance.
As a result of the analysis in this chapter, it can be argued that the use of words and the organisation of the structure of the statements made by Islamic Resistance are purposeful; as such, they are part of a strategy to reflect the self and power and to contextualise its military actions in the line of defending Lebanese territory from Israel. In addition, the statements reflect the vision of Islamic Resistance towards the Palestinian cause through the overt dehumanisation of the Israeli army and the labelling of Israel as an occupier of the whole of Palestine. As a result, the statements reflect the following objectives: mobilisation, reconciliation and psychological warfare.
The next chapter aims to identify the signs and codes in the chosen samples of the fighters’ testaments, videos of military operations, video songs and flashes.
Chapter 7. The Structure of the Audio-Visual Outputs of the Military Media Unit and their Semiotic Implications

This chapter aims to analyse samples of three outputs of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance: the fighters’ testaments, (32 video clips); the two videos of operations' depicting the capturing of Israeli soldiers; and, three propaganda flashes and a video song. In employing semiotic and social semiotic tools to analyse the microstructure of the samples, this chapter aims to identify their embedded signs and extract the relevant codes. It intends to partially address Research Question 1 (What are the signs and codes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance?) and to provide a preface to Research Questions 2 (How does the media discourse of Islamic Resistance frame its identity and other identities?) and 3 (What are the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance?)

As a result, this chapter serves in furthering an understanding of the messages and objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

In addition to the Overview and Conclusion, this chapter consists of seven main sections. After the Overview, the second and third sections illuminate the macro- and microstructure of the fighters' testaments of Islamic Resistance; the fourth and fifth sections illuminate the structure and the contents of the videos of the military operations of Islamic Resistance related to capturing Israeli soldiers; the sixth and seventh sections illuminate the macro- and microstructure of three propaganda flashes produced by the military media unit of Islamic Resistance; and finally the eighth section illuminates the structure and the content of a video song produced by the military media unit of Islamic Resistance.

The archival data for analysis in this chapter was collected from the unit, Dar Al Manar for Art Production and Distribution, which has access to Al-Manar’s archive. The data are on DVDs, except for the video song, which was produced after the assassination of the commander of Islamic Resistance; the rest were produced during the July War in 2006.
7.1 Overview

Unlike the data examined in the previous chapter, the materials to be analysed here are audio-visual. By analysing these materials, it can be argued that all the outputs of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance have been analysed. Under the umbrella of critical discourse analysis, this chapter considers the macro- and microstructure of the analysed materials. With regard to the microstructural analysis, this chapter utilises, basically, semiotic and social semiotic tools, because the analysis is not limited to the words, but also to the images embedded with signs. The materials analysed in this chapter are aired primarily on Al-Manar, except for the videos of military operations.
7.2 Macrostructure of the Analysed Fighters’ Testaments

This section aims to show the macrostructure of videos of fighters’ testaments in order to sketch a part of their image. The military media unit of Islamic Resistance presents its fighters’ testaments in videos after their death, and screens them, particularly via Al-Manar.

In observing the chosen sample, it can be argued that the 32 fighters’ testaments have the same macrostructure. Every fighter's testament video is nearly three minutes in length. Every testament includes a lead 25 seconds and an end 27 seconds. The beginning and the end include graphic artwork to constitute a video within a series of fighters’ testament videos. It starts graphically by showing the Quranic verse “And the earth will shine with the light of its Lord, and the Book shall be set in place, and the prophets and witnesses will be brought. And judgment will be made between them with truth, and they will not be wronged” (39: 69). Following this verse, a shot shows a few fighters walking with the sun in front of them. Later, a shot shows persons carrying bagpipes, and then the phrase, Nahno Wa’adokom As-sadeq (We are your true pledge) emerges graphically with non-diegetic music. The next close-in shot focuses on the logo and the rifle inside Hezbollah’s flag, then shows the Quranic verse written above it, “or verily the party of Allah, they are the victors” (05: 56). With the background music continuing, an image shows fighters carrying a coffin of one of their comrades, covered by Hezbollah’s flag. Shortly before the fighter appears to present his testament, the term Rijalo-Illah (Allah’s Men) is inserted in Hezbollah’s flag close to the logo.

After the fighter finishes his testament, the bagpipe music returns and a graphic image shows white birds (like pigeons) in flight to symbolise the demise of the fighter1. Notably, this image is used as a background after the fighter finishes his testament until the end of the video. The next close-in shot focuses on the term, “The Islamic Resistance”, the motto in Hezbollah’s flag. Then, a shot shows a few fighters walking in a field of wildflowers. After these scenes, where the close-in shot still focuses on the term, Islamic Resistance, the video ends with a

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1 The Irish Republican Army used bagpipes during the mourning of its fighters (Weinraub, 1988). It seems that Islamic Resistance is impressed by IRA and wishes to appropriate some of its symbols.
quote from the Quranic verse “and they have not changed in the least” (33: 23) and the caption, “The Military Media [Unit]- Islamic Resistance.”

In summary, the military media unit unified, graphically, the presentation of the fighters’ testaments and endowed them with religious meanings. However, the next subsection sheds light on the images of the fighters while presenting their testaments.

7.2.1 Image of the Fighters

In the videos of fighters’ testaments, the imagery of the fighters is divided into two genres: their image while they, posthumously, read their testaments and their image presented by the military media unit as a result of video editing and inserting footage of the fighters. This subsection considers both genres and the following can be concluded:

- Every fighter is framed graphically where Hezbollah’s flag is floating on the left hand side of the screen. The fighter is defined by the subtitle Ashahid Al-Mujahid (Mujahid Martyr), followed by his name and pseudonym, and the term, Rijalo-Ilah, is written vertically to the right of the subtitle.

- Thirty fighters present their testaments in the bush. Some seem to be sitting under a tree. However, two fighters, Ali Mahmoud Saleh (Bilal Adshit) and Hussein Sabra (Abo Mahdi) are sitting in an office. In both these videos, Hezbollah’s flag seems to lie on the table.

- All fighters wear camouflage uniforms and read their testaments from a paper. However, every video is edited to cut some pieces from the testaments and to insert footage, such as showing the fighter working on the weapon he specialised in, walking in the bush, carrying his rifle, smiling, praying, reading the Quran and kissing it. In addition, footage of a few fighters carrying their rifles in a field of windflowers is inserted in many videos. Some videos show a part of the Lebanese flag with a few fighters walking nearby.

- The fighters seem spontaneous while they read their testaments. Some fighters are filmed while they are writing their testaments. Many fighters make grammatical and spelling mistakes. The feature of spontaneity
seems to be deliberately maintained by the military media unit to indicate that the fighters themselves wrote their testaments without any interference.

- The fighters endeavour to be courageous while they are directing parts of their testaments to their parents and families. Thus, they do not cry or show their tears.

This subsection has shown the images of the fighters while they present their testaments. It has revealed how the military media unit frames the images of fighters. The next subsection aims to shed light on the general structure of the fighters’ testaments, before analysing their microstructure.

7.2.2 Structure of the Testaments

The chosen sample of 32 testaments belongs to fighters killed during the July War in 2006, where the military media unit aired their wills later. However, these testaments, as observed in the analysed videos, have undergone an editing process. As a result of editing, the majority of these testaments have no clear introduction and it seems there are omitted sentences and/or paragraphs. However, there are similarities at the beginning of many testaments where the fighters send their regards to Islamic Resistance leaders. Furthermore, there are similarities in terms of the testaments' contents, although the paragraphs do not have a similar distribution. However, the majority of these testaments end with the fighter uncovering his identity.

The next section intends to shed light on the microstructure of the testaments, particularly the themes and the pseudonyms used by the fighters.

7.3 Microstructure of the Analysed Testaments

This section aims to analyse the contents of the testaments in order to identify their embedded signs and interpret them, because they constitute a part of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

As observed in the video, every testament has an individual author, who is a fighter. Thus, there are 32 authors of the testaments and the producer of the testaments' videos is organisational - the military media unit of Hezbollah's military arm. This multiplicity of authors, grammatical errors and the dearth of
metaphoric use shift the focus of the microstructural analysis into another dimension. Thus, the analysis considers the testaments’ themes and identifies the embedded signs of the pseudonyms used by the 32 fighters.

7.3.1 Themes of the Fighters’ Testaments

Every testament contains short messages with sentimental and ideological themes. However, all themes in the testaments are considered ideological, because the fighters include sentimental themes with religious implications as well.

The sentimental themes in the testaments are the messages directed by the fighter to his mother, father, and to his wife and children if he is married. Regarding the messages directed to his parents, the fighter asks them to forgive him and to be patient, reminding them of Islamic parables from the Battle of Karbala in 680 when the Prophet Mohammad’s grandson, Imam Al-Hussein, was killed with members of his family and companions when they faced the army of Yazid, the then Umayyad Caliph, in Iraq.

The following excerpt provides an example of how one of the fighters addresses his mother:

“… My compassionate mother, I advise you, by patience and prayer, to take Lady Zainab [Imam Al-Hussein’s sister] as your model and thereupon you will be proud in the Hereafter. Also, I advise you to utter trilling cries of joy when you hear the news of my martyrdom…” [my translation].

From Hassan Ahmad Akil’s Testament

In this quoted excerpt, the fighter provides his Islamic understanding of the concept of ‘martyrdom’. In deconstructing this testament to show the fighter’s intention in general, and the phrase, “I advise you to utter trilling cries of joy when you hear the news of my martyrdom” in particular, it can be seen that the fighter considers his ‘martyrdom’ to be a wedding ceremony. For the fighter concerned, the ceremony is the inception of new life promised by Allah to the ‘martyrs’ in the Hereafter. This concept of martyrdom concludes that the coming life is immortal and includes access to all benefits in paradise, which are not
limited to marriage to the fair virgins, called, in the Quran, Hoor-Aleen (Fadlullah, 2002).

In this vein of sentimentality, the married fighters direct their messages to their wives and children. Generally, they ask them to be patient and complete the fighters’ mission by educating the children well. In addition, they ask their children to follow the right Islamic path in their lives. The following excerpt provides an example of how one of the fighters addresses his little daughter:

“How much I love that future day when I may see you wearing your white dress, my angel, to present you as a bride. But, be patient my little girl … May Allah reward well this patience. Let [Imam] Hussein’s little daughter, Sokayna, be your intercessor in paradise. At the end, peace be on your eyes, on your angelic face; and the meeting will be with the beloved Prophet and his purified family …” [my translation].

From Samer Muhammad Najm’s Testament

These two examples show that the sentimental themes reflect the cultural and religious values of the fighters. From a cultural perspective, the fighters show the strength of family ties. However, they show, from a religious perspective, the importance of taking figures in the Battle of Karbala as models for their families. Thus, the majority of the analysed testaments mention this battle and a number of its ‘heroes’, such as Imam Al-Hussein, his brother, Al-Abbas and his sister, Zainab. Furthermore, some fighters reiterate, in their testaments, aphorisms attributed to this historical battle. For example, the fighter, Yasser Mustafa Sabra, when he addressed his leadership, quoted the following adage stated by Imam Al-Hussein’s companions, “... If we are killed, then our bodies burnt, and [our ashes] thrown in the air [and this action repeated] seventy times, we shall never leave you alone” (From Yasser Mustafa Sabra’s Testament) [my translation]. However, the following adage, which is attributed to Lady Zainab at the end of the Battle of Karbala, is used by some fighters to show the level of belief and patience, to provide parables and to indicate that the battle was for the sake of Allah: “O’ Allah, please accept our sacrifice” [my translation].

The perpetual remembrance of this historical tragedy and the intertextuality in
the testaments reveal that the Battle of Karbala’s doctrines (The commemoration of Imam Al-Hussein’s martyrdom, also known as Ashura, as noted previously) are entrenched in the fighters’ minds and hearts, because they reflect their cultural and religious identity, as Shiites’ Twelvers, or in other words, their overt ideology.

Similarly, the ideological themes may be religious or reflect the fighters’ views of the conflict with Israel, or both. Table 21 shows the ideological themes in the analysed testaments, and whether they are religious or related to the conflict with Israel, or both.

Table 21: Classification of the ideological themes in the fighters’ testaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological Themes</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greetings to the Prophet Muhammad and his Family</td>
<td>To reflect self-identity from religious perspective</td>
<td>To reflect on belonging to Islamic Resistance, the military arm of Hezbollah, which is fighting Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greetings to leaders of Islamic Resistance, Imam Khomeini and Imam Khamenei</td>
<td>To reflect self-identity from an organisational perspective</td>
<td>To liberate the Lebanese occupied territories and eliminate Israel from existence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuing the Resistance in Lebanon; Protecting the Resistance</td>
<td>To be rewarded in the Hereafter</td>
<td>To defeat and eliminate Israel from existence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberating Al-Quds</td>
<td>As Imam Khomeini advised</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeting the Palestinians and their Intifada; Asking for continuity of the Resistance in Palestine</td>
<td>To support an Islamic issue</td>
<td>To support the Intifada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making the life a path to the Hereafter</td>
<td>To be rewarded by entry to paradise</td>
<td>To join the Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beware of the devil</td>
<td>To keep the self purified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asking women to wear the Islamic dress (hijab)</td>
<td>Hijab is an Islamic duty for Muslim women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The significance of educating children academically and religiously</td>
<td>Educating children in the moral and lessons of the Prophet Muhammad’s family so as to be role models</td>
<td>To join the Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The importance of martyrdom and jihad in Islam</td>
<td>To undertake an Islamic duty and be like Imam Al-Hussein’s soldiers and members of his family</td>
<td>To win the war against the enemy or to gain martyrdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purification during fighting</td>
<td>To consider purification an introduction to perform jihad</td>
<td>To gain superiority in fighting Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following the line of Wilayat Al-Faqih (the Rule of the Jurist Theory)</td>
<td>To adopt this theory in Islamic ruling and obey the concerned jurist</td>
<td>To transfer the flag of jihad to Imam Al-Mahdi when he appears from his long occultation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These themes, which reflect the identity of the fighters of *Islamic Resistance*, show the significance of the Palestinian cause in the fighters' words. Hence, nine fighters in the aired testaments mentioned Palestine, the Palestinian Intifada, Al-Quds and Al-Aqsa mosque. Furthermore, the themes also reflect the fighters' ideological views as they follow Islamic theory in the ruling, the Rule of the Jurist Theory, which is called, in Arabic, *Wilayat Al-Faqih*.

In summary, the themes in fighters’ testaments are sentimental and ideological. The first refers to excerpts in the fighter’s words that he directs to his family and loved ones. However, the second refers to the themes held as religious concepts and/or relating to the conflict with Israel. In this regard, the testaments aim to mobilise the followers and supporters to continue the path of Resistance.

The next subsection further explores the fighters’ identities, focusing on the pseudonyms used by fighters in the testaments analysed.

### 7.3.2 Fighters’ Identities and their Pseudonyms

As noted previously, the testaments hold contents that reflect the fighters’ identities. Thus, the fighters reveal their religious beliefs, their loyalties and their views towards the conflict with Israel. In addition, the fighters identify themselves at the end of the testaments in two forms. Firstly, they describe themselves with down-to-earth words. Secondly, they use pseudonyms to name themselves.

Regarding the first form, when the fighter ends his testament he generally uses the terms, ‘your brother…’, ‘the poor slave…’, ‘the poor slave of Allah…’ and ‘the poor slave who needs Allah’s mercy…’, before providing his name and/or his pseudonym. These terms reflect the religious concepts of the fighters. Notably, when the fighter uses the term, ‘your brother…’, he addresses his comrades and the followers of *Islamic Resistance*. However, when the fighter uses the term, ‘the poor slave…’, he expresses his intended level of worship to Allah in order to reach paradise.

On the other hand, every fighter in *Islamic Resistance* has a pseudonym, as shown in the testaments. The military media unit inserts the pseudonym of the fighter in the subtitle after the fighter’s name. Thus, the editing process of the testaments by the unit does not affect the pseudonyms, because they are linked to the fighters’ names.
The study of pseudonyms is significant in further uncovering the identity of the fighters, because the pseudonyms, whether chosen by the fighters themselves or their organisation, reflect 'the self.' Hence, naming is considered a social practice and a cultural process to identify the self and distinguish it from the ‘other’ (Suleiman, 2011). Thus, using pseudonyms allows an insight into how the fighters frame their identities, or how the organisation frames their identities, through naming.

The onomastic choices of pseudonyms by the fighters in the 32 analysed testaments can be classified into four categories: Islamic names related to the Prophets and Shiite Muslim Imams; father of (…) which is called in Arabic, konya; names linked with towns; and names which describe good features. Table 22 shows the 32 fighters' pseudonyms and their categories:

Table 22: The fighters’ pseudonyms in the analysed testaments and their significations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fighters’ Names</th>
<th>Pseudonyms</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Meanings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Haidar Haidar &amp; Hassan Muhammad Shbib</td>
<td>Walaa</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Walaa means loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Khalil Khalaf</td>
<td>Jihad Alghrbiyya</td>
<td>Name linked to a town</td>
<td>Alghrbiyya refers to a town in Southern Lebanon in which the fighter may have been born or lived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taysir Muhammad Zein Ad-Deen</td>
<td>Malak</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Malak means an ‘angel’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad Malik Hammond</td>
<td>Karrar</td>
<td>Name relates to a Shiite Imam</td>
<td>It is the name of one of the first Shiite Muslim Imams – Imam Ali ben Abi Talib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hosam Abdulhadi Al-Mosawi</td>
<td>Sayyed Kazem</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature and relates to a Shiite Imam</td>
<td>Sayyed indicates that the fighter’s family roots go to Imam Ali ben Abi Talib and Kazem is the name of the seventh Shiite Muslim Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hass’an Ali Maatouk</td>
<td>Rabee</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Rabee means ‘spring’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Ahmad Akil</td>
<td>Ali Ahmad</td>
<td>Name relates to a Shiite Imam and the Prophet Muhammad</td>
<td>Ali is the name of four Shiite Muslim Imams and Ahmad is one of the Prophet’s names.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Ahmad Nasser &amp; Mustafa Ali Zalzali</td>
<td>Sadeq</td>
<td>Name relates to a Shiite Imam</td>
<td>Sadeq is the name of the sixth Shiite Muslim Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein Sabra</td>
<td>Abo Mahdi</td>
<td>Mahdi’s father (Konya)</td>
<td>Abo means father and Mahdi is the name of the twelfth Shiite Muslim Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein Youssef Salman</td>
<td>Komail</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Komail is a name coincides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters’ Names</td>
<td>Pseudonyms</td>
<td>Categories</td>
<td>Meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rani Adnan Bazzi</td>
<td>Hajj Hatem</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Hajj means the person who performed pilgrimage duty in Mecca and Hatem is an old Arabic name which signifies a generous man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samer Muhammad Najm</td>
<td>Sajed</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Sajed means a person who performs prostration to Allah. The term signifies a high level of worship, because prostration is generally performed by Muslims during their daily prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akif Hussein Al-Mosawi</td>
<td>Abo Hadi</td>
<td>Hadi’s father (Konya)</td>
<td>Abo means father and Hadi is the name of the tenth Muslim Shiite Imam. Notably, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah is called Abo Hadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Abdul-Hussein Fahs</td>
<td>Abo Sadeq</td>
<td>Sadeq’s father (Konya)</td>
<td>Abo means father and Sadeq is the name of the sixth Shiite Muslim Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Amin Sha’aiato</td>
<td>Mojtaba</td>
<td>Name relates to a Shiite Imam</td>
<td>Mojtaba is the name of the second Shiite Muslim Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaa’ Ali Yassin</td>
<td>Mohtadi</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Mohtadi means the person who is guided to the right way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Ahmad Ad-Dur</td>
<td>Baqir</td>
<td>Name relates to a Shiite Imam</td>
<td>Baqir is the name of the fifth Shiite Muslim Imam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Abbas Al-Mosawi</td>
<td>Sayyed Imad</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Sayyed indicates that the fighter’s family roots go back to Imam Ali ben Abi Talib. Notably, Imad coincides with the name of the late commander of Islamic Resistance Imad Mughniyeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Abdul-Hassan Khalil</td>
<td>Mortada</td>
<td>Name relates to a Shiite Imam</td>
<td>Mortada is the name of the first Shiite Muslim Imam, Ali ben Abi Talib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Mahmoud Saleh</td>
<td>Bilal Adshit</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature and linked to a town</td>
<td>Bilal coincides with a name of one of the Prophet Muhammad’s companions, who was calling for prayer. However, Adshit refers to a town in Southern Lebanon in which the fighter may have been born or lived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Mustafa Ad-Dolbani</td>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>Name of a Prophet</td>
<td>Ibrahim is considered a Prophet for Muslims, according to the holy Quran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imad Ahmad Saad</td>
<td>Abo Ali Farooq</td>
<td>Ali Farooq’s father (Konya)</td>
<td>Ali is the name of four Shiite Muslim Imams and Farooq means ‘a sword’ which divides between the bad and the good things. Remarkably, the Muslim Caliph, Omar ben...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters’ Names</td>
<td>Pseudonyms</td>
<td>Categories</td>
<td>Meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamal Muhammad Afif</td>
<td>Abo Qassem</td>
<td>Kassem’s father (<em>Konya</em>)</td>
<td>The Prophet Muhammad is called Abo Al-Qassem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Khalil Hijazi</td>
<td>Mihrab</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Mihrab means the ‘prayer niche’ or the ‘place for prostration’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Kamal Soror</td>
<td>Ali Talib</td>
<td>Name relates to a Shiite Imam</td>
<td>Ali is a name of four Shiite Muslim Imams. However, Talib coincides with the name of the eldest brother of the first Imam Ali ben Abi Talib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Youssef</td>
<td>Jawad Ayta</td>
<td>Name linked to a town and relates to a Shiite Imam</td>
<td>Jawad is the name of the ninth Shiite Muslim Imam and Ayta signifies a town in Southern Lebanon in which the fighter may have been born or lived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa Amin Marji</td>
<td>Alaa Blida</td>
<td>Name linked to a town</td>
<td>Alaa is an Arabic name that signifies exaltedness. However, Blida signifies a town in Southern Lebanon in which the fighter may have been born or lived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadir Khodr Al-Jarkas</td>
<td>Abo Hassan Sida</td>
<td>Hassan’s father (<em>Konya</em>) and linked to a town</td>
<td>The first and eighth Shiite Muslim Imams are called Abo Al-Hassan. However, Sida signifies the city of Sidon in Southern Lebanon in which the fighter may have been born or lived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasser Mustafa Sabra</td>
<td>Abo Mustafa</td>
<td>Mustafa’ father (<em>Konya</em>)</td>
<td>The Prophet Muhammad is called Abo Al-Mustafa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalid Ali Abdullah</td>
<td>Hilal</td>
<td>Name describes a good feature</td>
<td>Hilal is an Arabic name, which mean ‘crescent’. Notably, the crescent is a symbolsignifying Muslims, similar to the cross, which signifies Christians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, this subsection has explored the meaning of the onomastic choices of fighters’ pseudonyms. It has revealed that the majority of the pseudonyms reflect the religious beliefs of the fighters and consequently the ideology of their organisation.

The next subsection aims to extract further embedded signs in the testaments.

### 7.3.3 Signs and Codes in the Fighters’ Testaments

The videos of the analysed fighters' testaments contain words and images. In this regard, it is crucial to delve into these testaments to identify the embedded signs in the images and words, respectively.
As noted in discussing the methodology, particularly with regard to Barthes (1964, 1972, 1977), semiotics is the study of sign, whether it has a linguistic form or not. In observing the videos of the fighters’ testimonies, it can be argued that there are stretches of footage impregnated with signs. Similarly, there are also words and aphorisms in the testimonies impregnated with meanings. Regarding the representational images, the military media unit presents the fighters’ testimonies in a congruent way to ensure a similar signification by the intended audience – that is, Arab viewers. In this context, the unit enhances the ‘mythical representation’ of the fighters through showing their piety as a result of a high level of religious faith, which enlightens their road of jihad. Table 23 shows the repetitive visual signs in the analysed fighters’ testimonies.

Table 23: Significations of images in the analysed videos of fighters’ testimonies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Images (Signs)</th>
<th>Significations</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wearing a camouflage uniform - every fighter</td>
<td>To signify the fighters belong to a military organisation</td>
<td>The repetition of this symbolic image by the unit intends to show <em>Islamic Resistance</em> as a liberation movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying a rifle in the field</td>
<td>To signify the fighters will not abandon their weapons</td>
<td>Through repetition of this indexical image, the unit shows <em>Islamic Resistance</em> continuing its struggle after Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading the holy Quran</td>
<td>To signify the fighters are Muslims and thus their war has religious characteristics</td>
<td>Through repetition of this iconic image, the unit intends to confirm to other Muslims that the fighters of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> are Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissing and Walking under the holy Quran, which is carried by another while carrying their rifles</td>
<td>To signify the fighters are asking Allah’s blessing in their military actions</td>
<td>This repetitive iconic image shows the unit constitutes a symbol for the fighters’ protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplicating by raising the hands to the sky</td>
<td>To signify the fighters are asking Allah to attend to their needs</td>
<td>This repetitive indexical image seems to be cut by the unit from the fighters’ prayers and isolated to underpin the meaning of trust in Allah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prostration in prayer</td>
<td>To signify the fighters are worshippers of Allah</td>
<td>Similar to the previous sign, this repetitive iconic image is isolated from other prayerful actions to emphasise the religious meaning of the sign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smiling</td>
<td>To signify joy, happiness and calm</td>
<td>This repetitive indexical image intends to show the fighters are not sad or depressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In portraying the images, as shown in Table 23, the military media unit uses the rhetorical principles of repetition and isolation to saturate and emphasise the connotations of the visual signs in order to impress the viewers and induce them to support the actions of Islamic Resistance. According to Barthes (1972), repetition, and to some extent, proximity in the visual sign are important concepts to the mythologist “to decipher the myth: it is the insistence of a kind of behaviour which reveals its intention” (p. 119).

Considering the analysis in this case, the mythologist is organisational. It is the military media unit of Hezbollah’s military arm, because it is the producer of the testaments’ videos. In this regard, the unit presents a mythical sign in portraying the fighters as ordinary people, like the supporters and other Muslims on the one hand, and on the other hand, as extraordinary people who have spilt blood to defeat Israel. In analysing further its signification, the emerged mythical sign of the fighters points to their sacrifice and heroism and imposes these meanings on the viewers.

In addition, there is a sign that requires deconstruction to reveal its hidden meaning – one that is unstated by the military media unit. In applying Derrida’s analysis regarding the sign’s heterogeneity (Derrida, 1997), the sign of the fighters reading the holy Book, Quran, or praying has spatial and temporal characteristics. The latter is hidden and has to be discovered by following a trail of meaning. In this regard, this religious sign of reading the Quran and praying has signification that requires going beyond the first order of meaning to unveil the hidden denotation. Understanding that the fighters of Islamic Resistance are Shiites' Muslims (Alagha, 2006, 2011), the temporal characteristics of the analysed sign urge the researcher to trace the absent signification. In deconstructing the sign by tracing the context and the intended audience, it can be argued that the intended viewers are not only Shiites, because the testaments were screened after the July War in 2006 on Al-Manar television, which started airing to the Arab World after May, 2000. Following deconstruction, it is possible to see that the hidden meaning of the sign is to show other Muslims, who are from different sects in the Arab World, that fighters of Islamic Resistance do not differ from them, because they are praying like other Muslims and reading the same holy Book.
On the other hand, the analysed testaments include textual signs. These signs are presented by the fighters in their testaments to signify 'the self' and 'the enemy.' It is notable that the signs to signify self-identification are religious, reflecting Shiite doctrines. The interpretation and explanation of these symbolic signs, based on Pierce’s triadic model, can lead to an exploration of their embedded meanings (Peirce, 1974). Table 24 shows the triadic signs in the analysed fighters’ testaments.

Table 24: Textual signs in the analysed fighters’ testaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representamen</th>
<th>Interpretant</th>
<th>Referent (Object)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Az-Zahra’</td>
<td>Prophet Mohammad’s daughter</td>
<td>Az-Zahra’ is a model for an aggrieved woman (Al-Hasani, 2012a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zainab</td>
<td>Az-Zahra’s daughter and Imam Al-Hussein’s sister</td>
<td>Zainab is a model of a patient and strong woman (Al-Qarashi, 2001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Al-Hussein</td>
<td>Az-Zahra’s son</td>
<td>Imam Al-Hussein is a model of the free and brave leader who sacrificed himself and his family for the sake of the Muslim nation (Tabātabā’ī, 1977).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Al-Mahdi (or Al-Mehdi)</td>
<td>The twelfth Shiite Imam</td>
<td>Based on the Twelvers’ creed of Shiites, this Imam is still alive and he will appear to help justice prevail in the world (Tabasi, 2003).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppressors (Istikbar)</td>
<td>Israel and USA</td>
<td>Israel is the occupier; USA supports its occupation and imposes oppression throughout the world. The fighter, Musa Amin Marji, used Khomeini’s adage, “America is the biggest Satan.” However, the fighter Hassan Ahmad Akil raised the slogan, “Death to America and Israel.” The concept of death is reiterated in Hass’an Ali Maatouk’s incitement to “annihilate the Zionist enemy wherever [its troops] exist in Lebanon” [my translation].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The presented explanation of the signs (the referent) can be traced in the literature about Hezbollah’s religious beliefs and its first manifesto (for example, Alagha, 2006). However, the analysed testaments do not differ from the written statements of Islamic Resistance, as yielded in the previous chapter, in representing Israel and the Israeli army (for example, the Israeli enemy; the rapist enemy; the Zionist enemy and the Zionists). Remarkably, these narrative testaments, as shown in Table 24, include some terms that express rage against
Israel and the United States of America. One of the rare metaphoric usages in the testaments is the term, ‘germ’, in “Israel is the germ of corruption” (from Musa Amin Marji’s testament). According to this fighter, Israel signifies a bug infecting the body and thus it should be eradicated. The fighter did not attribute his quote. However, this description of Israel was originally used by the late Imam Khomeini (Khomeini, 1981). This reveals the impact of Khomeini on the fighters’ ideology. In this context, the meaning of this phrase aligns with another aphorism, stated by Khomeini, that Israel is a "cancerous growth" (ibid, p. 278). Notably, Alagha (2006) did not attribute this adage to Khomeini. In a similar vein, El Houri (2012) did not point out to this adage in his research.

In addition to the signs, there are two codes in the analysed videos - The True Pledge and Allah’s Men - mentioned in the previous chapter in the codes included in the analysed written statements; these codes will be discussed as frames in a later chapter.

In summary, the embedded signs in the testaments signify 'the good' self-identity and 'the bad' identity of 'the other', who is the enemy of Islamic Resistance. As alluded to in the interpretation, the fighters used religious signs to reflect their identities and to provide Shiite parables to the addressees. In this regard, the analysis showed the impact of Imam Khomeini’s doctrines on the fighters, regarding their views towards Israel and the United States of America.

The next section intends to analyse videos of two military operations to show their contexts, structures and to identify their embedded signs.

### 7.4 Macrostructure and Contexts of the Analysed Videos of Military Operations

The videos of the military operations of Islamic Resistance, filmed by the military media unit, were aired, in the first instance, via Al-Manar (Harb, 2011). However, the two analysed videos of military operations depicting the capturing of Israeli soldiers in October, 2000 and July, 2006 were aired primarily by other satellites after several years. As shown previously in the review of the literature in Chapter 3, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) aired the first video of a military operation in a documentary named, Almoqayada Alkobra (The Great Swap Deal) in 2006 (Eljek, 2006). However, the video of the second operation was aired by Al-Mayadeen satellite in 2012 during a political talk.
show hosted by the channel’s chairman, Ghassan ben Jiddo, and the guests were a prisoner released from Israeli jails in 2008, Samir Al-Quntar, and the member of Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc in the Lebanese parliament, Nawaf Al-Mosawi (Fahs, 2012).

The two videos have a military context, because they are operations initiated by Islamic Resistance to capture Israeli soldiers, in order to swap them with Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails. Thus, the first video of capturing three Israeli soldiers in October, 2000, which was screened on LBC shortly after the end of the July War in 2006, and later by Al-Manar (2011), was contextualised by the producer to argue that the aim of capturing Israeli soldiers was to liberate Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails. Similarly, the second video depicting the capturing of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July, 2006, was contextualised in the same way to argue that the operation led to the release of the rest of the Lebanese prisoners in 2008, particularly Samir Al-Quntar, after Israel refused to release him in the swap deal in 2004 (Eljek, 2006).

This section is concerned with analysing the videos of two military operations, because they are the outputs of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance. However, the analysis of the videos requires showing what happened before, during, and after the military operations to provide a fuller understanding of their contexts and consequently their contents. Thus, the next two subsections aim to contextualise the analysis and show the macrostructure of the analysed videos of military operations before analysing their microstructure to identify the signs.

7.4.1 Operation Sufa

After the Israeli army withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May, 2000, there were two protracted issues: Shebaa Farms, which Lebanon claimed as national territory, demanding that the Israeli army should withdraw from this land; and the Lebanese prisoners in Israel, including the remains of the killed combatants. These two protracted problems provided Islamic Resistance of Hezbollah with an excuse to continue fighting in order to liberate the Lebanese occupied territories and to free the prisoners from Israeli jails (Alagha, 2006).

As revealed in the documentary Sufa, produced by Al-Manar (2011), the military organisation started preparing to capture Israeli soldiers after May, 2000. Hence, Islamic Resistance started monitoring the movement of Israeli soldiers close to
the new demarcation, the Blue Line, drawn by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on the border promptly after the Israeli withdrawal. The Unit of Monitoring and Assembling Information in Islamic Resistance discovered that the appropriate aperture for capturing Israeli soldiers faced Shebaa Gate. This border Military Point is numbered 590 by the Israeli army.

In a complementary duty, the relevant units in Islamic Resistance started performing military manoeuvres on how to capture Israeli soldiers and transfer them to a safe place inside the Lebanese territories.

The thirty-minute documentary shows scenes of the manoeuvres and interviews one of the officers of Islamic Resistance named ‘Jihad’, who pointed out the then preparation for capturing Israeli soldiers. Jihad, whose face was concealed and voice obfuscated to conceal his identity, appeared wearing a camouflage uniform with a walkie-talkie and carrying a rifle. He revealed that the organisation created a geographic area similar to Point 590 with all the stipulated logistics for performing high-level manoeuvres and military exercises on how to capture Israeli soldiers alive.

After weeks of exercises, fighters of Islamic Resistance successfully practiced the final manoeuvre to capture Israeli soldiers: that is, three minutes from bombing until transfer of the captives to the cars, and twenty minutes to reach a safe place.

Close to the military theatre, there are three garrisons: the Indian Regiment in UNIFIL, which supervises Shebaa Gate; Roisat Alaalam, which allows the Israeli army to monitor the operation field; and Ar-Radar, which also allows the Israeli army to monitor the line of withdrawal of Islamic Resistance. To solve these obstacles and run a successful operation, the organisation aimed to deploy its attacking units secretly and prepared other units – particularly Roisat Alaalam and Ar-Radar – to storm the Israeli garrisons with heavy fire during the operation.

On the day of the operation, the unit faced another obstacle presented by stones spread on the road to Shebaa Gate, which may have inhibited the movement of the vehicles from advancing to transfer the captives. The solution was to organise an amateur soccer match on the road by the fighters themselves, who changed out of their camouflage uniforms and started moving the stones using their feet while they were playing with the ball.
Unwittingly, on the same day, a number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon expressed their support for the new Intifada in the Occupied Territories by demonstrating on the Blue Line against the Israeli soldiers. This movement shifted the Israeli army’s attention towards this crowded point on the border and provided *Islamic Resistance* with a cover to launch its military operation to capture three dead soldiers after exploding a bomb in their unarmoured jeep (*Sufa*). Remarkably, *Sufa* means in Hebrew ‘The Storm’ and this jeep had gone out of service in 2003, because it is unarmoured (Catignani, 2004). Table 25 summarises chronologically the related accompanying details on the day the three Israeli soldiers were captured, as shown in the documentary *Sufa*.

Table 25: Details of what happened on the day of Operation *Sufa*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>07 October, 2000</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6:20 am</td>
<td>An Israeli patrol inspected the border fence at Point 590</td>
<td>The soldiers in the patrol noticed the existence of the fighters in the area and wrote this in their report, commenting ‘it is okay, it is a routine scene’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:00 am</td>
<td>The intelligence unit in the Hermon Territorial Brigade received information that the enemy intended doing something</td>
<td>The leaders of the brigade discounted the information, because there was no ability to verify it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:00 am</td>
<td>The sergeant, Binyamin Avraham, and the soldier, Omar Souad, arrived at the office of the commandant in the detachment.</td>
<td>The commandant reminded them of the procedure they should follow if they faced abduction. Also, he provided Avraham with a written order to transfer it to the sergeant Adi Avitan, who was to join the patrol.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:05 am</td>
<td>The three Israeli soldiers Adi Avitan, Binyamin Avraham and Omar Souad drove the <em>Sufa</em> jeep to inspect the border.</td>
<td>They drove the patrol in front of a jeep that is specialised in eliminating any traces on the unpaved road alongside the border. The military media unit, as shown in the documentary, filmed them at Point 590.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00 am</td>
<td>The Palestinian refugees organised a rally on the southern Lebanese border to express their support for the Palestinian Intifada.</td>
<td>The Israeli army monitored the rally, enhanced its forces with more soldiers and closed the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:37 pm</td>
<td>The communication officer in Hermon Territorial Brigade called the patrol.</td>
<td>The officer phoned the Patrol 47 and spoke with the sergeant Binyamin Avraham who told him they had entered Point 590.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:43 pm</td>
<td>The fighters of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> bombed the Patrol 47.</td>
<td>The three Israeli soldiers were killed. The operation ended after three minutes by transferring the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After bombing the jeep, the fighters transferred the three dead Israeli soldiers via a black Range Rover to the Lebanese territories. With regard to this, *Al-Manar’s* documentary revealed that *Islamic Resistance* prepared, as a back-up plan for withdrawal, a white Nissan Pathfinder similar to cars of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon's (UNIFIL) overlaid with the same sign and containing camouflage uniforms the same as those worn by this international force. However, the fighters did not use this car, which was discovered hours after operation by UNIFIL in the area alongside the Range Rover used, after it broke down during the transfer of the captives.

After 47 rounds of negotiations, a swap deal took place on 29 January, 2004. However, this deal did not include the release of some Lebanese prisoners, particularly Samir Al-Quntar, who had been captive since 1979. This issue was an excuse for *Islamic Resistance* to capture another two Israeli soldiers on 12 July, 2006.

### 7.4.2 Operation Khallat Al-Warda


In a similar method to that used in the previous successful operation, the Unit of Monitoring and Assembling Information in *Islamic Resistance* found that the *Khallat Al-Warda* location, also known as Israeli Military Point 105, was the appropriate place for capturing Israeli soldiers. According to a report screened by *Al-Manar* (2013), *Islamic Resistance* noticed six issues at Point 105:

- It has the lowest geographical level in the area and thus it is invisible to the Israeli army barracks.
- The road towards this point is relatively rugged and the distance between the Israeli army patrols is nearly 110 metres.
- The Israeli soldiers do not communicate with their leadership at this
point.

- The Israeli surveillance cameras do not cover this point, and thus it is considered a blind spot.
- The location of the Israeli barracks inhibits reciprocal fire against their enemy at this point.
- The heavy bush coverage at this point provides Islamic Resistance fighters with a cover to initiate their military operation and retreat safely.

As a result of these characteristics, Point 105 was considered a ‘Dead Zone.’ Based on a talk show on Al-Mayadeen (2012), Islamic Resistance had prepared and planned for three months for Operation Khallat Al-Warda. The number of Islamic Resistance fighters who shared in this operation was between 35 and 40. They met in a village on the outskirts of Tyre city five days before the operation. Only the next day were they informed about the nature of their coming operation when four of the leaders of Islamic Resistance visited them. The leaders provided the group with images and videos of Khallat Al-Warda where the operation would take place. As in Operation Sufa, the organisation created a field similar to Point 105 in topographic relief for manoeuvres. After two days of manoeuvres with live ammunition, the sudden-attack group succeeded in completing its practice exercise within six minutes, the duration required for the expected military operation.

The sudden-attack group, which was working in league with other groups participating in the operation, had camped under the trees close to Point 105 and set up a telephone wire to communicate with the leadership. Notably, the then commander of Islamic Resistance, Imad Mughniyeh (Hajj Radwan), supervised and directly witnessed this operation in detail from Ayta ash-Shab village.

The fighters camped in the bush and waited for zero hour to initiate the operation. On 12 July, 2006, two Israeli army Hummers approached Point 105. After the second Hummer was hit, the fighters were ordered to initiate the operation. They crossed the border fence, and the sudden-attack group advanced towards the first Hummer, which was damaged by rockets, to capture Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. Table 26 summarises chronologically the related accompanying details on the day these two Israeli soldiers were captured.
Table 26: Details of what happened on the day of Operation Khallat Al-Warda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12 July, 2006</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2:20 am</td>
<td>A group of Islamic Resistance fighters crossed the border fence at Point 105</td>
<td>The Israeli army did not discover this group, which established itself in the area to attack the patrols in the morning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:45 am</td>
<td>Two Israeli Hummers advanced towards Point 105</td>
<td>Sergeant Ehud Goldwasser intended to examine if there had been an infiltration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8:57 am</td>
<td>The first patrol, which has a code 4, communicated with the second patrol 4A</td>
<td>It was the last conversation between the two Hummers, which were nearly 110 metres apart.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:05 am</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance initiated its operation to capture Israeli soldiers</td>
<td>The sudden-attack group crossed the border fence and headed towards the first damaged Hummer at Point 105 to capture two soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:50 am</td>
<td>The Israeli army knew that there were two missing soldiers and issued the 'Hannibal Directive'.</td>
<td>The Israeli army attempts failed to locate the two captives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00 am</td>
<td>The then Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, knew about the operation through his military secretary</td>
<td>Olmert was meeting with the father of the soldier, Gilad Shalit, who was captured by Hamas in the Gaza Strip a few weeks before. Thus, the new operation weakened the effectiveness of Israeli deterrence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:00 pm</td>
<td>The leader of Islamic Resistance, Hassan Nasrullah, held a press conference</td>
<td>Nasrullah declared that the captives are in a safe place and asked Israel to negotiate indirectly for a swap deal with Lebanese prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before midnight</td>
<td>The Israeli cabinet met to discuss the procedures which should be taken to restore the Israeli deterrence</td>
<td>The cabinet declared the Second Lebanon War, which ended after 33 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At night, the Israeli cabinet declared the Second War on Lebanon. The war was ended on 15 August, 2006, by Security Council Resolution 1701. However, the captives were still in Lebanon in the hands of Islamic Resistance and there was no information about their destiny until 16 July, 2008, when a swap deal returned the coffins of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser to Israel and a number of prisoners and dozens of coffins were returned to Lebanon, including Samir Al-Quntar.

7.5 Contents of Analysed Videos of Military Operations

After providing briefly the context and the macrostructure of the videos of
military operations, this section aims to show their microstructure by showing their contents in detail in order to identify, in a later section, their signs and codes.

Following each military operation, as shown in the previous chapter, the military media unit issued a statement. However, the videos contain further visual details and semantic language. Notably, both videos of military operations of the capturing of Israeli soldiers are not complete, particularly the second one. In contrast to the first one, the second video does not uncover the status of the two soldiers when they were captured. Furthermore, the video seems to have undergone editing for military purposes. With regard to this, Al-Mayadeen’s chairman, Ghassan ben Jiddo, promised to air further footage to reveal if the two Israeli soldiers, or one of them, was injured or dead when the fighters opened the Hummer to extract them.

In this context, the next two subsections aim to show chronologically the contents of these videos of the two military operations, paying attention to the details.

7.5.1 Smashing the Sufa and Snatching the Dead

As shown previously, the military media unit filmed the capturing of Israeli soldiers for the first time in October, 2000. The film, which was aired through the two documentaries, The Great Swap Deal and Sufa respectively, is about three minutes in duration. However, the second documentary screened items related to the captured Israel soldiers after the operation.

The film of the military operation started by screening the Israeli army jeep (Sufa) as it advances towards Point 590 at Shebaa Gate. Colloquial words were heard later with great difficulty after uploading the sound and repeating the scene several times, “Allahoma Salleh ala Muhammad Wali Muhammad... Ejet... Ejet” which means “O’ Allah, bless Muhammad and His Households (or Family)... It has come... It has come.” However, the film did not indicate if the speaker was the cameraman or a fighter.

When the jeep arrived at Point 590 and turned back it was smashed by a bomb planted in the ground. A fighter shouted “Ya Saheb Az-Zaman” which means O’ Master of the Age. This phrase was repeated seven times during the film. After the explosion, which occurred at 12:43 pm, a black Range Rover advanced
towards Shebaa Gate. Two fighters, who did not wear camouflage uniforms, disembarked from the car. One of them ran quickly towards the gate and planted a small bomb in its lock. Then, he ordered his comrade to turn back and sheltered behind a huge cement block. When the lock of the gate was exploded, a third fighter opened a barricade fence located before Shebaa Gate.

The fighter who bombed the lock of the gate went to the smashed jeep followed by two other fighters. Then, the Range Rover crossed through the gate and turned back towards Lebanese territory before it stopped. The camera showed two fighters, one behind the destroyed jeep and another, who threw a pinch, possibly of soil, using his left hand, towards the jeep. However, the rising smoke from the jeep prevents the viewer from recognising what else is going on. The Range Rover’s driver opened the trunk where two fighters disembarked and advanced towards the smashed vehicle. However, the movement of the camera between the jeep and the Range Rover inhibits counting the precise number of the fighters who crossed Shebaa Gate or how they held the stretchers. It can be observed that there were about seven fighters and the two fighters who disembarked from the trunk of the Range Rover held the stretchers. After 20 seconds, the fighters secured the dead soldiers on two stretchers and put them in the trunk of the Range Rover. Because of the use of long shots in the filming and editing process, the image of the Israeli soldiers does not allow clear identification.

Then, the Range Rover headed back quickly towards Lebanese territory surrounded by four fighters before it disappeared from the camera shot at 12:46 pm. Notably, during the operation there were voices of the fighters on the walkie-talkies. However, these voices were not clearly heard, except for the word ‘Okay’, due to the accompanied sounds from artillery and guns against the Israeli army garrisons.

In summary, this subsection shows, in order to identify later their signs and codes the content of the video, filmed by the military media unit of Islamic Resistance, of the first military operation of the capturing of Israeli soldiers. The next subsection aims to show the content of the second video of a military operation in which Israeli soldiers were captured.
7.5.2 Crossing the Border Fence to Open Pandora’s Box

As with the first video, the second operation was not aired primarily via Al-Manar. As stated previously, it was aired, in the first instance, on Al-Mayadeen during a political talk show. However, this video, which is two minutes and 12 seconds in length, is not complete, because it does not reveal the fate of the two captured Israeli soldiers.

The film starts by showing seven fighters moving under trees in the bush. Under the whiz of bullets and a voice that is difficult to hear, saying “Allah Akbar” (Allah is the Greater), the fighters advance in a queue towards the border fence and the fighter in the lead starts cutting the barbed wire to open a gap. A long shot inserted in the film shows a road and the bush on its banks. It seems that this was the road the Israeli army vehicles were travelling along. The scene turns back to the fighters, where the fighter who opened the gap in the barbed wire throws the cutter on the ground before crossing the border, followed by five of his comrades. The second and the fourth fighters carry, in addition to their rifles, two fire extinguishers. However, the fifth fighter carries a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG). Again, a long shot has been inserted, showing the road, before the scene turns back to the border fence, where a group of six fighters are following the first group. The leader of this group carries a rocket-propelled grenade. Shortly after, an explosion seems to occur on the right-hand side of the fighters who crossed the border fence. The film does not show what has exploded. In reviewing the scene several times, it can be concluded that it was a missed shot or the fighters bombed a suspected point used for observation, or other military purposes.

All the fighters wear camouflage uniforms, shields and helmets. They cross the border and head towards a gate leading to a Hummer stopped on the road. The fighters explode the left side of the gate while a fighter close to the barbed wire shoots at the Hummer. In observing the film further, the two fighters who are carrying the fire extinguishers head back, shortly after bombing the gate, towards a group of fighters under the trees. A long shot has been inserted to show the road and a village. Then, the scene turns back to the military theatre where the rising smoke is everywhere and seven fighters have crossed the gate advancing towards the stopped Hummer, which seems to have been shot on its
left side. One of the seven fighters carries a metallic bar maybe to be used for opening the Hummer’s doors if they are locked. The film ends when a fighter opens the Hummer’s door, while an eighth fighter runs towards the gate.

In brief, this subsection has shown the content of the operation Khallat Al-Warda, which led to the Second Lebanon War. Remarkably, the film is edited and it is not complete, because it does not show how the fighters extracted the two Israeli soldiers from the Hummer and it does not reveal if either of the soldiers was injured or dead.

The next subsection aims to show the signs and codes in the videos of the two military operations.

7.5.3 Signs and Codes in the Analysed Videos of Military Operations

As shown in their contents, the two videos basically include images. However, the words heard in these two operations are considered in the analysis, because they denote religious meanings.

Both videos have a sequence of images or scenes showing the two sides of the conflict: the Israeli army and Islamic Resistance. In this regard, Islamic Resistance screened the footages depicting the heroism of its fighters in the context of mobilisation and the footages depicting the defeated Israeli army in the context of psychological warfare. Thus, the analysis of scenes or images in the two videos intends to show the embedded signs.

Due to fact that the majority of signs in the analysed videos is visual, this subsection refers to Barthes, who paid attention to analysing the sign that does not have a linguistic form (Barthes, 1964, 1972, 1977). In addition, this subsection considers Peirce’s classification of the sign as iconic, symbolic and indexical (Peirce, 1974).

In both videos, there are iconic, symbolic and indexical images. In this vein, there is one symbolic sign and seven iconic signs, two of which can be indexical signs and one of which can be a symbolic sign as well. The pure symbolic sign is related to the clothes worn by the fighters’ of Islamic Resistance. The camouflage uniforms worn by the fighters during the second military operation, as observed in the video, signifies that Islamic Resistance portrays itself as a
liberation movement. However, the four pure iconic signs are: bombing or hitting Israeli army vehicles to signify the superiority, power and control of *Islamic Resistance* on the battlefield; crossing the border by the fighters of *Islamic Resistance* and advancing towards the Israeli vehicles to signify the confidence, courage, tranquillity, power and the continuity of *Islamic Resistance* to achieve its mission; bombing the lock of the border gates to signify that *Islamic Resistance* contends with the Israeli army; and, transferring the captives quickly by car to signify the seriousness of *Islamic Resistance* and the achievement of the mission within a short timeframe.

On the other hand, the two signs are iconic and indexical at the same time, namely: the rise of smoke from the vehicles and the area to signify, iconically, the strength, accuracy and power of *Islamic Resistance*, and the heavy fire by fighters of *Islamic Resistance*, which can be seen as indexical; and the carrying of two fire extinguishers by the fighters, as observed in the second military operation, to signify, iconically, the planning and control of *Islamic Resistance*, and the capturing of Israeli soldiers alive from the Hummer, which can be seen as an index of the aim of *Islamic Resistance*. Finally, an iconic and symbolic sign shown at the same time is the transferring of the bodies of the killed Israeli soldiers to a jeep without showing them, as observed in the first military operation, to signify, iconically, the success and control of *Islamic Resistance* over what can be aired; this sign can also be symbolic if the aim of the organisation is to show respect for death, audience or both.

As observed, the dominant images are iconic and there are symbolic and indexical signs requiring further analysis, particularly the symbolic ones. Remarkably, some iconic images may be indexical at the same time. For example, the images of the border fence and gates are indexical in the sense that they signify the Israeli army’s isolation of ‘the self’ for security purposes. Similarly, the image of the Israeli army vehicle on the road is indexical, because it signifies the existence of Israeli soldiers inside it.

The images of fighters of *Islamic Resistance* crossing the Blue Line or the border fence may be indexical in terms of breaching, or not breaching, international law. This notion can be observed in the video of the second military operation. However, the first military operation was conducted in the occupied Lebanese territories, at Shebaa Farms. Seemingly, *Islamic Resistance*
was aware of this issue when it released a statement, as shown in the previous chapter, about the capture of two Israeli soldiers on 12 July, 2006; this statement did not include the exact location of the operation and on which side of the border it captured the two Israeli soldiers, despite that fact that Article 4 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949 protects the militias and resistance movements when they operate “in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied” (Pictet, 1960, p. 44).

In his commentary on this flexible statement in Article 4, Pictet (1960) concludes that such organisations “can thus operate over the whole of the enemy territory, including the corresponding air space and the territorial waters and, of course, on the high seas; some authors even consider that their activity may extend over the whole territory under enemy control” (p. 58).

Regarding the symbolic signs, the camouflage uniform, if it is considered as a distinctive sign, is crucial in the actions of Islamic Resistance. Article 4 of the said Geneva Convention states four conditions under which militias and resistance movements are to be protected and one of these conditions is that they have “a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance” (Pictet, 1960, p. 44). However, this provision about the fixed sign, which may include the wearing of a camouflage uniform, was amended by the addition of Protocol I of Article 44 of 8 June, 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949, to conclude that the distinctive sign is any sign which distinguishes the fighter from the civilians in order to protect them and to provide the combatants with prisoner-of-war status if they are captured by their enemy (Sandoz, Swinarski, & Zimmermann, 1987).

In contrast to the second military operation, the fighters in the first operation, as shown in the first video, did not wear camouflage uniforms. As illustrated previously in the documentary ‘Sufa’, the fighters tried to deceive the Indian Regiment in UNIFIL, which was supervising Shebaa Gate. Thus, they did not wear their camouflage uniforms, which can be considered their distinctive sign, in this operation to capture Israeli soldiers. Although the fighters in the video carried their arms openly, as a fulfilment of the condition (c) of article 4 (Pictet, 1960), and initiated their military operation in an area where there were no civilians, it is difficult to observe a distinctive sign in that military operation. The repercussions of an absence of a distinctive sign could be that this can be
seen as a war crime, and the penalty, which may be applied to the fighters who shared in the operation and did not wear a distinctive sign, would deprive them of prisoner-of-war status if they were captured during that operation (Sandoz, Swinarski, & Zimmermann, 1987; Pfanner, 2004).

On the other hand, the image of the Israeli soldiers in the two videos is of them inside vehicles, whether unarmoured or armoured. Islamic Resistance did not screen any Israeli soldier fighting or walking. Instead, it portrayed the Israeli soldiers in the vehicles unable to respond, defeated, killed and captured. These images of the Israeli soldiers seem to have double-sided significations. As Barthes (1972) argues, the impact of the repetition of visual signs to saturate the minds of intended audiences is expected to change their behaviours; thus, Islamic Resistance aims to create a new stereotype of the Israeli army and cultivate it in the minds of Lebanese, Arab and Israeli people. Based on the concept of proximity, the organisation intends to show Lebanese, Arabs and Muslims how a small group of fighters can defeat the strongest army in the Middle East. When Al-Mayadeen (2012) aired the second military operation of Islamic Resistance in a talk show, the guest Nawaf Al-Mosawi, who is the member of Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc in the Lebanese parliament, induced the Arab youth to see how a group of people just like them were able to defeat the Israeli army. However, the organisation intends to show the Israeli army and the Israelis a shocking image, where the vehicles are easily hit or smashed and where the Israeli soldiers are easy to kill and capture by a relatively small number of fighters. Furthermore, the footage of the Israeli soldiers’ items, particularly clothes which were covered with blood, as shown in the documentary ‘Sufa’, seems to reiterate the shocking images in the aftermath of the operation in order to wage psychological warfare and demoralise the Israelis and the Israeli army spirit.

Barthes (1972) points out that the mythical sign has a double function, because it plays a role in providing a certain version of meaning and stresses this meaning as it expresses a form of reality. In the investigation of the two videos, Islamic Resistance unveiled its intention by enhancing the mythical representation of its ‘able’ fighters vs. ‘unable’ Israeli soldiers, through the concepts of isolation and repetition. Thus, the meaning of ‘heroism’ is isolated by the ‘victorious’ footage of Islamic Resistance fighters to emphasise certain images that connote a
positive meaning. Likewise, the ‘defeat’ of the Israeli soldiers is isolated and repeated in the two videos to stress certain images that connote a negative meaning to the viewers.

In addition to the denotation of scenes, there are verbal signs heard in the videos. Unlike the second video, which includes an iconic sign *Allah Akbar*, there are two symbolic signs heard in the first military operation of the capturing of three Israeli soldiers: *O’ Allah, bless Muhammad and His Households... It has come... It has come* and *Ya Saheb Az-Zaman*. These signs hold religious meaning and reflect the identity of the fighters. Regarding the first sign, one of the fighters or an accompanying media operative said when he saw the Israeli jeep approaching Shebba Gate “*O’ Allah, bless Muhammad and His Households...*” This energetic expression is Islamic and used by Muslims as a good sign and a remembrance of the Prophet Muhammad and His Households to grasp holy blessings and achieve a successful mission. Thus, the other words heard after this honorific blessing “... *It has come... It has come*” emphasise this meaning.

However, *Ya Saheb Az-Zaman*, which is heard seven times during the military operation, is a Shiite Muslim term and can be considered a code, because it has deep meaning. It signifies the twelfth Shiite Imam, who is called Imam Muhammad ben Al-Hassan Al-Mahdi (or Al-Mehdi). According to what is called in Islam, ‘the Twelvers’, or the Shiites who believe in twelve Imams, Imam Al-Mahdi disappeared in 941 and will return one day from his occultation to prevail in justice and peace in the world after years of tyranny and oppression (Al-Qarashi, 2006).

This code, which is a frame and denotes religious meaning, will be discussed further, in a later chapter, to show its role in the ideology of *Islamic Resistance*.

In summary, this section and the previous one have analysed a sample of videos of military operations of *Islamic Resistance*. The sample included the two videos of the capturing of Israeli soldiers. The analysis has shown the context, the macrostructure and the microstructure of these videos to identify the embedded signs and their meanings. The next section aims to analyse a sample of flashes produced by the military media unit.
7.6 Macrostructure of the Analysed Flashes

Three flashes were chosen for analysis. They were aired by Al-Manar and have a military context, because they were produced during the July War in 2006 between the Israeli army and Islamic Resistance. These video clips are in the context of mobilisation and psychological warfare.

The first flash is named Merkava Aljel Alrabei (Merkava MK-4). Its duration is 33 seconds and it contains six visual captions in Arabic and Hebrew relating to the efficiency and superiority of this Israeli tank in the battlefield, which enables it to attract an international reputation in the military industry. However, the futility of these tanks in the villages of Southern Lebanon turned them into coffins for Israeli soldiers.

As will be shown in Table 27, these captions are accompanied by footage of this model of tanks before, during and after they were hit by Islamic Resistance missiles. This narration is accompanied by music and sound effects.

Table 27: Audiovisual structure of the flash: Merkava MK-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audio</th>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Music from a cymbal</td>
<td>A tank advances (medium shot)</td>
<td>Identifying the musical instruments used is based on hearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing the music and using a sound effect (to signify providing information)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music from a cymbal returns</td>
<td>A wide caption in Arabic and Hebrew, Merkava-4</td>
<td>The image shows only the caption in the middle of the screen. Notably, all the captions in this flash are in the same graphic design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing the music and using a sound effect</td>
<td>A close shot shows the left side and tower of the tank advancing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music from a cymbal returns</td>
<td>A wide caption in Arabic and Hebrew, The most armoured in the world</td>
<td>The caption describes the tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing the music and using a sound effect</td>
<td>A medium shot shows the front of the tank advancing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music from a cymbal returns</td>
<td>A wide caption in Arabic and Hebrew, The most developed</td>
<td>The caption describes the tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing the music and using a sound effect</td>
<td>A tank stops at a T-intersection (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music from a cymbal returns</td>
<td>A wide caption in Arabic and Hebrew, High combative ability</td>
<td>The caption describes the tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing the music and using a sound effect</td>
<td>A medium shot shows a fighter in a place that looks like a small room viewed through binoculars</td>
<td>It seems that this observer fighter is an Israeli soldier inside the tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music from a cymbal returns</td>
<td>A wide caption in Arabic and Hebrew, However, in Southern Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing the music and using a sound effect</td>
<td>A wide caption in Arabic and Hebrew,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Music from a cymbal returns and adding music from other instruments to elevate the rhythm.

A close shot shows the canon of a tank and a soldier on its tower while it advances.

The added music from other instruments and changing the rhythm are to signify something will happen.

A close shot shows the canon of a tank and a soldier on its tower while it advances.

The names are those of villages in Southern Lebanon.

A close shot shows the canon of a tank and a soldier on its tower while it advances.

The camera zooms in to show the huge fire emerging from the hit tank (close shot).

Further zoom in to show the huge fire emerging from the hit tank (close shot).

The zoom process seems to be the result of editing. Thus, the image of the hit tank is repetitive in this and the previous shot.

A wide caption in Arabic and Hebrew, It has turned into coffins for your soldiers. Then a subtitle, the military media [Unit] - Islamic Resistance to refer to the producer of the flash.

There are two grammatical mistakes in the Arabic caption. Firstly, a letter has been missed from the first word Asbahat which means turned. This missed Arabic letter is related grammatically to the apodosis of the conditional particle Amma in the previous caption which means However. Secondly, No'osh, which means coffins, should be No'osha, because it is a predicate of the defective verb Asbahat which means turned.

The original language of this flash is Arabic and I translated it for this research.

The second flash is named, Al-Wa'ad As-Sadeq Atin (The True Pledge is Coming). Its duration is 58 seconds and it contains captions, in Arabic and Hebrew, of the Israeli settlements and cities that are within range of the missiles of Islamic Resistance. Also, it contains footages of missiles being fired and graphic images of the targeted areas. This flash, as will be shown in Table 28, contains a short song accompanied by music and sound effects. This song includes national words reflect the Lebanonisation, or by other words the notion of reconciliation in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
Table 28: Audiovisual structure of the flash: The True Pledge is Coming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audio</th>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Music (hearing sounds from a cymbal, drum and violin)</strong></td>
<td>A fighter runs carrying a missile (waist shot). Adding red colour effect to the cadre</td>
<td>Identifying the musical instruments used is based on hearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Music continues</strong></td>
<td>A fighter close to truck holds a battery for launching missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Music continues</strong></td>
<td>A fighter close to truck holds a battery for launching missiles and another two batteries nearby (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Music continues</strong></td>
<td>Names of Israeli settlements in Arabic and Hebrew scrolling over the image of the first battery for launching missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adding a beat on a triangle to the continued music</strong></td>
<td>Further names of Israeli settlements in Arabic and Hebrew scrolling over the image of the first battery for launching missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adding a siren warning to the music (sound effect)</strong></td>
<td>Further names of Israeli settlements in Arabic and Hebrew scrolling over the image of an Israeli settlement. The addition of the red colour effect to the cadre ends this scene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Music returns</strong></td>
<td>Further names of Israeli settlements in Arabic and Hebrew scrolling over the image of an Israeli settlement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Music continues</strong></td>
<td>Forming a table in Arabic and Hebrew on 2/3 of the screen (on the left hand side). The table contains the following: Range: 20 Km 176 settlements 48,000 settlers. However, the rest 1/3 of the screen contains the image of an Israeli settlement (medium shot)</td>
<td>This scene contains an image effect by adding a red semi circle including small red spots to signify the range and the targeted settlements. This effect exists in the previous two scenes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sound of firing missiles</strong></td>
<td>A battery fires missiles. Adding a red colour effect to the image (medium shot)</td>
<td>Image affects the viewer through repeated fast firing of missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Music returns</strong></td>
<td>Graphic image of a settlement from a satellite (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The true pledge is coming (accompanied with the music)</strong></td>
<td>A caption in Hebrew translating the meaning of the song over a graphic image of a coastal city from a satellite</td>
<td>It is the start of a short song</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adding a siren warning to the music (sound effect)</strong></td>
<td>Names of Israeli settlements in Arabic and Hebrew starts scrolling over the graphic image of the coastal city</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adding a beat on a triangle to the music</strong></td>
<td>Further names of Israeli settlements in Arabic and Hebrew scrolling over the graphic image of the coastal city</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Music continues</strong></td>
<td>Further names of Israeli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Image</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>settlements in Arabic and Hebrew scrolling over the graphic image of the coastal city</td>
<td>Forming a table in Arabic and Hebrew on 2/3 of the screen (on the left hand side). The table contains the following: Range: 20 Km 176 settlements 48,0000 settlers. However, the rest 1/3 of the screen contains the image of Israel settlement (medium shot)</td>
<td>This scene contains an image the effect of which is made by adding a red semi circle including small red spots to signify the range and the targeted settlements. This effect exists in the previous two scenes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music continues</td>
<td>A fighter in a field and firing a missile at night (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of firing missiles</td>
<td>A fighter in a field and firing a missile at night (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image</td>
<td>ghaning a poster of Sheikh Ragheb Harb on its left door (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of firing missiles</td>
<td>A graphic image of a settlement from a satellite (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The true pledge is coming (accompanied with the music)</td>
<td>A caption in Hebrew translating the meaning of the song over a graphic image of the settlement from a satellite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The roaring thunder is coming (with the music)</td>
<td>A caption in Hebrew translating the meaning of the song over a graphic image of an explosion in a settlement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of firing missiles</td>
<td>Firing a missile at night from the stand on a track. Adding a red colour effect to the cadre (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of firing missiles</td>
<td>Firing a missile at night from the stand on a track hanging a poster of Sheikh Ragheb Harb on its left door. Adding a red colour effect the cadre (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of firing missiles</td>
<td>Firing a missile at night from the stand on a track raising Hezbollah’s emblem. Adding a red colour effect to the cadre (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’ soldiers of idiocy (accompanied with the music and a sound effect of bombing)</td>
<td>A caption in Hebrew translating the meaning of the song over a graphic image of an explosion in a settlement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (with music and a sound effect of bombing)</td>
<td>A caption in Hebrew translating the meaning of the song with an image of firing a bomb from a canon. Adding a red colour effect to the cadre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>will re- (with music and a sound effect of bombing)</td>
<td>A caption in Hebrew translating the meaning of the song with an image of firing a missile at night</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Image</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-main (with music and a</td>
<td>A caption in Hebrew translating the meaning of the song with an image</td>
<td>This sentence, Lebanon will remain, seems to show that the firing of missiles by Islamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sound effect of bombing)</td>
<td>of firing a missile from a stand on a truck at night. Adding a red</td>
<td>Resistance against Israeli settlements is a reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>colour effect to the cadre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O’ soldiers of idiocy</td>
<td>Names of Israeli settlements in Arabic and Hebrew scrolling over a</td>
<td>Repetition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(accompanied with the</td>
<td>red semi circle with red spots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>music)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon will remain (with</td>
<td>Further names of Israeli settlements in Arabic and Hebrew scrolling</td>
<td>Repetition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the music)</td>
<td>over a red semi circle with red spots and an image of a Israeli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The true pledge is coming</td>
<td>An image of an Israeli settlement from a satellite (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(with the music)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The true pledge (with the</td>
<td>A caption in Arabic and Hebrew, Beyond and further beyond Haifa</td>
<td>By the end of this scene the music ends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>music)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A strong beat on a drum</td>
<td>A circle including a question mark is located under the caption,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beyond and further beyond Haifa, then a subtitle, the military media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Unit] - Islamic Resistance to refer to the producer of the flash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The original language of this flash is Arabic and I translated it for this research.

The third flash is named *Lan Tamho Zikrana* (You will never be able to Abolish our Renown). Its duration is 45 seconds. This flash comments on the then Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, who aimed to destroy *Hezbollah* after the outbreak of the July War in 2006 because, as shown previously, Israel does not distinguish between *Hezbollah* and its military arm, *Islamic Resistance*. This flash does not contain any captions in Hebrew. The captions are in Arabic. As will be shown in Table 29, the captions contain Olmert’s words and four short sentences contending his aims.

Table 29: Audiovisual structure of the flash: You will Never be Able to Abolish our Renown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audio</th>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A beat on a cymbal</td>
<td>An Arabic caption starts, We shall</td>
<td>Identifying the used music instruments is based on hearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another beat</td>
<td>An addition to the caption to be, We shall eliminate <em>Hezbollah</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another beat</td>
<td>An addition to the caption to be, We shall eliminate <em>Hezbollah</em> and its</td>
<td>The Arabic sentence is completed in this scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Image</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rocket’s power</td>
<td>“We shall eliminate <em>Hezbollah</em> and its rocket’s power”, Ehud Olmert</td>
<td>Ehud Olmert is the then Israeli Prime Minister during July War in 2006 (Harel &amp; Issacharoff, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats on a tambourine and a drum</td>
<td>An image of a fighter jet starting departing (close shot)</td>
<td>It seems that the image belongs to southern district of Beirut during an Israeli air raid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>An image shows the smoke outbursts from bombed buildings (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>A helicopter starts departing (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>A helicopter fires on targets (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Another helicopter flies (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Another helicopter launches a missile towards a target on the ground (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>A drone flies (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>A wide caption in Arabic, Toil your plot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue, but with low volume</td>
<td>A truck has a stand for launching long-range rockets. There are two flags on this truck one of them is <em>Hezbollah</em>’s emblem (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of firing a missile</td>
<td>Firing a missile from the stand on the track (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sound of the fired missile</td>
<td>The fired missile is in the sky (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats on a tambourine and a drum return back</td>
<td>A tank advances (close shot on its canon)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Two Israeli soldiers in front of a tank providing instruction to its crew (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Four tank advance on a road (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>A tank fires a bomb (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Zoom in on the canon of the tank while bombing showing the amount of outburst fire from its muzzle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>A wide caption, Pursue your efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of firing a missile</td>
<td>Firing a missile from the stand on a track raising <em>Hezbollah</em>’s emblem and hanging a poster of Sheikh Ragheb Harb on its left door (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sound of the fired missile</td>
<td>The fired missile is in the sky (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats on a tambourine and a drum return back</td>
<td>A number of Israeli infantry soldiers walk (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Six Israeli soldiers walk (waist shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Five Israeli soldiers sit on the gutter of a road (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Four Israeli soldiers sit on the gutter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Image</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Two Israeli soldiers sit during the night with their dog (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>A row of Israeli infantry soldiers walk (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>An Israeli soldier carries his gun running (close shot on his legs and the canon of his gun)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>A wide caption, And wage your abilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of firing a missile</td>
<td>Firing a missile from the stand on a track raising Hezbollah’s emblem (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound continues</td>
<td>Firing a missile from a battery put on a stand of a track (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound continues</td>
<td>Firing a missile from the stand on a track during the night (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound continues</td>
<td>Firing a missile from the stand on a track raising two Hezbollah emblems (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound continues</td>
<td>Firing a missile from a battery (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound continues</td>
<td>Firing a missile from another battery (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats on a tambourine and a drum return back</td>
<td>An image of an Israeli battleship (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>An image of an Israeli boat moving (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Two persons, one of them does not wear the uniform of the Israeli army, view the movable boat (shoulder shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>An image of an Israeli battleship (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>An explosion at night in the sea (long shot)</td>
<td>This image is taken from hitting the Israeli battleship ‘Sa’ar 5’ off coast of Beirut on 14 July, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Zoom in on the explosion showing the outburst of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Firing a missile from a battery and Hezbollah’s flag planted nearby it (close shot on the muzzles of the battery and the top of the flag)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>An outburst of fire from a hit car (medium shot)</td>
<td>It seems that the car is Israeli in a settlement and it was hit by missiles of Islamic Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beats continue</td>
<td>Six Israeli soldiers carry a coffin of their comrade covered by the Israeli flag (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding a beat on a cymbal to elevate the rhythm</td>
<td>Firing a missile from the stand on a track (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding another beat</td>
<td>Two hit tanks, one of them is upside down (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding another beat</td>
<td>An outburst of fire from a hit vehicle (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Image</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding another beat</td>
<td>Three Israeli soldiers carry with another three a coffin of their comrade covered by Israeli flag (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding another beat</td>
<td>Two tanks on a road where the first was hit by a missile (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding another beat</td>
<td>A caption in Arabic, Deity by Allah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding another beat</td>
<td>Adding another part of the caption to be, Deity by Allah, you will never be able to abolish our renown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adding another beat with lower rhythm</td>
<td>Adding the name of the producer of the flash, the military media [unit] - Islamic Resistance under the previous caption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The captions in this flash are in Arabic and I translated it for this research.

This section has shown the audio-visual structure of three flashes. This step is essential before analysing the microstructure of these flashes and extracting the codes and signs.

### 7.7 Microstructure of the Analysed Flashes

As shown in their macrostructure, these flashes have primarily an interpersonal function, because they are in the context of the July War. Unlike the other two flashes, You will never be able to Abolish our Renown does not contain translation into Hebrew. This may suggest that the main targeted audience of this flash is Shiites in Lebanon. In applying Halliday’s metafunctions of language to the clauses in the flashes, the semantic relations can come into full view (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014).

Unlike the statements in the previous chapter, which include only words, the flashes contain, in addition to words and images, music and sound effects.

In applying Halliday’s first metafunction of language, where the clause is considered as a representation, the actor, the process, the goal and the recipient in the flashes are absent in terms of words. Thus, the images, the music, the sound effects and the context can substitute the absent words to provide lexical cohesion and generate full meaning. For example, the transitivity in the flash Merkava MK-4, as it will be shown in Table 30, cannot be identified only from the words, because the images, the sound effects and the context substituted the words.
Table 30: Transitivity in the flash: Merkava MK-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli army</td>
<td>uses Merkava MK-4</td>
<td>Southern Lebanon</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The actor can be known from: Images and the context of the flash, particularly the soldiers in the caption “it has turned into coffins for your soldiers”</td>
<td>The process can be known from: Images</td>
<td>The goal can be known from: Images</td>
<td>The recipient can be known from: The context of the flash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Resistance</td>
<td>shoots</td>
<td>Merkava MK-4</td>
<td>the Israeli army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The actor can be known from: The context of the flash</td>
<td>The process can be known from: Image of hitting Merkava MK-4 and hearing the hit</td>
<td>The goal can be known from: Images</td>
<td>The recipient can be known from the caption: It has turned into coffins for your soldiers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, Table 30 has shown two actors and consequently two processes, two goals and two recipients:

- The Israeli army (Actor) uses Merkava MK-4 (Process) to enter Southern Lebanon (Goal) and attack Islamic Resistance (Recipient).
- Islamic Resistance (Actor) shoots (Process) Merkava MK-4 (Goal) and kills Israeli soldiers (Recipient).

Notably, the chronological distribution of scenes in the flash, Merkava MK-4, renders Islamic Resistance into a defender facing a Merkava MK-4 in Southern Lebanon and an actor turning this tank into a coffin for Israeli soldiers. In a similar vein, the goal and the recipient are absent in the second and third clauses of the flash The True pledge is Coming. However, the context, where the addressee is the Israeli army, the images and the sound effects can be substituted for these eclipses. Thus, the goal is “to you” in “The true pledge is coming [to you]” and in “the roaring thunder is coming [to you]”. However, the recipient, according to the images and graphics, is the Israeli army and Israelis.

On the other hand, “the true pledge” is a substitution of Islamic Resistance and “the roaring thunder” is a substitution of the missiles of Islamic Resistance of the type “Thunder.” However, the signification of these two metaphoric expressions can be obtained from the context, images and sound effects. In this vein, the
substitution is not only on the level of syntagmatic structure, but also on the paradigmatic level.

In applying the second of Halliday’s metafunctions of language, where the clause is considered as an exchange between two entities, the flash You will never be able to Abolish our Renown provides an example of mood and modality. This clause is used to reply to the then Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, who intended to eliminate Hezbollah and its arsenal of missiles. Table 31 shows the notion of mood in this flash.

Table 31: Example of mood in the flash: You will never be able to Abolish our Renown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mood Tag</th>
<th>Residue</th>
<th>Mood Tag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Finite</td>
<td>abolish our renown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You</td>
<td>will never</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Finite</td>
<td>eliminate Hezbollah and its rocket’s power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We</td>
<td>shall</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 31, the degree of inclination in the reply is high, because Islamic Resistance takes issue with the Israeli Prime Minister. In this regard, the flash shows scenes of the Israeli army bombarding areas in Lebanon to fulfil the threat of the Israeli Prime Minister and shows, as well, scenes of the response of Islamic Resistance against the Israeli army and Israel.

In its reply to the Israeli Prime Minister, Islamic Resistance used a particle lan in Arabic, which means never in English, to render the verb abolish in a subjunctive mood. This usage of a particle for the subjunctive can be considered a form of modality.

Regarding the third of Halliday’s metafunctions of language, where the clause is considered as a message, the texture of the flash may uncover the intention of the producer. For example, the themes and rhemes in the flash You will never be able to Abolish our Renown are:
“Toil your plot (Theme); pursue your efforts (Theme); and wage your abilities (Theme); Deity by Allah (Unmarked Theme), you will never be able to abolish our renown (Rheme).”

This message was directed by Islamic Resistance to the then Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert. It contains imperative verbs and causative objects to counter Olmert’s intentions. However, the images, the music and the sound effects in the flash interpret the nature of the themes and the rheme.

On the other hand, the flash Merkava MK-4 shows how Islamic Resistance provides its anti-thesis and arguments. In this flash, the organisation provides the theses about the Merkava MK-4, as follows: the most armoured in the world (Thesis); the most developed (Thesis); high combative ability (Thesis).

In this vein, the flash shows these theses reflecting the Israeli point of view about the superiority of this tank in the battlefield. After the theses, the organisation provided its argument through scenes, showing how its fighters shoot this tank and destroy it. However, Islamic Resistance provided its anti-thesis at the end of the flash: “It has turned into coffins for your soldiers.” This flow of theses, argument and anti-thesis shows the crucial role of images, music and sound effects in the production of meaning. Thus, the declarative clause provides the new information about this tank: “It (Given) has turned into coffins for your soldiers (New).”

To delve further into their microstructure, the next subsection aims to shed light on the notion of intertextuality in the analysed flashes.

7.7.1 Notion of Intertextuality in the Flashes

Before identifying the signs and codes, it is important to point to the intertextuality contained in the flashes. Two of these flashes contain quotes without referring to their sources: The True Pledge in Coming and You will never be able to Abolish our Renown. At the end of the first flash, the caption, Beyond and further beyond Haifa, is a clause stated by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, the leader of Islamic Resistance, Hassan Nasrullah, during the July War after firing on the city of Haifa with batches of missiles (“Sayyed Hassan,” 2006). Thus, the producer of this caption intends to inform the Israelis that Nasrullah’s pledge is guaranteed.
However, the whole reply of *Islamic Resistance* to the then Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, in the second flash, You will never be able to Abolish our Renown, is written without referring to its source or author. As shown in its macrostructure, the reply in this flash contains four clauses or sentences without any hint of its source from the producer, “Toil your plot; pursue your efforts; and wage your abilities; Deity by Allah, you will never be able to abolish our renown.” In researching the origin of these words, it can be argued that they are said by Lady Zainab to the then Umayyad Caliph, Yazid, in his palace in Damascus in the year 680, after his army killed her brother, Imam Al-Hussein, and members of her family and family’s companions in the Battle of Karbala (Al-Qarashi, 2001). The intertextuality in this flash is not limited to the words. It can be argued that the producer of the flash has a nuanced understanding of how the then people of Damascus and Yazid hosted Karbala’s captives. According to the historical narration, from the perspective of Shiite Muslims, the people of Damascus started beating on drums and other similar musical instruments to express their happiness, because Yazid concealed the real identity of the captives and told the city that they were Romans (Al-Qarashi, 2001). Thus, it is argued that the producer of the flash in the military media unit used music from musical instruments similar to the original to compose a reply to Olmert, thus creating a signification between sounds and words. Like Zainab, who replied to Yazid and his propaganda, *Islamic Resistance* used her words to address the Israeli Prime Minister. Towards this end, this intertextuality expresses the notion of power and reveals the role of religion in the actions of *Islamic Resistance*. The next subsection aims to show the signs and the codes in the flashes.

### 7.7.2 Signs and Codes in the Analysed Flashes

As shown previously, the flashes contain words, images, music, sounds and sound effects. However, the main focus is on the images and sounds, whether it is musical or not. Barthes (1977) argues that the images are understood by the viewers faster than the texts and consequently have a further impact on audience. This notion may reveal why the military media unit focuses in the flashes on images and sounds rather than words. Seemingly, the music and the sound
effects play a role to emphasise the denotation of the images by creating a powerfully suggestive ambience.

In observing the major denotation in the flashes, it can be argued that they are power and knowledge. These two notions are intertwined, because they can be noticed in the signs that denote double significations. Based on Peirce’s classification, the majority of signs in the analysed flashes are iconic and indexical. When the organisation includes in the flash, The True pledge in Coming, two graphic images showing the range of its missile, the number of settlements within the firing range and the number of targeted Israelis, it reveals a level of knowledge about its opponent and it is an index of its power.

Likewise, the images of shooting a Merkava MK-4 after providing information about its efficiency signify the power of Islamic Resistance. In a similar vein, the sounds of missiles firing towards the Israeli settlements and hitting a tank or a battleship signify the power of this organisation and the military knowledge of its fighters. Thus, repeating the scene of hitting the Merkava MK-4, whether by the sound of the explosion or the image of fire and smoke raised from the tank, aims to emphasise the signification of the power of the organisation and its ability to wage psychological warfare against the Israeli army. Similarly, the strong beat on a drum, and the question mark after the caption, “Beyond and further beyond Haifa”, have the same double signification.

However, the raising of Hezbollah’s emblem on a truck in a field by the fighters while firing missiles is an index to their party and to distinguish themselves from civilians; additionally it is a signal of compliance with international humanitarian law as the emblem is considered a distinctive sign. In addition to this indexical sign, there is a symbolic one, where the sound of siren warnings in the flash, The True pledge is Coming, signifies danger.

Remarkably, the analysed flashes contain one code, The True pledge. This code is repeated in the previous genres of Islamic Resistance discourse.

In short, this section and the previous one have analysed three flashes produced by the military media unit of Islamic Resistance. It has shown their macrostructure, intertextuality, microstructure and, consequently, their embedded signs. Unlike the previous analysed genres, the flashes contain music. Thus, the analysis has considered this notion in showing the signification of signs.
The next section aims to analyse a sample of video songs produced by the military media unit of Islamic Resistance to show its structure and content.

7.8 Macrostructure of the Video Song: The Land Narrates its Imad

The use of songs by Arabs for mobilisation purposes in the war against Israel goes back to 1956 (Abo-Arja, 1996). In this regard, the same author points out that Arab media pre-1967 war was airing songs to mobilise Arab masses against Israel. However, the same author argues that these songs had poor contents and did not achieve the level of the song, Allah Akbar Faok Al-Mo'otadi (Allah is the Greatest against the Aggressor), which was aired after the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt in 1956 (ibid).

Acknowledging the importance of this genre in the war, the military media unit of Islamic Resistance produces video songs, one of which is Al-Ardo Tahki Imadaha (The Land Narrates its Imad). The main aim of this song is to glorify the commander of Islamic Resistance, Imad Mughniyeh, who was considered in some countries as a terrorist and assassinated in the Syrian capital, Damascus, on 12 February, 2008 (Badran, 2009). The military media unit adapted the words, written by a poet, to produce a video song.

The duration of this video song, which is aired by Al-Manar, is 4 minutes and 7 seconds. As shown in Table 32, this video song contains footage of Imad Mughniyeh’s military achievements, which is the central subject of the song.

Table 32: Audiovisual structure of the video song: The Land Narrates its Imad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audio</th>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allah Akbar (from Azan)</td>
<td>A scene of a village (long shot) and caption in Arabic Al-Ardo Tahki (The land narrates)</td>
<td>It may be the village in Southern Lebanon where Imad Mughniyeh was born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>A fighter raises a yellow flag painted with Imad Mughniyeh’s portrait (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>A number of Palestinian, Lebanese and Imad Mughniyeh’s flags on the right hand side of the fighter who is raising the flag (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>After raising the flag, the fighter stands up close to it in front a number of other fighters</td>
<td>All the fighters wear camouflage uniforms with green berets and yellow kerchiefs around their necks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>The fighter who raised the flag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Image</td>
<td>Comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standing close to it (medium shot)</td>
<td>The flag, which includes Imad Mughniyeh’s portrait, flutters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Legs of five fighters in the first row showing them raising their rifles (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get ready</td>
<td>Fighters present arms (long shot)</td>
<td>The music starts from this scene accompany all the song. It seems that the music composed to align with the words.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present arms</td>
<td>A fighter salutes the flag (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The land narrates</td>
<td>Two fighters running in a bush carrying their rifles and two flags contain Imad Mughniyeh’s portrait (medium shot)</td>
<td>Repetition of the words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present arms</td>
<td>A canon of a rifle carried by a fighter inside a field of wheat (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repetition</td>
<td>A canon of a rifle carried by another fighter inside the field of wheat, followed by Imad Mughniyeh’s flag fluttering (close shots)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present arms</td>
<td>A group of fighters sing and behind them Imad Mughniyeh’s flags, Hezbollah’s flags and Palestinian flags (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O moon</td>
<td>A close shot on the field of wheat showing the spikes, then a medium shot shows Imad Mughniyeh wears a camouflage uniforms walking in a bush</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present your stars and rise... O sea in the impact of the news</td>
<td>Legs of a man walking through a beach and then on a wave pushes two military helmets towards the beach (close shots)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The world should hear to... about a giant passed through</td>
<td>A symbolic craft of two coffins covered by Israeli flags on the beach, a number of military helmets and a canon thrown on one of them (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If he passes, the glory thereupon passes... following his trace</td>
<td>One of the coffins starts burning (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The firm will narrates about whom determination halted</td>
<td>A group of fighters sing this quote and behind them Imad Mughniyeh’s flags, Hezbollah’s flags and Palestinian flags (long shot) followed by Imad Mughniyeh’s flag fluttering (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who led a victory to glory</td>
<td>A fighter salutes Imad Mughniyeh’s flag (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who the history of proud written by him</td>
<td>A group of fighters standing in rows present their pledge and behind them Hezbollah’s flags (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O master</td>
<td>A fighter holding Hezbollah’s flag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whom the pledge still knows</td>
<td>A fighter holding Hezbollah’s flag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You taught us: who</td>
<td>A group of fighters sing this quote and behind them Imad Mughniyeh’s flags, Hezbollah’s flags and Palestinian flags (long shot) followed by Imad Mughniyeh’s flag fluttering (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audio</td>
<td>Image</td>
<td>Comment</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wants glory</td>
<td>runs in a bush (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The destiny will not oppose him</td>
<td>A fighter holding <em>Hezbollah’s</em> flag runs in a bush (long shot) then</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the face of Imad Mughniyeh emerges on the right side of the screen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O silence who shocked the [Israeli] elites’ staff...</td>
<td>A group of fighters sing this quote and behind them are Imad</td>
<td>These two explosions go back to the withdrawal of Israeli army from Lebanon in May, 2000 when <em>Islamic Resistance</em> destroyed the empty Israeli army’s barracks in the newly liberated Lebanese territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thereupon the history should write</td>
<td>Mughniyeh’s flags, <em>Hezbollah’s</em> flags, Lebanonese flags, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Palestinian flags (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their end is written by you</td>
<td>A massive explosion is followed by another one (medium shots)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Imad Mughniyeh sitting in a field holding a green notebook (medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>A number of fighters walking in a field (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>A fighter puts his palm on Imad Mughniyeh’s grave (close shot)</td>
<td>This act may signify that the fighter is reciting the opening Surah from the <em>Quran</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Imad Mughniyeh’s face (close shot), then a dissolving shot on his</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>grave</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the time passes, you will stay</td>
<td>A fighter stands on a boat (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at present</td>
<td>A number of fighters in a row walk to the beach and their leader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>carries Imad Mughniyeh’s flag (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are the song of eternity</td>
<td>A group of fighters sing this quote and behind them Imad Mughniyeh’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>flags, <em>Hezbollah’s</em> flags, Lebanonese flags, and Palestinian flags</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are the chef d’oeuvre of the homeland</td>
<td>An image of Imad Mughniyeh’s face inserted in the Lebanese flag</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>instead of the cedar tree emblem (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the time passes, you will stay at present</td>
<td>Imad Mughniyeh wears a camouflage uniform and speaks (medium shot)</td>
<td>The footage shows Mughniyeh providing instruction to fighters who are not seen in the shot. Notably, there is an editing effect in the shot to veil the place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are the song of eternity... you are the chef d’oeuvre of the</td>
<td>A group of fighters sing this quote and behind them Imad Mughniyeh’s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>homeland</td>
<td>flags, <em>Hezbollah’s</em> flags, Lebanonese flags, and Palestinian flags (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O silence</td>
<td>A long shot of a fighter on a boat</td>
<td>The flag seems to be either for</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audio</th>
<th>Image</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>who shocked the [Israeli] elites' staff</td>
<td>A group of Israeli soldiers cry (close shot)</td>
<td>Imad Mughniyeh or Hezbollah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thereupon the history should write</td>
<td>An image of killed Israeli soldiers and Israeli soldiers carrying a coffin (medium shots)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their end is written by you</td>
<td>An image of destroyed Merkava tank surrounded by Israeli soldiers (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The land narrates its Imad</td>
<td>An image of fighters carry their rifles walking during at night (medium shot)</td>
<td>The scene includes special effects, such as showing the full moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present arms O moon… Present your stars and rise</td>
<td>An image of fighters carry their rifles walking during at night in the light of the moon (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O sea</td>
<td>Lebanese, Palestinian and Hezbollah’s flags fluttering (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the impact of the news</td>
<td>White birds fly with background image of Imad Mughniyeh (close shot)</td>
<td>In this scene, the editor used image effects such as the white birds flying.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The world should hear to... about a giant passed through… If he passes, the glory</td>
<td>Imad Mughniyeh wears camouflage uniform and is speaking (medium shot)</td>
<td>It seems that Mughniyeh carries a rifle in the scene and provides instructions to a group of fighters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thereupon passes... following his trace</td>
<td>Two fighters carrying their rifles and Imad Mughniyeh’s flags (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>A carried coffin covered by Hezbollah’s flag and surrounded by people (medium shot)</td>
<td>It seems to depict Imad Mughniyeh’s coffin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>A woman carries a basket filled with flowers (close shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Flowers thrown on Imad Mughniyeh’s coffin (medium shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the time passes, you will stay at present… You are the song of eternity… You are the chef d’oeuvre of the homeland</td>
<td>A group of fighters carry their rifles walking in a row in a field under the face of Imad Mughniyeh (long shot)</td>
<td>In this scene, the editor used image effects to insert the face of Mughniyeh over the fighters to signify his supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O silence</td>
<td>Imad Mughniyeh is speaking, then providing an order in his right hand (shoulder shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who shocked the [Israeli] elites' staff</td>
<td>Image showing the rank of an Israeli soldier (close shot) followed by an image of two Israeli soldiers (long shot)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thereupon the history should write their end is written by you</td>
<td>Israeli soldiers carry a coffin of their comrade, followed by burying an Israeli soldier (medium shots)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music</td>
<td>Two fighters carry Imad Mughniyeh’s flags walking from the sea towards the beach passing between two Israeli soldiers burning coffins (long shot)</td>
<td>The coffins are not real. They are symbolic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music accompanied by</td>
<td>Captions showing the end of the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The sound of sea waves, The land narrates, the producer of the song, the military media unit, the writer of the song, the singers, the composer and an expression of gratitude to the contributors who helped to create the song.

The language of this song is Arabic and I translated it for this research.

After showing the macrostructure of the video song, the next subsection aims to shed light on its content.

7.8.1 Content of the Analysed Video Song

The words of this song are written by a poet and adapted by the military media unit to produce a video song. In this regard, the major contribution of the unit is by adding images in the process of production to align with the words. However, this subsection aims to show the content of the video song; The Land Narrates its Imad; and identify the indexical signs, because the majority of the signs, as shown in the macrostructure, are iconic.

The words of the song are in Arabic. However, it is difficult for the listener to know the subject of the song, which contains metaphoric and metonymic expressions, without watching the video song. Thus, the meaning of the song is intertwined with the added images. As a result of this characteristic, the visual composition directs the viewers’ minds towards certain meanings and concepts. In this vein, the music of the song does not have an independent meaning, because it was composed to align with the words.

The context of the song is the assassination of the commander of Islamic Resistance, Imad Mughniyeh. Thus, the main aim of the song is to glorify the ‘martyrdom’ of Mughniyeh and his role in liberating the occupied Lebanese territories in Southern Lebanon and in facing the Israeli army during the July War in 2006. Thus, the images show the destruction of barracks in Southern Lebanon shortly after the Israeli withdrawal in May, 2000 and the destruction of Merkava tanks in 2006. The meaning of these two indexical signs intends to underline why The Land Narrates its Imad and why the death of this ‘knight’ is shocking, because he is considered a ‘chef d’oeuvre’ of Lebanon. Furthermore, the video song shows this leader providing instructions and commanding the
fighters. Hence, the video song presents Mughniyeh as a victorious leader. However, the images of Israeli soldiers, where the focus is on the coffins, are entrenched with defeat. Notably, the two burning symbolic coffins on the beach can be indexical signs, because they may signify the two captured Israeli soldiers in 2006 when Mughniyeh played a role in the operation, as shown previously in analysing the video of the second military operation and the capturing of Israeli soldiers.

The concept of the destruction of Israel is clear in the song and Mughniyeh worked to this end. Thus, the burning of the two symbolic coffins covered by Israel's flags emphasises destruction. This image is in the context of psychological warfare. However, the fluttering Palestinian flags, alongside Lebanese, Hezbollah and Imad Mughniyeh’s flags, denote the importance of the Palestinian cause in the operations of Islamic Resistance. Thus, this military arm aims to entice other Arabs in order to mobilise them in the war against Israel.

In summary, the video song provides five messages:

- Imad Mughniyeh is not a mastermind of terrorism; he is a Lebanese national hero who worked to liberate Lebanese territories from the Israeli army
- The intention of eliminating Israel from existence
- The glorification of martyrs of Islamic Resistance
- The belief in the armed Resistance
- Support for the Palestinian cause
7.9 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed chosen samples of audio-visual materials produced by the military media unit of Islamic Resistance. These samples are from fighters’ testaments, videos of military operations, propaganda flashes and video songs. It has illuminated the macrostructures of the chosen samples and delved into their microstructure to identify their implications and the embedded signs. Furthermore, this chapter has paid attention to the contexts and the notion of intertextuality in the samples, because they play a significant role in constructing the meaning.

The analysis of the microstructure has focused on the signification of the images in the samples. It utilised, basically, Peirce and Barthes’ analysis of the sign and, occasionally, Derridean deconstruction. These tools allowed the author to identify many signs and their meanings, because the identification of signs and codes are crucial to the later identification of the frames and objectives in the discourse of Islamic Resistance.

This chapter has found that Islamic Resistance intertwines its religious ideology and power in depicting ‘the self’ and its actions. Thus, it presents its arm and fighters as true Shiite Muslim believers and as strong combatants who possess adequate knowledge and strength to face the Israeli army. As a result, the audio-visual messages of the military media unit reflect, collectively, the following objectives: mobilisation, reconciliation and psychological warfare.

After analysing samples from various productions of the military media unit, the next chapter aims to analyse samples of the Secretary-General’s speeches to identify their rhetorical structure and embedded signs. By doing so, the analysis of all the elements of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance will be complete.
Chapter 8. The Structure, Rhetorical Implications and Signs in the Speeches of the Leader of Islamic Resistance

This chapter aims to study the structures and rhetoric in a sample of speeches of the leader Islamic Resistance, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, and identify their embedded signs. It intends to address partially Research Question 1 (What are the signs and codes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance?) and provide a preface to Research Questions 2 (How does the media discourse of Islamic Resistance frame its identity and other identities?) and 3 (What are the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance?).

In this regard, this chapter aims to show the notion of argumentation in Nasrullah’s speeches, which have a resistant context, and how he has become a public speaker. These speeches contribute to the objectives of Islamic Resistance.

In addition to the Overview and Conclusion, this chapter consists of four sections: the first section contextualises the chapter by providing a literature related the leader of Islamic Resistance Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah; the second section classifies the contexts of the speeches of this leader; the third section illuminates the general structure of his speeches; and finally the fourth section identifies embedded signs and the elements of persuasion in Nasrullah’s speeches by showing the notions of ethos, logos and pathos.

The three speeches analysed in this chapter are archival and delivered by Nasrullah on the following dates: 22 September, 2006; 14 February, 2008 and 16 February, 2010. They were collected on DVDs from Dar Al Manar for Art Production and Distribution. However, this chapter partially utilised, for the textual analysis, the translation of these speeches on the English page of the website of Islamic Resistance (www.moqawama.org), which is called Al-Ahed News.
8.1 Overview

As noted previously in the review of the literature in Chapter 3, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah is considered the leader of its military arm, Islamic Resistance, and his speeches, which have a resistant context, constitute, with the outputs of the military media unit, the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

The current leader of Islamic Resistance is Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, who has held his position since 1992. He is considered the mouthpiece of the organisation. Based on rhetoric and semiotics under the umbrella of critical discourse analysis approach, this chapter analyses three speeches delivered by Nasrullah, to show how he presents his organisation and its enemy, Israel.

This chapter is considered prefatory for Chapters nine and ten, which further classify and interpret the frames, and further explore the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
8.2 Who is Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah?

This section aims to show, briefly, who Hassan Nasrullah (transliterates also into Nasrallah) is, because it provides background information about his personality and ideology. Thus, it will serve in providing a fuller understanding of his speeches.

As shown previously in the literature in Chapter 3, the Secretary-General heads Hezbollah and he is considered the leader of Islamic Resistance. Since its inception, three Secretary-Generals have headed Hezbollah: Sheikh (or Shaykh) Subhi At-Tufayili, Sayyed Abbas Al-Mosawi and Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah (Alagha, 2006; Hamzeh, 1993). Notably, Nasrullah became the leader of Hezbollah after the assassination by the Israeli army of his predecessor, Al-Mosawi, in February 1992 (Alagha, 2006).

Nasrullah was born in Karantina, located in the eastern district of Beirut, in 1960 to a father who had migrated from a village in Southern Lebanon, called Al-Bazourieh, to the capital to work and raise his nine children (Alroz, 2000). However, the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975 obliged Nasrullah and his family to return to the village (Thiel, 2010). In that year, Nasrullah joined the Amal Movement and headed, after one year, to the city of An-Najaf in Iraq to study Islamic jurisprudence in order to be a cleric (ibid). Upon his arrival in Iraq, Nasrullah met with Al-Mosawi, who became his teacher, guide and mentor (Alroz, 2000). After a couple of years, and as a result of the Baath oppression against Lebanese clerics in Iraq, Nasrullah fled back to Lebanon, as did many of his colleagues and his teacher, to start another stage of his life (Thiel, 2010). Following his arrival in Lebanon, Nasrullah continued his religious studies, because his teacher opened a hawza (an Islamic school or college for teaching Sharia) in Baalbek (Alroz, 2000). After the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982, Nasrullah quit Amal in 1982 with a number of his comrades. As a result, this group formed the foundation of Hezbollah. In the mid-1980s, Nasrullah left Baalbek for Beirut to be one of the key figures of Hezbollah (Alroz, 2000). In 1989, he travelled to the Iranian holy city, Qom, to continue his religious studies (Thiel, 2010). However, he headed back to Lebanon after one year to again hold a position in Hezbollah and became Hezbollah’s Secretary-General in February, 1992 (ibid).
8.2.1 How Nasrullah Became a Public Speaker

As part of his position in the party, Nasrullah delivers speeches on various occasions (Noe, 2007). Thus, he has turned into a charismatic leader and his speeches grasp the attention of audiences, particularly Hezbollah’s followers and supporters (El Houri, 2012; Thiel, 2010). However, the question remains: where and how did Nasrullah study public speaking?

In teaching his students, including Nasrullah, Sayyed Abbas Al-Mosawi prepared them on how to be public speakers in the future, and as a result, every student had to periodically prepare a brief speech or sermon and deliver it in front of his teacher and colleagues, asking them to comment and discuss the language and the content of his discourse (Khaton, 2002). This experience can be considered the fundamental basis for Nasrullah on how to deliver a speech.

Before the July War in 2006, Nasrullah was delivering his speeches directly to the public in front of the masses. However, the consequences of this war obliged Nasrullah, for personal security reasons, to deliver the vast majority of his speeches through a videoconference technique (El Houri, 2012).

When he delivers his speeches, Nasrullah enriches his speeches with religious terminology from Shiite culture and heritage (Khoury & Da’na, 2009). As the leader of Hezbollah’s military arm, Nasrullah reveals news of some of the military activities of Islamic Resistance. In an interview with the Lebanese newspaper, Al-Akhbar, Nasrullah pointed out that he discusses, with his jihadist comrades, the sensitive military content of his speeches, and the political content of his speeches with the Shura Council (Al-Amin et al., 2014b).

Nasrullah addresses the public periodically in order to maintain the mobilisation of the created community of Resistance (Matar & Dakhllallah, 2006). In his

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1 One of the Lebanese Shiites’ clerics, Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Badawi, published the book *The Art of Delivering a Speech* (in Arabic) in 1994. This book, which is directed primarily at clerics, is not limited to tracing the history of the art of speech. It classifies the kinds of speeches, stating the structure of the speech, what and how the addresser should use references, how to change the tone of the voice during the speech, and the appearance of the addresser and what he should wear. It seems that Nasrullah may be utilising ideas from this book in delivering his speeches.

2 For example, when Islamic Resistance sent a drone in an operation to take footage of the Israeli army facilities, Nasrullah revealed this operation and named the drone Ayoub as a remembrance of a deceased leader in the Islamic Resistance air force (Bonjar, 2012). Also, when an Israeli force was attacked in Southern Lebanon in 2013, Nasrullah declared via Al-Mayadeen (2013) that fighters of Islamic Resistance initiated this military operation against the infiltrating Israeli force.
speeches, Nasrullah understands the significance of propaganda and psychological warfare to demoralise the Israeli spirit and mobilise the followers of Islamic Resistance and its supporters in Lebanon and the Arab world (Harb, 2011). Because propaganda and ideological hegemony are important in the war against Israel, Alagha (2006) points out that, since July 30, 2001, Hezbollah has “placed its media institutions under the direct command of [the Secretary-General Hassan] Nasrallah, aided by the head of the Political Council and that of the Executive Council” (p. 52).

After providing a historical background as to where Nasrullah studied to deliver a speech, how he delivers his speeches and his media role, the next section aims to show the contexts of Nasrullah’s speeches in order to identify those related to Islamic Resistance.

8.3 Contexts of Nasrullah’s Speeches

Identifying the contexts of Nasrullah’s speeches illustrates the reason for choosing speeches made on certain occasions for analysis in this chapter.

According to the website of Islamic Resistance (www.moqawama.org), Nasrullah delivers speeches on several occasions and has been interviewed by media outlets. In his classification of Nasrullah’s speeches, Majid (2007) identifies ten categories: speeches during conferences; speeches relating to the Palestinian cause; speeches on victorious days of Islamic Resistance; speeches commemorating days of martyrdom and injury of Islamic Resistance; speeches during Islamic ceremonies; speeches during organised civilian occasions; speeches during private ceremonies; speeches during Ashura days; speeches during the July War in 2006; and interviews with televisions and newspapers.

Majid’s categorisation has been based primarily on the time of the speech. However, the present research is concerned with the speeches of Nasrullah that are related to Islamic Resistance. Thus, the focus is shifted to Nasrullah’s speeches that have resistant contexts rather than other contexts, because the content of the speech is affected by the nature of the occasion.

In re-categorising Nasrullah’s speeches for this research, the correlation between the context and the content identifies the resistant speeches as follows:
In the religious ceremonies, during Ashura—the commemoration of the killing of the grandson of the prophet Muhammad, Imam Al-Hussein, and the holy Islamic month Ramadan, Nasrullah’s speeches have religious, political and resistant content.

In the ceremonies held on days that are significant for Islamic Resistance, such as the commemoration of its ‘martyrs’ in February, ‘the Resistance and Liberation Day’ in May and ‘the Victory Day’ in August, the contents of Nasrullah’s speeches on these days are primarily about the Resistance.

In the ceremonies during Al-Quds Day on the last Friday of Ramadan, as it was declared by the late Imam Khomeini (Al-Mosawi, 2012), Nasrullah’s speeches hinge primarily around the Resistance.

In the Commemoration of Muslim scholars, Nasrullah’s speeches have primarily religious and political content.

On urgent occasions, such as the July War in 2006; the release of Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails; the assassination of the Commander of Islamic Resistance in 2008, Nasrullah’s speeches primarily hold resistant content.

The samples of Nasrullah’s speeches chosen for analysis in this research have, primarily, a resistant content. However, the next section aims to show the structure of Nasrullah’s speeches before proceeding to analyse their microstructure.

8.4 General Structure of Nasrullah’s Speeches

Shedding light on the general structure of Nasrullah’s speeches provides, prior to analysing the content, a glimpse of the arrangement of ideas. As a result of using a videoconference technique to address the audience directly, Nasrullah generally appears in front of a background that informs viewers about the occasion of his speech.

In every speech, including the analysed speeches in this chapter, Nasrullah starts by praising Allah and asking Him to send the blessings of the Prophets in general and the Prophet Muhammad – in particular, Prophet Muhammad’s
family and his elite companions. Following this lead, Nasrullah welcomes the audience and salutes them before providing an outline of his speech. Based on the outline written on a paper or papers, Nasrullah presents, chronologically, the points of his speech. He states the arguments and presents points to secure them from falsification. At the end of the speech, Nasrullah re-thanks the audience and salutes them.

In summary, this section has shown the general structure of Nasrullah’s speeches. However, the next section aims to delve into the chosen samples of his speeches to explore their rhetoric or, in other words, the notion of persuasion, before extracting their signs and codes.

8.5 Triangle of Rhetoric in Nasrullah’s Analysed Speeches

Nasrullah generally presents his speeches extemporaneously without reading from a paper or a screen or using any listening device. Unlike the majority of his speeches, Nasrullah read from a paper during the funeral of Islamic Resistance’s commander, Imad Mughniyeh. It seems that the sensitivity of the case, where the Lebanese and the world wanted to know, more closely, the workings of his organisation after the assassination of Mughniyeh, obliged Nasrullah to choose his words carefully. Thus, Nasrullah’s speech on this occasion was shorter than the rest, as it will be shown.

However, the extemporaneous feature in the delivery of the speeches requires interpreting them from a different angle, in order to show how Nasrullah uses his speeches to achieve the agenda of Islamic Resistance, or in other words, how he uses his speeches in policy-making. Thus, this research utilises a rhetorical approach to explore the notions of ethos, logos and pathos in the investigated speeches. Although this tool is old and generally referred to in the context of Aristotle, it can be applied to contemporary speeches (Gottweis, 2007).

In analysing Nasrullah’s three speeches for this research, this chapter will show the notions of logos and pathos in every speech and illuminate the elements that

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1 There is a study utilising Halliday’s functional grammar in interpreting a number of translated speeches of Nasrullah (Bazzi, 2009) and another one that considers their lexical repetition and ideology (Lahlali, 2012). However, these studies do not consider the extemporaneity in the majority of Nasrullah’s speeches. In addition, the speeches may include grammatical mistakes. As a result of this extemporaneity, the main focus in analysing Nasrullah’s speech should be shifted to how the ideas are presented, rather than the grammar and the order of words.
contribute to Nasrullah’s ethos. However, it is crucial, initially, to provide a brief description about the subject of every speech.

The first speech is called ‘The speech of Divine Victory’, delivered after the end of the July War in 2006. Nasrullah addressed the masses on 22 September, 2006, to confirm the success of Islamic Resistance in the war and its continuous work to increase the number of its missiles. The duration of this speech is 75 minutes.

![Figure 23: The speech of Divine Victory with regard to the significance of Resistance](image)

Figure 23 shows that ‘resistance’ is the most dominant term in Nasrullah's speech and this reflects the occasion of the speech. Lebanon (including its etymologies) and Israel (including Zionists) are the two most dominant terms after ‘Resistance’. However, and as observed from other dominant words in the speech, resistance/Resistance (that is, Islamic Resistance) is the entity that defends Lebanon and its people from Israel and its forces.

The second speech was delivered on 14 February, 2008, during the funeral of the commander of Islamic Resistance, Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated in the Syrian capital, Damascus. The duration of this speech is 30 minutes.
Figure 24 shows that Imad (Mughniyeh) is the most dominant term in Nasrullah's speech and this reflects the occasion of the speech. In a similar vein, the term 'war' has the same dominance. However, Israel, Resistance and Lebanon are the following three most dominant terms in the speech. Similar to the first speech, and as observed from other dominant words in the speech, Resistance is the entity that defends Lebanon and its people from Israel and its forces.

The third speech was delivered on 16 February, 2010, during Islamic Resistance’s week-long commemoration of its ‘martyrs’. In this speech, designed to reassure the importance of the Resistance in protecting Lebanon from Israeli assaults, Nasrullah threatened Israel that Islamic Resistance would destroy buildings in Tel Aviv if any building in the southern district of Beirut was hit by Israel. The duration of this speech is 70 minutes.
Figure 25 shows that Israel (including its etymologies 'Israeli' and 'Israelis') is the most dominant term in Nasrullah's speech. This dominance does not reflect the occasion of the speech, which is the week in which Islamic Resistance commemorates its martyrs. However, the term 'martyrs' (including its etymology 'martyred') appears alongside the other dominant terms, which are 'war', 'Resistance' and 'Lebanon'. Contrary to the first two speeches, this speech reveals that Israel is the entity that the Resistance will face to defend Lebanon and its people.

8.5.1 Ethos

As shown previously, Nasrullah studied and practiced how to deliver a speech. Since heading Hezbollah in 1992, he has addressed the public periodically. Thus, Nasrullah, through frequently delivering speeches, has succeeded in becoming a popular figure in Lebanon and the Arab World, where the masses wait to hear his words (El Houri, 2012).

Nasrullah’s personal characteristics, including his powers of persuasion, contribute to his ethos. In delivering his speeches, Nasrullah complies in wearing religious dress, the turban and the jubbah, always appearing with a trimmed
beard. In addition to this physical appearance, Nasrullah raises his voice when he threatens Israel, stimulating the masses’ enthusiasm. For example, when Nasrullah stated, in the first analysed speech, “Today […] the Resistance has more than twenty thousand rockets”, the masses reacted by cheering and replying that they are at his service. The audience reacted in a similar fashion when Nasrullah threatened Israel in his third speech: “If you bomb a building in Dahiyeh [the southern district of Beirut], we will bomb buildings in Tel Aviv.” The reaction of the audience during the speeches contributes to Nasrullah’s ethos. As Gottweis (2007) argues, ethos ultimately “depends on the perception of audiences” (p. 242).

Before delivering his speech, Al-Manar and other Hezbollah's media outlets call the crowds to attend the central ceremony where Nasrullah addresses the masses. Thus:

The sense of anticipation before he is due to make an address is heightened by repeated broadcasts of his previous appearances, images of the audience waiting for him while waving the canary flags of Hizbullah, and Nasrallah’s pictures and banners with the word labbaika (we will act on your demands) or fida’ al-sayyed’ (meaning, a sacrifice to Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah), reflecting a deep emotional bond with, and loyalty to, him (Matar, 2015, p. 442).

In his explanation to the reception theory based on encoding-decoding model of communication, Hall (2007) points to three types of receivers based on the codes embedded in the message: dominant-hegemonic, negotiated and oppositional. Nasrullah's audiences are from the followers and supporters and thus they are in a dominant-hegemonic position. In this regard, Nasrullah and his audience have the same culture and as a result they share the same codes. This audience understands the codes in the speeches of its leader who built his charisma on credibility and truth since 1992. Since became Hezbollah's Secretary-General, there have been three stages that boosted Nasrullah's popularity and emphasised his charisma: the killing of his 18-year-old son, Hadi, on the battlefield on 23
Nasrullah's ethos turned his addressees - the followers and the supporters - into vulnerable receptors who believe in every word of their leader, who invests “his friendly and conversational mode of address, as well as his truthfulness, as personal attributes that reveal he is an “organic” leader rooted in Lebanon’s everyday culture” (Matar, 2015, p. 439). Thus, Nasrullah, who is altogether a religious, political and military leader, has become a leader symbol, or by other words a symbolic leader (Harb, 2011). This form of leadership defined by Hatem (1974) as “one who is believed to be in some unusually intimate relation with supernatural power, or to have some extraordinary qualities beyond the normally human” (p. 81).

After providing an overview of the elements that contribute to Nasrullah’s ethos, the next subsection aims to show the notion of logos in his speeches.

8.5.2 Logos

Nasrullah uses his speeches to engage in a debate, providing points to verify his arguments\(^1\). In this regard, this subsection aims to show how Nasrullah presents his arguments and points in the three analysed speeches. In the first analysed speech, Nasrullah postulates a number of arguments related to the July War; this research will illuminate the arguments which have resistant content.

The first argument is based on how a few thousand of Islamic Resistance fighters defeated the Israeli army in the July War; it concludes that the victory happened with the support and aid of Allah.

To verify his thesis that Islamic Resistance received Divine aid and support during the war to achieve a miraculous victory, Nasrullah provided the following points:

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\(^1\) In her multidisciplinary study of Nasrullah’s speeches based on content analysis and critical discourse analysis, Issa (2012) illuminates how Nasrullah postulates the theses in a speech and how he supports them with points. Although Issa studied Nasrullah’s argumentation under the discipline of critical discourse analysis, she has never provided an analysis under the notion of logos, nor she has shed light on the notions of ethos and pathos.
• *Islamic Resistance* fighters stood in the open ground for 33 days exposed to the open skies without aerial cover in front of the strongest air force in the Middle East.

• *Islamic Resistance* fighters faced 40,000 officers and soldiers, four brigades of Israel's elite forces, three squads from the [Israeli] army reserve and […], the strongest tank in the world and the most powerful army in the region.

• Israel was provided, by an air bridge, with the conveyance of smart bombs from America via Britain.

• Lack of Arab support

• Domestic political division

• *Islamic Resistance* fighters drove the naval warships out of [Lebanese] territorial waters, destroyed the pride of the Israeli industry - the Merkava tanks – disrupted Israeli helicopters in daytime and later at night as well, and on their elite brigades.

Although Nasrullah attributed the victory in the July War to Allah, he insisted that the experience and knowledge in the fighting of *Islamic Resistance* should be considered as well. He said: “[*Islamic Resistance*] depends on the thinking, planning, organising, training and armaments, and as is said: dealing with the root causes [...] a Resistance that has knowledge, wisdom, planning, training and equipment.”

The second argument was that the war in July, 2006 was decided on by the United States of America ‘to crush *Hezbollah*’ and it ended after the Israeli army failure. To validate his thesis, Nasrullah provides the following points:

• [The American administration] did not approve stopping the war on the first two days, and the first week [and] did not accept [to stop] it on the second week, the third and the fourth week.

• If you recall the last days [of war], the largest number of tanks were destroyed, the largest number of occupation soldiers were killed […] helicopters crashed… Hence, the Zionists realised that a disaster awaited them should they continue.
• The American [administration] interfered and accepted the [Security Council resolution’s] drafts […] in order to stop the war. They stopped the war not for the sake of Lebanon […], but for the sake of Israel.

In his third argument, Nasrullah interwove his theme around Resistance and dignity, addressing leaders of Arab states that have launched a peace initiative with Israeli since 2002, that they are not successful, because they do not want to wage war against Israel. To verify his thesis, Nasrullah raised the following questions and the points about the failure of Arab states against Israel:

• How will you obtain honourable settlement, while you announce day and night that you will not fight for the sake of Lebanon, nor Gaza, the West Bank, not even for the sake of Al-Quds?
• How will you get to a reasonable settlement, when every day you declare you will not use the weapon of oil? Even when someone spoke of the weapon of oil you ridiculed and mocked him […]
• You do not want to fight, boycott, use oil as a weapon or even allow people to demonstrate in the streets, nor allow the Resistance in Palestine to arm; you blockade it, deprive it of funds, starve it and cut off its salaries, for what, only for [the then U.S. Secretary of State] Condoleezza Rice? How will these acquire a just or honourable settlement? Do the Israelis even recognise you?
• As for saying we are weak, I say the people of Lebanon have demonstrated to all peoples of the world, that the Lebanese Resistance presents the proof against all Arab and Islamic armies.
• Today the Israelis look to the Resistance and the people of Lebanon with great respect and appreciation, but all these obsequious people equal nothing.
• The Arab armies and people are not only able to liberate Gaza, the West Bank and the eastern district of Al-Quds […] they are able to regain Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.
• The problem is when a person [some Arab governors] places himself between two options: between his people and his throne, [he] chooses his throne, between Al-Quds and his throne [he] chooses his throne...

The fourth argument postulated by Nasrullah hinged around a thesis that *Islamic Resistance* distorted the image of an undefeated Israeli army. To verify this thesis, Nasrullah provided the following points:

• It is enough for you to read what is going on in occupied Palestine and what the Zionists are saying about what is going on between Israeli generals and leaders.
• An opinion poll conducted by [the Israeli] newspaper, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, says: who do you see as most appropriate person for the Prime Ministry in Israel, [the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert received 7%, the heroic Minister of War [Amir Peretz] 1 %.

The fifth argument is that *Islamic Resistance* is stronger than it was on the first day of the war on 12 July, 2006. However, this argument came after Nasrullah demanded establishing a strong and fair state in Lebanon to defend the country and as a result, the arsenal of *Islamic Resistance* will reach its aim. To verify his thesis about the strength of this military arm, Nasrullah provided the following points:

• In the recent war, a new [military] experience has been accumulated…
• Today […] the Resistance has more than twenty thousand rockets. Within a few days only, after the devastating war, the Resistance fully regained its military, organisational and armament capabilities.

In the second analysed speech, Nasrullah paid tribute to the commander of *Islamic Resistance*, Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated in Damascus. In his speech before burying Mughniyeh, Nasrullah accused Israel of Mughniyeh’s assassination and threatened it. He provided a number of arguments related to the consequences of Mughniyeh’s assassination.
In his first argument, Nasrullah insisted that the assassination of the leader of *Islamic Resistance* – Mughniyeh – would never cause the organisation to collapse. To verify his thesis, Nasrullah provided the following points:

- Let us remember; we had the same situation with Sheikh Ragheb [Harb]. Their killing of him made the Resistance grow stronger and Israel had to get out of the [Lebanese] capital, the mountains, the Western Beqaa, as well as most of South [Lebanon] except for the occupied strip. It is because of Sheikh Ragheb’s virtuous blood and his proud Resistance that Israel withdrew …
- They killed [Sayyed Abbas Al-Mosawi] and […] a few years later, Israel left [Southern Lebanon] defeated and humiliated in [May] 2000 because of his blood, because of the Resistance that carried Abbas Al-Mosawi’s name and banner, not because of international resolutions or the [pressure of the international community …

In line with the previous argument, Nasrullah postulates a thesis that Israel is doomed to fall and it will cease to exist after the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh. To verify his thesis, Nasrullah presented the following points:

- Ben Gurion […] the founder of the Zionist Entity in occupied Palestine says that Israel […] will fall after losing its first war
- Some of the Zionists called the [July War in 2006], the Sixth War […], but the leading strategists in Israel called it the first war […]. Israel acknowledges that it has lost the war…
- The Winograd commission report [the Judge who was appointed by the Israeli Prime Minister to investigate the Israeli army performance during July War…] could not hide the bitterness of the reality, repeating hundreds of times with the words ‘serious failures’, ‘shortages’, ‘weakness’, and ineptness on the part of the political, military leadership and the Israeli army…
- Why did they fail and why did they lose the July war, although they have, as he [the appointed Israeli judge Eliyahu Winograd] says, the
strongest army in the Middle East and the best equipment and technology anybody has? [...] They fail] because they faced, in Lebanon for 33 days, a serious, sincere and courageous Resistance [...]. They were fighting Imad Mughniyeh, his brothers and his pupils, who were on the lookout for them [and...] fought them with courage, bravery and intelligence…

In the same context, Nasrullah pointed out that Imad Mughniyeh accomplished his mission for any coming war and his comrades will continue the mission. To verify this thesis, Nasrullah provided the following points:

- Since the end of the July war and from 14 August [...] we had our people on the front line preparing for the next possible conflict from the very first day [...]. Today, [...] The Islamic Resistance is more than ready to face any possible aggression [and] any war on Lebanon.
- Today after the Israelis killed Hajj Imad, they should listen to me well: in any future war, there will not be one Imad Mughniyeh awaiting for you, nor will there be a few thousand fighters [...] 

In the third analysed speech, Nasrullah paid the annual tribute to the martyrs of Islamic Resistance in general and ‘martyred leaders’ in particular. In his speech, Nasrullah took the opportunity to speak about Islamic Resistance, its achievements and its right to defend Lebanon. As a result, Nasrullah provided a number of arguments related to Islamic Resistance.

The first thesis hinged around an argument that the three ‘martyred leaders’ of Islamic Resistance, Sheikh Ragheb Harb, Sayyed Abbas Al-Mosawi and Imad Mughniyeh, were aware of the nature of the struggle against Israel since boyhood and thus they carried responsibilities in the Resistance till they were assassinated. To illustrate this idea, Nasrullah provided the following points:

- Sheikh Ragheb […] the title of a Resistance [fighter] that rejects to shake hands with the enemy or smile in his face, and rejects his presence in the first place… [He] was martyred at the age of 32.
• Sayyed Abbas [...] was the leader of the Resistance movement, a leader of Resistance operations… [He] was martyred at the age of 40 only.

• As for Hajj Imad, he was a leader on the ground, and on the field. He was a promise keeper and faithful to the blood of the martyrs... [He] was martyred at the age of 46 only…

In his second argument, Nasrullah raised questions as to whether the promises of the United States of America or the international community can protect Lebanon from Israel. To invalidate these promises and questions, Nasrullah provided the following points:

• There is something related to the [US President Barack] Obama administration's credibility [...] he couldn't stop [the building of] settlements [in the occupied Palestinian territories].

• This international community cares only for its interests and respects only the strong.

In a similar vein, Nasrullah posed a question as to whether neutrality is suitable for Lebanon, in order to affect the return of its occupied territories and persuade Israel to return the Palestinian refugees from Lebanon. To prove this theory is wrong, Nasrullah quoted the then Israeli foreign minister’s statement, who refused to stop the building of settlements, and the statement of his deputy, who considered returning the Palestinian refugees to their homeland a ‘red line’. Based on these questions and answers, Nasrullah concluded that Lebanon could be strong. To verify this thesis, Nasrullah provided two proofs of strength:

• The formula of strength with which we confront all challenges is the army, the people, and the Resistance, [a formula] passed by the ministerial statement. Today this formula proved its success and validity, and has become our choice in confrontation.

• The [Lebanese] official stance [...] as well as the position of greater majority of the political forces and movements in Lebanon, as such
positions express the rejection of [Israeli] threats, not submitting to them, and they also express national solidarity in the face of any Israeli actions.

In this vein, Nasrullah addresses some Lebanese to inform them that Israel does not need a pretext to assault any country, including Lebanon. To confirm his thesis, Nasrullah provided the following points:

- From 1948 till 1967 and in all its wars on Lebanon - even in the July War – the hostages were not a reason or a pretext - these wars were premeditated [...] Israel is in no need for pretexts from anyone, and in case it needed one, it is pretty capable of manufacturing it.
- What's dangerous in this logic [when some Lebanese ask Islamic Resistance not to give Israel a pretext to attack Lebanon] is that it inclusively lays responsibility on the Resistance… There is an attempt to justify any attack for Israel. Therefore we are ready to debate this topic […] to persuade them that this logic is wrong, and the methodology is wrong, and that [logic] does not serve the confrontation with Israel.

Following this argument, Nasrullah warns some Lebanese against providing Israel with a pretext to attack Lebanon. He returned to his previous thesis that neutrality cannot protect Lebanese territories from Israeli assaults and return Palestinian refugees to their occupied territories. Thus, Nasrullah argued the followings reasons to defend Lebanon’s right to be a strong country:

- In history and in societies, there are laws and historical and social rules. All human experience says that survival is for the strong.
- In confronting tyrants, oppressors, occupiers and invaders, history tells us that only your dignity and strength protect your land and people, and that the weak have no place in the equation.
- Those who beg for protection have no place. Only the strong can impose their respect on the world and reach their aims, and if they fall, they fall as dignified martyrs.
Based on the previous arguments, Nasrullah derived another thesis that the policy of Israel aims to prevent its enemies from obtaining the means of power. To verify his thesis, Nasrullah provides the following points:

- [Israel] is threatening [its enemies] with war; if you bring this kind of weapons we will do so and so…
- Why does [Israel] assassinate this specific martyr [Mahmoud Al Mabhouh in Hamas]? [...] Israel targets the capabilities of increase and finalisation of readiness.
- [Israeli is recruiting] sedition…

In line with his previous thesis, Nasrullah derived a further thesis that Israel is afraid, and its threat to Lebanon is part of its psychological warfare which aims to prevent *Islamic Resistance* from becoming stronger. To illustrate his thesis, Nasrullah provided the following points before confronting the Israeli threats with counter threats:

- Israeli statements [to threaten Lebanon] are meant as a means of deterrence. If not 100% then 95% of these statements are conditional.
- Israel is frightened, because it says "if you do … we do so and so"
- These threats are part of the psychological war [...] Nevertheless, if they [the Israelis] see that the [Lebanese] people are afraid, then they will not stop at threatening and will launch a war.

In observing the angle of logos in these three speeches, it can be concluded that Nasrullah has the ability to turn an argument into a thesis, validating it with providing further details and facts. The process of selecting certain arguments and framing them in points are intended by Nasrullah to theorise for his thesis. This selecting and framing transmute, Nasrullah’s speech into a chain of theses, where one thesis is derived from another one. These characteristics are not only demonstrating the logical derivation in Nasrullah’s speeches, but also they are enhancing his ethos to become a charismatic leader.
All of these three speeches are hinged around the idea of perpetuating the achievements of *Islamic Resistance* and its ‘martyrs’ in the context of mobilisation and psychological warfare. Although there are arguments about the role of America in the conflict, the main focus is the arguments that relate to the conflict between *Islamic Resistance* and Israel. In summary, the common extracted ideas from the arguments in the analysed three speeches are:

- Immortalising the achievements of *Islamic Resistance* on the battlefield and describing its fighters as heroes
- Threatening Israel and considering *Islamic Resistance* in the front line to defend Lebanon from Israeli assaults
- Protecting the military arsenal of *Islamic Resistance*
- Warning the Lebanese and Arabs about Israeli intentions
- Calling Arab states to consider the notion of power in facing Israel by arming the Palestinian Resistance movements
- Accusing the United States of America by helping Israel to attack Lebanon

After showing the notion of logos in a sample of Nasrullah’s speeches, the next subsection aims to shed light on the notion of pathos in his speeches.

### 8.5.3 Pathos

Nasrullah addresses the masses, the followers and the supporters, as they are his partners in *Islamic Resistance*. He aims to engage them in the up-to-date news of *Islamic Resistance* and share together the feelings of happiness and sorrow. In every speech, as it will be shown in the analysed speeches, Nasrullah uses similar words to address the audience and quotes religious statements which reflect common values with the addressees.

In his speeches, Nasrullah welcomes the masses and calls them, “Dear brothers and sisters.” Notably, the first analysed speech is high with emotion, because it is Nasrullah’s first public speech after almost a month from the end of the July War. Nasrullah tells the masses that he refuses to address them through videoconference technique despite the Israeli threats against him. He attributes
the victory to the masses and says he considers them the patrons of *Islamic Resistance* by saying, for example, “What halted the war after the virtue of Allah the Exalted and Majestic, are your sons, the fighters . . .”

Such use of the familial terms, ‘brothers’, ‘sisters’, ‘sons’ and ‘daughters’ in the speech "underline[s] the role of Arabic as a 'mother language or tongue', which expression is no longer just a stock term of the kind that we find in modern linguistics, but one of live, metaphorical flesh and blood. This conceptualisation strikes a deep moral chord in Arabic and Islamic cultures, because of the revered position of maternity (and paternity) in these cultures" (Suleiman, 2013, p. 118).

In the same analysed speech, Nasrullah pays attention to welcoming people from all Lebanese districts and his wider audience in Lebanon, Iran, Arab countries and other countries, who are rejoicing the victory in the July War. Following this welcome, Nasrullah salutes his audience and their suffering during the war, repeating the term 'Peace be...' eleven times. Also, Nasrullah repeats the term 'your Resistance' five times in this speech. Such repetition is to stress the idea that the addressees are the community of the Resistance. Notably, the function of repetition in the speech is persuading the masses and capturing their emotions (Lahlali, 2012).

Moreover, the second analysed speech, on the occasion of the funeral of Imad Mughniyeh contains the term, 'our martyr...' three times. This speech pays further attention to the notion of argumentation, because it seems that Nasrullah does not want to show high emotion in the context of the psychological war with Israel. However, Nasrullah shows heightened emotion at the end of his speech, in order to buoy up the morale of the audience, saying: “Let us raise on our shoulders a leader in whom we take pride and a martyr whose martyrdom we dearly cherish. Despite the winter and the cold, let our voices be heard by all enemies and killers. We shall continue our Resistance until the complete victory is achieved, Allah willing, whatever the sacrifices may be.”

Nasrullah considers the masses' emotions. Thus, he pays attention to the religious days and tragedies, especially when his speech coincides with a relevant occasion. In the third analysed speech, which coincided with different religious and national occasions, Nasrullah presents five condolences. He offers his condolences to the Islamic nation for the memories of the deaths of Prophet Muhammad, of the second Shiite Muslim Imam, Al-Hassan ben Ali and of the
eighth Shiite Muslim Imam, Ali ben Mousa Ar-Rida. In addition, Nasrullah offers his condolences to the families of the victims who died in the Ethiopian plane crash in Beirut. Finally, he offers his condolences to the family of the assassinated Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafic Hariri, his political party and supporters.

In the last two condolences, Nasrullah expresses his sympathy and empathy with other Lebanese who are not followers and may not be supporters of his party. These condolences show that Nasrullah aims to address Lebanese groups other than his followers and supporters to grasp their attention and entice them. This reflects Lebanonisation or, in other words, the notion of reconciliation in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.

In a similar vein, Nasrullah quotes Quranic verses and Islamic texts in his speeches. In his second speech, Nasrullah quotes a Quranic verse to indicate that the assassinated commander of *Islamic Resistance*, Imad Mughniyeh, was a true believer: "Among the believers are men who are true to the covenant they made with Allah. Some of them have fulfilled their vow, and some are still awaiting; and they have not changed in the least" (33: 23).

Likewise, the third analysed speech includes a Quranic verse to show that the ‘martyrs’ of *Islamic Resistance* are the believers and will be rewarded in the Hereafter, "And those who believe in Allah and His messengers - they are the truthful, and the witnesses with their Lord; they will have their reward and their light" (57: 19).

In addressing Israel in his first speech, Nasrullah employed the words of the third Shiite Muslim Imam, Al-Hussein ben Ali, to the Umayyad Caliph, Yazid in the battle of Karbala, “We are the sons of that Imam, who said: Is it with death you threaten me? Death to us is normalcy and martyrdom is dignity offered from Allah.” Although he did not refer to the name of the Imam who said this adage, Nasrullah invokes the culture of his followers, which is entrenched with the *Ashura*’s narration and its revolutionary implications. Notably, the second sentence of this adage was written on the platform where Nasrullah delivered his speech to pay tribute to Mughniyeh.

By saying, “We are the sons of that Imam”, Nasrullah refers to his cultural and religious identification, the followers and even the supporters of Imam Al-Hussein, or in other words, he refers to what is called the ‘community of
Resistance’. Although Imam Al-Hussein is one of his ancestors, Nasrullah considers that common belief and culture are dominant in the line of blood (Zaiton, 2007). In this regard, Nasrullah calling his addressees, “Dear brothers and sisters”, aligns with this interpretation.

The quotes from the holy book, Quran, and Islamic history show the notion of intertextuality in Nasrullah’s speeches. Furthermore, they show the sense of Islamic solidarity with the addressees. Thus, these quotes can be classified under the notion of pathos.

In this regard, it can be argued that the use of pronouns in Nasrullah’s speeches is strategic. In his analysis of the relation between the three elements in the communication process: the sender, the message and the addressees, Eco (1984) points out the use of pronouns in the message, because they enhance the textual strategy and may entail semiotic value.

As a speaker or a message sender, Nasrullah addresses not only the followers and the supporters, but also the Israelis. This interpersonal communication reflects Nasrullah’s strategy in framing and dichotomisation.

In addressing his followers and supporters and threatening Israel, Nasrullah uses direct pronouns. When he calls his addressees, as shown previously in the first analysed speech, for example, “We are the sons of that Imam”; or “Today, you are offering a strong, and extremely important and critical political and moral message to the Lebanese, Arabs and people of the whole world…”, Nasrullah shows that he considers them a part of his military organisation, intending to mobilise them. However, when Nasrullah threatens Israel, as shown in the third analysed speech, for example, “If you bomb a building in Dahiyeh [the southern district of Beirut], we will bomb buildings in Tel Aviv”, he aimed to demoralise their spirits, because they are the others, ‘the enemy’. Thus, the use of pronouns is crucial to identifying the objectives of the speech.

In short, the subsection has illuminated the angle of pathos in Nasrullah’s analysed speeches, which adds value to logos and ethos. As a result, the relation between the three elements in the triangle of rhetoric in Nasrullah’s speeches is dialectic, because every notion provides the other two with strength and coherence. Figure 26 shows the dialectic relation in Nasrullah’s speeches.
The next subsection aims to show the signs and the codes in the analysed Nasrullah’s speeches.

8.5.4 Embedded Signs in Nasrullah’s Speeches

This subsection aims to sketch the signs in Nasrullah’s speeches, and determine whether these signs have linguistic or non-linguistic form. Furthermore, it aims to extract the codes. However, this subsection also refers to Barthes (1964), who extended analysis into non-linguistic signs, and Peirce (1974), who classified the signs into three forms.

Regarding the visual signs, there are three signs observed in Nasrullah’s analysed speeches: iconic, symbolic and indexical. The iconic sign can be observed through the calmness in Nasrullah’s appearance accompanied with a tone reflecting this mode. However, Nasrullah’s appearance wearing jubbah and a black turban are indexical and symbolic. They are an index that Nasrullah is a Muslim cleric. However, the black turban is symbolic because only clerics, particularly Shiites, whose ancestors go back to the Prophet Muhammad’s Household, distinguish themselves by wearing black turbans instead of white ones.
In addition, there is an indexical sign in Nasrullah’s gestures. He raises his right arm, pointing his index finger, accompanied with amplifying the tone of his voice while threatening Israel. This indexical sign in threatening Israel has become Nasrullah’s brand. In his reply to a question to a Lebanese newspaper about this gesture, Nasrullah uncovered that he was moving his hand spontaneously till he noticed that the masses were reacting and cheering with his threatening gesture and, as a result, he started choosing the appropriate time to point his finger and raise the tone of his voice (Al-Amin et al., 2014b).
Likewise using linguistic signs similar to those in other media outputs of Islamic Resistance, as shown in the previous two chapters, Nasrullah generally employs the same terminology to signify the self, the followers, the supporters and the ‘other’, Israel. Table 33 shows the frames used in Nasrullah’s analysed speeches.

Table 33: Signs used in the analysed speeches of Nasrullah

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamic Resistance</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naming</strong></td>
<td><strong>Characterisation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We</td>
<td>Serious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahedeen</td>
<td>Sincere or Devout</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>Courageous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Resistance</td>
<td>Brave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of Lebanese Resistance</td>
<td>Has intelligence and knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending Lebanon</td>
<td>Steadfast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to Protect Lebanon</td>
<td>Proud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model of liberation</td>
<td>Loyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Brave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threatens in return</td>
<td>Endure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model of liberation</td>
<td>Brothers and Sisters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defeating Israeli army</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Passionate</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trusting on Allah</td>
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</table>
Many of these signs have been identified previously in the outputs of the military media unit, particularly the statements. To avoid repetition, it is important to point out that the signs that are triadic, such as the mujahedeen or fighters of *Islamic Resistance*, Israeli army and settlements, have been analysed previously to show, for each of these signs, its *representamen*, *interpretant* and *referent* (or object).

Regarding the paradigmatic relations of signs, it can be argued that the frames used by Nasrullah, whether for his organisation or Israel, are generally congruent with those in the written statements. However, Nasrullah used further frames in naming Israel. This process of naming not only reflects the ideology of the speaker, but it also maintains the mental representation in the perception of the followers and the supporters.

As with the use of metaphoric expressions in the statements, Nasrullah employs the same linguistic usage. In the first analysed speech, Nasrullah uses a metaphoric expression when he describes the Israeli elite soldiers in the July War to his addressees as mice: “The [Israeli] elite brigades were turned into frightened and horrified mice by your sons [the fighters of *Islamic Resistance*].” In this derogatory description, Nasrullah aims to present a non-human image of elite Israeli soldiers fleeing scared in the battlefield in front of a band of *Islamic Resistance* fighters. Instead of using the term, ‘fled’, to describe the status quo of Israeli soldiers during the war, Nasrullah employs the image of abused mice to signify the cowardice of Israeli soldiers when they face *Islamic Resistance* fighters. Such images seem to be intended by Nasrullah in the context of mobilisation and psychological warfare to reframe the perception of Israeli soldiers in the minds of his addressees.

Regarding the codes used in the speeches, Nasrullah employs similar codes in the statements and fighters’ testaments, particularly in naming Israel as the

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Zionist Entity. This code will be analysed in the next chapter to present its implications, alongside other codes previously extracted from the outputs of the military media unit, in order to classify the frames used in the discourse of *Islamic Resistance* and their meanings.

In summary, this subsection has sketched the signs used in Nasrullah’s speeches. These signs provide an insight into how Nasrullah identifies his organisation, followers, supporters and his enemy. In addition, this subsection has shown one of the uses of metaphoric language in Nasrullah’s speech that entails the dehumanisation of elite Israeli soldiers.
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the rhetoric in three speeches of the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, the leader of Islamic Resistance, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, to show the signs used and, consequently, the frames and objectives. However, this chapter has been contextualised by providing background information about Nasrullah, particularly how and where he learnt to deliver a speech. In line with depicting the structure of Nasrullah’s speeches, this chapter has distinguished between the contexts of Nasrullah’s speeches, showing how he delivers his speeches.

Based on the notion of rhetoric, particularly the rhetorical triangle – ethos, logos and pathos – this chapter has shown the microstructure of the chosen samples of speeches that have a resistant context. As a result, it has shown Nasrullah’s charisma, his argumentation and how he addresses followers and supporters. In addition, it has shown that these three rhetorical notions in the speeches act in a dialectic relation to contribute to the charismatic leadership of Nasrullah. Also, this chapter identified the signs and codes in the analysed speeches.

This chapter found that the leader of Islamic Resistance, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, uses his speeches to call for struggle against Israel. Within this strategy, Nasrullah uses his charisma and his argumentative ability to mobilise the Lebanese and the Arabs for this struggle and to demoralise the spirits of the Israelis. As a result, Nasrullah's speeches reflect the following objectives: mobilisation, reconciliation and psychological warfare.

The next chapter classifies the frames of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and delves into their meaning.
Chapter 9. Frames in the Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance

This chapter aims to interpret the frames in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. These frames have already been contextualised previously by shedding light in Chapter 4 on the ideological contexts of the analysed media discourse.

Thus, this chapter addresses Research Question 2 (How does the media discourse of Islamic Resistance frame its identity and other identities? and is prefatory to Research Question 3 (What are the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance?).

In addition to the Overview and Conclusion, this chapter consists of three sections. The first section introduces briefly the analysis of the frames in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance; the second section interprets the frames that Islamic Resistance utilises to name 'the self'; and finally the third section interprets the frames utilised by this military arm to name 'the other', its place and its actions.
9.1 Overview

This chapter proceeds with presenting the data findings. As shown previously, *Islamic Resistance* utilises, in its media discourse, signs and codes in the process of naming. Due to their deep meanings and their conventional nature, the codes extracted from the previous three chapters are considered as the basic frames in this research, because they represent, culturally and politically, 'the self' and 'the other.' It interprets the denotations of the frames identified. At the linguistic level, it delves into the lexical roots of a number of frames, particularly in Arabic. At the religious level, it utilises Islamic resources, including the Quran and other books related to the Shiite Muslim creed and related jurisprudence. However, it also pays attention to the notion of intertextuality through reviewing the political and cultural contexts of some of the frames utilised.
9.2 Identified Frames in the Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance

Suleiman (2011) argues that, "Code names offer us snapshots of symbolic meanings along a moving frame" (p. 225). However, the frame can be traced through language, because it is:

a marker of identity. In this function, language assumes greater importance than usual in situations of conflict. Language bonds its speakers internally and bounds them externally. In this respect, it acts as a boundary-setter between the in-group and out-group (Suleiman, 2004, p.13).

Identifying the frames in this research is significant, because they:

represent interpretative schemata that combine cognitive tools and language that allow people to make sense of everyday experiences and events, and are more likely to resonate with the intended recipients when they draw on shared cultural themes and cultural memory in specific historical contexts (Matar, 2010, p. 150).

As shown previously in identifying the signs and codes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, there are terminologies used for the actions, actors and places. In this vein, Suleiman (2004) argues that, "one of the most important aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the manipulation of terminology to create a linguistic map that conditions people's perceptions of the facts on the ground" (p. 138). Thus, the process of naming in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict "functions as locating in history, as temporalizing, and ultimately as asserting power as colonial domination or as anti-colonial resistance" (Massad, 2006, p. 14).

This following sections aim to identify the frames in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and their meanings. These frames provide an insight into how Hezbollah's military arm presents 'the self' and its enemy, 'the other.'
9.3 Frames of 'the Self'

The name, *Islamic Resistance*, includes two words denoting the identity of this military wing: 'Islamic' and 'Resistance.' The first term reflects its ideology. However, the second term underlines the aim of this military arm as a resistance movement to liberate the occupied Lebanese territories from Israeli occupation.\(^1\) In tracing its Arabic lexical meaning, the term *moqawama* (resistance) is derived from the verb *qawam* (resist)\(^2\) and it may signify the igniting of a war by one group against another one (Manzur, 2003).

The culture of Resistance has its footprint in the history of conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa and it was resonated by religious leaders against the European invaders to Algeria, Egypt and Sudan in the eighteenth century. This culture was echoed by the Palestinian Grand Mufti, Amin Al-Husseini, against the Israelis in the middle of last century (Strindberg and Wärn, 2011).

In this context, "armed resistance[s] not only carries with it the promise of political liberation but constitutes in and of itself the means of psychological emancipation" (Strindberg and Wärn, 2011, p. 58). Hence, Resistance is considered "as a quest for political autonomy and dignity" (ibid, p. 125).

Abrahamsen (cited in Strindberg and Wärn, 2011) argues that, "resistance cannot be idealized as pure opposition to the order it opposes, but operates instead inside a structure of power that it both challenges and helps to sustain" (p. 144).

Drawing on this post-colonialism theorisation of Resistance, which can be applied to *Islamic Resistance*, "the violence of anticolonial resistance movements fills a psychological function by offering 'a primary form of agency through which the subject moves from non-being to being, from being an object to a subject'" (Young, cited in Strindberg and Wärn, 2011, p. 58). As a result, the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* is emancipatory.

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1 Unlike the Security Council's resolution 242, which states directly the term 'occupation' to denote the Arab territories occupied by Israel in June, 1967 (S/RES/242, 1967), the Security Council's resolution 425 issued on 19 March, 1978 describes indirectly the Israeli army invasion of Lebanon as an 'occupation', because it "calls upon Israel to immediately cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory" (S/RES/425, 1978).

2 In a war, when two groups fought each other, it is called in Arabic *Taqawamo* (Manzur, 2003).
The signs and codes that reflect 'the self' that have identified and extracted in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* can be classified into three categories: the frames that identify the fighters, the actions, and the ideology.

### 9.3.1 The Fighters

*Islamic Resistance* fighters are described in its media discourse with labels, such as ‘heroes’, ‘mujahedeen’, ‘defenders’ and ‘liberators of Lebanese occupied territories’. In addition to these signs, they have been called Allah's Men. This code, which signifies masculinity in Arabic culture, requires deep interpretation, because it emerged during the July War in 2006, as shown in the data collected for analysis.

During the July War in 2006, the popular Syrian poet, Omar Al-Farra, praised the military actions of *Islamic Resistance* and its fighters, composing a poem *Haolā Hom Rijalo-llah* (Those are Allah's Men) (Daabol, 2006). Notably, this poem was aired via *Al-Manar* in Al-Farra's voice during and after the war¹.

Al-Farra's term Allah's Men invaded the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, because it was utilised by its leader and the military media unit. However, the same term was also used by the Lebanese poet, Ghassan Matar, who was inspired by Nasrullah's reply to the fighters during the war². Matar's poem *Ahibaii* (My Beloved Ones), which was sung by Julia Boutros (Juliaboutros, 2006), included this term Allah's Men to show how the leader of *Islamic Resistance* addresses his fighters³.

The meaning of this frame can be traced from two sources. Based on the notion of intertextuality, Allah's Men has its root in a number of verses in the Quran calling to the true believers, such as in the verse, “Among the believers are men who are true to the covenant they made with Allah” (33: 23). However, the second interpretation of this frame is based on Arabic semantics or grammar. As the fighters of *Islamic Resistance* belong to *Hezbollah*, this implies that they are

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¹ *Dar Al-Manar for Art Production and Distribution* included Al-Farra's poem on a DVD with other propaganda flashes and video clips, aired on *Al-Manar* during the July War in 2006.

² The DVD issued by *Dar Al-Manar for Art Production and Distribution* includes also Ghassan Matar's poem in his voice.

³ Both Ghassan Matar and Julia Boutros are Lebanese Christians.
Hezbollah's men (Rijalo Hezb-llah). In Arabic, it is permissible to omit an adjunct or an annexed (Modaf) if it is as well a governed noun of a genitive construction (Modaf Ilaih), because the following governed noun of a genitive construction may refer to the omitted word without affecting the meaning. As a result of this semantic process, the omitted Arabic word from Hezbollah's men (Rijalo Hezb-llah) is the adjunct and the genitive Hezb (which means the party). Thus, the new term is Rijalo-llah can signify Hezbollah's men (Rijalo Hezb-llah).

Whatever the implication of Allah's Men, this term has turned into a frame and has become a brand or an indicator to the fighters of Islamic Resistance, because it emerged during the July War and has been maintained since then as a marker of their identity.

9.3.2 Actions of Islamic Resistance

As shown in the previous chapters, particularly in the sections that identify the embedded signs, Islamic Resistance presents its military actions in the context of defending Lebanon from the Israeli army assaults, liberating the occupied Lebanese territories and Lebanese prisoners from the Israeli jails. Thus, Islamic Resistance frames the actions of its fighters as responding or replying to Israeli attacks and violation.

The utilisation of this label in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance to frame the actions of 'the self' implies that this military arm has a nuanced understanding of the importance of choosing self-defensive words in addressing the public, particularly audiences in Western countries, in order to change their perception about the nature of the conflict and entice a sort of legitimacy.

In his comments on the description of Israeli military actions in some Western press, Suleiman (2004) points out that:

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1 Allah's Men can be also called an eponym of Islamic Resistance fighters. In language, 'eponym' refers to a specific famous person to link his or her attributes with someone else. Using an eponym well can be something of a balancing act; if the person is too obscure, no one will understand your reference, but if it's too well known, it may come across as a cliché” (McGuigan, 2007, p. 79).

2 The statements issued by Islamic Resistance during the July War in 2006, as shown previously, included the war trope terms 'confronted' and 'battle' to signify the fighters' actions and what is going on in the field. In Arabic, the term "confrontation" is less dangerous than 'battle', and this, in turn is less dangerous than 'war” (Suleiman, 2013, p. 138).

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the military actions by the Israelis are always a 'response' to something, even when they strike first. If they haven't actually been attacked, it's a 'response' to a security threat. 'Response' is a very useful word. It provides a ready-made reason for the Israelis' actions and neatly brushes off demands for further explanation. It says: 'Don't ask why we did it, ask the other side' (p. 138).

Similar to Israel and its sympathisers or allies, the utilisation of this frame in relation to actions seems to have significance in the media war of Islamic Resistance. In addition to this frame, Islamic Resistance may name its military operations. As shown previously, the military operation of capturing two Israeli soldiers on 12 July, 2006, was named Al-Wa'ad As-Sadeq (The True Pledge).¹ This name is directed to the followers, supporters and to Israel that the pledge of the leader of Islamic Resistance, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, to capture Israeli soldiers to swap for Lebanese prisoners has been achieved². In this context, the name of this military operation was opted for by the Secretary-General of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, according to Al-Mayadeen (2013). However, the adoption of this name by Islamic Resistance reflects the ties between this military arm and some Palestinian militant organisations (Haidet, 2007).

### 9.3.3 Religious Frames

In observing its media discourse, Islamic Resistance does not hide its religious identity. In this regard, the organisation utilises codes directed to the followers,

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¹ Due to the role of the commander of Islamic Resistance, Imad Mughniyeh, in successfully supervising Operation the True Pledge and as a result of his assassination in February, 2008, the swap deal in July, 2008 held its sobriquet Operation Al-Radwan, according to Al-Mayadeen (2013). However, Levitt (2013) points out this name is considered "as part of the group's revenge for Mughniyeh's assassination" (p. 5).

² On 29 January, 2004, Nasrullah vowed to liberate the rest of the Lebanese prisoners from Israel's jails, asking its government to release them. Otherwise, Islamic Resistance threatened to initiate operations to capture Israeli soldiers to swap them, as the documentary 'Sufa' produced by Al-Manar (2011) revealed. The significance of naming the military operations and swap deals is to preserve "personal and collective memories" (Suleiman, 2011, p. 145).
because they hold the same religious ideology and consequently they may understand the frames used.

As noted previously in a number of issued statements and the first video of military operations in which Israeli soldiers are captured, *Islamic Resistance* and its fighters pay attention to the self-religious creed and religious occasions during military operations. Thus, the organisation uncovers, in its media discourse, the fighters' religious calls on the battlefield, such as *O’ Ali* and *O’ Master of the Age*. Furthermore, the organisation shows the importance of the Islamic calendar months (*Hijri* calendar), such as Muharram; if the military operation coincides with that month, which contains *Ashura*, it implies, as shown in its media discourse, ‘*The Victory (or the Triumph) of Blood over the Sword*’. Also, it frames the death of its fighters as *martyr(s)* and the *mujahid martyr (s)*, whether they are killed in the so-called sacred duty of jihad or in facing the Israeli army.

However, it is important to interpret these noted religious frames in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, because they form a theological representation of 'the self' and fuel the conflict with Israel.

Regarding the denotations of the *martyr* and the *mujahid martyr*, Alagha (2011) points out that the title *mujahid martyr* (or the martyr fighter) is to signify the Muslim fighter who is killed in the battlefield. However, *martyr* is a title given "to an innocent civilian Muslim person who died without taking part in the fighting" (Alagha, 2011, p. 97). The same author provides another distinction between these two types of martyrdom, pointing out that only "the martyr fighter is neither washed nor wrapped in a burial shroud"1 (ibid).

According to its issued obituaries, *Islamic Resistance* uses *martyr* and *mujahid martyr* interchangeably to signify the death of its fighters in the battlefield. Generally, the contexts of the obituaries reveal the identity of the fighter(s) as a mujahid and/or mujahedeen. This implies that all the fighters of *Islamic Resistance* are mujahedeen and become martyrs when they are killed in the battlefield, or in a sacred duty of jihad.

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1 Alagha (2011) did not provide proof to support his argument that *Islamic Resistance* buried its martyr fighters between 1982 and 2000 without washings and without wrapping in burial shrouds.
However, the two codes, *O'Ali* and *O' Master of the Age*, denote calling the first and the twelfth Shiite Muslim Imams, respectively. The first Imam is Ali ben Abi Talib, who is the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, because he married the latter's daughter, Fatima. According to Shiite Muslim historical narration, as shown earlier, Imam Ali ben Abi Talib is considered to be the first legitimate caliph and heir of the prophet Muhammad (Al-Hasani, 2012a; Tabātabā’ī, 1977). Furthermore, this Imam is considered to have been an early Muslim hero who fought alongside the Prophet Muhammad in the battles against the polytheists and Jews. In this regard, Shiite Muslims attribute the destruction of a castle's gate at the onset of Khaibar's (or Khybar's) Battle against the Jews to the physical and spiritual strength of Imam Ali (Al-Hasani, 2012a; Tabātabā’ī, 1977). Thus, it can be argued that the fighters of *Islamic Resistance* call on this Imam to obtain from him the notions of heroism, strength and power.

However, the second Imam is the twelfth Imam, who is called Al-Mahdi and also as Al-Muntazar (*The Awaited Imam*), because, as noted previously, he "will come as the savior of mankind" (Tabātabā’ī, 1977, p. 212). The call *O' Master of the Age* signifies that the fighters believe and acknowledge that the occulted Imam Al-Mahdi is their current legitimate caliph, paving, by their military actions, his way to appear (Zaiton, 2007). In this context, *O' Master of the Age* may signify that the fighters consider themselves the soldiers of this hidden Imam whose reappearance they are waiting for in order to establish a state of justice (Tabasi, 2003).

On the other hand, the adage, "*The Victory (or The Triumph) of Blood over the Sword*" was said by the late Imam Khomeini to signify that the importance of

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1 These calls *O'Ali* and *O' Master of the Age* may signify that *Islamic Resistance* fighters are asking their two Imams for help. However, this meaning seems unclear and inadequate.

2 Khaibar, transliterated also as Khaybar, is the name of a town close to Al-Madinah city in Saudi Arabia, which witnessed the battle between Prophet Muhammad's troops and the Jews, who fortified themselves in a castle (Al-Hasani, 2012a). Notably, *Islamic Resistance* names a type of its long-range missiles fired on Israel during the July War, as noted previously in a number of its statements, Khaibar. Thus, the utilisation of this historical name by *Islamic Resistance* signifies the importance of religious parables for inspiration in its war against Israel.

3 After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Shiite cleric, Muqtada As-Sadr, established a militia naming it *Al-Mahdi Army* (Nasr, 2006). The implication of this name reflects the ossification of Imam Al-Mahdi's belief in the Shiite Muslim consciousness.
sacrifice in winning any battle, considering Ashura’s tragedy is the parable of inspiration for people to face dictatorship, "Let the bloodstained banners of Ashura be raised wherever possible, as a sign of the coming day when the oppressed shall avenge himself on his oppressor" (Khomeini, 1981, p. 246). Notably, Imam Khomeini said this adage about Ashura - "the Victory (or the triumph) of Blood over the Sword" - in a declaration from his exile in Paris on 23 November, 1978, one week before the month of Muharram, pointing out the sacrifice of Iranians necessary to topple the Shah's regime (Khomeini, 1981). As a result of the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, Khomeini confirmed his adage and reaffirmed the importance of the commemoration of Ashura (Khomeini, 1996).

The outcome of jihad or military struggle, as noted previously, is martyrdom or victory. However, the question is: how can a military defeat, such as the Battle of Karbala, be considered a victory?

In revisiting the implications of jihad, according to Qassem (2008), the real defeat denotes the defeat of the belief and the spirit. Drawing on this understanding, the outcome of the Battle of Karbala was a double victory for Imam Al-Hussein and his comrades for the self and for the nation, because they gained martyrdom with happiness and their belief and principles prevailed to inspire the coming generations.

After shedding light on the self-framing of Islamic Resistance, the next section aims to illuminate the frames of its enemy, 'the other.'

9.4 Frames of 'the Other'

As noted previously, the frame can be considered as a tool of representation, because it works in the production of knowledge (Watson, 2007). Hence, "representation connects meaning and language to culture" (Hall, 2013b, p.1).

In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, framing is characterised by the process of naming, particularly the actions and the places. It entails cultural and political dentation by both parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Suleiman, 2004).

The Palestinian cause shaped the perception of Hezbollah and consequently its military arm, since its inception, towards the conflict with Israel (Matar & Dakhllallah, 2006). As observed in its media discourse, Islamic Resistance employs certain frames to describe Israel, its places, its army and its actions. It
denies the right of Israel to exist and describes its army as an occupation army. Thus, there is no Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) or Israel ministry (and minister) of defence in its discourse. Instead, the organisation replaces the term 'defence' by 'war' and IDF by 'occupation army', as shown in its media discourse.

This section provides an insight into how the media discourse of Islamic Resistance reframes Israel and its actions. It shows the origin of the frames utilised by Islamic Resistance in language and culture. These frames can be another form of war ignited by the organisation against Israel.

9.4.1 Reframing Israel's Name

As shown in its media discourse, Islamic Resistance refers generally to Israel and its army as Zionists who occupy Palestine. In the political and media literature, "to call it Palestine is to refer to it as a colonized space in both the pre-1948 and the post-1948 periods and to signal its continued appellation as such for a postcolonial period still to come. To call it Israel is to refer to it in the post-1948 period after the coming to fruition of the Zionist project, forestalling any notion of a post-Israel Palestine" (Massad, 2006, p. 14).

In obtaining the meaning of the Zionist Entity, which is utilised by Islamic Resistance to name Israel, it is crucial to illuminate the denotations of Zionism and entity. Massad (2006) points out that Zionism in its early days was non-Jewish, because the main idea of European colonialists in the nineteenth century, particularly British and French colonialists, was establishing a Jewish state in Palestine to allow the European Jews to migrate to this new state. In this context, the establishment of Israel reflects the intersection of interests between European colonialists and European Jews, who suffered from anti-Semitism and accepted the idea of settling in Palestine and having their own state. Thus, Massad (2006) argues that "Zionism and anti-Semitism had a unified goal – the removal of Jews from Europe – which became the basis for their shared imperial vision" (p. 15).

In contrast to the term ‘Zion’, which may be found in the Old Testament and may refer to a hummock in Jerusalem, Zionism appeared in an article published by the Jewish Austrian journalist, Nathan Birnbaum, in his newspaper, Selbst-

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1 Theodor Herzl, the patronage of the Zionist movement and the advocate of establishing a state for the Jews, proposed initially that European Jews should convert to Christianity to avoid anti-Semitism (Massad, 2006).
Emancipation in 1886 and utilised later by Herzl to imply, as noted earlier, political denotation (Shoufani, 1996). As a consequence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Khomeini (1981) calls Zionism "the enemy of Islam and humanity" (p. 196).

In reviewing the samples chosen for this research, Islamic Resistance did not choose religious or cultural names to name the State of Israel, such as ‘The Jewish State’ or ‘The Hebrew State’. Instead of these terms, which may not be considered abusive and may align the description of Israel with its state, Islamic Resistance names Israel, the Zionist Entity (Al-Kayān As-Suhyūnī). In Arabic, the term Kayān (entity) signifies an occurrence or a new created thing. However, the lexical roots of this Arabic term Kayān derives from the verb Kan which generally means a defective verb in Arabic grammar (Manzur, 2003). Notably, the term Zionist Entity is employed by the Arab media to describe Israel "as an artificial state that lacked the geographic, demographic and economic strengths necessary for long-term survival" (Suleiman, 2011, p. 131). Thus, the use of the term 'entity' seems to ossify the notion that the existence of Israel is deficient and cannot be considered a state.

In a similar vein, Islamic Resistance utilises, in its media discourse, the term Rapist Entity to describe Israel. The utilisation of this term is:

a continuation of the post-1948 rhetoric, the Arab political discourse represented the occupation of Arab land in 1967 in sexual terms, describing it as an act of rape (ihtisāb). This rape was all the more devastating to the victim because it was perpetrated by what was regarded as the weaker party in the conflict, against the stronger and numerically most dominant one regionally, which, since then, has suffered chronic political and military impotence. This act of rape penetrated deep into the Arab psyche, because in carrying it out, the perpetrator used the latest Western technology, which the Arabs had so much desired but were constantly denied (Suleiman, 2011, p. 131).

The adoption of this frame by Islamic Resistance from the Arab media discourse seems reflective of the political landscape of this military arm and the
significance of utilising this frame to address Arab audiences, including those who do not hold the same religious belief as the organisation, but who may support the war against Israel.

9.4.2 Reframing Israeli Places

In its media discourse, as noted previously, Islamic Resistance calls the Israeli villages and cities, ‘colonies’ and occasionally calls them ‘settlements’. For Islamic Resistance, all Palestine is occupied by Israel. Thus, Islamic Resistance, which was reviving Al-Quds' day with a military parade, considers Al-Quds an Islamic holy city that should be liberated from Israeli occupation (Attal, 2010). El Houri (2012) points out that the notions of occupation and colonialism prevailed after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 over the Palestinian territories. Thus, occupation is:

one of the defining elements of modern Arab identity, notably in Palestine but also elsewhere with the legacy of the colonial and post-colonial experiences. As a category, occupation is coupled with and cannot be dissociated from resistance as the struggle to end occupation (ibid, pp. 174 & 175).

In this vein, and as El Houri (2012) argues:

the notion of liberation cannot be dissociated from the experience of occupation and the attachment to the land as the physical space on which the conflict is fought. Liberation becomes a re-occupation of land that had been lost – a re-appropriation of the formerly occupied space (p. 175).

The term used to describe the legal status quo of the territories in the West Bank, east Jerusalem and previously the Gaza Strip – Occupation – is a term utilised by the Security Council of the United Nations to name the Arab lands occupied by Israel in June, 1967 (Suleiman, 2004). Thus, the term Occupied Territories:
derives from the UN resolution 242, … used once only in spite of the fact that it is the only term that defines the legal status of the so-called 'Administered Territories'. The term 'Occupied' is used once and then only as a gloss for term 'Administered', thus favouring the latter term over its former counterpart (p. 166).

The same author claims that:

the academic discourse on the use of names for the settlements in the Occupied Territories is not immune from this injection of ideology. By censoring the word 'Occupied' in the name Occupied territories, Israel social science takes the ‘occupation’ out of ‘Occupation’. And when this happens in publications in English-medium journals, as it does all too often, the impact is no longer localised (Suleiman, 2011, p. 205).

To provide an example and verify his argument, Suleiman (2011) points out that David Aberbach "instead of referring to Palestine under the British mandate by that name, the author describes it as 'pre-State Israel' [...] In this case, Palestine is written out of history in the same way that the Israeli occupation is written out of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza" (p. 205).

In retrospect, the term 'colonies' and its derivative, such as 'colonists', may not be abusive, because they signify "how some leading Zionists, particularly those working in the culture domain, conceptualised themselves and their activity" (Suleiman, 2004, p. 188). Thus, this term was "used by the Zionist movement to designate the new Jewish 'settlement' in Palestine" (Suleiman, 2011, p. 208).

However, the term ‘settlements’, in Arabic, "mustawanāt, from istawtana, implies the act of an outsider to settle down in a location that does not originally belong to him or to which he is a stranger" (ibid).

Poole (cited in Suleiman, 2011) argues:

that the term settlement in English 'conjures an idea of a virgin, unpopulated territory: an image of building log cabins in the wilderness,' as well as carrying the 'secondary sense of
agreement,' neither of which is true. Israeli settlements were built 'in heavily populated Palestinian areas' and have been declared illegal by UN Security Council and the international court of Justice. The Hebrew term for settlements is hitnakhlut, 'a word of biblical origin which means roughly settling on one's patrimony' (p. 208).

Suleiman (2004) points out that:

Sharjah TV in the United Arab Emirates calls the Israeli settlement[s] in the Occupied Territories mughtasabāt, not mustawtanāt [...]. The former term is derived from the root ghasaba, the meaning of which incorporates the ideas of taking away by force, extortion, coercion, abduction and rape. This range of meanings is closer to how the Arabs conceptualise the Israeli settlements, and is closer to the status of the settlements in international law (p. 188).

As noted earlier, the use of this term aligns with the description of Israel in discourse of Islamic Resistance as the Rapist Entity.

9.4.3 Reframing the Israeli Army Actions: Deadly adventure

After Islamic Resistance initiated the operation to capture Israeli soldiers on 12 July, 2006, some Arab leaders criticised this action and named it mughamarah ghayr mahsubah, which denotes, literally, uncalculated adventure (Darwish, 2009).

Two days after the military operation, the leader of Islamic Resistance, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, responded to these leaders via Al-Manar:

Yes, we are adventurers [...]. However, we are adventurers since 1982. We did not bring to our country anything, except for victory, freedom, liberation, honour, dignity and proud [...] This is our adventure. In 1982, you and the world called us madmen. However, we have confirmed that we are wise [...]. I tell them [the Arab leaders] gamble on your minds and we will gamble on our
adventure [...]. We have never gambled on you before. Instead, we have gambled on Allah, our people, our passions, our strengths and our sons. Today, we have the same gamble, and the victory will come if it is Allah's will ("Sayyed Nasrullah," 2006) [my translation].

In his comments on 'uncalculated adventure', Darwish (2009) points out that this expression:

is actually a bad translation of the English term (uncalculated risk), uttered by installed, undemocratically elected or parachuted Arab politicians, most likely under the influence of English language instructions from their masters and or negative translations by inexperienced, sloppy or absent-minded Arabic translators was back-translated into English as (uncalculated adventure). Neither the Arabic term in Arabic nor its English translation make much sense in either language (p. 239).

As shown in its media discourse, Islamic Resistance did not refuse to be called 'adventurer'. However, it described its adventure¹, as Nasrullah argues, by positive and rational implications. In contrast, Islamic Resistance describes the Israeli army war on Lebanon as a deadly adventure. This reframing of the Israeli army attack on Lebanon and the Arab leaders' history is derogatory, because it implies they are careless. Through this reframing, which may entail the demoralisation of Israel and its allies, Islamic Resistance mobilises its followers and supporters, because its fighters will turn the Israeli army 'adventure' in Lebanon into a 'deadly ' one.

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¹ In Arabic, the term mughamarah (adventure) denotes "a reckless, thoughtless act" (Darwish, 2009, p. 239).
9.5 Conclusion

This chapter has interpreted the identified frames extracted, as codes, in the previous three chapters, delving deeply into their meanings. Although *Islamic Resistance* is considered a religious guerrilla organisation, as shown previously, its actions and the construction of its media discourse cannot be interpreted in isolation from the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As noted earlier, in interpreting the meaning a number of frames of 'the other' and their origin based on Suleiman (2004, 2011), it can be seen that this military arm reflects the vision of many Arabs towards this conflict. Thus, the framing of Israel and its actions can be viewed as a countering strategy to the misinterpretation conducted by other media outlets.

Through showing their origin, this chapter has provided an insight into the frames utilised in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.

After identifying the frames and interpreting them, the next chapter aims to identify the major objectives contained in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. 
Chapter 10. Objectives in the Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance

This chapter aims to identify the objectives in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. Although the previous chapters detailing the data analysis and related findings provided insights into some embedded objectives, this chapter seeks to delineate the major objectives in the identified discourse; thus, the chapter addresses Research Question 3 (What are the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance?).

In addition to the Overview and Conclusion, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section introduces the objectives in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance; the second section explores the mobilisation in the analysed discourse; the third section identifies the reconciliation in the analysed discourse and its strategy; and finally the fourth section illuminates the psychological warfare objective in this discourse.
10.1 Overview

In the previous analysis of the archival data and interpretation of the frames, a number of objectives have already been identified, such as the dehumanising of the Israeli army, the renaming and framing of 'the self', and the reframing of 'the other.' These objectives have cultural implications. However, there are other major objectives embedded in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* that require identification and explanation of their denotations. To this end, this chapter utilises further relevant literature and archival data, including data related to the Lebanese parliamentary elections, which has been obtained from the Beirut Office of Statistics.
10.2 Major Objectives of the Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance

Framing and reframing, whether of 'the self', or of 'the other' may, as noted previously, imply that Islamic Resistance intermingles the success of its military operations with cultural objectives. In asserting this notion in the context of clashes between Islam and the West, Khoury and Da'na (2009) consider the success of Hezbollah's military arm, in its war against Israel, a "failure of cultural imperialism [which] signifies a serious challenge to Western hegemony, which depended on the hegemony of its world views, the inherent assumption of the superiority of Western cultural forms, and the uncritical acceptance of its images of the self and the other" (p. 146).

In this regard, the Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Naim Qassem, delineates what Islamic Resistance achieved through the liberation of occupied Lebanese territories in May, 2000 and its defeat of Israel in 2006:

Firstly, it has shown the hidden power of our Ummah to refuse the Occupation.
Secondly, it has returned the spirit to our region to face the frustration and lack of confidence to change.
Thirdly, it has revived the Palestinian Resistance in the dignified and brave Palestinian people.
Fourthly, it has proved the strength of steadfastness against the new Middle East project.
Fifthly, it has changed Lebanon from a weak into a steadfast state, and we need to continue to turn it into a strong state, if it is Allah's will (Qassem, 2008, pp. 15 & 16) [my translation].

These elements are significant, because they contextualise the identification of objectives in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. Building on the previous analysis of Nasrullah's rhetoric and the identified signs in the media outputs of the military media unit, Table 34 provides the major objectives of the media discourse.
Table 34: Objectives achieved from the analysed media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Fighters' Testaments Videos</th>
<th>Military Operations' Videos</th>
<th>Propaganda Flashes and Video Songs</th>
<th>The Speeches of <em>Islamic Resistance's</em> leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Show the power of <em>Islamic Resistance</em></td>
<td>Frame the image of the deceased fighters of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> as calm and strong</td>
<td>Show the strength of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> fighters</td>
<td>Show the knowledge and the ability of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> to attack Israel and its army</td>
<td>Unveil the power of <em>Islamic Resistance</em>, such as information about its arsenal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trend towards Lebanonisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reframe the perception of Arabs towards the significance of Resistance</td>
<td>Refer to the self-confidence to counter Israel and its Prime Minister</td>
<td>Maintain the discourse of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> as a liberator of the occupied Lebanese territories and defender of Lebanon against any Israeli war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document the attacks against Israel and its army</td>
<td>Show the significance of the religious belief of <em>Islamic Resistance</em> in the war against Israel</td>
<td>Show images of bombed vehicles and tanks</td>
<td>Highlight the role of <em>Islamic Resistance's</em> commandar Imad Mughniyeh in order to remind Israel and its army of the defeat</td>
<td>Warn, threaten and counter Israel and its army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reframe the name of Israel and its army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reframe the image of Israel and its army</td>
<td>Reframe the perception of Arabs towards the significance of Resistance &amp; reframe the image of Israel and its army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilisation, Reconciliation &amp; Psychological Warfare</td>
<td>Mobilisation</td>
<td>Mobilisation &amp; Psychological Warfare</td>
<td>Mobilisation, Reconciliation &amp; Psychological Warfare</td>
<td>Mobilisation, Reconciliation &amp; Psychological Warfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three objectives – mobilisation, reconciliation and psychological warfare – are linked to the frames in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*: *mobilisation* is for 'the self', which implies mobilising the followers and the supporters; *reconciliation* is between the belief in ‘self’, as an Islamic organisation, and the belief in Lebanon as a homeland and a multi-confessional state; and finally, *psychological warfare* implies the demoralisation of 'the other' – Israel.

In her theorisation of the liberation propaganda, Harb (2011) traced, historically, the denotation of this propaganda. Although there is no census on the definition of this term, propaganda can be defined "as the communication of ideas designed to persuade people to think and behave in a particular way" (Taylor,
cited in Harb, 2011, p. 15). In this regard, liberation propaganda is "of
integration and where it is a propaganda of subversion, it is subversive of the
activities of a foreign enemy. It is like most forms of propaganda, context
specific. It borrows some, and rejects other, aspects of the principles and tools of
propaganda which are identified in different academic studies in the twentieth
and twenty first centuries" (Harb, 2011, pp. 21 & 22). Thus, it is:

a campaign that achieves, and was intended to achieve, public
support for a national cause or other mission, with mass media
being a core tool in disseminating political, social and patriotic
messages to the public [...] the notion of 'liberation propaganda'
 [...] is certainly of a media campaign [...] that seeks to promote
national unity and strengthen support for the resistance groups
that are fighting invasion or occupation forces within a sovereign,
independent state" (Harb, 2011, pp. 30 & 31).

Drawing on these explanations, Harb (2011) concludes that the propaganda of
Islamic Resistance:

is a propaganda of integration not (internal) subversion. It is an
'honest' [...] white [...] propaganda. Its sources and aims are
acknowledged. It is a propaganda that claims dependency on
objective and factual information. It is a propaganda that aims at
dismissing fear of the enemy and denouncing the enemy's
credibility and abilities and highlights the ability and credibility of
the resistance group and its leader (ibid, p. 231).

This theory of liberation propaganda, which is adopted in this chapter, enables
contextualising and understanding of all three objectives of the media discourse
of Islamic Resistance. Hence, the liberation propaganda is an overarching
objective of Islamic Resistance intertwined with its ultimate strategy.
10.3 Mobilisation

In its media discourse, *Islamic Resistance* mobilises its followers through showing the power of *Islamic Resistance* and the heroism of its fighters, and embedding its outputs with religious implications and parables. In the analysed samples from the outputs of the military media unit, the notion of mobilisation can be clearly sketched. As observed in the videos of military operations to capture Israeli soldiers, the message is directed to the followers and the supporters, “If these guys [the fighters of *Islamic Resistance*] can do it, you [the other Lebanese and Arabs] can do it too” (Harb, 2011, p. 195). The fighters' testaments indirectly entice the people who hold the same religious belief to join the line of the Resistance. Similarly, the propaganda flashes, such as You will never be able to Abolish our Renown, intend to mobilise the followers.

As Bazzi (2009) argues in relation to mobilisation during the conflict, “one hears about *Us* and *Them*, *hegemony* and *counter-hegemony*, *the enemy*, *threat*, *self-defence* or *resistance*. Parties to the conflict will vigorously mobilise their own media outlets to campaign against this enemy. Language becomes a powerful and aggressive tool in this conflict and so do the classification systems involved” (p. 56).

In this vein, *Islamic Resistance* mobilises the supporters, particularly Arab nationalists, through raising the Palestinian flag, such as shown in the analysed video song, and the portrayal of *Islamic Resistance* in the frontline to defend its supporters from Israel. Thus, the aim of this mobilising discourse is to create a community of Resistance against Israel in Lebanon and in the Arab and Muslim world (Qassem, 2008). This implies that the organisation aims to entrench the concept of Resistance and its continuity as a Lebanese necessity to liberate the occupied territories and defend the country (ibid). This notion can be observed clearly in Nasrullah's speeches after May, 2000 and with greater emphasis during and after the July War in 2006.

The analysis of a sample of his speeches and of his message to *Islamic* fighters during the July War shows that Nasrullah is playing a significant role in continuing the mobilisation of followers and the supporters. During the July War, according to the *Islamic Resistance* website (www.moqawama.org), Nasrullah addressed the public periodically via speeches through *Al-Manar* and
interviews with other media outlets, such as Assafir newspaper and Al-Jazeera. Similarly, Nasrullah has continued to buoy up the morale of the followers and supporters after the war, as the analysis of a sample of his speeches revealed. Nasrullah can be described as an authoritative figure "whom people are willing to believe [... and] as a symbol [that] was used to instil a massive wave of patriotism and heroism among a national audience in order to achieve a common objective" (Harb, 2015, p. 199). This characteristic has been observed by a number of scholars, such as David Wilseman, who considers that Nasrullah "is nothing if not a man of his word" (ibid); and Thanassis Cambanis, who observed that, "the secretary-general and charismatic supreme leader of Hezbollah command[ed] more popularity in the Middle East than any other Leader" (ibid, p. 200).


four criteria that distinguish charismatic leadership from other types of leadership. These are the leader’s image, which suggests that followers believe that the leader possesses superhuman and extraordinary characteristics; receptivity, which means followers believe the leader’s statements because it is he or she who makes them; compliance, meaning followers obey the leader; and emotions, which mean a leader provokes intense emotional responses from his or her followers (p. 439).

However, the notion of mobilisation in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance has been translated into creating a community of Resistance.

10.3.1 Community of Resistance

Fairclough (1995) argues that, "the relationship between texts and society/culture is to be seen dialectically. Texts are socioculturally shaped but they also constitute society and culture, in ways which may be transformative as well as reproductive" (p. 34).
Through its media discourse, it can be argued that *Islamic Resistance* has created what can be called a ‘community of Resistance’, or in other words, a public sphere\(^1\). To perpetuate its significance and continuity in the absence of outputs of the military media unit, Nasrullah periodically injects the created public sphere with speeches designed to mobilise followers and supporters. Although this public sphere extends beyond Lebanon, because there are Arab and Muslim supporters of the Resistance and its actions against Israel spread throughout the region, the main public sphere for *Islamic Resistance* is Lebanon.

To secure the created public sphere and continuity of the Resistance, *Hezbollah* has participated in the Lebanese parliamentary election since 1992 under the name, *Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc*, which includes a number of MPs whose main aim is to protect *Islamic Resistance* (Atrissi, 2012b).

*Hezbollah* invests in the public sphere created by the Resistance in order to participate in the Lebanese political system. This public sphere was created in the absence of the Lebanese state due to the civil war and the multi-confessional and political status quo that translated into pluralistic public spheres in Lebanon (Alagha, 2011). In his analysis of actors who occupy the public sphere, Habermas (1996) distinguishes between actors who "emerge from the public and take part in the reproduction of the public sphere itself" and “actors who occupy an already constituted public domain in order to use it” (p. 364).

Although *Hezbollah* provides social services that can be invested to emphasise its political power (Hamzeh, 1993, 2004), the party occupies the public sphere created by its military arm and utilises the continuous flow of discourse, which is maintained by its leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah. For this leader, any power that attacks *Islamic Resistance* will be fought, because it will be labelled an ‘Israeli arm’ (Atrissi, 2012b). Thus, the result of the July War, which was accompanied by Lebanese political division, obliged *Hezbollah* to secure strictly the created public sphere (Alagha, 2011).

In reviewing a relevant theory related to the mobilisation for the emerged public sphere, Social Representations, as a media theory, goes back to Serge

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\(^1\) As noted previously, the term 'Community of Resistance' was coined by Matar & Dakhlallah, (2006) and also used by the Deputy Secretary-General of *Hezbollah* Sheikh Naim Qassem (Qassem, 2008). This term also resonates with Bseiso (2013), who examined the notion of Lebanonisation in the promotional flashes on Al-Manar, which reflect the domestic policy of *Hezbollah* and consequently the discourse of its military arm.
Moscovici, who argues that media and the public create a common sense about an issue in a certain time (Höijer, 2011).

In her discussion of Moscovici’s approach, Höijer considers that:

Social representations are about processes of collective meaning-making resulting in common cognitions which produce social bonds uniting societies, organisations and groups. It sets focus on phenomena that becomes subjected to debate, strong feelings, conflicts and ideological struggle, and changes the collective thinking in society (p. 3).

Drawing on this theory, the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* aims to create a common sense in Lebanon of the importance of its struggle to liberate and protect the Lebanese territories from the Israeli aggressions. The measurement of this creation can be identified through observing the results of *Hezbollah* in Lebanese parliamentary elections, which are considered a referendum on the significance and continuity of *Islamic Resistance*. In the process of mobilisation, the leader of *Islamic Resistance*, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah addresses the public in general, and the Shiites in particular, on the eve of every election, to explain the general policy of its party and the need for its military arm to continue the Resistance against Israel. In this regard, the reading of the results of Lebanese parliamentary elections, particularly after the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, can examine the acceptance of the community of Resistance embedded in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*.

The nexus between mobilisation and the Lebanese parliamentary election can be observed through the voting percentages directed towards the *Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc*. In this vein, Atrissi (2012b) points out that the parliamentary election in some Lebanese districts, where the majority of residents are Shiites Muslims, is considered a referendum on the significance of securing support for *Islamic Resistance*.

These Lebanese districts are Southern Lebanon (including Nabatieh) and Northern Bekaa. In reviewing the last three elections in 2000, 2005 and 2009, it can be seen that the political power of *Hezbollah*, which is generated from the
power of its military arm, is in a steady progress\textsuperscript{1}. A review of the percentage of votes directed from these two districts to the *Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc* in three parliamentary elections, it is clear that the discourse to protect the Resistance is achieving its aims. Figure 27 shows the percentage of the votes obtained by *Hezbollah's* candidates in the *Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc* in the last three elections in Northern Bekaa.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure27.png}
\caption{Percentage of votes to *Hezbollah's* candidates in the *Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc* in Northern Bekaa district (Source of data: Beirut Office of Statistics)}
\end{figure}

Similarly, *Hezbollah's* candidates in the *Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc* in Southern Lebanon district, which was occupied by Israel in 1982 before it withdrew in May, 2000, obtained the highest votes in the parliamentary election, allying with another Shiite party, *Amal*. Figure 28 shows the percentage of votes

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure28.png}
\caption{Percentage of votes to *Hezbollah's* candidates in the *Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc* in Southern Lebanon district (Source of data: Beirut Office of Statistics)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{1} The Lebanese parliamentary election resumed in 1992 after it was stopped for twenty years due to civil war. Since it was resumed, Lebanon witnessed six parliamentary elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009. In all these elections, *Hezbollah* participated successfully (Kasser, 2011). Due to coalition and confessional distribution of the electoral and seats, the *Faithfulness of the Resistance Bloc* includes 13 members (the number of MPs in the Lebanese Parliament is 128). Remarkably, the electoral power of *Hezbollah*, according to 2009 election, is the highest in Lebanon 18.19\% (Khalil & Shaito, 2013).
obtained by Hezbollah's candidates in the Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc in the last three elections in Southern Lebanon\(^1\).

![Figure 28: Percentage of votes to Hezbollah's candidates in the Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc in Southern Lebanon district, including Nabatieh (Source of data: Beirut Office of Statistics)](image)

These figures after May, 2000 and after the July War in 2006 reveal the solidarity of the followers and supporters of Islamic Resistance. Also, they reflect a certain consensus on the necessity of this military arm to a sizable number of Lebanese. However, this consensus is among the Shiite Muslims\(^2\).

In her analysis of political organisations that have military arms, Berti (2013) argues that they gain domestic support, because they are "providing social services and other political and social goods, thus creating a network of supporters – clients whose political backing is not linked to their approval of the group's military activities" (p. 6). Although this claim seems to be logical, it

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\(^1\) In the 2009 parliamentary election, Southern Lebanon district was divided into seven constituencies, including Nabatieh (Khalil & Shaito, 2013). Although there are followers and supporters of Hezbollah in Sidon, the percentage of votes in Figure 28 does not include Sidon.

\(^2\) As Lebanon is a multi-confessional state, the result of the election can show the distribution of confessional votes for every candidate. Thus, the vast majority of the voters to the Faithfulness to the Resistance Bloc are Shiites.
cannot be generalised to *Hezbollah* for three reasons: the multi-confessional structure in Lebanon; the strong electoral power of *Hezbollah*; and, the religious implications in the discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, which entices Shiite Muslims to back its military action.

In order to explain the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, the next section sheds light on the notion of reconciliation, its implications and how it is embedded in the discourse.

### 10.4 Reconciliation between Citizenship and *Ummah*

The language of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, as observed in the analysis, plays a pivotal role in holding and transmitting its ideology and expressing its power. Habermas (cited in Wodak, 2002) points to the significance of language in power, because “language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. Insofar as the legitimizations of power relations, [...] are not articulated, [...] language is also ideological” (p. 12). However, the relation between *Islamic Resistance* and its followers and between this military arm and supporters are not on the same level. This argument has been made because the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* reflects two paradoxical discourses, particularly during and after the July War. While the fighters and their leader, Nasrullah, declare that they love Lebanon as the homeland, they direct their discourse to *Ummah*, which denotes the Islamic nation. In a similar vein, the explanation of *Wilayat Al-Faqih* delineates that the grand leaders of *Islamic Resistance* are Iranians – the late Imam Khomeini and the Supreme Leader, Imam Ali Khamenei (Hamzeh, 2004).

Thus, the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* includes reconciled codes to a certain type of audience - other Lebanese - in order to maintain or to entice their support in the conflict with Israel. Contrary to the followers, the targeted audience is not in the same religious or sectarian line of *Islamic Resistance*. In his explanation of the reception theory based on an encoding-decoding model of communication, as noted previously, Hall (2007) points to a type of audience that is in a negotiated position.

When *Islamic Resistance* initiates attacks against the Israeli army, it intends, as shown in its media outputs, to defend Lebanon and fight Israel on behalf of
Umma for the sake of Allah. However, the engagement in any military struggle (jihad) stipulates religious permission from the concerned emulated jurists and, as a result, Islamic Resistance fighters are loyal to the Wali Al-Faqih or Supreme Leader (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002).

Except for the fighters' testaments, which emphasise mobilisation and declare loyalty to the Wali Al-Faqih, the majority of Islamic Resistance media outputs mix the identity of Lebanese citizens and their Islamic identity as Shiite Muslims following the rule of Wali Al-Faqih. As shown in the statements in expressions such as "our beloved homeland Lebanon" and "our country", and in Nasrullah's speeches, there is a trend towards what can be called 'Lebanonisation.' At the same time, the concept of Ummah still exists clearly, because Islamic Resistance forefronts its 'martyrs' and victory to the Islamic nation, Ummah. As Nasrullah pointed out during the July War in 2006, Islamic Resistance fights Israel on behalf of Ummah and consequently the outcome of the war is a victory or a defeat for Ummah (Al-Mosawi, 2012).

According to Roy (cited in Strindberg and Wärn), "Hezbollah is both an intensely local and global movement. In recent years, it has become equated with so called 'Islamico-nationalism', a term that seeks to describe a movement that, despite a claim to solidarity with a transnational umma, nevertheless confines its main area of operation to a demarcated national territory" (p. 123). Strindberg and Wärn add with regard to Hezbollah: "Rather than being a purely Islamic agenda, it consciously and overtly blends the Islamic and the national - religious and secular concerns - that resonate with people far outside the Islamist sphere" (pp. 123 & 124).

The clashes in the identity and loyalty of Islamic Resistance are not isolated from the political landscape in Lebanon, because they reflect Hezbollah's shifts in domestic policy. As noted previously, the identity of Islamic Resistance was revolutionary and linked to Hezbollah's aspirations to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon, based on Khomeini's vision for Islam (Shararah, 1998). However, the temporary political stability in the 1990s and the need for dialogue with other Lebanese political parties provided Hezbollah with an excuse, in 1990s, to be pragmatic and to modify its motto from 'Hezbollah - the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon' into 'Hezbollah - the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon' (Alagha, 2006).
This political shift towards further Lebanonisation was a result of religious debate in which it was concluded that Wilayat Al-Faqih cannot be applied in a multi-confessional country, such as Lebanon (Badry, 2001). Under the umbrella of Wilayat Al-Faqih, Hezbollah engaged completely in the Lebanese political system, and participated in the democratic elections (Fadlullah, 2014). However, these political developments towards Lebanonisation do not imply that Hezbollah and consequently its military arm should relinquish their belief in Wilayat Al-Faqih (Alagha, 2011). Thus, scholars (for example, Shararah, 1998) consider that Hezbollah has established a mini-state that has its army, Islamic Resistance, within Lebanon and aims to constitute an Islamic state based on the Wilayat Al-Faqih theory of Islamic ruling.

To tackle the dilemma of identities and loyalties in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, it is crucial to identify the implications of Ummah (the Islamic nation). In contrast to Azani (2011) who does not identify clearly its implications, Al-Mosawi (2012) endeavours to find a common denotation of Ummah versus citizenship. After reviewing the denotations of Ummah, Al-Mosawi (2012) concludes that this term has its roots in a number of Quranic verses and it denotes the Islamic nation, pointing out that some Islamic scholars believe that Muslims should choose their religion if there is a conflict of interests between their citizenship and Islam. The same author outlines the role of two key Shiite Muslim clerics, Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shamsideen, and Imam Musa As-Sadr, in considering Lebanon the final homeland for the Lebanese Shiite Muslims. They also theorise on the significance of Resistance against Israel in Lebanon, considering Lebanon a part of the Arab World and a part of Ummah. Thus, facing Israel in Lebanon has three dimensions, because its outcome will be the defence of Lebanon and consequently the benefitting of the Arab World and of Ummah. However, both scholars believe that facing Israel is the role of the Lebanese Army, but it is permissible for the Lebanese people, particularly the residents in Southern Lebanon, to carry weapons to defend themselves and their land against Israel if the Lebanese Army needs their assistance or it is unable to face the Israeli army.

Thus, the media discourse of Islamic Resistance mirrors the notion of reconciliation between Lebanese citizenship and Shiite Muslim identity as part of Ummah.
10.4.1 Ultimate Strategy behind the Discourse of Islamic Resistance

Based on the notion of reconciliation identified in its media discourse, the question postulated is: Does moving towards Lebanonisation mean that Islamic Resistance must relinquish its mission to eliminate Israel and liberate Palestine, as stated in Hezbollah's first manifesto in 1985?

To answer this question, it is crucial to revisit Hezbollah's manifesto in 1985 and its charter in 2009 to identify the strategy of Islamic Resistance. In its first manifesto in 1985, Hezbollah considered the aim of Islamic Resistance in Southern Lebanon to be the liberation of the occupied Lebanese territories and the elimination of Israel (Alagha, 2006). However, Hezbollah, in its political charter in 2009, which can be considered its second manifesto, called for a domestic ‘Defensive Strategy’ to liberate the occupied territories and defend Lebanese sovereignty against Israeli violations. In this regard, the charter suggested a strategy that would benefit from the previous cooperation between the arms of the Resistance, described as the ‘Resistance of Lebanese against the Occupation’, and the ‘Lebanese Army’ ("Hezbollah's Political Charter," 2011).

In observing the language of the charter, there are two points to note: firstly, the charter named the ‘Resistance’, instead of Islamic Resistance; secondly, the charter did not identify the area of occupied land. Although the first point acknowledged that the mission of defending Lebanon is not limited to Hezbollah's military arm, it takes the discussion about dissolving and disarming Islamic Resistance off the table. However, the second observation is that ‘the occupied land’ is a broad expression and it may not be limited to the Lebanese occupied territories. Similar to the first manifesto, Hezbollah showed its aims of supporting the Palestinian cause, the Palestinian Resistance and declared its aspiration of eliminating Israel, concluding that the liberation of Palestine is a mission of Ummah.

In comparing the structure of both the first manifesto and the second charter regarding the notion of the Resistance in Lebanon and eliminating Israel, the following claims can be made:
Both the manifesto and the charter are contextualised by providing a general background of the political status quo in the region and of the negative role of the United States Administration. However, the second charter was organised into chapters.

In the first manifesto, the role of Islamic Resistance in the liberation followed a section about eliminating Israel from existence.

The second charter included, in Chapter Two: *Lebanon, the role of the Resistance to defend Lebanon*. However, the aspiration of eliminating Israel through *Ummah's* efforts was included in Chapter Three: *Palestine and the Negotiation for Settlement*.

These observations reveal that Hezbollah's strategy regarding Palestine, Israel and securing Islamic Resistance has not changed yet. This policy has an impact on Islamic Resistance, which will maintain its media discourse till it achieves the liberation and the elimination of Israel, because the tactics are the only feature that has been changed in the discourse. After illuminating the notions of mobilisation and reconciliation and their implications, the next section focuses on the notion of psychological warfare in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

**10.5 Psychological Warfare**

The term conflict is generally embedded with political, economical, diplomatic and cultural implications and consequences (Matar & Harb, 2013).

In reviewing the relevant theories, protracted social conflict theory provides an insight into the nature of conflict between Islamic Resistance and Israel. This theory implies that:

protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of the communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages. Furthermore, initial conditions (colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multi-communal
nature of the society) play important roles in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990, p. 12).

Although this theory was developed to be applied to interstate conflicts, it can be applied to conflict between *Islamic Resistance* and Israel, because it has a similar genesis and shares one of the possible consequences of this theory – that is, psychological ossification. This consequence has been reflected in the antagonistic nature (*us versus them*), or in other words, the multi-level polarisation embedded in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. As noted previously in the analysis and as summarised in Table 34, the *other* (them: Israel, its army and people) is clearly stated in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, which has been shaped in a consistent and parallel way with its military operations. This strategy is related to the psychological warfare of *Islamic Resistance*. However, this objective can be considered a part of propaganda. Hatem (cited in Harb, 2011) argued that, "when [it] is aimed at an enemy during wartime, propaganda is identified as 'psychological warfare'" (p. 15).

By definition, psychological warfare denotes "the use of propaganda against an enemy [...] generally intended to demoralize the enemy, to break his will to fight or resist, and sometimes to render him favourably disposed to one’s position. Propaganda is also used to strengthen the resolve of allies or resistance fighters" ("Psychological Warfare," 2014).

The identified signs and frames in the discourse of *Islamic Resistance* utilise contentious and derogatory words to describe Israel, its places and its army. Drawing on belief in the ethical position of *Ashura*, Nasrullah and his organisation consider the significant defeat is the defeat of the belief and the spirit, or in other words, psychological defeat (Qassem, 2008).

Since the inception of *Al-Manar* in 1991, the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance* has cooperated with this television to undermine the Israeli army's credibility through airing Nasrullah's speeches and the video footage of military operations against Israeli garrisons and troops in Southern Lebanon (Harb, 2011). In this vein, the same author pointed to the damaging effect of filming on the Israelis, quoting statements from the Israeli press about the success of *Hezbollah*'s military arm in terms of psychological warfare. Under the motto
'know your enemy', the military media unit monitors the Israeli media outlets to know public opinion and attitudes, and the political status quo (ibid). This reveals that Islamic Resistance has learnt media lessons from the previous Arab wars with Israel, particularly the June War in 1967. In reviewing the Arab media discourse on the eve of that military defeat, Abo-Arna (1996) points out that the Arab media was oblivious about the political, social and military structure in Israel and thus the Arab public were provided with unrealistic images about the Israeli soldier, such as ‘coward’ and ‘unable to fight’. As a result of bad propaganda and the sharp discrepancy between fact and reality, the Arab defeat in June, 1967 was shocking to the Arab audience, because Israel succeeded in showing them an image of an undefeatable Israeli army. As a result of these lessons learned from Arab-Israeli conflict, Islamic Resistance has focused on distorting the image of the Israeli army and demoralising the spirit of the Israelis (El Houri, 2012; Harb, 2011). After the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Southern Lebanon, Nasrallah delivered a speech in the city of Bint Jbeil close to the border, swearing that Israel is frailer than a spider’s web (Issa, 2012). Notably, Nasrallah reads, on a daily basis, a translated report summary extracted from Israeli media outlets (Salamah, 2008). This shows the significance of knowing 'the other' in the context of psychological warfare. Between 25 May, 2000 and 12 July, 2006, as shown in the statements, the media discourse of Islamic Resistance was still active through the issuing of statements about intermittent operations against Israeli troops in Southern Lebanon and the airing of related videos via Al-Manar. In a similar vein, Nasrallah has been delivering his speeches publicly in front of thousands of followers and supporters, countering Israel and threatening its army (El Houri, 2012). Although Islamic Resistance does not address Israel and the Israeli army as Jews in its media discourse, the utilisation of the word Khaibar to name a type of long-range missile may deeply touch the Jews’ memory, because it reminds them of an historical Islamic conquest against a Jewish castle close to Madinah city. 

1 This metaphor reveals the notion of intertextuality, because Nasrallah has quoted the Quranic verse, "And truly the frailest of homes is the home of the spider if they only knew" (29: 41).
Through his speeches during the July War in 2006, Nasrullah played a significant role in waging psychological warfare against the Israeli government and its army (Mahjob, 2008). In the first days of that war, Nasrullah addressed the Israelis via Al-Manar, asking them to listen to his words, stating that their cabinet is foolish and hides the truth from its public, reconfirming that his previous words about the coming military shocks have commenced through the bombing of an Israeli battleship off the coast at Beirut.

In a mission concurrent with Nasrullah's words, the psychological warfare was continued via the media discourse issued during the war that focused on the notion of shocks to the Israelis. This notion was embedded in the propaganda flashes produced by the military media unit, as shown previously in the flash The True Pledge is Coming, to bewilder the Israelis about the next target after the battleship or the next area that would be hit by the long-range missiles of Islamic Resistance.

In their comments on the result of the July War, Khoury and Da'na (2009) linked the victory of Islamic Resistance to Nasrullah's previous description of Israel as weaker than the spider’s house, concluding "that the Arabs can confront Israel and achieve victory" (Khouri & Da'na, 2009, p. 144).

After the end of the July War, Nasrullah maintained, through his speeches, the flow of psychological warfare against Israel contained in the discourse of Islamic Resistance. Shortly after the end of the July War in 2006, (shown previously in the first analysis of a speech), Nasrullah confirmed that Islamic Resistance had accumulated its arsenal of missiles within days.

Mahjob (2008) points out that Nasrullah has achieved the aims of his psychological warfare against Israel through planting the seeds of distrust in the minds of Israelis about their leadership and military capabilities, and through creating doubts among the Israelis that they will not achieve any victory. To spread fear among the Israelis, Nasrullah unveiled that Islamic Resistance refrained from bombing Israel’s chemical factories in Haifa city during the July War to avoid causing the residents an environmental disaster.

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1 Some scholars have translated the Arabic term mofajaā, which was used by Nasrullah during the July War in 2006, into surprise (for example, El Houri, 2012). However, surprise is a literal translation and it may not coincide with the military contextual meaning of mofajaā. Thus, this research utilises the term 'shock', because it signifies the meaning of mofajaā better than 'surprise.'
As shown previously in his third analysed speech, Nasrullah is keen to keep Israel under the threat of his military arm by warning its army against bombing any building in Lebanon, because *Islamic Resistance* will respond by destroying buildings in Israel. This speech was followed by another one in May, 2010 when Nasrullah threatened the Israelis that *Islamic Resistance* would impose, in any coming war, a sea blockade on Israel’s coastline on the Mediterranean Sea ("Sayyed Nasrallah Promises," 2010). In this speech, Nasrullah emphasises the notion that Israel is scared of his organisation:

Its [the Resistance] acts of heroism, including its operation, martyrs, wounded and imprisoned fighters, in addition to all those convinced and walking on the path of its ideology and the ultimate goal of getting even with the enemy anywhere, anytime. All this brought spiritual and moral defeat to the Israeli military [...] and the populace as whole. This is only the start. Things became more humiliating with the decision of withdrawing from Lebanon in the year 2000 without demanding anything (ibid) [my translation].

In this vein, Nasrullah, in the same speech, disparages the Israeli army's declarations about its manoeuvres, because it will not frighten the Lebanese and will not stop the fear in Israel, which will cause them to try and restrain to some Israelis from leaving the country. To further instil fear among the Israelis, Nasrullah compares *Islamic Resistance* fighters and Israeli soldiers:

I challenge Israel to find footage of even a single scene of our youth in the Resistance crying [...] when we have much footage of their soldiers doing so... They have weapons, yes, which are used to frighten us and no longer do so, because our hearts are no longer afraid.

Today I conclude by saying let us overturn the equation, why remaining on the defensive – by that I'm referring to the psychological level. Why should Lebanon remain the scared side seeking reassurance? Let Israel be the frightened side, let it search for reassurances. I do not want to give Israel reassurance nor is
this the requirement, because, when assured, Israel launches
assaults, when unsure it recedes (ibid) [my translation].

As a result of his sincere pledges, the Israelis follow Nasrullah’s speeches
closely and a number of Israeli scholars have pointed out the impact of his
speeches on the public (El Houri, 2012; Salamah, 2008).

In summary, Islamic Resistance addresses Israel as a Rapist and Zionist Entity
unable to survive, its army as defeated and a brutal occupier, and its towns and
cities as settlements and colonies, built over Palestinian lands. Thus, the
objective of psychological warfare is not only military, but also mental, through
changing the perception of the Israelis to convince them that they do not have a
future in the region and that they have to leave Israel. In this regard, Khoury and
Da'na (2009) consider that the victory of Islamic Resistance in July, 2006 has
cultural implications for the following reasons:

A small, rational, well-organized native movement in the smallest
Arab country (aside from the island of Bahrain) managed in six
years (between May 2000 and July 2006) not only to undo Israel’s
military victories since 1948 but also to challenge Western
hegemony. This is a revolutionary achievement by any standard. It
signifies the embedded sway of native cultures and, by
implication, constitutes a serious challenge not only to Israel’s
colonial scheme but to Western imperialist hegemony as well (p.
146).
10.6 Conclusion

This chapter has identified and explained the major objectives in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. These objectives are: mobilisation, reconciliation and psychological warfare.

In terms of the notion of mobilisation, this chapter points out that the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* has created what is called a ‘community of Resistance’, or ‘public sphere’. This created public sphere is utilised politically by *Hezbollah* to secure its military arm. Also, this chapter has pointed out the role of the leader of *Islamic Resistance*, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah, in the process of mobilising followers and supporters.

In explaining the notion of reconciliation, this chapter focused light on how the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* showed a trend towards Lebanonisation in a multi-confessional country, pointing out that the ultimate strategy of this discourse has not been changed yet.

This chapter has also shed light on the notion of psychological warfare in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* and how Nasrullah continues this mission to demoralise the spirit of Israel and its army.

As a result of this chapter, it can be argued that the objectives in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* – mobilisation, reconciliation and psychological warfare – together contribute to the strategy of facing Israel, because this organisation denies the right of Israel to exist.
Chapter 11. Summary and Conclusions

This chapter aims to provide a summary of the preceding chapters, key findings and their contributions to the literature, the link of this thesis to other research, areas for future research and conclusion.
11.1 Overview

This thesis has analysed the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, focusing on its macro- and microstructure and taking into consideration its contexts. The original data for analysis were in Arabic and the researcher attempted to translate precisely, as much as possible, illustrating where appropriate the reasons of choosing a certain translation for a particular term.

Utilising the tools of linguistics and semiotics within the discipline of critical discourse analysis allowed this thesis to analyse the multimodal media discourse of Hezbollah's military arm. Thus, the tools utilised to analyse the components of Islamic Resistance's media discourse were not applied on all genres. To take an example, in the case of the written statements, the analysis was textual. It considered the grammatical structure and the linguistic choices in these short statements to uncover their embedded signs and codes and consequently their frames and objectives. As this thesis focuses on analysing the unedited original statements, the researcher was able to consider the notion of intertextuality to conclude what the Quranic verses used at the beginning of the statements add to the overall meaning.

In contrast, the analysis of the audio-visual outputs of the military media unit was textual and visual. In addition to analysing the words, it considered the denotations of the various pieces of footage, because they are embedded with signs and representations of 'the self' and 'the other'. Similarly, the analysis of speeches of the leader of Islamic Resistance was textual and visual. However, the researcher considered, in the analysis, the extemporaneous features of the speeches, focusing on the embedded signs and the rhetorical implications that advance the objectives of Islamic Resistance.

The interpretive nature of this thesis and the means of analysis, considering the contexts, allowed the thesis to present the findings with further analysis and insights.
11.2 Summary

In contrast to existing studies that neither identify nor analyse the media discourse of Hezbollah's military arm, Islamic Resistance, this thesis bridged the gap in this field, paying attention to all outputs of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance. Before identifying and analysing the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, this thesis was contextualised by providing, at the beginning, an overview of the utilisation of the media by militant organisations in the Middle East, pointing out the vast majority of their media outlets. It reviewed historically the use of media by Palestinian and Lebanese militant organisations. In addition, it reviewed the contemporary use of media by Iraqi insurgents and Syrian rebels. Thus, Chapter 2 delineates the media outlets and social platforms of militant organisations in the Middle East. In this regard, it pointed out the impact, on militant organisations, of the satellite revolution and of the emergence of social media.

After this contextualisation, Chapter 3 presented an overview of Hezbollah, its media outlets, its military arm, Islamic Resistance and the military media unit, which is attached to this military arm. In this regard, reviewing the literature and Hezbollah's organisational structure was critical to the argument that Islamic Resistance has its own media discourse, comprised of the speeches of its leader and the outputs of the military media unit: written statements, videos of fighters' testaments, films of military operations, video songs and flashes. Thus, this chapter identified the gaps in the existing studies, which did not analyse all the outputs of the military media unit and, as a result, did not identify the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

Chapter 4 delved into the ideological contexts of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. It pointed to the religious belief of Islamic Resistance, or in other words its ideology. As this organisation is Shiite, Chapter 4 outlined the meaning of a number of religious terminologies and the historical parables that inspire Islamic Resistance, particularly Ashura (Battle of Karbala). Also, it pointed to the concept of jihad from the perspective of Islamic Resistance and outlined the implications of Wilayat Al-Faqih theory in Islamic ruling which has been adopted by this military arm.
To commence the analysis of the identified media discourse, Chapter 5 outlined the philosophical assumptions, the adopted methodology, the theoretical framework and the utilised tools under the umbrella of the discipline of critical discourse analysis. In this regard, Chapter 5 identified and justified the choice of archival data for analysis. Due to the multimodality of the analysed discourse, this chapter presented a model of how to study the messages and objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

Chapter 6 commenced in the analysis. It illuminated the structures of the written statements issued by Islamic Resistance and delved in the analysis of their microstructure, linguistically and semiotically, to show their grammar, syntax, lexical cohesion, metaphor, metonymy, euphemism and the embedded signs and codes. Thus, the analysis allowed for the coverage of all aspects of representation of 'the self' and 'the other', and paid attention to the Quranic verses used at the beginning of some statements and what they added to the meaning.

However, Chapter 7 analysed the macro- and microstructure of a sample of the audio-visual outputs of the military media unit. The analysis of a sample of fighters' testaments was undertaken textually and visually. It paid attention to the denotation of the images, the structure of the testaments' videos, their themes, fighters' pseudonyms and signs. In contrast, the analysis of the films of military operations was undertaken visually. In the analysis of the two videos of the capture of Israeli soldiers, the contexts and the denotation of the signs, particularly the symbolic ones, showed the embedded meanings. However, the analysis of a sample of flashes was undertaken textually and visually to show the meaning of the contents and identify the signs. On the other hand, the analysis of the video song focused on the content. Similar to the previous chapter, the analysis in this chapter shed light on the notion of intertextuality.

Chapter 8 comprised the last data analysis. It identified the rhetorical implications in a sample of resistant speeches delivered by the leader of Islamic Resistance, Sayyed Hassan Nasrullah. The analysis showed the signs and the notions of ethos, logos and pathos in the speeches. As Nasrullah actively maintains the flow of the discourse of his military arm, the analysis of his speeches provided an insight into the objectives in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
After completing the analysis of the samples, Chapter 9 addressed the data findings. Thus, this chapter identified, classified and interpreted the frames in media discourse.

Chapter 10 identified the objectives in the analysed discourse. It deepened the analysis of the findings to show how the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* maintains its objectives.

**11.3 Research Issues**

RQ.1: What are the signs and codes in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*?

The thesis found that the signs and codes in the media discourse of *Hezbollah*’s military arm, *Islamic Resistance*, have never been identified in previous research nor interpreted, consequently, due to the dearth of relevant literature.

To identify and interpret the signs and codes, it was crucial to identify the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. Thus, RQ.1.1: What are the types of messages of the military media of *Islamic Resistance*? was prefatory to answer the first question of this thesis.

RQ.2: How does the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* frame its identity and other identities?

The thesis found that the frames in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* have never been explored nor explained and part of this problem was the result of the paucity of studies that attempted to identify the media discourse of *Hezbollah*’s military arm. However, the interpretation of frames stems from the connotations of codes and the notion of representation of 'the self' and 'the other' in the discourse. To derive the right interpretation of the frames, the thesis investigated the literature in terms of the ideological contexts of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. Thus, RQ.2.1: How does the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* express its core ideology and cultural values? was prefatory to answer the second question of this thesis.

RQ.3: What are the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*?

The thesis found that the literature relating to the objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* has focused only on the notion of propaganda, particularly in the films of military operations before May, 2000. In this regard, there has been neither identification of all the objectives of media discourse of
Islamic Resistance, nor, consequently, explanation of them. These objectives should be derived as a result of identifying and analysing the signs, codes and frames in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.

11.4 Research Analysis
This research paid attention to the analysis of the contexts and multimodality of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. To answer the questions posed within the context of the discipline of critical discourse analysis, this thesis was guided by the media theory of Framing; it also developed a model for analysis based on Fairclough and his amendments to van Dijk's approach on how to study a media discourse. As the identified media discourse of Islamic Resistance in this thesis was multimodal, the analysis of the data to uncover the meanings was based on tools from relevant approaches in (critical) linguistics, (social) semiotics and rhetoric. Although the identified signs and codes can all be considered in a chapter, this thesis included them in the data analysis chapters of the genres of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance, before utilising them for further interpretation and explanation in the chapters detailing the data findings. This process to maintain the flow of analysis, as shown previously, aligns with Fairclough's three stages by which to analyse the discourse - description, interpretation and explanation. Table 35 shows the stages of the analysis employed in this thesis to analyse the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and present the findings emerging from the analysis.

Table 35: Framework of answering the research questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Discourse of Islamic Resistance</th>
<th>RQ.1</th>
<th>RQ.2</th>
<th>RQ.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signs &amp; Codes</td>
<td>Frames</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Interpretation</td>
<td>Explanation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Order of Meaning</td>
<td>Second Order of Meaning</td>
<td>Third Order of Meaning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 35, the contexts played a significant role in understanding the media discourse of Islamic Resistance.
11.5 Research Findings

As it appears in its title, this thesis has excavated the **history** of *Islamic Resistance* and its structure to pinpoint its media discourse, interpret its **messages**, and explain its **objectives**. These three strands – history, messages and objectives – form the three interconnected components of this thesis, as Figure 29 shows.

![Figure 29: The three linked analytical processes of this thesis](image)

On the other hand, this thesis has achieved its overall aim and sub-aims, as Figure 30 shows. Regarding its overall aim, the thesis analysed the messages that represent the entire genres of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*: statements, fighters' testaments, videos of military operations, propaganda video clips, a video song and speeches of its leader about the Resistance.
Regarding its sub-aims, this thesis has categorised the media messages of *Islamic Resistance* to identify its discourse. As it pinpointed the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, the thesis identified and analysed the signs and codes extracted from the samples to explore their modes and meanings. In this vein, the thesis has identified and interpreted the religious concepts in the analysed discourse aided by reviewing the literature related to *Ashura* and *Wilayat Al-Faqih*, because they reflect the ideology of *Islamic Resistance*. Drawing on the identified signs and codes and the ideological contexts aided by reviewing the literature relating to the Arab media discourse about the conflict with Israel, this thesis has identified and interpreted the frames in the analysed discourse, because they show how *Islamic Resistance* represents its identity and other identities, including that of its enemy. As a result of this analysis, the thesis has identified the objectives in the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* and delved into their implications.

### 11.5.1 Key Findings and Contribution to the Literature

This thesis contributes to the existing studies concerning the media discourses of militant organisations in the Middle East in general and the media discourse of...
Hezbollah's military arm, Islamic Resistance, in particular. It explores the way in which this military arm uses media discourse, embedded with signs and codes, to reflect its self-belief, to frame identities and advance objectives. In this vein, there are three key findings contribute to the literature:

The first key finding is the uncovering of the signs and codes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. In Chapters 6, 7 & 8, the thesis identifies the signs and extracts the codes in the analysis of the samples of every genre of the discourse. As it answers its first question (RQ.1), the thesis contributes to the existed studies (e.g. Harb, 2011; El Houri, 2012) through classifying the signs and codes into two modes: linguistic and visual and through unveiling how Islamic Resistance presents its own categorisation of signs and codes to create certain meanings obtained by the targeted receivers when they mentally compare each sign to its opposite one: the signs of 'the self' (e.g. Resistance vs. Terrorists) vs. the signs of 'the other' (e.g. Israel vs. Zionist Entity; Israeli Defence Forces vs. Occupation Army).

As it sought to select neither translated nor edited data for analysis, this thesis identifies the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations of signs and detects the intertextuality in the discourse. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the thesis reveals that intertextuality in the analysed discourse is not limited to the texts, it also exists in music as observed in the analysis of the propaganda flash ‘You will never be able to Abolish our Renown’ in Chapter 7.

The second key finding is the uncovering of the frames in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. In Chapters 6, 7 & 8 the thesis reveals how this military arm frames linguistically and visually its identity and the identity of its enemy, and in Chapter 9 the thesis provides the meaning of the frames utilised in the discourse. As it answers its second question (RQ.2), this thesis contributes to the existing studies (e.g. Matar, 2010; El Houri, 2012) through pinpointing the intricate language used in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and its functions to reveal how this discourse has been framed to take issue with the current editorial balance in the Western news paradigm of representing both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The strategy behind this discourse, which eschewed the Arab media mistakes during the conflict with Israel, intends to change that perception and create a collective memory of Resistance that avoids falsification.
The third key finding is the uncovering of the major objectives of the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. In Chapter 10, the thesis presents the objectives of the analysed discourse. As it answers its third question (RQ.3), the thesis contributes to the existing studies (e.g. Harb, 2011) through revealing that the fixed strategic objective in the analysed discourse is the liberation strategy and the dynamic to achieve this long-term goal comprises the tactical objectives represented by continuous mobilisation, reconciliation with the Lebanese multi-confessional political system to secure the society of Resistance relinquishing the call for an Islamic regime, and psychological warfare to demoralise the spirit of the Israeli society.

In the line of achieving the liberation strategy, the thesis contributes to the existing studies (e.g. El Houri, 2012) through revealing how *Islamic Resistance* refers to its religious belief as an Islamic Shiite organisation to obtain metaphysical power. Hence, the Divine secret is the inspiration that stimulates the fighters of *Islamic Resistance* to face Israel without fright or hesitation to achieve either victory or to gain martyrdom. However, this motivational power has been rationalised, as observed in the analysed discourse, to focus further on achieving the victory through using the logic of argumentation and grabbing the *raison d'être* of military capabilities to subjugate Israel.

In this regard, the thesis uncovers the way in which the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* intertwines knowledge and power and this aligns with Foucauldian understanding of discourse.

### 11.5.2 Relationship to Previous Research

Although this thesis complements the existed studies concerned with the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*, it differs from them through three issues:

Firstly, the analysis in this thesis has been contextualised by providing, in Chapter 2, the historical use of media by militant organisations and by pointing to the majority of media outlets used by militants in the Middle East. Contrary to the existing studies (e.g. El Houri, 2012), this contextualisation is significant, because it illuminates the phenomenon of the military media units established by military wings.

Secondly, this thesis identifies in Chapter 3 the genres that constitute the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance*. Contrary to the current studies (e.g. Bseiso,
2013; El Houri, 2012), the thesis distinguishes between the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and other discourses that support the Resistance on Hezbollah's media outlets. Theoretically, as alluded to in the review of the literature in Chapter 3 and the analysis of the samples that represent its entire genres in Chapters 6, 7 & 8, the thesis defines media discourse of Islamic Resistance as: an organisational; meaningful linguistic and visual messages; a representation of identities to frame 'the self' and reframe 'the other'; an expression of social reality where an organised Lebanese Shiite group faces Israel in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East; a form of propaganda and psychological warfare to mobilise the followers and supporters and to demoralise the spirit of the Israelis; and a vehicle of power by which to emphasise the culture of Resistance in Lebanon and the Arab countries. One of the thesis findings in its way to identify the genres of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance is that the roots of this military arm were formed nearly four years before Hezbollah's inception. This indirect discovery in Chapter 3, which was not mooted by other studies, was based on reviewing some fighters' obituaries on the website of Islamic Resistance (www.moqawama.org).

Thirdly, this thesis utilises critical discourse analysis, as shown in Chapter 5, to analyse the multimodal discourse of Islamic Resistance. Although the current studies provide a significant literature about Hezbollah, its military wing, its media outlets and objectives (e.g. Matar & Harb, 2013), they do not use a similar approach in their analysis and consequently they neither identify nor analyse the media discourse of Hezbollah's military arm in order to identify, interpret and explain its signs, codes, frames and major objectives. This problem in the current studies is related to the dearth of analysis of the entire outputs of the military media unit of Islamic Resistance, and hence the statements, fighters' testaments, propaganda video clips and video songs produced by this unit were not subject to the analysis.

The next subsection aims to illuminate the areas which have not been covered in this thesis.
11.5.3 Areas of Future Research

In the analysis of the signs, codes and frames, it seems that the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* has - what can be described - a unique genetic map, because it mirrors four identities: Lebanese, Arab, Shiite and Islamic.

This attempt opens the door for concerned researchers to investigate further this aspect, particularly in their studies to the embedded identities in the media discourses of other militant organisations in the Middle East.

Although this thesis is concerned with the outputs of the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance* related to the conflict with Israel, it does not cover the outputs of this unit during the Syrian war. Notably, during the final process of submitting this thesis, news reports claimed that the military media unit of *Islamic Resistance* has been activated as a result of the engagement of this military arm in the war in Syria to support the regime. This provides for concerned researchers in future a new trend to study the media discourse of *Islamic Resistance* in the context of the war in Syria.

In a similar vein, the recent Israeli war on Gaza in August, 2014 provided evidence of the significance of media units for the military arms of Palestinian organisations, particularly *Hamas* and *Palestinian Islamic Jihad*. Thus, the media discourse of the Palestinian military arms cannot be investigated without considering the outputs of their media units, which are similar to the outputs of the media unit of *Hezbollah's* military arm.

As alluded to in Chapter 2, the inception of the Internet and the influx of social media platforms are considered a remarkable shift in the studies of the discourses of militant organisations in the Middle East whether they engage in the war against Israel, or they have their own political and ideological agendas, including ISIS. Although further studies have mooted the virtual discourses of *Hamas* and *Palestinian Islamic Jihad*, the majority of these studies, as observed in Chapter 2, were journalistic reports documenting the use of these movements and their sympathisers to social media platforms during the Israeli war on Gaza Strip, particularly in 2014.

This area of studies is ethical and provides a base for concerned scholars to delve academically into the media discourses of militant organisations. However, the existence of interactive online platforms, such as Skype, can be
tempting for some scholars (e.g. Khatib, 2015), in the context of the war in Syria and Iraq, to interview militants and observe the existed virtual media platforms of militant organisations.

This thesis suggests that it is significant for the researchers to focus in their analysis of the media discourse of any militant organisation on the discourse itself rather than conducting interviews with militants in order to avoid any ethical dilemma or legal concern. Thus, this thesis refers in the analysis to the archival data, presenting a research model on how to study the media discourse of a militant organisation in the Middle East within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict - a model which can be applied to militant Palestinian organisations; in doing so, it recommends that concerned researchers benefit from this study, in analysing a discourse of any organisation, whether it is classified extremist or terrorist, through paying close attention to the outputs that constitute its media discourse.
11.6 Conclusion

This thesis has explored all the outputs of the military media unit and analysed archival data samples of them alongside a sample of the speeches of Hezbollah's Secretary-General in order to analyse the media discourse of Islamic Resistance. It contributed to the knowledge concerning this discourse by bridging the existing gaps in the previous research and providing a fuller understanding of embedded messages. Taking into consideration that many insurgents and guerrillas in the Middle East have established military media units and have satellite televisions, this research can provide guidelines to other researchers to explore and analyse the media discourses of other military groups in the Middle East.

The outcomes of this thesis are:

- Presenting a theoretical framework, under the umbrella of critical discourse analysis discipline, on how to study media discourse of Islamic Resistance. A similar framework can also be replicated by researchers to explore and interpret the media discourses of other military groups operating in the Middle East
- Distinguishing, through a critical review of the literature, between the media discourse of Islamic Resistance and other media discourses of Hezbollah
- Identifying and interpreting the signs and codes in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance
- Identifying and interpreting the images of Islamic Resistance and the Israeli army, as shown in the discourse
- Outlining the cultural values and ideology embedded in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance
- Identifying, classifying and interpreting the embedded frames in the media discourse of Islamic Resistance
- Identifying and explaining the objectives of the media discourse of Islamic Resistance
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